Ancient Commentators on Aristotle

ELIAS AND DAVID:
Introductions to Philosophy

OLYMPIODORUS:
Introduction to Logic

Translated by
Sebastian Gertz

Elias and David

Introductions to Philosophy

with

Olympiodorus

Introduction to Logic

Ancient Commentators on Aristotle

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Acknowledgements

Conventions

[. . .] Square brackets indicate additions to the translation for the sake of greater clarity.

<. . .> Angle brackets indicate additions to the Greek text. Notes to the translation provide further details on textual matters.

{. . .} Curly brackets indicate suggested deletions of text. Notes to the translation provide further details on textual matters.

(. . .) Round brackets function as ordinary English parentheses and may enclose transliterated Greek words or phrases.

Introduction

1. Three introductions to philosophy from the school of Olympiodorus

Few subjects in the history of thought have attracted as much attention from philosophers as the nature and purpose of philosophy itself. The three texts brought together in this volume present a vision of philosophy as it would have been taught and studied in the sixth century CE, in the intellectual centre of the Eastern Mediterranean, Alexandria. All three authors presented here (Olympiodorus, Elias, and David) belong to a school of philosophy that is now known to scholars as Neoplatonism; all three stand in the shadow of one particular Neoplatonist teacher, Ammonius of Alexandria, who was active in the late fifth and early sixth century CE.[1] Neoplatonism is perhaps most recognizable for its focus on bold metaphysical speculations and its attempt to turn the works of Plato into a coherent system of thought with its own canon of sacred texts, but the teaching duties of professors like Ammonius were often taken up with more introductory matters, particularly the study of Aristotle's logical works, which were seen as a vital foundation for any further advances into philosophy.[2]

Aristotle's *Categories* provided the starting point for the ancient study of logic, although students at Alexandria would first approach the text through a series of introductory works.[3] They would have had at their disposal Ammonius' own commentary on the *Categories*, whose preliminary section discusses the study of logic, the *Categories*, and Aristotle's philosophy in general. By the time of Olympiodorus, who studied under Ammonius, this section of the commentary had become significantly expanded, to twenty-five pages of Greek from Ammonius' mere fifteen. Olympiodorus is also the author of a work that would have preceded his *Introduction to Logic* but is now lost to us, namely a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagôgê* (itself an introduction to key concepts in Aristotle's *Categories*). Olympiodorus' commentary on Porphyry's

Isagôgê is likely to have included an introduction to philosophy in general;[4] the main outline of topics can be reconstructed from the two works of his students Elias and David, whose own *Introductions to Philosophy* are translated in this volume alongside Olympiodorus' *Introduction to Logic*. Together, the three texts present a lively picture of what it might have been like to sit in a first year philosophy course in ancient Alexandria, and how ancient thinkers understood their own discipline of philosophy. Despite, or perhaps rather because of, their elementary nature, introductions to philosophy in the style of Ammonius, Olympiodorus, and his followers proved to be a popular cultural export, influencing Syriac, Persian, Arabic, and Armenian texts throughout the centuries.[5]

While we are able to reconstruct the life and activity of Olympiodorus on the basis of a few solid facts, the most important of which are that he was a professor of philosophy in Alexandria who lived roughly between 500–570 CE, reliable biographical details about his students David and Elias are scarce indeed. Elias is the author of a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagôgê* (the first part of which contains the *Introduction to Philosophy* translated here), a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, and a commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* (of which only a small portion survives).[6] One manuscript (Paris. suppl. gr. 678) numbers Elias 'among prefects' (*apo eparkhôn*), but it is uncertain whether the title 'prefect' is honorific or whether it implies some official responsibilities in the Emperor Justinian's administration.[7] David, on the other hand, wrote a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagôgê*, in addition to his *Introduction to Philosophy* translated here. Four works survive in Armenian that bear a close similarity to the two Greek works inscribed with the name 'David', namely an *Introduction to Philosophy*, and commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagôgê*, Aristotle's *Categories*, and Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*; all four works are attributed to David the Invincible (*Anhaǧt'*).[8] We know almost nothing about the Greek David, and are told a lot more about the Armenian David (some of it quite fantastical), who is credited with translating Greek works into Armenian and composing pious literature such as the *Panegyric of the Cross*. The exact relationship between the two Davids is a complex philological matter on which no consensus has so far been reached.[9]

The names 'Elias' and 'David' suggest Christian authorship, but it cannot be ruled out that (possibly anonymous) lecture notes from some courses held in

Olympiodorus' circle were later inscribed with good Christian names to boost their credibility and status.[10] So little is securely known about either 'Elias' or 'David' that their names alone cannot serve as evidence for their religious beliefs. Evidence internal to the texts translated here would at first sight rule out Christian authorship: while pagan authors from Homer to Olympiodorus are quoted with some frequency, any references to Scripture are absent.[11] In the case of Elias, two references to Homer are bracketed with a dismissive comment about the 'false beliefs of the Greeks', but these comments look suspiciously like later insertions by a pious scribe.[12] In the context of the passage, they have no bearing on the argument and could be removed without loss of meaning. An isolated reference to the 'archangelic powers' appointed by god can likewise not be used as evidence that Elias was a Christian, since Proclus, a stout Pagan, used similar language in his works.[13] More difficult to explain is a reference to the Christian bishop Synesius, who supposedly fended off barbarian invaders with no more than the sound of music.[14] It is worth noting, however, that the anecdote occurs at the end of a lecture, and it is at least conceivable that a scribe could have appended it to the illustrations already provided by Elias, perhaps mistakenly inserting a marginal note into the main text.[15] When we turn to David, we are presented with a similar picture: there is no hint of Christian theology in his *Introduction to Philosophy*, and there is much that sounds like traditional Platonism, including doctrines such as the immortality of the rational soul and the imperishability of the heavens.[16]

Before I turn to a brief description of each of the three texts, I must note one omission: not included in this volume is the *Introduction to Philosophy* by Pseudo-Elias, a work that shows great similarities with David's both in structure and content. Regretting its absence here, I point the interested reader to the excellent French translation by Pascal Mueller-Jourdan.[17] Pseudo-Elias probably belonged to the same philosophical circle as Olympiodorus, Elias, and David, but the exact identity of the author is a matter of dispute.[18]

Elias and David, *Introduction to Philosophy*

In good Aristotelian fashion, both Elias and David begin their introductions to philosophy with a set of four questions that guide their subsequent enquiries. Applied to philosophy, they are:

(i)   Does philosophy exist?
(ii) What is philosophy?
(iii) What sort of thing is philosophy?
(iv) What is the purpose of philosophy?

Item (i) in this list, concerning the existence, or, as we might say, the possibility of doing philosophy, leads to a particularly interesting discussion in David's case.[19] He engages with four separate sceptical arguments designed to show that knowledge, and with it philosophical knowledge, is unattainable. Two of the arguments could have come straight out of Plato's *Theaetetus*: one infers the sceptical conclusion from the supposed fact that all things are in flux, while the other attempts to deny the existence of philosophy (more precisely, of the theoretical part of philosophy, as David points out) by relying on the assumption that knowledge can only be acquired through the senses. Equally challenging are the remaining two sceptical arguments that David presents to his fledgling philosophers, who are served some heavy fare early on in their career. According to one, philosophy is knowledge of being; being is an ambiguous term or 'homonym'; homonyms are indefinable; what is indefinable is unknowable; and therefore philosophy is impossible. The last argument in the series, finally, claims that knowledge of universals, insofar as it is a universal accident like whiteness, cannot be 'present in' (in Aristotle's sense of depending for its existence on a particular individual) particular substrates such as human beings. By this point, David's students may well have wished they had started with the *Categories* directly.

After refuting the Sceptics and securely establishing the existence of philosophy, Elias and David proceed to define philosophy – not, however, without first offering a general survey of the theory of definition. Unlike descriptions, definitions seek to capture the nature of a thing (the definition of 'definition' is none other than 'a concise statement that designates a particular nature'), as in the following example: 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge'. In the case of philosophy, Elias and David accept the following six definitions and provide detailed discussions of each:

1.   Philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings.
2.   Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things.
3.   Philosophy is a preparation for death.
4.   Philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man.

5. Philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences.
6. Philosophy is love of wisdom.

Elias and David have much that is interesting to say about each of these definitions. As a first example, we may consider definition 3 ('Philosophy is a preparation for death'), which invites sustained reflections on Plato's dialogue *Phaedo*. In that text, Socrates apparently prohibits suicide, a position which could at first sight appear inconsistent with his insistence that the body and its impulses are a hindrance as far as the attainment of knowledge is concerned, and that the true philosophers pursue nothing other than 'dying and being dead' (64A). Elias and David offer a solution that consists in distinguishing between natural life and death, and voluntary life and death; it states, in essence, that we should not identify with bodily impulses but all the same ought to live out our natural lifespan.[20] To take one more example, the discussion of definition 4 ('Philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man'), ultimately derived from a famous passage (176A–B) in Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus*, prompts our two authors to discuss the difference between the human and the divine: what precisely is meant by the cautionary qualification 'as far as is possible for man'? They offer a set of three relevant characteristics (goodness, power, and knowledge), and are careful to mark out the relevant degree of likeness that obtains between man and god. Elias uses the analogy between Socrates and his image to make the point that likeness in some respects does not entail likeness in all respects, while David spells out how humans do not possess goodness, knowledge, and power in the same way as the divine.

Apart from explaining the meaning of each of the six individual definitions of philosophy, Elias and David address a question that is likely to occur to the reader: why are there precisely six definitions of philosophy, and how are they related (and specifically, which definitions are prior and posterior)? Here, we can distinguish at least two kinds of answer. One derives the number of definitions from the supposed perfection of the number six, which is the first perfect number in the series of natural numbers (the sum of its divisors is equal to itself). Particularly in David, students are exposed to a long digression on the properties of the numbers from 1 to 10, where little philosophical gold can be mined. More interesting is the second kind of answer, according to which philosophy, as something that has both a name and an existence, can be

defined according to either. The definition by name is, of course, the familiar 'love of wisdom', while the definition by existence divides into five different strands. Insofar as philosophy is first knowledge, it is prior and superior to all other branches of knowledge, and can hence be titled 'the craft of crafts and the science of sciences'. Yet insofar as it is a branch of knowledge, it can be defined according to its subject matter and the goal that it seeks to accomplish. Both subject matter and goal can in turn be subdivided into remote and proximate branches, bringing the total number of definitions to the requisite six.[21] The list of definitions on p. 27 is thus hierarchically ordered: first in the series is the definition derived from philosophy's proximate subject matter ('knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings') and its remote counterpart ('knowledge of human and divine things'). Subordinate to these are the definitions derived from the proximate and remote goal ('a preparation for death' and 'becoming like god as far as is possible for man' respectively). Second to last comes the definition from superiority, which singles out a feature of philosophy that is peculiar to it, rather than universal, while the definition from etymology takes last place, just as the name of a given thing comes second to its existence.

After surveying the definitions of philosophy and thereby giving an account of its nature, Elias and David proceed to characterize philosophy through discussion of its parts; they are theoretical philosophy, which comprises theology, mathematics, and natural science, and practical philosophy, i.e. politics, economics, and ethics. Ostensibly, the division of philosophy answers the question 'what sort of thing is philosophy?', and it is once again David who provides the most detailed account of it. He identifies the following eight different methods of division:

1. Division of a genus into species.
2. Division of species into individuals.
3. Division of wholes into like parts.
4. Division of wholes into unlike parts.
5. Division of substance into accidents.
6. Division of accidents into substances.
7. Division of accident into further accidents.
8. Division 'from one thing and in relation to one thing' (*aph' henos kai pros hen*).

David seems somewhat hesitant between two different ways of accounting for philosophy's division into a practical and a theoretical part. On the one hand, he observes that both theoretical and practical philosophy take their name from the single discipline of philosophy, which would make method 8 (division of things that derive from one thing and that stand in relation to one thing; as e.g. a book on medicine, a medical diet, a medical plaster, etc. can all be derived from the single craft of medicine) most relevant. On the other hand, David hesitates to admit that this method is anything more than 'enumeration', since infinitely many things can be derived from some single term. His solution is to argue that philosophy divides as a whole into like parts (method 3 in the schema above), since the parts of philosophy can each be called 'philosophy', and are therefore like each other and like the whole.

Pedestrian though it may appear at first, the division of philosophy into its parts hints at something of fundamental importance to the conception of philosophy in Olympiodorus' school: both theory and practical activity are conceived of as indispensable parts of a single discipline. While accepting that the parts of philosophy have different goals, with theoretical philosophy aiming at the truth, and practical philosophy seeking to improve human character, Elias insists that either can be viewed as superior to the other, depending on which point of view one adopts:

> It is possible to rank one part over the other: the theoretical part over the practical part, since it knows all real beings, and has truth as its aim; and the practical over the theoretical, because even though it does not have all real beings as its subject matter, with a view to adorning them, all the same it has the good as its goal, which is beyond truth [...], since the good is with god.[22]

Thus, although the subject matter of theoretical philosophy ('all real beings', in Elias' words) is more universal than that of practical philosophy and in that sense superior to it, the goal of practical philosophy can in turn be viewed as more encompassing than that of theory. As Plato's example of a madman asking for his weapon back shows, telling lies can sometimes promote the good; thus the good, while it includes what is true, extends beyond it.[23] For Elias and David, then, philosophy has a dual purpose: it perfects the cognitive

powers of human beings through knowledge of the truth and their desiderative powers through reason's rule over anger and desire.

Olympiodorus, *Introduction to Logic*

Despite its pithy title, Olympiodorus' *Introduction to Logic* is really an introduction to three different subjects that would naturally follow on from the general *Introduction to Philosophy* such as we find it in Elias and David. There is, first, an introduction to Aristotle's philosophy; second, an introduction to logic in general; and third, an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*.

The first part of the work addresses a set of ten questions codified by the great Neoplatonic scholarch Proclus. They are:

1. From where do the philosophical schools derive their names?
2. What is the division of Aristotle's books?
3. What is the starting-point for their study?
4. What is their method?
5. What is their purpose?
6. What kind of person should a student of Aristotle's books be?
7. What kind of person should a commentator be?
8. What is the style of Aristotle's writings?
9. Why did the Philosopher make a point of being unclear?
10. How many and what kind of preliminaries should there be for each book?

Readers may find Olympiodorus' discussion of point 3 in this schema to be of particular philosophical interest. What part of Aristotle's corpus should the novice philosopher begin with? With logic, ethics, natural science, or mathematics? After briefly rehearsing arguments in favour of each of the four disciplines as providing the best starting point, Olympiodorus proposes his own solution, according to which ethics is the starting-point for the study of Aristotle.[24] Interestingly, however, he immediately qualifies his position with the following remark:

> But since we do not order and beautify our characters in the manner of unreasoning animals and in a vulgar way, but through syllogistic

argumentation and demonstrative proof, it is right that logic should come
before ethics, natural science, and mathematics.[25]

How precisely logic can order our characters through proofs is not spelled out
any further in the passage, but presumably Olympiodorus' point is that moral
improvement requires some form of moral reasoning, which can be refined
and improved through the study of logic.

But if logic is the starting point for philosophy, we are faced with a traditional
conundrum: is logic itself a part of philosophy, or merely a tool for the latter?
This, in effect, becomes the main question that Olympiodorus pursues in the
second part of his work, the introduction to logic in general. He argues that
Plato succeeds in capturing the truth contained in both the Stoic position that
logic is a part of philosophy and the Peripatetic view that it is a tool for
philosophy, and presents the following compromise formula:

> Logic is a tool when considered as empty schemata, as when I say: 'from two
> universal affirmations a universal affirmative conclusion follows'. But it is a
> part when used together with the things themselves, as when I say: 'the soul
> is self-moving, what is self-moving is immortal, therefore the soul is
> immortal', and again, 'everything just is good, everything good is noble,
> therefore everything just is noble'.[26]

In this way, Olympiodorus the teacher can impress upon his students the
superiority of Plato over Aristotle: while Aristotle may have discovered the
study of logic considered as 'empty schemata', Plato was able to construct
proofs from his own understanding of 'the things themselves'.[27]

The third part of the *Introduction to Logic*, finally, serves as an introduction
to Aristotle's *Categories*. It employs a traditional introductory scheme covering
six questions, namely the work's (1) goal, (2) its usefulness, (3) its place in the
order of reading, (4) the explanation for its title, (5) its writer, and (6) its style.
Building on the work of Porphyry and Ammonius, Olympiodorus argues that
the goal of the *Categories* is to discuss 'simple vocal expressions that signify
simple things through the intermediary of simple thoughts in their first
application'. 'First application' refers to an assignment of names such as 'bed',
'chair', and the like to simple objects such as beds and chairs in the world, as
opposed to the 'second application', which assigns names to groups of words,
e.g. 'noun' and 'verb'.[28]

2. Detailed outline of lectures

Elias, *Introduction to Philosophy*

Lecture 1:	Exhortation to philosophy

Theory of definition

Lecture 2:	What is a definition?

Lecture 3:	What is the origin of the name 'definition'? Where do definitions derive from?

The definitions of philosophy

Lecture 4:	The six definitions of philosophy

Lecture 5:	Interpretation of the first, second, and third definitions of philosophy ('philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings', 'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things', and 'philosophy is a preparation for death')

Lecture 6:	Interpretation of the third definition of philosophy (*continued*); interpretation of the fourth definition of philosophy ('philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man')

Lecture 7:	Interpretation of the fourth definition of philosophy (*continued*)

Lecture 8:	Interpretation of the fifth definition of philosophy ('philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences')

Lecture 9:	Interpretation of the sixth definition of philosophy ('philosophy is love of wisdom'); why there are six definitions of philosophy

The division of philosophy

Lecture 10:	Division of philosophy into two parts

Lecture 11:	Subdivision of the mathematical part

Lecture 12:	Subdivision of the practical part of philosophy

David, *Introduction to Philosophy*

Lecture 1:	Exhortation to philosophy

Olympiodorus, *Introduction to Logic*

Notes

1 For a good overview of Ammonius' activity and that of his students, see Blank
   2010.
2 The standard survey for this introductory literature is Westerink 1990.
3 As Sorabji 2016, 48–50, points out, the full schema of introductions to the study of
   Aristotle in Ammonius' school would have included numerous stages, including
   (1) an introduction to philosophy in general; (2) an introduction to Porphyry's
   Isagôgê; (3) a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagôgê*; (4) Porphyry's *Isagôgê*; (5) an
   introduction to Aristotle's philosophy in general; and (6) an introduction to the
   Categories. Some commentators such as Olympiodorus also include (7) an
   introduction to logic between (5) and (6).

4 In his *Introduction to Logic*, Olympiodorus himself refers to a work that must have come before but is no longer extant, which is evidence that he did indeed give introductory lectures on philosophy in general, in the manner of Elias and David. See e.g. *Prol.* 4,9–10; 16,26.

5 See Sorabji 2016, 50–3, for the diffusion of introductions to philosophy in the Ammonian tradition, and Hein 1985 for a study of their survival in Arabic.

6 For the Greek text of these works, see Busse 1900 and Westerink 1961.

7 Westerink 1961, 127–8, argues that Elias the philosopher was identical with the Elias described as prefect (*eparkhos*) of Illyricum in Justinian's Novella CLIII. In his 1990 article, however, Westerink considers the title honorific, and writes: 'The practice of bestowing the title [*sc.* 'prefect'] on (e.g.) men of letters, comparable to the knighting of authors, actors and musicians in Great Britain, and formerly in Germany, is at least as old as the sixth century' (361). For a full account of Elias' work and the philological problems posed by it, see Goulet 2000.

8 Of particular interest for the present volume is the Armenian version of the *Prolegomena*, which is most likely a translation of the Greek original, and translated into English by Kendall and Thomson 1983. The Armenian translator has modified the text in a number of places, occasionally substituting Armenian names for Greek ones, as Thomson has pointed out (ibid., xix), and condensing the lengthy numerological section of the Greek version into a single lecture. In some cases, the Armenian translation can help our understanding of the Greek text; for a number of significant examples, see Calzolari 2009a.

9 For a survey of both the Greek and the Armenian evidence, see Calzolari 2009b.

10 See Wildberg 1984, 44–5, for an argument to this effect.

11 Cf. Wildberg 1984, 38–9, who refers to the 'fireworks of learning' on display in Elias' *Introduction to Philosophy*.

12 See Elias, *Prol.* 7,3; 12,1. Westerink 1990, 364, raises the possibility that 'Elias himself used these convenient formulas to shield himself against possible attacks', but does not cite any other contexts where Elias shows similar circumspection where pagan doctrines (such as e.g. the eternity of the world) are concerned.

13 See Elias, *Prol.* 20,34, and compare, for example, Proclus, *in Crat.* 79,4; 117,3.

14 See Elias, *Prol.* 31,23–5.

15 See already Busse 1892, 12.

16 See e.g. David, *Prol.* 30,20–1 (the soul is immortal); 6,15–16 (the heavens will not perish).

17 See Mueller-Jourdan 2007.

18 For an attempt at identifying Pseudo-Elias with Stephanus of Alexandria, see Wolska-Conus 1989. See, however, Roueché 2012 for a critical discussion of Wolska-Conus' thesis.

19 Elias shows little interest in discussing the existence or non-existence of philosophy; he instead gives only a terse summary of Aristotle's argument that philosophical inquiry is inescapable (*Prol.* 3,17–23).

20 The different concepts of life and death and their mutual relations are well illustrated by Elias' diagram (see p. 33 in this volume). See also Gertz 2011, 27–50, on this issue.

21 See the diagram in the Appendix on p. 67 of this volume, taken from Elias, *Prol.* 8,20–7.

22 Elias, *Prol.* 27,27–32.

23 See Elias, *Prol.* 26,23–7, and cf. Plato, *Republic* 331C–D.

24 Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 9,5–7.

25 Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 9,7–11.

26 Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 17,32–7.

27 See Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 18,3–10.

28 See Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 21,39–22,2.

Elias

Introduction to Philosophy

Translation

Textual Emendations

Below I list departures from Busse's main text (Busse 1900), often to signal agreement with textual changes already suggested by the editor himself in his apparatus criticus.

1,4–8	Delete lines 4–8, as Busse recommends with some hesitation.
1,15	Read *ou pantôs . . . <ontos>*.
2,6	Add *<kai anamimnêskesthai>* after *opôpen*, as Busse recommends.
2,13	Delete *auta*.
2,20	Read *phulaxanta* in place of *phulaxas*, as recommended by Busse.
2,21	Read *labonta* in place of *labôn*, as suggested by Busse.
2,23	Read *autês* for *autous*, as suggested by Busse.
3,7	Read *zêtoumen* in place of *zêtêma*, with Busse.
3,25	Insert *<tekhnai, hoion>* after *philosophias*.
3,27	Read *<eurêmasi>* after *heautês*, as Busse suggests.
4,7	Read *<anthrôpos>, anthrôpon*, with Busse.
5,5	Read *exêgêtikoi* in place of *exêgêtai*.
5,7	Read *hote* in place of *anti tou*.
5,9	Read *ellipôsi* for *elleipsôsi*, as Busse rightly suggests.
5,12	Read *enelipon* in place of *eneleipon* and excise *angelous*, as Busse recommends.
5,23	Insert *<hoion>*, as Busse suggests.
6,6	Read *<kai> kourei <kai> paidotribêi* with MS Mon. 399.
6,20	Read *horismos teleios* in place of *teleios horismos*, with Busse.
7,19	Read *tês diatheseôs* in place of *tês aitias*, with Busse.
9,2–3	Insert *tên* before *eita*, as Busse suggests.
9,34	Insert *<hoion>* before *ean*, as suggested by Busse.
10,19	Excise *to pothen eisi*, with Busse.
11,12	Excise *kai* before *legomen*, with Busse.
11,30	Delete the second *auton*.
15,12–13	Read *<ho> Arkhigenês <hôs>* [*ho* del.] *stratopedon therapeuôn*.

16,1   Read *heauton* with P, in place of *heauto*.

16,35   Read *epei* in place of *epeidê*.

17,2   Excise the words *to methekton agathon*, with Busse.

17,26   Insert *gar* after *hôsper*, as Busse recommends.

17,29   Read *hôsper* for *hoti*, as suggested by Busse.

19,4   Read *anousious* in place of *anhosious*, with Busse.

19,5   Add *tên zôên* after *autên* with P.

19,18   Read *tôi kheironi têi epithumiai*, in place of *têi epithumiai têi kheironi*, with Busse.

21,16   Read *gar* in place of *de*.

21,22   Read *to <ontôs> kalon*, as Busse suggests.

22,16   Insert *dêlousês* before *dikaian*, as Busse suggests.

27,28   Accept Busse's supplement *<peri ha kataginetai to theologikon>*.

31,5   Insert *ti* after *peri*.

33,18   Read *didomenon* in place of *didonta*.

34,4   Read *êthika <kai oikonomika kai>* [*ê* del.] *politika*, with Busse.

Introduction to Philosophy, with God's help

Lecture 1

Everything desires the good,[1] and the good is the common goal for everything (the good is called 'good' (*agathon*) because everything 'rushes towards it eagerly' (*to agan theein*)). {The word 'good' denotes emphasis, which is why grammarians 5 prohibit the use of 'good-er' and 'good-est', because there should be no double emphasis in a single word. Rather, they recommend using 'more good', since there are two words here, and 'very good', which is even more emphatic than 'more [good]'.}[2] For this reason, we often despise being, but not the good. The very 10 people who bring about evil do not bring it about as evil, but as good; a doctor, for example, cuts the body when opening a vein, not with the intention of cutting but because he wants to heal. And a murderer commits murder, not because he desires murder [itself], but because he desires the gain for himself that results from it, which he considers good. Therefore everything desires the good, but either the real good or what is believed to be the good, <which is>[3] not always good. 15

If, then, everything desires the good, whatever is shown to be more good is more desired; just as, for example, what is hotter warms more and what is cooler cools more. So everything desires the greater good more. Now we become ardent and mad lovers of philosophy if we know what kind of good 20 accrues from it. The good of philosophy is great and exactly as Plato describes 2,1 it when he says: 'no such good for humans has ever been given by god nor will there ever be'.[4] But since it is not possible to know the good of philosophy while being ignorant of its nature, we must say what its nature actually is. For different natures also have different goods. For example, the good of a horse is to be 5 vigorous and to walk on its hooves, but that of man (*anthrôpos*) is to consider what he has seen (*anathrein ha opôpen*)[5] <and to recollect it>.[6] Man alone among animals has the power of recollection, while the irrational animals have only memory, as the example of Odysseus' dog Argos shows, who kept the memory [of his master] for twenty years.[7] Memory and recollection are not

the same: memory (*mnêmê*) is the remaining of intellect (*monê nou*),[8] and
10 recollection (*anamnêsis*) the renewal of lost memory (*apolomenês mnêmês
ananeôsis*). This is our view. But the philosopher Proclus maintains in his
commentary on the *Phaedo* that the irrational animals also have recollection.[9]
For, he says, the unchanging nature of knowledge goes beyond the life of these
natures, since to remember throughout[10] and not forget is beyond the nature of
these irrational animals – this is not possible [even] for men, who are better.
15 But the irrational animals also forget. For despite having previously fallen into
some danger, they fall into the same one again; and those that previously
fawned after a lapse of time bark and become angry at those whom they were
once used to. From which fact it is obvious that they forget and recollect.

    That they have recollection is evident also from the fact that they are not
brought into familiarity in the same way with someone they have seen before as
20 with a complete stranger; for they are brought more swiftly into familiarity with
someone they have seen before, so that it is evident that they <have preserved>[11]
some impression and that through this imprint they <have begun>[12] to recollect.
Except that, even if recollection occurs with both [men and irrational animals],
there is nevertheless a difference of sorts: for in the case of man, with recollection
also comes the awareness of recollection <itself>,[13] but in the case of irrational
25 animals it does not, since these are not aware that they have recollected. For just
as sight sees, but does not know that it sees, so it is with them too.

    The argument has shown that different natures have different goods. For
this reason we also need to know the nature of philosophy. But since it is
impossible to know this without a definition (definitions divide and unfold
[particular] natures), we should begin from the definition, since the argument
30 has reached a point where this is necessary. But a definition designates the
essence (*to ti estin*) [of a thing]; therefore we should start with this, as the
argument has shown. We will state the definition of philosophy in another
lecture, if the Lord looks favorably on me.[14]

3,1   # Lecture 2

For a second reason too we ought to begin with the question 'what is
[philosophy]?', i.e. its definition, and pass over the question 'does it exist?':

When beginning philosophy we ought to have begun with the question 'does it exist?', following the law of dialectic that four questions should be considered   5
for each art and science:

1. Does it exist?
2. What is it?
3. What sort of thing is it?
4. What is its purpose?[15]

It is reasonable that <we ask>[16] 'does it exist?', because many things have a name but do not exist, e.g. the goat-stag, the so-and-so, and so on.[17] Others have a name, but their existence is uncertain, e.g. the sphere without stars[18] and the antipodes. In all these cases we ask 'does it exist?'. But we ask 'what is it?'   10
about things that exist, when we want to know what they are, e.g. a man or a horse. The same people who deny the existence of philosophy unwillingly attribute existence to it (they admit its existence when they try to demonstrate that it does not exist, because demonstration is a part of philosophy).[19] Let us for this reason pass over the question 'does it exist?' and begin from the question   15
'what is it?', while being grateful to these people who are keen to deny the existence of philosophy, because in their attempt [to deny its existence] they have made philosophy more manifest to us through their proofs; or rather, as Aristotle says in his work *Exhortation*, in which he exhorts the young to philosophy: 'if we ought to practice philosophy, we ought to practise philosophy, and if we ought not to practise philosophy, we also ought to practise philosophy;   20
therefore we certainly ought to practise philosophy.'[20] For if philosophy exists, we certainly ought to philosophize, given that it exists; but if it does not exist, in the same way we ought to inquire why it does not exist; but by enquiring, we are philosophizing, since inquiry is the cause of philosophy.

We should begin from the question 'what is philosophy?' for a third reason too: if <the crafts>[21] that are produced by philosophy, <e.g.> rhetoric, grammar,   25
and medicine, directly define and describe themselves, so much more will philosophy do this, since she is their discoverer and uses <her own discoveries>[22] for her own purposes. The science of definition and division are the discoveries of philosophy.

We have shown, then, that we should start from the definition for three reasons. But since it is not possible to know the definition of philosophy while   30

being ignorant of definition as such, just as someone cannot write well without knowing how to write as such, or speak Attic Greek (*attikizein*) without being able to speak as such, so one cannot know a particular definition while being ignorant of definition as such. So let us examine three questions about definitions:

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1. What is a definition?
2. What is the origin of the name 'definition'?
3. Where does every definition derive from?

5 We should begin with the first question. Now a definition is a concise statement that designates a particular nature. We say 'statement' (*logos*) by contrast with a name (*onoma*), since a name also designates nature (when I say <'man'>, I separate man[23] from the other animals). But a name is a single word, while a definition is a collection and assembly of multiple words. We have added 'concise', by contrast with the prolix utterances of rhetoric and medicine, or

10 else by contrast with names, because designation [of particular natures] by names is the *most* concise, while the designation by definition is [simply] concise. For this reason some people say that a definition is an expanded name, while a name is a compressed definition. We have added 'designates a particular nature' by contrast with descriptions. Descriptions do not designate particular natures but their accidents; definitions on the other hand designate particular

15 natures. This is reasonable, since definitions derive from essential properties (by essential properties I mean those without which the definiendum could not exist, e.g. 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge', because man could never exist or be thought of without either being an animal, or rational, or mortal, or receptive of intellect or knowledge; when one of these is absent, he does not exist). But descriptions derive from

20 accidents, which can be separated without destroying the substrate [in which they are present]; e.g. 'Socrates is Athenian, bald, pot-bellied, snub-nosed, of dark complexion': Socrates can exist without these accidents. So it is reasonable that we say 'a definition designates nature', since descriptions do not designate

25 natures but their accidents. This is also why we say 'description' (*hupographê*), as if it were an inferior form of painting (*hupheimenê graphê*), i.e. shadow-painting, since definitions are analogous to the perfect form of painting, I mean painting with colours.

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'If you state the definition of definition, you should also state the definition of that definition, and so on ad infinitum.' We respond to this puzzle that the statement that defines universal definition also encompasses itself [with the definition], as if some [particular] man were to define universal man: this man also encompasses   30
himself [with the definition], since not only universal man but also he himself is a rational animal. This answers the first question [about definitions].

Lecture 3

Let us examine the second question: 'what is the origin of the word "definition"?' Well then, definition is named metaphorically after boundary-stones on land.   35
In ancient times, when the Nile was flooded and threw the fields into confusion,   5,1
wars and killings over the division of the land would occur after it had subsided. So they [*sc.* the Egyptians] contrived some sort of boundary-stones in order to delineate their plots, and stopped the fighting. This is why they call their measure *akaina*, because it removes killing; 'I slay' (*kainô*) means 'I kill'. So in   5
this way definitions that <explain>[24] [particular] natures, since they aim at right balance and the conversion [of terms], tend neither to excess nor deficiency. They are only convertible (*antistrephousin*) <when>[25] they correspond (*isostrophoi eisi*) to the subject, because reciprocity (*to anti*) depends on equality (*to ison*), e.g. 'equal to the gods' (*antitheos*) and 'a match for men' (*antianeira*) and so on.

It is striking how definitions are deficient: if <they use too few>[26] words, they include too many things, but if they use too many words, they include too   10
few things, I mean in the definiendum. For example, when I say 'man is an animal', consider how I <have used>[27] too few words, but included too many things, since I have encompassed {angels and}[28] other animals too. Again, if I say 'man is a rational mortal animal, receptive of intellect and knowledge, and resourceful', I have used too many words, but included too few things, I mean   15
in the definiendum, because not every man is resourceful. If something is resourceful, it is a man, but it is not the case that if something is a man, it is resourceful. So definitions are convertible when they are neither excessive nor deficient. This addresses the second question.

20   As our third question, we ask where every definition derives from. We say
      that it derives either from the subject matter or the goal or from both. This is
      reasonable, since every craft and science has both a subject matter and a goal:
      a subject matter with which it is concerned, and a goal it seeks to attain. <For
      example>[29]: the subject matter of medicine is the human body, and its goal is
25   health; the subject matter of rhetoric is private and political affairs (by 'private'
      I mean the defence speeches of Demosthenes or when he pleads on behalf of
      some individual, and by 'political' all public affairs, [e.g.] when he counsels the
      city to attack Philip), and its goal is persuasion. The subject matter of grammar
      is all Greek words, and its goal is never to get them wrong, neither a single one
30   nor many. To go wrong about a single Greek word is called 'barbarism'; to go
      wrong about many, 'solecism' (*soloikismos*). Solecism is so called because it is
      an abuse of sound speech (*sôou logou aikismos*).[30]

      If, then, every craft has both a subject matter and a goal, it is reasonable that
      definitions derive either from one of the two or from both. They derive from
      the subject matter, as when I say 'medicine is a craft that deals with the human
6,1   body'; from the goal, [as when I say] '[medicine] is a craft that produces health';
      and from both, [as when I say] '[medicine] is a craft that deals with the human
      body and that produces health'. We should know that in the case of all other
      crafts and sciences only the definition from both [subject matter and goal] is
5   perfect, since their subject matter is also shared with other arts, e.g. the human
      body with <both>[31] the barber <and> the gymnast. In the same way, political
      affairs are also the subject matter of other crafts. And the goals are not only
      achieved by the [respective] crafts mentioned before, but also by chance and
      other factors. Not only the doctor produces health, but also it occurs by chance,
10   as has been said in *On Doctrines*.[32] An old wife can produce health by singing,
      and a charm [can] likewise [produce health]. Persuasion is not only attained
      by rhetoric, but gold, beauty, and many other things also persuade. So Hyperides
      the rhetor, when he was pleading on behalf of Phrune the prostitute and
      became aware that he was not persuading the judges in his defence speeches,
15   told the prostitute to rip off her cloak, and then won his case because of the
      sight of her breasts.[33]

      We should judge skills (*hexeis*) not by their goal but by how they bring
      about the goal. It is characteristic of the doctor not to heal but to omit nothing
      that leads to health, and the goal of the rhetorician is not to persuade but

to omit nothing that leads to persuasion. So it is reasonable that in the case of the other crafts and sciences only the definition from both [the subject matter and the goal] is a \<perfect definition\>.[34] But in the case of philosophy the definition from either [the subject matter or the goal] is perfect, because the subject matter of philosophy is not the subject matter of any other craft or science.

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Lecture 4

We have learned from the preceding discussion that definitions are derived from three elements, from the subject matter, the goal, or both. Now let us learn what the subject matter of philosophy is and what is its goal, and how it is defined by both. We should know that everything that exists is the subject matter of philosophy, which is why it is knowledge of existing things, since it alone knows everything. The other crafts and sciences that are concerned with one thing know one thing but are ignorant of many others. They are forms of ignorance more than forms of knowledge; but philosophy is more a form of knowledge since it professes to know everything that exists. The goal of philosophy is to show that man is a god on earth by his knowledge of everything that exists, and [that he is] just like the Pythia describes Lycurgus:

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> You have come to my rich temple, Lycurgus,
> And I am in doubt whether I shall declare you a god or a man.[35]

7,1

Do not think that, because the Pythia said 'I am in doubt', she does not have knowledge[36] (or else the Pythia would need another Pythia). She said this because it is naturally uncertain whether Lycurgus is a god or a man. What is uncertain cannot otherwise be known, unless it is with uncertainty. For example, lukewarm is intermediate between cold and hot, and when we say that it is hot, we are wrong, and likewise when we say it is cold. But if we include the uncertainty and say 'I don't know what I should call it, whether hot or cold', we communicate to the listener the idea that the lukewarm partakes of hotness as well as coldness. In the same way grey is intermediate between white and black, and when we say that it is white, we are wrong, and likewise

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when we say that it is black. But if we include the uncertainty, we make it clear to the listener that it partakes of each. So the Pythia too would have been wrong if she had said 'he is a god', since Lycurgus is a man; and if she had said 'he is a man', like most other members of the common herd, she would also have been wrong (he is not like these). Instead, she called him a divine man. In the same way Plato in the *Laws* represents Socrates as asking the Cretan and the Spartan citizen about Minos and Lycurgus, whom he knew were lawgivers, Minos of the Cretans, and Lycurgus of the Spartans: 'who is responsible, strangers, <for arranging> your laws, a god or a man?'[37] The Cretan answered, since he is superior: 'god, stranger, god'; for Minos is superior by reason of Zeus. The Greeks say that he ascended to Zeus for nine years in order to set right the laws. Homer hints at this when he says:

> He reigned for nine years, close companion of the great Zeus.[38]

So this is how philosophy aims to show that man <is a god>[39] upon the earth.

Now that we have learned what the goal of philosophy is and what is its subject matter, let us also state how they [*sc.* the goal and the subject matter] define philosophy. We should know that there are six definitions of philosophy, no more and no fewer. Two derive from the subject matter, two from the goal, one from superiority, and one from etymology. Their order is the following: the definition from etymology comes last of all, since it is concerned with words alone and has nothing to say about reality, whereas philosophy is excited by reality (*ta onta*). After this comes the definition derived from superiority, since common are prior to particular terms, and the common definitions of every craft and science derive from the subject matter and the goal, but the definition from superiority is particular to philosophy. Only philosophy has a definition derived from its superiority, while the other [crafts and sciences] are defined by both [the subject matter and the goal], as has been said.[40] After the definition from superiority come the definitions derived from the goal, and after these the ones derived from the subject matter, since the subject matter is always prior to the goal. This is how the definitions can be divided.

They can be arranged in the following way:

First definition: Philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings.
Second definition: Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things.

After this,

Third definition: Philosophy is a preparation for death.   10
Fourth definition: Philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man.
Fifth definition, which derives from superiority: Philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences.
Sixth definition, which derives from etymology: Philosophy is love of wisdom.

This is the order of definitions.

After this, let us state who invented the definitions of philosophy. We should know that Pythagoras stated the sixth definition from etymology and the two   15
derived from the subject matter. Plato on the other hand stated the two definitions derived from the goal, the one in the *Theaetetus* ('Philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man'[41]) and the one in the *Phaedo* ('Philosophy is a preparation for death'[42]). Aristotle states the definition from superiority in his *Metaphysics*.[43]

After this, some people raise the following puzzle: 'why are there six   20
definitions of philosophy?'. We give the following explanation: philosophy is neither a thing without name, as many things are (aptitude for music, for example, does not have a name because we do not say 'music-ness' (*mousikotês*)), nor a sound without meaning. So it has both a name and existence, and because it has a name, it has the definition from etymology, but insofar as it exists, it has   25
its being in first knowledge, and insofar as it exists in first knowledge, it has the definition from superiority (because the first is superior), and insofar as it is knowledge, it has the two definitions from the subject matter and the two from the goal.[44]

After this, some people raise the following puzzle: 'why are there two definitions derived from the subject matter and two derived from the goal?'. We reply to this that the subject matter is double, either universal or particular; e.g. the carpenter's subject matter is particular wood, let us say shittah-wood   30
or oak-wood, and every kind of wood. Because of its universal subject matter,

philosophy has the definition 'knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings', and because of its particular subject matter 'knowledge of divine and human things'. The goal of philosophy is likewise double, proximate, and remote; the proximate goal of the doctor, for example, is to cure a particular

35   condition, let us say one that is feverish, and its remote goal is to cure every condition. Because of its proximate goal, philosophy has the definition

9,1   'a preparation for death', and because of its remote goal, 'becoming like god as far as is possible for man'. This is because purifying the soul is a more proximate goal, and when <it>[45] has been purified it has become like god. First one needs to purify oneself and then one becomes like god in just this

5   way, because the impure is not allowed to touch the pure, according to Plato's own words.[46]

　　Some people add another, seventh, definition: the doctors, exchanging bronze for gold instead of gold for bronze as Homer says,[47] have changed the definitions; they have defined medicine as philosophy of the body, and

10   philosophy as the medicine of the soul. But, doctors, this way of demonstrating what is clear from what is unclear is circular. The demonstration is circular when with two uncertain things, we wish to securely establish one by means of the other, as in this example: when I don't know where Theon and Dio are staying, if I ask 'Where is Theon staying?' you reply 'Where Dio is', and if I ask again 'Where is Dio staying?', you reply 'Where Theon is'. A similar case is this:

15   'so-and-so has given birth, since she is lactating, and she is lactating, since she has given birth'. Philosophers should avoid circular demonstrations, since they make the same terms prior and posterior to each other, and clear and less clear, and cause and caused. When we use Dio to show where Theon is, Dio is clearer, prior, and the cause; but when we use Dio in turn to show [where Theon is],

20   Theon is clearer, prior, and the cause. Besides, the argument leads to nonsense: if Theon is staying where Dio is, and Dio where Theon is, Theon is staying where Theon is staying. And if so-and-so has given birth because she is lactating, and she is lactating because she has given birth, she has given birth because she has given birth, which is talking nonsense. Therefore this sort of argument should be avoided not only in demonstrations, but also in definitions,

25   which are the starting-points of demonstration.

　　In addition, this definition [*sc.* 'philosophy is the medicine of the soul'] is contained in the definition derived from the goal, i.e. 'philosophy is a

preparation for death', because the death of the dissolute life is the cure of the soul.

People introduce another, eighth definition of philosophy, which Plato states in his *Phaedo*. There he says that philosophy is 'the greatest kind of music',[48] not the kind of music that brings strings into harmony (this is trivial), but the parts of the soul, i.e. reason, spirit, and appetite, such that reason always rules, spirit is ruled by reason and rules desire, and desire is ruled. When these parts fulfill their proper function, the harmony of the soul is preserved, but if the worse parts usurp power, they create disharmony, <e.g.>[49] when desire rules, as in the example of Phaedra who is throttled by love,[50] or when spirit rules over reason, as in the example of Medea, when she says:

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> I know that I am about to do evil,
> But spirit overcomes my decisions.[51]

But this [eighth] definition is also contained in the definition from superiority, because the greatest is superior.

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Lecture 5

Having discussed the numerous definitions of philosophy, their order, their inventors, and the reason why there are six (we have shown this by division, and by removing the two additional definitions), let us go on to their interpretation. The first definition of philosophy, which derives from the general subject matter and goes back to Pythagoras, states: 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings'.[52] We cannot identify the work in which Pythagoras states this definition, since he did not leave any writings behind; what [his] writings are to others, his students are to him. He thought that one should not leave one's own discourses behind as though in a lifeless vessel, because they cannot stand up for themselves more than one's disciples. He was right to add '*qua* real beings', in place of 'insofar as they are real beings', in order to <show that philosophy>[53] knows the nature of the stars, {their origin},[54] and the nature of men, since he does not want to know how many stars or men there are, but their nature. Someone knowing men *qua* men will also know past, present (*ta onta*), and future men, as the poet says:

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The best diviner

25   Is he who knows present, future, and past.[55]

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'why did Pythagoras not say
"[knowledge] of *all* real beings"?'. We reply that he encompassed 'all' by saying
'*qua* real beings', because someone who knows real being *qua* real being
also knows every real being, and someone who knows man *qua* man also
knows every man. And besides: the article 'of [real beings] (*tôn*)' is equivalent

30   to 'of all [real beings]', since the article is equivalent to universal specification,

11,1   unless it refers back [to a known entity], as in the example 'the man went',
which refers to a man who is known. But if I say 'man is an animal', 'man' is
equivalent to 'every man', since every man is an animal.

Here is yet another puzzle: if philosophy knows all real beings, the other

5   crafts are superfluous, since we cannot find a subject matter for them. We reply
that all real beings are the subject matter of philosophy for the purpose of
knowledge and contemplation only, but they are the subject matter of the other
crafts so that they can achieve some effect on them. Sound, for example, is the
subject matter of the philosopher, so that he may know its causes and what
power produces it; but it is the subject matter of the grammarian, so that he

10   can achieve some effect on it and know its composition. The human body is the
subject matter of the philosopher, so that he can know its nature and elements
alone; but it is the subject matter of the doctor, so that he can make it healthy.
But if you say, 'Well then, does the doctor not make predictions?' we reply[56]
that he makes predictions, not only in order to have knowledge of it like the
philosopher, but also in order to achieve some effect with his prediction.
Likewise the grammarian knows the eight parts of speech, not in order to

15   know this in itself, but in order to produce the sounds of the Greek language.
To put it simply, the philosopher knows the natures [of real beings],[57] but the
other crafts their accidents.

Another definition of philosophy, which derives from its particular
subject matter and also goes back to Pythagoras, is 'philosophy is knowledge

20   of human and divine things'.[58] What do you mean, Pythagoras? Does philosophy
only know divine and human things, and not the nature of horse and oxen
and plant, and everything else? We reply that the definition has
encompassed everything: all things are twofold, either eternal or perishable.

Among eternal beings, divinity is pre-eminent; among perishable beings, humanity. Pythagoras, by mentioning the superior element in each class, has also included the rest.

After this they raise the following puzzle: 'why did Pythagoras not also add "*qua* real beings" here?' We reply that <it is because what the first definition states generally has here>[59] become differentiated, and it was superfluous to add '*qua* real beings'. When mentioning 'divine things', he understood them '*qua* divine', and when mentioning 'human things', he understood them '*qua* human'.

They raise another puzzle: 'if you say that both the first and the present definition encompass everything, how are they different? How can you say that one is universal, but the other particular?' We should reply to this that this actual particular [subject matter] brings Pythagoras specifically to mention divine and human things.[60] We should know that the first definition surpasses the second in concision and accuracy: in concision, because it states '[knowledge] of real beings', in accuracy, because it adds '*qua* real beings'. However, the second definition surpasses the one before it in clarity: it makes clear what the first one conceals, by saying 'divine and human things'. Real beings are either divine or human, and the intermediaries are understood with them, as we have said;[61] just as Zeus is called 'the father of men and gods',[62] not because he is not also the father of the other beings,[63] but because this appellation also includes the rest.

Another definition of philosophy, which derives from the proximate goal, states 'philosophy is a preparation for death'. This is how Plato defines it in his dialogue *Phaedo*. He says: 'Those who philosophize are likely unaware that those who rightly practise philosophy do none other than pursue dying and being dead',[64] that is to say, they want to become pure, or have already purified themselves. 'Dying' belongs to the present time and refers to the philosopher in the process of purification, while 'being dead' belongs to the past, and refers to the philosopher who has purified himself. We can conclude that philosophers practise none other than becoming pure or being pure, i.e. philosophy is a preparation for death. 'Likely' (*kinduneuousin*)[65] stands in place of 'they have concluded this from a necessary demonstration'.

After these remarks, people raise the following puzzle: 'what do you mean, Plato? Does the philosopher, whose character is like god on earth, infringe

15   upon the sovereignty of the Demiurge and attempt to undo the bond that
      the latter has tied, like slaves that run away from their prison against their
      masters' will? Did Plato not say the opposite in the same dialogue, namely: "we
      are as in a sort of prison and must not release ourselves from it, until he who
      bound us loosens the bond"?[66] What shall we do, Plato? Should we pursue
20   death because of your first statement, or not pursue it because of your second
      statement?'[67]

      We reply to this puzzle that Plato does not contradict himself with his
      second statement, and nor does the philosopher rebel against the Demiurge
      and attempt to loosen the bond which He has tied. But since death is twofold,
   just as life is, I shall begin from what is clearer (dispositions are clearer than
25   their absence): there is a natural life and a voluntary life. Natural life is the
      bond between soul and body, when the soul gives perception and motion to
      the body, and to which all men are subject. Voluntary life is the bond between
      soul and body when we leave the soul to attend to the body's pleasurable
      indulgences. This is what Plato says: every pleasure is like a nail that fastens the
30   soul to the body.[68] Not every man lives the voluntary life, but only the dissolute.
      If, then, life is twofold, so too is death. Two opposites exist in the same number
      of ways, since the two are equal in strength, since the stronger one will always
      prevail, and there will be one, [and] no longer two.

      Now natural death is the separation of the soul from the body, to which all
13,1 men are subject, when the soul no longer gives perception and motion to the
      body. But death is voluntary when we no longer allow the soul to attend to
      pleasurable indulgences, and instead the soul will finally be in charge, since she
      is Olympian while the body is earth-born, and it is not right that the better
      nature should be ruled by the worse. Only philosophers, whom the poet
5   describes as follows, are subject to voluntary death:

      Twice dead men, when others die only once.[69]

      If, then, death is twofold, Plato does not really contradict himself when he
      sometimes says that one should prepare for death, and sometimes that we
      should not untie [the bond] until He who bound us unties it, but should leave
10   nature to untie the natural bond when she pleases, while we may untie the
      voluntary bond which we ourselves have tied, so that Plato's doctrines may be
      sovereign everywhere and promote that bond and release.

People make the following division, because some four terms are closely linked to one another: being, non-being, well-being, and being vicious. Natural life brings about being, natural death non-being, voluntary death being good, and voluntary life being vicious. Since there are two oppositions, six 15 combinations result, three of which can co-exist, and three of which cannot. The following diagram illustrates this:

Natural life ———————————— **Natural death**
cannot co-exist with

can co-exist with *can co-exist with* *can co-exist with* *can co-exist with*

Voluntary life ———————————— **Voluntary death**
cannot co-exist with

Therefore, we should practise death, not to bring about non-being, but well- 25 being. Life is natural and death voluntary when the soul gives perception and motion to the body, but we do not allow the soul to attend to the pleasurable indulgences of the body. Instead, the better part rules the worse. Death is natural and life voluntary when body-loving souls hover around tombs after their natural death and produce shadowy phantasms.[70] Homer hints at this 30 when he says:

Bewailing its fate, leaving behind manliness and youth.[71]

Life is natural and voluntary when we pursue life in a dissolute manner, while 14,1 living our natural lives.

I would have liked Cleombrotus to hear these arguments. When he had pondered what was said in the *Phaedo*, <he died after hurling himself off a rooftop>,[72] as the following epigram about him by Callimachus describes:

Upon saying 'Goodbye, Sun', Cleombrotus from Ambracia
Leapt from a high rooftop into Hades.   5
He suffered no evil that would merit death, but had read
A single book of Plato's, *On the Soul*.[73]

I myself, on the other hand, would say the following verses to him:

>   If Plato's book had not kept my passion in check
> 10   I would already have loosened the grievous and woeful shackle of life.[74]

That is to say, unless I had been given the benefit of knowing how to live well by Plato, I would have preferred non-being to being vicious. There is therefore a form of death that is better than a certain form of life, and this is what philosophy always urges one to practise.

Lecture 6

15   Not only Cleombrotus, but also the Stoic philosophers, as though they were Cleombrotoi of sorts, understood philosophy to be a preparation for natural death. This is why they formulated five ways of departing [from life] with justification.[75] They say that life is like a great feast during the course of which the soul seems to be entertained. There are as many ways of breaking up the
20   feast as there are of departing [from life] with justification. A feast is broken up in five ways: either because an urgent matter suddenly arises, for example the arrival of a friend after some interval of time (his friends will get up with joy and break up the feast); or because of the onrush of disorderly and abusive revelers; or because the meat set before the guests is rotten and noxious; or
25   because of scarcity of food; or because of drunkenness. In these same five ways one may also depart [from life] with justification: either because an urgent matter arises, as when the Pythia ordered someone to kill himself for his own city when its ruin was imminent, which is why Menoeceus killed himself for his own country and [thereby] saved it.[76] Or [one may depart from life with
30   justification] because of the onrush of tyrants who force us either to do
15,1 shameful things or to say what is secret; in this way at least, the Pythagorean woman who was held by a tyrant and forced to betray secrets (namely the reason why the Pythagoreans do not eat beans, because they had the saying 'to
5   eat beans and the heads of one's parents amounts to the same thing'[77]) said 'I would rather eat them than tell you', but when she was being forced to eat them she said in turn 'I would rather tell you than eat them'. So in the end, because she was being forced to do one of the two, either to eat [beans] or to tell [the

secret], she severed her own tongue with her teeth because it is the organ of speech and taste, and lost her life due to the injury.[78]

Or the soul ought to remove herself [from life] with justification because prolonged disease prevents her for the most part from using the body as her instrument. This is why Plato too does not approve of the dietetic part of medicine, on the grounds that it attends to diseases and drags them out.[79] But he does approve of surgery and pharmacy, which Archigenes used <to>[80] cure an army. Sophocles too says:

> It is not for a doctor
> To sing incantations over a wound that needs the knife.[81]

Or [one may depart from life with justification] because of poverty. Theognis is right to say:

> To escape poverty, a man should throw himself
> Into the cavernous sea, Kyrnos, or from sheer cliffs.[82]

Or [one may depart from life with justification] because of madness. Just as drunkenness was breaking up the feast in our earlier example, so here too it is reasonable to take oneself out because of madness. Madness is none other than natural drunkenness, and drunkenness is none other than voluntary madness. So much about this argument.

Plotinus however writes a monograph about departing with justification and does not allow any of these five ways [of justifying suicide].[83] He says that god does not withdraw his providential care from us, but we make ourselves unfit [to receive it], and think that god is far removed from us even though he is always present to all alike, as people with a pure way of life show, who see god himself and become his companions. Likewise the sun too gives light [to all] alike, but bats, which are unfit [to receive the light], avoid the sun and are not illuminated by it. Instead they think that it is darkness, even though it is the source of light. In the same way the philosopher, imitating god and the sun, should not be completely indifferent to the body out of his concern for the soul, but give it appropriate care, until he removes <himself>[84] from kinship with the body because the latter has become unsuitable. For it is awful to commit suicide before the right time, i.e. before the one who has bound us releases us. Roman law too shows this, when it does not permit the bodies of

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16,1

5   suicides to receive burial before their feet have been mutilated – unless we can
     apply the poet's verse on the body of Hector to this law:

     But in his rage he injures senseless earth.[85]

     So much about this definition.

10   Another definition of philosophy, which derives from its remote goal, is
     'philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man'. In the dialogue
     Theaetetus Plato represents Socrates, his teacher, in discussion with a certain
     geometer named Theodorus, from Cyrene. This is what Socrates says: 'But
15   since evil is here and frequents this life, we should try to flee from this earth.'
     When Theodorus, to whom the speech is addressed, asks 'what is this flight?',
     Socrates replies: 'Becoming like god as far as is possible for man.' When
     Theodorus asks, 'And in what way does one become like god?', Socrates replies:
     'By being pious and just with wisdom, and by knowing this.'[86] This is what
     Plato says.

20   Some raise the following puzzle: 'how can the philosopher become like
     god?'. We reply that it is because he has the characteristics of the divine. The
     poets characterize the divine by three features, its goodness, power, and
     knowledge.[87] The following verses show this:

     The gods are givers of noble things[88]
     The gods can do everything[89]
25   The gods know everything[90]

     Here, the divine is not said to be all-powerful without qualification, because it
     is unable to do evil on account of its abundant goodness. Just as fire cannot cool
     because of the innate heat that belongs to its essence, and snow cannot heat
     because of the innate coldness that belongs to its essence, so the divine cannot
30   do evil because of the innate goodness that belongs to its essence. So then, in
     the case of men too, one can see that some are good by nature, and even if they
     purposely try to become wicked, they are not able to do so. It is possible that
     what the poets say is also true:[91] doing evil is not a power but a lack of goodness,
35   just as adventitious illnesses come about through a lack of health.

17,1   And <yet>[92] goodness, power, and knowledge are different in god and the
     philosopher: the goodness in god is not different from him, but he is goodness
     itself,[93] while the goodness in the philosopher is participated goodness and

different from him, just as wood that has been whitened is different from whiteness. But the power of god is also different [from the philosopher's]: god can do all that he wants, but not the philosopher. For it is true that

> The race of the immortal gods
> Will never be like that of men who walk upon the earth.[94]

But neither are the knowledge of god and that of the philosopher the same: god knows everything at the same time and always, while the philosopher professes to know everything, but not at the same time. Instead, he examines each thing individually, and he does not always know it, but [only] sometimes, as Plato shows when he says, 'Blessed is he in whom wisdom and prudence are present, even if only in old age'.[95] For this reason, he has added 'as far as is possible for man', because the philosopher is like god as far as it is possible for man to become like him. The philosopher should imitate god in all respects: in goodness, so that he too can care for imperfect souls (just as Socrates went about the workshops and chose natures that were suitable for philosophy); in power, so that he can procure for himself the omnipotence of god by some contrivance, if he only wants what he is able to do, and does not desire anything out of the ordinary, like flying; in knowledge, so as to know the causes of everything.

After these remarks people ask: 'If like is like to what is like, god will also be like the philosopher, given that the philosopher is like god, and god will be no greater in stature than the philosopher.' We can reply to this difficulty that it is a specious argument: they [*sc.* god and the philosopher] are no different in those respects in which they are like each other, but in other respects they have many differences. <For>[96] just as the image of Socrates is like him, but Socrates differs from it as the living from the lifeless, so too god differs from the philosopher as the living from the lifeless and image from original. And besides: <just as>[97] the image is said to be like Socrates, but Socrates is not said to be like his image, since he is the original, so it is in the case of god and the philosopher. The philosopher is said to be like god as an image is like its original, but god, since he is the original, is not like the philosopher who is a particular image. And besides: the philosopher participates in god in goodness, power, and knowledge, but equally god is participated in the same things by the philosopher, and in this respect [god] is said to be like [the philosopher].

18,1   Lecture 7

Since Plato was not content with saying that philosophy is becoming like god
as far as is possible for man, but also added the way of attaining likeness by
5   saying 'one becomes like god by being pious and just with wisdom and by
knowing this', let us examine the following three questions:

> 1. Why did he add 'justice' to 'piety'?
> 2. Why did he only mention two virtues, justice and wisdom, when there
>   are four?
> 3. Why did he say 'and by knowing this'?

In answer to the first question, in which we enquire why Plato added 'justice' to
10   'piety' (it seems that Plato is talking nonsense with this, they say, and saying the
same thing, because piety is no different from justice), we can say that Plato is
not talking nonsense. There is a great difference between piety and justice:
justice is the performance of one's proper duties towards men, but piety is
performing appropriate actions for the gods, which is why we call people who
are concerned with sacred matters 'pious'. Piety is a heightened form of justice,
15   which is why impiety is called a heightened form of injustice. Justice is said to
relate to equals, i.e. to men, but piety to what is better.[98] Therefore justice is
either said with reference to what is superior, and results in piety, or to what is
inferior, when it is called providential. Plato was not ignorant of the difference
20   between justice and piety, because he wrote two dialogues, the *Euthyphro* and
the *Republic*, entitling the *Euthyphro* 'Euthyphro or On Piety' and the *Republic*
'Republic or On Justice' (the republic belongs to humans).[99] The argument has
correctly progressed like a ladder: justice is prior to piety, since one cannot be
pious if one has not become just, just as someone who does not perform his
25   duties towards men cannot perform those towards the divine. This is the
solution to the first question.

The second question: we should examine why Plato mentioned only two
virtues when there are four. We say that by mentioning the two superior virtues
Plato has encompassed the others too. These virtues [*sc.* justice and piety] are
superior to the others, as we will show. Since there are three parts of the soul,
30   the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts, each of the other virtues are borne
by one of the parts (wisdom by reason, courage by spirit, temperance by desire),

but justice did not think it fit to be borne by one part of the soul but has rather pervaded all three. It is characteristic of justice to bestow on each the order they deserve: when each part in its natural condition fulfills its proper function, e.g. when reason rules like a king, and spirit rules and is ruled (it rules desire, 35 but is ruled by reason) like soldiers, and desire is ruled like the people, then 19,1 justice appears clearly as being a certain harmony of these parts. People who have been wronged show that justice pervades the whole soul, when they call themselves dead and <bereft of substance>[100] (*anousious*) because they have been deprived of their substance (*ousia*), while justice sustains <this life>,[101] as 5 it were, and quickens it.

For this reason some people raise the following puzzle: 'if justice is the harmony of the other virtues and is consequent upon them, how can it be included among them, given that it is common to them?'. We reply that the common is twofold, either as a genus that is divisible into species, like animal is divisible into rational and irrational (in this case the genus is not included among the species), or as a possession, in which case it is also included. For 10 example, let some three people have three servants, one individual servant each, and let them also have one servant in common. This latter servant will be included among the others, so that there are four. We can say the same in the present case: the virtues are a possession of the soul, with each being borne by one part, but justice is the common possession of the three parts of the soul, for which reason it is included among the other virtues, and there are four. Therefore the argument has shown that justice is superior because it pervades 15 the three parts of the soul. After justice comes wisdom, because it supervenes on the superior part of the soul, reason; after wisdom courage, because it is borne by the spirited part, and fourth temperance, because it is borne <by the worst part, desire>.[102] The task of justice is to bestow on each the order they 20 deserve; of wisdom, to do what one ought; of courage, to overcome resistance; of temperance, to prevent one from resembling the worst part. If preventing one from resembling the worst part is also characteristic of courage, strictly speaking the worst part is said with reference to pleasure, which overwhelms the body, while spirit has the separate goal of exacting revenge against someone who has caused harm, because the person who has caused harm is external [to the agent]. If this is true, then, someone with one virtue will also have the 25 others, and each of them will be justice, which bestows on each the appropriate

order; each will be wisdom, which does what one ought; each will be courage, which overcomes resistance; and each will be temperance, which prevents one from resembling the worst part. So much about this question.

30   The third question is to examine why Plato said 'and by knowing this'.[103] We reply that he did so on good grounds, so that we may possess the virtues that result from education and effort, and not the natural and ethical ones. The natural virtues are the result of mixture, for example when people of cold temperament are temperate but cowardly, and those of hot temperament

35   courageous but dissolute. These, then, are the natural virtues, which are also

20,1 irrational. The stork, in any case, is just, the fox wise, the lion courageous and the turtle-dove temperate. The ethical virtues are the result of a certain habituation, because one has had the right kind of parents or teachers. To put it simply, some virtues are with reason, some without, and some are completely without reason, like the natural virtues, and others are with reason,

5   but either with reason coming from outside, i.e. from the teacher, like the ethical virtues, or from inside, like the virtues that are produced in someone by education and effort. For this reason, then, Plato has added 'and by knowing this', instead of saying 'in order that we may have, not the irrational virtues, but those with reason, I mean [reason] from inside, i.e. the virtues that are produced in someone by education and effort'. Plato calls the natural virtues

10   'slavish' because they can also belong to slaves, but Plotinus call them 'imperfect', because they do not imply one another and stand in opposition.[104] As we have said, if someone with a hot temperament makes a point of being courageous, he is not always temperate (he is dissolute because of the hotness [of his temperament]), and again, if someone with a cold temperament makes a point of being temperate, he is not always courageous but cowardly. But the

15   virtues [that are produced] by effort and education imply one another and do not stand in conflict. This is what we have to say about the fourth definition of philosophy.

Lecture 8

The fifth definition of philosophy, which goes back to Aristotle, is 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences'. In the treatise *Metaphysics*,

which has been given the title *Theology*, Aristotle has stated this definition.[105] 20
The definition is rightly called 'by superiority', since Aristotle has stated it precisely in his treatise on theology. For this reason, people ask: 'why does he use such a redoubling [in the definition] [*sc.* 'craft of crafts and science of sciences']?'. We reply that it is for five reasons.

The first reason is that some people who admire the grandeur of philosophy use this sort of redoubling. It is as if someone gazing at whiteness were to say 25
many times: 'how white, how white, and absolutely no tinge of blackness', and someone tasting sweetness were to say 'how sweet, how sweet, and absolutely untouched by bitterness'. In the same way someone admiring the grandeur of philosophy would say 'what knowledge, what knowledge, and no ignorance anywhere' many times. For only philosophy is knowledge. This is the first reason. 30

The second reason is that philosophy is like a king and god. Just as the king appoints rulers through whom he interacts with and observes everyone, while he [himself] does not observe or talk to anyone (he does not sully himself by interacting with the common run of mankind); and just as god has appointed archangelic powers through whom he guards the universe; so philosophy too, 21,1
which stands on a sort of acropolis, knows particular things through the particular crafts and sciences. And just as the king is the ruler of rulers, so philosophy is said to be the craft of crafts. And again, just as god is said to be the king of kings, so philosophy too is said to be the science of sciences. This is 5
the second point.

The third reason is that philosophy provides the starting-point for the other crafts and sciences. Aristotle says in his *Sayings* that 'all those who occupy themselves with the other crafts and sciences are indifferent to philosophy, like the suitors of Penelope who, even though they could not sleep with her, were well content to sleep with her servant girls.'[106] When grammar, who says that 'some vowels are naturally long, some short, and some of intermediate length', is asked why *êta* and *ômega* are naturally long, she admits to being ignorant, and will send you off to the philosopher of the liberal arts (*ton mousikon philosophon*). Likewise, when medicine, who says that there are four humours, since there are four elements, is asked why there are four elements and no 15
more and no fewer, she will send us to the natural philosopher, <because>[107] Aristotle has shown in his *On Generation and Corruption* why the elements are

no more and no fewer than four.[108] Likewise rhetoric, who divides herself into
three parts, into hortatory, judicial, and panegyric, and says that the goal of
hortatory rhetoric is the advantageous, of judicial rhetoric the just, and of
panegyric the fine, when she is asked what the really advantageous, the really
just, and the <really>[109] fine are, admits to being ignorant of this, and passes us
on to the political philosopher.

Philosophy does not only provide these sorts of crafts and sciences with
starting points, but also the artisanal crafts. Architecture, at any rate, wanting
to produce a straight line, extends the measuring rule as much as it can, while
it takes from geometry [the knowledge that] a straight line is one whose
intermediate points lie between the extremes. In this case we say that three
men are standing in a straight line, if the middle one will keep the two men at
the extremes from facing each other, but if they form a circle, they see one
another.[110] It is for this reason that theatres are circular, so that people can see
one another, and that lecture halls are circular, so that [students] can see one
another and their teacher.[111] But philosophy also provides the craft of building
with first principles: the craft of building, because it wants to know if the wall
is straight, uses a plumb-bob (*barullion*),[112] taking care that the lead weight or
suchlike is placed at right angles to the edge. But if there is to be a colonnade,
it does not follow a straight line but forms an oblique surface.[113] This is the
third reason.

The fourth reason is that philosophy corrects the mistakes of the other
crafts. Rhetoric talks about what is just by convention (it talks about the
existing laws, which are different for different peoples; for the Persians [it is
just] to sleep with one's mother, sister, and daughter, while for the Triballi [it is
just] to kill one's aged parents), while philosophy states with greater accuracy
that law is by convention (it is different for different peoples), but justice is
everywhere the same by nature. It is unjust to confound causes and effects, and
to make the cause an effect and vice versa, or to make the rulers subjects, as is
the case with maternal incest (what was the cause and ruler *qua* mother
becomes the effect and subject *qua* woman). In philosophy, it is also unjust to
kill one's aged parents, since [patricides] loosen the natural bond against the
will of its binder. Again, while rhetoric distinguishes justice from the beneficial,
and <represents>[114] Antilochus' action concerning his own father Nestor as
being just because it was done for the sake of his father, but not beneficial for

Antilochus' body, which was slain,[115] philosophy says: 'justice and the beneficial are the same thing, because all that is beneficial is just, and all that is not beneficial is unjust. For what do injuries to the body mean to us?', referring to the soul with 'us'. Thus someone who got injured in battle for the sake of a friend said:

> But at least I got myself safely out. Why should I care for that shield?
> Let it go.[116]

By 'myself', he is talking about his own soul, while he calls his own body 'shield'.[117] Another man who was thirsty said: 'I leave my donkey to drink', calling his body a 'donkey', and [another man]: 'Pound away, pound the sack of Anaxarchus; you will never pound Anaxarchus himself.'[118] Again, while rhetoric says that it is better to do wrong than to be wronged, philosophy, on the contrary, says: 'doing wrong is much worse than being wronged. The wrong-doer does harm to himself and his soul, but the one being wronged has wrong done either to his first possession, i.e. his body, or to his second possession, I mean his property. But it is much worse to have one's soul in a bad state than one's body and external goods.' <...>[119] says: 'You're going to harm no one but yourself, because it is impossible that one's soul should be harmed by another.' Plato did not consider man to be a soul and a body, but rather a rational soul using the body as an instrument. He refers to man by three names, 'I', 'mine', and 'what belongs to mine', calling the soul 'I', the body 'mine', and possessions 'what belongs to mine'.[120] Because philosophy knows this, Plato says: 'I would prefer to do neither wrong nor to be wronged; but when there is a choice I would choose to be wronged rather than to do wrong.'[121] This is [the fourth reason].

The fifth reason is that philosophy has established the syllogism for her own use and uses it as a tool, while the other crafts use the syllogism but cannot construct it. Philosophy is like a cobbler who both makes sandals and wears them, while the other crafts only wear them and do not in fact make them. This is the fifth reason.

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'if philosophy is the craft of crafts, it will itself be a craft.'. We reply that because it is the craft of crafts it surpasses craft, or else that it is called craft of crafts because it instructs the other crafts. And besides: words said together are not [always] used in

their usual sense.[122] We say 'a dead man', even though he is not a man [any more], and 'a stone vessel', even though it is not a vessel, and 'fool's gold',
15 even though it is not gold (gold represents the value of what we want, but fool's gold does not have this use). Conversely, words used in their usual sense cannot [always] be said together, as when I say 'your dog, the father dog', one cannot say 'your dog-father'.[123] So much about the fifth definition of philosophy.

20 ## Lecture 9

We should not disdain the sixth definition of philosophy on the grounds that it has only been concerned with words, while the others were excited by reality or have paid serious attention to it. It surpasses the others in one respect: while they discuss only the reality [of philosophy], this definition [from etymology] discusses both the name and the reality. Well then, the sixth
25 definition of philosophy, which goes back to Pythagoras, states that 'philosophy is love of wisdom'. It is right that Pythagoras, who always turned towards himself in silence, should be the starting point and the end of our definitions of philosophy.

But Pythagoras, this definition does not convert, [when conversion] is a mark of excellence in definitions: if something is philosophy, it is love of wisdom, but it is not the case that if something is a desire for wisdom, it is
30 philosophy, since every craft and science desires its own subject matter.[124] But since Pythagoras cannot reply when he is asked, and his disciples cannot reply anything other than 'Pythagoras said so', regarding the word of their master superior to demonstration, let us say on behalf of Pythagoras what he would
35 reply, since he has been prevented from doing so. In antiquity, down to the time of Homer, the name of wisdom was abused and defiled, being applied to anybody who knows anything whatsoever, as the poet says:

24,1 Well skilled in [every] craft by the counsel of Athena[125]

And:

A wise carpenter fitted them together.[126]

Pythagoras at any rate, who was born a long time afterwards, restricted the application of philosophy's name to only those people who have knowledge   5
of immaterial things, i.e. philosophers. The divine things are clear and manifest to them, even though they are unclear to us because of our unfitness, just as the sun is to bats. This definition then, which was stated by Pythagoras, is perfect, because all philosophy is love of wisdom, and every desire for wisdom (given that we understand knowledge of immaterial things by 'wisdom') is philosophy.

But since one needs not only a whip in arguments, but also a bit (the whip,   10
to benefit our knowledge, and the bit, to benefit our memory, because we remember what has been said in few words, but we learn what has been said in many), let us bring together the definitions in a synopsis after the long discussion. Now philosophy is knowledge of real beings or knowledge of   15
divine and human things, because real beings are either divine or human. Philosophy, because it is harmony and virtue, neglects neither the gods on account of the complexity of human affairs, nor human affairs on account of the majesty of the divine, but extends its care to each. But philosophy is also a preparation for death, since those who commit suicide loosen the bond that the Demiurge has tied, while the philosophers loosen the bond that they   20
themselves have tied. But philosophy is also becoming like god, by reason of Lycurgus' dictum, who was a philosopher:

And I am in doubt whether I shall declare you a god or a man.[127]

But philosophy is also the craft of crafts and the science of sciences, since it instructs the other crafts. But it is also love of wisdom, since it knows immaterial   25
things.

We can marvel at the great number of the definitions of philosophy. They are six, and six is a perfect [number], because it is equal to its parts. The parts of six, when joined together, neither exceed nor fall short [of six]. Thus half of six is three, a third two, a sixth one, and notice that the number is perfect: three, two and one, when added together, produce only six. Some numbers are   30
perfect, others superabundant, and others deficient. The perfect numbers resemble virtue, but the superabundant and deficient numbers resemble the opposites of virtue, namely vices. Virtue, which is harmony, is flanked by two vices; justice, for example, by greed and false modesty, wisdom by cleverness

25,1   and ignorance, courage by cowardice and rashness, temperance by dissoluteness
and insensibility. Thus the perfect number resembles virtue and harmony, and
the other disproportion or vice.

Perfect numbers are those that are equal to their own parts, like the perfect
number six, while superabundant numbers are like twelve. When the parts of
5   twelve are added together, they result in sixteen, in this way: half of twelve is
six, a third four, a quarter three, a sixth[128] two, and a twelfth one, which produces
sixteen. Deficient numbers are like eight: the parts of eight, when added
together, only make seven, in this way: half of eight is four, a fourth of eight
10   two, and an eighth one, which makes seven. There are many superabundant
and deficient numbers, but only four perfect ones. Between one and ten there
is one perfect number, six; between ten and 100, <28>; between 100 and 1,000,
<496>; and between 1,000 and 10,000, <8,128>.[129]

15   The number of the definitions of philosophy is perfect in another way,
because there are four starting-points from which the definitions have been
derived: either from the subject matter or from the goal or from superiority or
from etymology. The number four is potentially the number ten, because when
four is added to the numbers before it, i.e. to three, two, and one, it produces
20   ten. But the number ten (*deka*) is perfect, not in the sense that it is equal to its
parts, but because every number has it as a goal (*kamptêr*), and because it
contains every number, which is why it is called 'receptacle' (*dekhas*). Philosophy
also resembles the number ten because she knows all that exists.

Lecture 10

Now that we have come to understand all of philosophy as a whole through the
25   six definitions, let us next go on to examine it through division, since philosophy
also has parts. But just as we have examined three questions in the case of
definitions (1. What is definition? 2. What is the origin of the word 'definition'?
3. Where do definitions derive from?), let us examine in the same way three
questions in the case of division:

1. What is division?
2. What is further division (*epidihairesis*)?
3. What is subdivision (*hupodihairesis*)?

How could we examine these questions more appropriately than by dividing philosophy, whose invention definition and division are? Division is the 30 primary section of a subject matter, as when I divide animal, for example, into rational and irrational. Further division is the secondary section of the same subject matter, as when I divide the same [genus of] animal, for example, into mortal and immortal (division and further division are no different: whichever one we apply first is the division, and whichever one we 26,1 subordinate is the further division). Subdivision is the section of one of the divided parts, as when someone divides rational into divine and human, and irrational into carnivore and herbivore. So subdivision is the section of one of 5 the divided parts.

Now that we have grasped this from the outset, let us state the division of philosophy. Well, philosophy divides into a theoretical and a practical part. They differ from each other both in their subject matter and goal. The theoretical part has all real beings as its subject matter, with a view to knowing them, but the practical part does not have anything as its subject matter, with 10 a view to adorning it, except human souls alone. The philosopher does not profess to adorn the soul of a horse or an ox or some other [animal], unless it is that of a man. So the two parts differ in their subject matter. But they also differ in their goals: the theoretical philosopher is concerned with truth and falsehood, but makes truth alone his goal, while the practical philosopher deals with good and evil, and makes the good alone his goal. He 15 wants to know good and evil and the difference between them in order to choose some things and avoid others, i.e. the philosopher [wants to know evil] lest he say or do something evil, like the doctor who wants to know noxious substances not in order to use them, but in order to alleviate their effect through his knowledge.

Some people ask: 'if the goal of the theoretical part of philosophy is 20 truth, but that of the practical part the good, the theoretical and the practical part are the same, because things with the same goal are the same'. We can reply that there is a great difference between the two parts: we often lie to obtain the good and tell the truth to obtain the bad; for example, when a person of sound mind lends a sword to someone, but suddenly goes mad and asks for its return in order to kill himself or someone else, the borrower 25 denies [having taken it], and although he lies, he does so to obtain the

good, since if he had been truthful, he would have done so to obtain the bad.[130] But the borrower could also be partly telling the truth: the man lending his sword, when he is of sound mind, is a different person from the man who has gone mad.

30   But lest we unawares make divisions past the joints like a bad butcher[131] where there is no bipartition, using reason as our guide let us make the divisions where there is a bipartition, into as many and the kinds of parts as reason dictates,[132] just like people sawing wood who use red ochre (*miltos*) as their guide.[133] <...>[134] to divide naturally, i.e. in each division we should
35   examine why it is divided into this many and these kinds of parts. Now philosophy divides into two and not three, as those who add the logical part to it [think].[135] With god's help it will be shown in the *Analytics* that logic is not a
27,1   part of philosophy, but an instrument, because parts are natural, and instruments adventitious.[136]

Philosophy divides into two, not because, as they say in the general course (*enkuklioi exêgêseis*), philosophy is knowledge of human and divine things insofar as the theoretical part has been established with a view to the divine (they say that the theoretical part (*to theôrêtikon*) is so called because it has as
5   its goal to 'see the divine' (*ta theia horan*)), while the practical part has been established with a view to human affairs.[137] They reason falsely by reason of the homonymy of 'human': they understand 'human' in one way in the definition (where instead of what is superior [among perishable things] it is applied to every kind of perishable thing), but in another here, where it applies to man in the strict sense. So let us give two explanations of this. The first is this, that
10   philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man. Since god not only knows all real beings but also extends his care to secondary beings, it is reasonable that philosophy, which imitates god, has also brought forth the theoretical part through its universal knowledge and the practical part through care for secondary beings. This is the first explanation.

The second is that philosophy is the medicine of souls. But the soul has two
15   kinds of powers, of knowledge and of action, and both belong to our essence, as our fondness for myths from a young age and the pleasure we take in curiosity show. As Menander says:

I love you, Onesimus, even though you are useless.[138]

And further:

> Nothing is sweeter than to know everything.[139]   20

Aristotle likewise [says]: 'all men naturally desire to know; a sign of this is their love of perception'.[140] But the practical part also belongs to our essence, as the fact shows that we are vexed in periods of rest and pluck our hair or twirl a ring or soften wax because we cannot stand complete   25 idleness. So it is reasonable that the theoretical part of philosophy has been brought forth with the powers of knowledge and the practical part with those of action.

Since this is true, let us subdivide the theoretical part. It is possible to rank one part over the other: the theoretical part over the practical part, since it knows all real beings and has truth as its aim; and the practical over   30 the theoretical, because even though it does not have all real beings as its subject matter, with a view to adorning them, all the same it has the good as its goal, which is beyond truth, as we have shown,[141] since the good is with god. For this reason the good is also called 'providence' (*pronoia*), since it 'exists prior to intellect' (*pro tou nou on*), and getting at the truth is the mark of intellect.

But because universals should be put first in lectures on logic, we should first subdivide the theoretical part. Now this divides into three subparts,   35 natural science, mathematics, and theology. This is reasonable: the philosopher wants to know all real beings, and all real beings are of three kinds, either completely material, like bones, hair, and finger nails, with which natural science is concerned; or completely immaterial, like the divine, <with which theology is concerned>;[142] or material in some way, and immaterial in another,   28,1 like triangular and square shapes inscribed into wax or on tablets, with which mathematics is concerned. These last things exist in matter, let us say in [writing] tablets or on wax, but can be conceived of by the imagination even without matter, like wax that has taken on the impression of a signet ring,   5 while leaving behind the metal [ring]. For this reason Plato calls the imagination a mould (*ekmageion*), because it receives impressions and strips the forms from matter.[143]

Some people raise the puzzle why we do not also call natural science 'mathematics', given that we can at least conceive of the form of flesh without

10   matter. We reply to them that we can conceive of shapes without matter, since
      they do not require any mixture, but we cannot conceive of flesh without the
      mixture in which flesh exists, because the mixture is matter.

      Therefore we should first take up completely material and natural things,
      and after these mathematics, which is like a ladder or a bridge. But we
15   should not immediately go on from what is completely material to what is
      immaterial, because we will experience the same as people [coming] out of a
      dark cave who bring themselves to suddenly face the sun's rays. These people
      should first become accustomed to face the sun's rays in a room with suitable
20   light. So in the same way we should train ourselves in mathematics, which
      is analogous to the room with suitable light, when ascending from what is
      completely material, which is analogous to the cave, and then proceed to what
      is immaterial, which is analogous to the sun's rays. Likewise, the Pythagoreans
      say 'shape and step', in place of 'we come a step closer to theology with each
      shape, comprehending the completely immaterial things one by one in our
      minds'.[144]

      Some people raise the following puzzle: 'If we learn (*manthanomen*)
25   everything, the immaterial as well as the material and the intermediate
      objects [of mathematics], why is not everything called "mathematics"
      (*mathêmata*) and only the intermediates have usurped the common name
      instead?' We reply that there are two reasons for this. One is that the
      mathematical sciences are suitable for demonstration, because we understand
      them exactly, while we guess the others more than we learn them. This is also
      why the philosopher Marinus said: 'If only everything were mathematics
      (*mathêmata*)!'[145]

30   The second reason is that we learn [the mathematical sciences] with pleasure
      because we suffer the affection of the Lotus-eaters: when we have experience of
      the mathematical sciences we do not want to withdraw from them, but hold on
      to them like lotus. Plato certainly says the same too: 'whatever the soul receives
      willingly is wont to become hard to wash out and unchangeable',[146] just as,
      conversely, he says: 'nothing that is learned by compulsion remains part of the
35   soul'.[147] Archimedes, when barbarians were besieging the Syracusans, did not
29,1 flee because he was working out some geometric theorem, but said, '[Let them
      come] at my head, not at my line', i.e. [strike] the head and not the line. This
      ends the present lecture.

Lecture 11

Even though the theoretical part of philosophy divides into three, natural science, mathematics, and theology, the commentators only teach the division of the mathematical part at this point, because it would be suitable for beginners. On account of this, let us subdivide the mathematical part. Well then, it divides into four, into arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. This is reasonable, since mathematics deals with number and size. Some numbers exist by themselves, and others in relation, while one kind of size is unmoved, and the other in motion.

Arithmetic deals with number by itself, since it examines the natures and accidents of numbers, as when you say: 'some numbers are even, and others odd', and their species. No qualification produces one kind of number, for example when you say 'double' and 'triple', and [some] qualification produces another kind, [e.g.] 'about half this' on the one hand, and 'about a third of that' on the other hand.

Music is concerned with number in relation [to something else], since it examines the ratio between the resonance of this string and that, and so [ratios like] double, multiple, or one-and-a-half. This is why people raise the following puzzle: 'if music is concerned with the harmony of sounds and their disharmony, how can they say that it is concerned with the relations between numbers?' We reply that this is never said about Pythagoras' music, since it is the most immaterial, which makes no use of matter or strings but contemplates the relations between numbers themselves separately. They say that one time, when Pythagoras was passing by a bronze foundry, he heard a certain tune and harmony produced by the blows of the hammers. He enjoined [the metal-workers] to change their anvils. As the same sound was no less preserved he enjoined them to change their hammers in turn. When they destroyed the tune, he attached weights both to the first and the second hammers, [to find out] what ratio they have to one another and to the tunes.[148] Since Pythagoras wrote down a harmonic ratio, he compared the ratios themselves by themselves without matter, so that if this sort of relation between numbers happens to exist among saucers[149] or flutes, the same tune would be produced.

But geometry is concerned with unmoving size and the shapes on the ground, while astronomy is concerned with moving size, and not only moving

but [also] always in motion, since it is the mark of the imagination alone to think that [the heavenly bodies] are at rest.[150]

30,1   The Phoenicians invented arithmetic (they were skilled merchants who needed accounts), and the Thracians music, since they are very warlike: the cold that blocks their internal heat makes it most fierce. This is why they are
5   spirited and warlike, by the force of the heat, and skilled at dancing because they have to escape arrows quickly. The Pyrrhic dance is also found among them, which is martial, according to the words of the poet:

> Merione, although you are an excellent dancer,[151]
> [My piercing spear might have made you stop.]

But they also have marching tunes.

The Egyptians invented geometry, as we have said above,[152] because when
10   the Nile floods it throws their land boundaries into confusion.

The Chaldaeans invented astronomy, because they live under a clear sky. They are from the East and have air that is easily rarified by the heat of the sun. Alexandria, Africa, and Persia belong to the third climate.[153]

After this, let us say what the order [of the parts of mathematics] is. The mathematical sciences that are concerned with number are prior to those that
15   deal with size. This is because number is more immaterial than size, since it can receive different kinds of shapes without confusion. The same number can be circular and square at the same time, for example. A number is circular by the law of the circle, because it starts from and returns to the same point, e.g. four times six equals twenty-four. A number is square when it is multiplied by itself,
20   e.g. four times four equals sixteen, because [sixteen] has resulted from a number multiplied by itself. A number is both circular and square when it results from a number that has been multiplied by itself and starts from and returns to the same point, e.g. six times six equals thirty-six, and five times five twenty-five. Notice how [thirty-six] starts from and returns to the same point,
25   and has resulted from a number multiplied by itself. There are many circular numbers and many square ones, but twenty-five and thirty-six are circular and square at the same time, and there are no others besides these two.

In the case of sizes this is not true: the size we mentioned before[154] does not
30   admit of being shaped by another shape without confusion, since it is more material. In the same way the philosophers demonstrate that the imagination

is immaterial because it can receive multiple impressions without confusion; this is characteristic of the immaterial. Arithmetic is prior to music, since arithmetic deals with number by itself, while music deals with number in relation. But what is by itself precedes what is in relation, if at any rate someone first becomes a man, and only then a father.

Among the mathematical sciences that deal with size, geometry is prior to astronomy, since geometry deals with what is unmoving and has a constant   35
quantity, while astronomy deals with what is in motion. For rest does not need   31,1
motion, but motion needs rest, because nothing can move without rest, nor can someone walk in sandy places if he does not have somewhere to rest his foot and push off from. Each motion is concerned with something at rest and unmoved, and they say that the heavenly body moves around <something>[155]   5
at rest, I mean the earth, which is unmoved by its own nature.

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'if all mathematical sciences need the inspiration of the muses, why is only one called "music" (*mousikê*)?' We reply to this difficulty that only music has as its task to cure the affections of the soul and the body. This is also why philosophy is the greatest kind of music,   10
because it cures the affections of the soul, for which reason philosophy is also called 'medicine of souls'. Since music heals the affections of souls, they say that Pythagoras, when he saw a young boy following a girl who played the flute, enjoined her to turn the flutes around, and when the melody was destroyed the boy stopped being infatuated [with the girl].[156] But we have musical enchantments even down to the present day: we listen to theatrical melodies when we have become relaxed and unwound, but to martial tunes in opposite   15
circumstances. Sheep are persuaded by the shepherd's pipe to go out to their pastures and to return again to their pens. The trumpet urges horses on in war and stirs them up. But they say that Agamemnon, when he was about to attack Troy, did not set out before leaving behind a certain singer to protect the   20
temperance of his wife Clytemnestra.[157] This is why Aigisthus, when he wanted to sleep with Clytemnestra, was not able to (even though she was willing) until he had brought the singer to ruin on a so-called 'desolate' island. Then Aigisthus led her to his own home, as the Homeric poems explain. {And Synesius the philosopher who later became the bishop of Cyrene, when barbarians were besieging Cyrene, put them to flight with some melodies, and when they were   25
fleeing they cut down one another even though no one was pursuing them.}[158]

Lecture 12

We should say how the practical part of philosophy is divided; this is the only thing missing from the division. Now Aristotle divides it into three parts,
30   ethics, economics, and politics. The practical philosopher, professing to adorn human souls, either begins with his own adornment, and is called 'ethical' (because it would be ridiculous if he professed to adorn others while being unadorned himself), or he adorns a few people, and is called 'economic', or he adorns many, and is called 'political'.

32,1   The Platonists make four objections to this division. First, [they object] that in no division is the genus absolutely the same as one of its species. For example, animal divides into rational and irrational, and animal is not absolutely the same as rational; otherwise, how could animal itself contain the irrational? But
5   in the present definition the practical part is the same as the political. The practical philosopher adorns one person or a few or many, and likewise the political philosopher adorns one person or a few or many.

The second objection is that the species do not contain each other in any division, since divisions were thought up for the sake of discrimination. So when one species is contained in another, division does not take place. For
10   example, no one divides Socrates into hands and fingers (the hand contains the fingers); again, no one divides animal into man and Socrates (man contains Socrates), but he divides animal into man and ox, and man into hands and feet, which do not contain one another. But in the present division the species
15   contain one another: ethics is contained in economics and economics in politics, since one is contained in a few, and a few are contained in many. Further, if each city is adorned, it is clear that members of a household [will also be adorned], and if members of the household are adorned, it is clear that each of the members [will be adorned].

The third objection is that the philosopher who adorns a few people is not always called 'economic [philosopher]', and the philosopher who adorns many
20   [is not always called] 'political [philosopher]'. What does the philosopher do when there are households that have more people than certain cities? Then the economic part [of philosophy] will be political and the political part economic.

The fourth objection is the following: if we concede that skills can be divided on the basis of the number of their beneficiaries, by benefiting one

person, or a few, or many, we will thus be dividing every craft and science
unawares; for every craft and science has the goal of benefiting either one   25
person, or a few, or many.

   As they have dismissed this division [of the practical part of philosophy] on
the grounds that it is deficient, the Platonists state another one. They divide the
practical part into two, into legislation and jurisdiction, because the practical
philosopher, as a corrector of habits, lays down laws by which those who seek
to live well should live and sets the penalties which those who do not abide by   30
the prescribed laws must suffer.

   But how can it be that Aristotle's division is into three parts, while Plato's is
into two, and that Plato does not accept Aristotle's division into three? Now
Aristotle's division is into three parts because of his writings on these subjects.
With a view to ethics he wrote the *Ethics to Eudemus* to Eudemus, [his] student,   35
and another to Nicomachus, his father, the *Greater Nicomachean* [*Ethics*], and   33,1
one to Nicomachus his son, the *Lesser Nicomachean* [*Ethics*].[159] With a view to
economics he wrote the treatise *The Household Manager*, in which he says that
the household is composed of four relations: of father to son, man to woman,
master to slave, and income to expense, so that there is not more income than   5
expense (this is miserliness and illiberality) nor more expense than income
(this is profligacy), but balance.[160] With a view to politics he has written *The*
Statesman. He also wrote the *Constitutions*, two hundred and fifty in number,
which he composed as a consequence of having travelled around much of the
world with Alexander the king.   10

   But Plato's division is into two parts. With a view to legislation, he wrote his
Laws in twelve dialogues, and with a view to jurisdiction, three underworld
journeys (*nekuiai*): one in the *Gorgias* (there he discusses the judges, Minos,
Rhadamanthys, and Aiacus), one in the *Phaedo* (there he talks about the places   15
of judgement, Cocytus, Tartarus, Pyriphlegethon, and Acheron), and one in
the tenth book of the *Republic* (there he discusses the souls that are being
judged, because he presents a certain deceased man who had done great wrong
and <receives>[161] the punishment for his deeds).[162]

   But how can it be that Plato does not agree with Aristotle's division into   20
three? We demonstrate this through their differences. In the *Gorgias* Plato says:
'the same in the city and the individual, when one agrees with himself and the
others',[163] instead of saying 'there is a single disposition, ethical, economic, and

political'. By saying 'in the city' he meant the political part, by 'when one agrees with himself' the ethical, and by 'and with others' the economic part. So he

25   wants to demonstrate that when the whole city lives badly, i.e. the political part, the individual also lives badly, i.e. the ethical part, and this is why he said 'the same in the city and the individual'. But the phrase 'when one agrees with himself and the others' indicates few people, to mean the same as economics. In the *Alcibiades* he says: 'someone who persuades one man also persuades few

30   or many, and to persuade one and many men belongs to the same person'.[164] 'But it's not necessarily the case', someone says, 'that the man who persuades many people also persuades an individual, if that individual is a private citizen.' We reply that when such an individual is just like the many, then he is persuaded. Further, Plato says in another dialogue that 'there is no difference

34,1   between justice in a single city and justice in a single soul, unless the small letters differ from the larger ones in some respect'.[165] So much about these matters.

But let us speak on Aristotle's behalf, that even if he has composed writings on ethics <and economics and>[166] politics, he does not divide the practical part

5   into these [disciplines], but knows that legislation and jurisdiction pervade them. Otherwise even the grammarians would fall into the same absurdities: do not think that since they discuss letters, syllables, and words, they divide speech into three parts and do not know what the division is in this very case.

10   Aristotle too knows the division into legislation and jurisdiction, since he imposes laws and passes judgements on himself. He imposes laws [on himself], as when we sing to ourselves the truly golden verses of Pythagoras:

Most of all, feel shame towards yourself.[167]

This is the law and sound foundation of the best way of life. Someone who is held back from ruinous actions by shame [felt] towards another may go on to

15   commit them when perhaps he is quite unaware. On the other hand, someone who is held back from such actions by shame [felt] towards himself will never do them, because he himself inescapably bears witness to his own evil.

He passes judgements on himself, as when we again sing to ourselves the same golden verses:

Do not let your weary eyes accept sleep
Before you have gone over each day's deeds three times:

'Where have I sinned? What have I done? What duty have I not performed?' 20
Rebuke yourself for the shameful acts you have done, but rejoice in the good.[168]

But legislation and jurisdiction also belong to a household. The master of the household is both lawgiver and judge and rears those who obey him with his words, while casting out those who do not. But legislation and jurisdiction also belong to a city; for where could they be practised more 25
suitably than in a city?

Notes

1 Cf. Plotinus, *Enn*. 1.8.2, 2–3.

2 Lines 4–8, a note on grammar, fit awkwardly into the context, an opening exhortation to philosophy which takes its starting point from the desire that all things have for the good. One might suspect (as Busse seems to have done) that the lines in question are an intrusion into the text, e.g. a marginal note that was wrongly copied into the main text.

3 Reading *ou pantôs . . . <ontos>*. Busse already recommends the insertion of *ontos*, but *pantôs* should be maintained. One would expect Elias to say that the apparent good is not *always* the real good; in some cases, of course, the apparent good and the real good will coincide.

4 A loose quotation of Plato, *Timaeus* 47B.

5 For other uses of this fanciful etymology of the word 'man' (*anthrôpos*) in the ancient commentators, see e.g. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 57,16–17; Proclus, *in Crat.* 16,42–3; Simplicius, *in Cael.* 281,20–1.

6 The addition *kai anamimnêskesthai* in a single MS (Parisinus 1973) helps to ease the transition from discussing the good for man to his ability to recollect; Busse rightly recommends its inclusion into the text.

7 Cf. Homer, *Od.* 27.290–327.

8 For this etymology, inspired by Plato, *Crat.* 437A, see also Olympiodorus, *in Phd.* 11.3, 6 Westerink.

9 Much of the content of Proclus' commentary on the *Phaedo* is preserved in the notes from *Phaedo* courses held by Olympiodorus and Damascius. See Westerink 1976–7 for an edition of these lecture courses. For a discussion of these commentaries and their relation to Proclus, see also Gertz 2011, 7–14.

10 Delete *auta* in line 13.

11 Reading *phulaxanta* in place of *phulaxas*, as recommended by Busse.

12 Reading *labonta* in place of *labôn*, as suggested by Busse.

13 Reading *autês* for *autous*, as suggested by Busse.

14 *Kreittontos* is a misprint, for *kreittonos*.

15 Cf. Aristotle, *An. Post.* 2.1.

16 Following Busse's suggestion, I read *zêtoumen* in place of *zêtêma*.

17 Elias' first example, that of the fictitious goat-stag (*tragelaphos*), is a commonplace in ancient commentaries. His second example, here translated as 'the so-and-so'

(*skindapsos*), originally referred to a stringed musical instrument, but was later used in the sense of 'word without meaning' (see the entry for *skindapsos* in LSJ).

18 The controversy alluded to here concerns the question whether there exists a sphere beyond the fixed stars.

19 Elias has the Sceptics in mind, whom he charges with denying the existence of philosophy. For a wider discussion of sceptical arguments in the ancient commentators, see Flückiger 2005.

20 Aristotle, *Exhortation* fr. 51 Rose. Cf. David, *Prol.* 9,2–5 and Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 144,15–17.

21 Reading <*tekhnai, hoion*> after *philosophias* would improve the syntax of this sentence.

22 Reading <*eurêmasi*> after *heautês*, as Busse suggests, would make the sentence clearer, and needs to be understood in any event.

23 Busse correctly points out that <*anthrôpos*> should be understood before *anthrôpon*; it may have dropped out as a result of haplography.

24 Reading *exêgêtikoi* in place of *exêgêtai*.

25 I suspect that *anti tou* is a corruption of *hote*, which would correspond to the *tote* at the beginning of the sentence.

26 Reading *ellipôsi* for *elleipsôsi*, as Busse rightly suggests.

27 Reading *enelipon* (aorist) in place of *eneleipon* (imperfect), as Busse recommends.

28 The word *angelous* ('angels') should be excised, as Busse suggests; it is a later intrusion.

29 Inserting <*hoion*>, as Busse suggests.

30 Elias' etymology of 'solecism' is fanciful and probably incorrect; a more plausible explanation for the word's origin derives it from the Greek colony Soli (cf. Strabo, *Geography* 14.2.28, 67).

31 Reading <*kai*> *kourei* <*kai*> *paidotribêi* with MS Mon. 399.

32 Elias may be referring to Galen's work *On Doctrines*; a possible parallel is 2, 2–25 Mueller, as Roueché has pointed out (1999, 154 n. 5).

33 See Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 590–1 for the story of Phrune's trial.

34 *teleios horismos* should be read in reverse, as *horismos teleios*, as Busse notes.

35 See Herodotus, *Histories* 1.65.

36 The text here also contains the following remark: 'according to the false beliefs of the Greek' (*kata tas Hellênôn phêmi pseudeis doxas*). It is most likely an interpolation by a Christian copyist; Busse already suggests excising it.

37 A quotation of Plato, *Laws* 624A. As Busse suggests, reading *tês diatheseôs*, which also occurs in Plato, would give better sense than the MS reading *tês aitias*.

38 Homer, *Odyssey* 19.179.

39 Inserting <*theon*> after *anthrôpon*.

40 See 6,3–4 above.

41 Plato, *Theaetetus* 176A.

42 Plato, *Phaedo* 64A.

43 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.2, 982a.

44 See the Appendix for an illustration of Elias' division of the six definitions of philosophy.

45 Inserting *tên* before *eita*, as Busse suggests, makes grammatical sense here.

46 Plato, *Phaedo* 67B.

47 Homer, *Iliad* 6.236.

48 Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 61A.

49 Inserting *<hoion>* before *ean*, as suggested by Busse.

50 Cf. Euripides, *Hippolytus* 727.

51 Euripides, *Medea* 1078–9.

52 The expression is Aristotle's; cf. *Metaphysics*, 3.1, 1003a20–21, for example. Its attribution to Pythagoras is curious and may be explained through the influence of some Neopythagorean writings that are lost to us. On this issue, see O'Meara 2013, 411–12. Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 5,29.

53 I have followed Busse's suggestion to insert *<dêlôsêi hoti hê philosophia>* after *hina*, where there seems to be a lacuna.

54 The phrase *to pothen eisi* fits somewhat awkwardly into the sentence, and may be excised, as Busse recommends.

55 Homer, *Iliad* 1.69–70.

56 The *kai* before *legomen* is better excised, as Busse recommends, and is not translated here.

57 Perhaps reading *tôn ontôn* for *autôn* is preferable here, as Busse seems to think.

58 The attribution of this definition to Pythagoras is suspect, see n. 52 above. Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 5,30.

59 The text in angle brackets translates a conjecture by Busse (*<dia to entautha ha ho prôtos horismos>*); the text is lacunose, and some supplement is needed.

60 Delete the second *auton* in line 30.

61 Cf. 11,19–25 above.

62 Cf. e.g. Homer, *Iliad* 1.554.

63 The text here also contains the following remark: 'according to the false beliefs of the Greek' (*kata tas Hellênôn phêmi pseudeis doxas*). It is most likely an interpolation by a Christian copyist; Busse brackets it. Cf. 7,3–4 above for a similar intrusion.

64 Plato, *Phaedo* 64A.

65 Elias here ingeniously subverts the actual sense of the word *kinduneuousin*, which affects some degree of doubt on the part of the speaker, and therefore has nothing to do with conclusions derived from necessary demonstrations.

66 Plato, *Phaedo* 62B.

67 Cf. the similar discussion in Lectures 10–11 of David's *Introduction to Philosophy* (pp. 112–17 in this volume).

68 Plato, *Phaedo* 83D.

69 Homer, *Odyssey* 12.22.

70 Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 81D.

71 Homer, *Iliad* 16.857.

72 The text is lacunose at this point; I am translating a conjecture by Busse in angle brackets (<*rhipsas heauton ek tou teikhous eteleutêse*>).

73 Callimachus, *Epigrams* 25.

74 Cf. David, *Prol.* 32,1–2, who attributes the epigram to Olympiodorus.

75 Cf. *SVF* 3.768 and Olympiodorus, *in Phd.* 1.8, 19–39.

76 Cf. Euripides, *Phoenissae* 1090.1313–14.

77 Cf. Plutarch, *Quaest. Conv.* 635E; Joannes Lydus, *De mens.* 4.42.28 Wuensch.

78 Cf. Olympiodorus, *in Phd.* 1.8, 29–32 and David, *Prol.* 33,9–14 for this story.

79 Cf. Plato, *Republic* 407C–D.

80 Reading <*ho*> *Arkhigenês* <*hôs*> [*ho* del.] *stratopedon therapeuôn*.

81 Sophocles, *Ajax* 581.

82 Theognis, *Elegies* 175–6.

83 Plotinus did write a treatise on justified suicide (*Enneads* 1.9), but its content is nothing like what Elias reports here. Most likely, Elias never read Plotinus directly, but relies on a commentary by Proclus (perhaps through excerpts preserved by Elias' teacher Olympiodorus), probably on the *Enneads* (which would explain the attribution to Plotinus most easily), or possibly on Plato's *Phaedo*. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Westerink 1964. Note here that Elias does not adopt the position of his teacher Olympiodorus, who permits suicide in certain circumstances. For Olympiodorus' position, see Gertz 2011, 46–50.

84 Reading *heauton* with P, in place of *heauto*.

85 Homer, *Iliad* 24.54.

86 Elias somewhat misrepresents the Platonic passage (*Theaetetus* 176A), which is a single uninterrupted speech by Socrates, not a back-and-forth between Socrates and Theodorus.

87 Cf. the parallels identified by Westerink 1990, 362 (Ammonius, *Isag.* 3,9–15; David, *Prol.* 17,2–9; Olympiodorus, *in Gorg.* 65,20–4).

88 Homer, *Odyssey* 8.325.

89 Homer, *Odyssey* 10.306.

90 Homer, *Odyssey* 4.379.

91 It is difficult to tell what authors and passages Elias has in mind here, given the very general nature of his appeal to 'the poets'.

92 Reading *epei* in place *epeidê*.

93 I am here following Busse in excising the words *to methekton agathon* ('the participated goodness') in line 2. They merely obscure the train of thought, and may be the result of a copying error (cf. *agathon methekton* below in line 3).

94 Homer, *Iliad* 5.441–2.

95 Plato, *Laws* 2, 653A.

96 Inserting *gar* after *hôsper*, as Busse recommends.

97 Reading *hôsper* for *hoti*, as suggested by Busse.

98 'To what is better': i.e. towards god or the divine.

99 In other words, a republic is an institution between equals, i.e. men, which is why it is concerned with justice.

100 Reading *anousios* in place of the corrupt *anhosios*, as Busse suggest; parallels are Proclus, *in Alc.* 271,23–4 and Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 73,5–6; 92,15–17. *Anousios* can mean 'bereft of substance (*ousia*)', bringing it closer in meaning to being 'dead' (*nekros*), but also 'bereft of property'.

101 I read *autên tên zôên* with P.

102 Following Busse's suggestion, I read *tôi kheironi têi epithumiai*, in place of *têi epithumiai têi kheironi*.

103 Elias' discussion of the third question is based on a false premise: the words 'and by knowing this' do not occur in the relevant passage in Plato's *Theaetetus* (176A). Perhaps Elias is misremembering, and mistakenly anticipating the later mention of 'knowledge' (*gnôsis*) at 176C4–5; alternatively, his text of Plato may have been changed for ideological purposes, so as to allow discussion of the different grades of virtue.

104 Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 69B, and Plotinus, *Enn.* 1.3.6, 15.22–4.

105 Cf. e.g. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.2, 982a.

106 This statement is also attributed to the Stoic philosopher Aristo of Chios and the Cynic Bion. Cf. *SVF* 1.350.

107 Reading *gar* in place of *de*.

108 See Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* 2.3.

109 Reading *to <ontôs> kalon*, as Busse suggests.

110 The Greek text reverses the logical order: we should expect 'if a group of people can see one another, then they are forming a circle [and not a straight line]' rather than 'if they are forming a circle, then they can see each other'. I am grateful to Mossman Roueché for pointing this out to me.

111 On the design of Alexandrian lecture theatres, see Sorabji 2015.

112 The entry for *barullion* in LSJ offers little help here, mentioning only 'an instrument to find the weight of liquids', or hydrometer. However, in the present

passage *barullion* has to mean 'plum-bob', i.e. a small, usually metallic, weight suspended on a string. Cf. Elias, *in Isag.* 117,10–11. I am grateful to Mossman Roueché and Donald Russell for their comments on this passage.

113 Elias' point here appears to be that a plumb bob would be of no use in constructing anything that is not vertical. This would justify taking *pteron* to refer to 'sloping side walls', e.g. of an Egyptian temple, rather than its common meaning 'colonnade'. I am grateful to Mossman Roueché for his comments on the passage.

114 Inserting *dêlousês* before *dikaian*, as Busse suggests.

115 Cf. Pindar, *Pythian* 6.28–32.

116 Archilochus fr. 5.3–4 (tr. Gerber).

117 Cf. Pseudo-Elias, *in Isag.* 12,19, and Olympiodorus, *in Gorg.* 26.7, 11, two parallels identified by Westerink 1990, 362.

118 See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.59, and cf. also Pseudo-Elias, *in Isag.* 12,18; Olympiodorus, *in Gorg.* 36.3, 9–11, two parallels identified by Westerink 1990, 362.

119 I suspect a lacuna before *phêsin*; presumably, though, the subject is still philosophy (cf. line 27 above, 'philosophy says . . .').

120 Cf. Plato, *Alcibiades* 129E–131B.

121 Plato, *Gorgias* 469C.

122 'In their usual sense': i.e., when said individually.

123 For this sophistical argument, see Plato, *Euthydemus* 298D–E.

124 One would expect Elias to object, not that every craft and science desires its subject matter, but that they all desire *knowledge* of their subject matter, and that in this respect they are 'love of wisdom' without being philosophy. Busse suggests replacing the word 'subject matter' (*hupokeimenon*) with 'goal' (*telos*), presumably with the thought that knowledge of a particular subject matter is the goal of every craft or science.

125 Homer, *Iliad* 15.412.

126 Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 9.13 for this quotation. It may be an imprecise recollection of Homer, *Iliad* 23.712, as Busse suggests, where the carpenter is described as *klutos* ('famous') rather than *sophos* ('wise').

127 Herodotus, *Histories* 1.65. See also 6,32–7,2 above.

128 Busse's text prints *henton*, clearly a misprint for *hekton*.

129 For the perfect numbers greater than six that Elias gives here, I have substituted the ordinal numbers in the MSS with cardinal numbers, following Busse's suggestion.

130 See Plato, *Republic* 331C–D.

131 Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 265E.

132 Perhaps reading *<an> hupogoreuêi* would improve the grammar of this awkward sentence.

133 Red ochre would be applied to a thin measuring-line, which could then be used to cut along a straight edge; cf. Eustathius, *Comm. ad Hom. Il.* 3.748, 27–9 van der Falk.

134 Busse rightly notes a lacuna here; his conjecture for a possible supplement, in angle brackets, is: 'let us make the divisions where there is a bipartition, <but not where there isn't one>'.

135 One should probably insert, or at any rate understand, *nomizousin*.

136 The reference seems to be to Elias' own lectures on the *Prior Analytics*, where the status of logic is discussed at length; see *in An. Pr.* 134,1–138,13 Westerink.

137 For the 'general course', see the note on Olympiodorus, *in Phaed.* 1.11, 6, in Westerink 1976.

138 Menander, fr. 849 Kock.

139 Menander, *Epitrepontes* fr. 2.2–3 Sandbach; fr. 850 Kock.

140 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1, 980a21–2.

141 See 26,20–8 above.

142 The words in angle brackets translate Busse's suggested supplement *<peri ha kataginetai to theologikon>*, which follows the way in which physics and mathematics are described in the present passage.

143 Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus* 194D.

144 See also Proclus, *in Eucl.* 84,16–17 Friedlein.

145 Elias is our only source for this utterance by Marinus of Neapolis, the successor and biographer of the great scholarch Proclus.

146 Plato, *Republic* 378E.

147 Plato, *Republic* 536E.

148 Cf. Iamblichus, *De vit. Pyth.* 26.115–16 Klein.

149 Elias seems to have in mind music produced by striking saucers with some form of hammer; see the entry for *oxubaphon* in LSJ, who refer to a relevant use of this word in the Suda, a Byzantine encyclopedia (see the entry 'Diocles').

150 Cf. Cleomedes, *On the Circular Motions of the Celestial Bodies* 130,15–16 and Plotinus, *Enn.* 2.9.18, 44–6.

151 Homer, *Iliad* 16.617.

152 See 4,35–5,4 above.

153 Elias here presupposes a division of the earth into seven latitudinal bands, each a different 'climate' (*klima*), dating back to Hellenistic times. It was common currency among astronomers, and is used, e.g., in Ptolemy's *Handy Tables*. See also Pliny, *Natural History* 6.211–18, and cf. Pseudo-Elias, *Prol.* 19,24 for the clear

sky under which the Chaldaeans live. I am grateful to Mossman Roueché for his comments on this point.

154 See 29,10.31–4 above.

155 Inserting *ti* after *peri*.

156 The vignette about Pythagoras' love cure in lines 11–14 has been suspected of being an intrusion into the text, but on no solid grounds. Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 13,24–7 and Olympiodorus, *in Gorg.* 5.3,12–5.4,1, two parallel passages identified by Westerink 1990, 362.

157 See Homer, *Odyssey* 3.65–6.

158 This legend about the most celebrated student in Hypatia of Alexandria's circle, Synesius of Cyrene (born *c.* 370 CE, died *c.* 414 CE), contains a kernel of truth: Cyrene suffered from repeated barbarian incursions during his lifetime. It is interesting that Elias here uses the example of a Christian bishop, but the passage which is loosely tacked on to the end of a chapter that is essentially complete could suggest that it is a later intrusion into the text, as Busse 1892, 12 implies. I am grateful to Mossman Roueché for his comments on the passage.

159 The 'greater' *Nicomachean Ethics* is probably identical with Aristotle's *Magna Moralia*; the 'lesser' *Nicomachean Ethics* is the widely studied treatise known to us by that name.

160 Cf. fr. 182 Rose.

161 Reading *didomenon* in place of *didonta*.

162 On the three afterlife accounts in Plato, see especially *Gorgias* 523E–524A; *Phaedo* 111C–114B; *Republic* 615C.

163 The reference is in fact to Plato, *Alcibiades* 126D, rather than to the *Gorgias*.

164 Plato, *Alcibiades* 114C–D. Cf. Olympiodorus' comments on the *Alcibiades* passage: 'Does the person who is persuasive to one mindless person also persuade a multitude of philosophers? Or does the person who is persuasive of a multitude of philosophers also persuade one mindless person? We reply that Plato resolves all of these questions, in one phrase, when he says "each one by one" (*hena hekaston*). For the person who persuades one also persuades many, since those "ones" (*ta hena*), if I may say so, are part of the many, and he [*sc.* Plato] made this clear by using the word "*each* one" (*hekaston*). Moreover, since the many is made up from individuals (*henades*), the person who persuades the many also persuades the one [in it]' (*in Alc.* 111,16–20, tr. M. Griffin).

165 Plato, *Republic* 368D–E.

166 Following a suggestion by Busse, I read *êthika <kai oikonomika kai>* [*ê* del.] *politika*.

167 See Hierocles, *in Carm. Aur.* 9,2 Koehler.

168 See Hierocles, *in Carm. Aur.* 19,1–5; Ammonius, *in Isag.* 15,24–16,3.

Appendix: The definitions of philosophy according to Elias, *Prol.* 8,20–7

Philosophy

Name

Existence in first knowledge

Definition from etymology ('Philosophy is love of wisdom')

First knowledge

Knowledge

Definition from superiority ('Philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences')

Definitions from the subject matter

Definitions from the goal

Definition from universal subject matter ('Philosophy is knowledge of real being *qua* real beings')

Definition from particular subject matter ('Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things')

Definition from the remote goal ('Philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man')

Definition from the proximate goal ('Philosophy is a preparation for death')

English–Greek Glossary

accident: *sumbainon*; *sumbebêkos*

accuracy: *akribeia*

adorn: *kosmein*

advantageous (n.): *sumpheron, to*

animal: *zôon*

appetitive: *epithumêtikos*

appoint: *kathistanai*

archangelic: *arkhangêlikos*

argument: *logos*

arithmetic: *arithmêtikê*

article: *arthron*

assembly: *sunagôgê*

astronomy: *astronomia*

barbarism: *barbarismos*

be borne upon: *epokheisthai*

becoming like: *homoiôisis*

being vicious: *kakôs einai*

bereft of substance: *anousios*

be wronged: *adikeisthai*

bipartition: *diphuïa*

bit (n.): *khalinos*

body: *sôma*

body-loving: *philosômatos*

boundary-stone: *horothesion*

care (n.): *pronoia*

cause (n.): *aitia*; *aition, to*

circular: *diallêlos*

clarity: *saphêneia*

co-exist: *sunhistanai*

collection: *sôreia*

commit suicide: *exagein heauton*

common (adj.): *koinos*

compressed: *sunestalmenos*

concern (n.): *epimeleia*

concise: *suntomos*

concision: *suntomia*

contemplation: *theôria*

contrivance: *mêkhanê*

convert (v.): *antistrephein*

correspond: *isostrophos esti*

courage: *andria*

courageous: *andreios*

craft: *tekhnê*

curiosity: *periergia*

deficient: *ellipês*

to be deficient: *elleipein*

define: *horizein*

definiendum: *horizomenon*

definition: *horismos*

deny: *anhairein*

departing [from life] with justification:
    eulogos exagôgê

describe: *hupographein*

description: *hupographê*

designating: *dêlôtikos*

desire (n.): *ephesis; epithumia*

desire (v.): *oregein*

discovery: *eurêma*

discrimination: *diakrisis*

disdain (n.): *periphronêsai*

disposition: *hexis*

dissolute: *akolastos*

divine (n.): *theion, to*

division: *diairesis*

do away with: *anatrepein*

do wrong: *adikein*

drunkenness: *methê*

economics: *oikonomikon, to*

education: *paideia*

effect (n.): *aitiaton, to*

effort: *ponos*

elements: *stoikheia*

encompass: *sumperilambanein*

end (n.): *peras*

equality: *ison, to*

essence: *to ti estin*

essential: *kat'ousian*

eternal: *aïdios*

ethical: *êthikos*

ethics: *êthikon, to*

etymology: *etumologia*

even: *artios*

to be excessive: *pleonazein*

expanded: *exêplômenos*

existence: *huparxis*

falsehood: *pseudos, to*

feast (n.): *sumposion*

fine (n.): *kalon, to*

fly (v.): *hiptasthai*

form (n.): *eidos*

fulfill one's proper function: *idiopragein*

further division: *epidihairesis*

general course: *enkuklioi exêgêseis*

genus: *genos*

geometry: *geômetria*

give: *khôrêgein*

goal: *kamptêr*; *telos*

goat-stag: *tragelaphos*

god: *theos*

good (n.): *agathon, to*

goods, external: *ektos, ta*

goodness: *agathon, to*; *agathotês*

goodness itself: *autoagathotês*

grandeur: *hupsos*

habituation: *sunêtheia*

harmony: *harmonia*

humanity: *anthrôpeion, to*

ignorance: *agnoia*

image: *eikôn*

imitate: *mimeisthai*

immaterial: *ahulos*

impiety: *anhosiotês*

imply one another: *antistrephein*

impression: *tupos*

individually: *idiai*

injustice: *adikia*

inquiry: *zêtein, to*

instrument: *organon, to*

intellect: *nous*

interpretation: *exêgêsis*

irrational: *alogos*

just: *dikaios*

justice: *dikaiosunê*

jurisdiction: *dikastikon, to*

king: *basileus*

know: *eidenai*; *gignôskein*

knowledge: *epistêmê*; *gnôsis*;
    gnôstikon, to

lack of: *adunamia*

law-giver: *nomothetês*

lecture: *praxis*; *theôria*

legislation: *nomothêtikon, to*

like a ladder: *klimakêdon*

line: *grammê*

madness: *lêros*
make predictions: *progignôskein*
mathematics: *mathêmatikon, to*;
    mathêmata
medicine: *iatrikê*
memory: *mnêmê*
metaphorically: *ek metaphoras*
mixture: *krasis*
mortal: *thnêtos*
motion (n.): *kinêsis*
mould (n.): *ekmageion*
multiply: *poluplasiazein*
music: *mousikê*
music-ness: *mousikotês*

name (n.): *onoma*
natural: *phusikos*
natural philosopher: *phusikos*
    philosophos, ho
natural science: *phusikon, to*
nature: *phusis*
non-being: *mê einai, to*
nonsense: *adoleskhia*
number (n.): *arithmos*

odd: *perittos*
omnipotence: *pantodunamon, to*
order (n.): *kosmos*, *taxis*
original: *paradeigma*
opposition: *antithesis*

part (n.): *meros*
participate: *metekhein*
particular (adj.): *merikos*
participated: *methekton*
perception: *aisthêsis*
perfect: *teleios*

perishable: *phthartos*
philosopher of the liberal arts: *mousikos*
    philosophos, ho
piety: *hosion, to*
pious: *hosios*
pleasurable indulgence: *hêdupatheia*
pleasure: *hêdonê*
plumb-bob: *barullion*
political philosopher: *politikos*
    philosophos, ho
politics: *politikon, to*
possession: *ktêma*
power: *dunamis*; *dunaton, to*
practise philosophy: *philosophein*
preparation: *meletê*
prison: *phroura*
private (adj.): *idiôtikos*
proof: *apodeixis*
proper duty: *kathêkon*
providence: *pronoia*
proximate: *prosekhes*
purify: *kathairein*
puzzle (n.): *aporia*

quantity: *poson, to*

raise a puzzle: *aporein*
ratio: *logos*
rational: *logikos*
reality: *pragma*
reason (n.): *logos*
receptacle: *dekhas*
receptive: *dektikos*
reciprocity: *anti, to*
recollection: *anamnêsis*
redoubling: *epanadiplasiasmos*
remote: *porrô*
resourceful: *mêkhanikos*
rule (v.): *arkhein*, *kratein*

science: *epistêmê*

send off: *apopempein*

separate (adj.): *perikhôristos*

shadow-painting: *skiagraphia*

shield (n.): *aspis*

signet-ring: *sphragistêr*

size: *megethos*

skill: *hexis*

slavish: *andrapodôdês*

so-and-so: *skindapsos*

solecism: *soloikismos*

soul: *psukhê*

sound (n.): *phônê*

speak Attic Greek: *attikizein*

species: *eidos*

specious argument: *paralogismos*

spirit: *thumos*

spirited: *thumikos*

spirited part: *thumoeidês, to*

stand in conflict: *antiprattein*

starting-point: *arkhê*

statement: *logos*

subdivision: *hupodihairesis*

to be the subject matter:
     hupokeisthai

substance: *ousia*

substrate: *hupokeimenon, to*

superabundant: *hupertelês*

superfluous: *periergos*

superior (adj.): *timiôteron*

superiority: *huperokhê*

surpass: *pleonektein*

syllogism: *sullogismos*

talk nonsense: *adoleskhein*

task: *ergon*

temperance: *sôphrosunê*

theology: *theologikon, to*

truth: *alêthes, to*

uncertain: *amphiballomenos*

uncertainty: *amphibolia*

unfit: *anepitêdeios*

unfitness: *anepitêdeiotês*

universe: *kosmos*

universal: *katholos, katholou*

useless: *periergos*

virtue: *aretê*

voluntary: *prohairetikos*

well-being: *eu einai, to*

whip: *mastix*

wisdom: *phronêsis, sophia*

without a name: *anônumos*

without confusion: *asunkhutôs*

word: *lexis*; *phônê*

writing: *sungramma*

Greek–English Index

adikein, do wrong, 22,27–23,3

adikeisthai, be wronged, 19,3; 22,27–23,3

adikia, injustice, 18,15

adoleskhein, talk nonsense, 9,23; 18,9–11

adoleskhia, nonsense, 9,20

adunamia, lack of, 16,33–4

agathon, to, goodness, 16,21.35; 17,1–
    3.15.33; good (n.), 1,3–2,6; 26,14–26; 27,
    31–3

agathotês, goodness, 16,27.30.34

agnoia, ignorance, 6,30; 20,29

ahulos, immaterial, 24,5.9.25; 27,38–9;
    28,15.21–4; 29,21; 30,15.30

aïdios, eternal, 11,22

aisthêsis, perception 12,25; 13,1.30; 27,22

aitia, cause 3,23; 17,21; reason, *passim*

aitiaton, to, effect, 9,17; 11,8; 22,9–10

aition, to, cause, 9,17; 22,9–10

akolastos, dissolute, 9,26; 12,30; 19,34;
    20,13

akribeia, accuracy, 11,32–3

alêtheia, truth, 26,13

alêthes, to, truth, 26,14.20; 27,29–32

alogos, irrational, 2,7–24; 19,8.34; 20,7;
    25,31; 26,3; 32,3–4

amphiballomenos, uncertain, 3,9; 7,5–6; 9,11

amphibolia, uncertainty, 7,8–12

anamnêsis, recollection, 2,17–24

andrapodôdês, slavish, 20,9

andreios, courageous, 19,34–5; 20,12

andria, courage, 18,30; 19,17.20–2.27;
    24,34

anepitêdeios, unfit, 15,25; 16,1

anepitêdeiotês, unfitness, 24,6

anhairein, deny, 3,12–5

anhosiotês, impiety, 18,15

anônumos, without a name, 8,22

anousios, bereft of substance, 19,4

anthrôpeion, to, humanity, 11,23

anti, to, reciprocity, 5,5

antiprattein, stand in conflict, 20,11

antistrephein, convert, 5,7.17; 23,28; imply
    one another, 20,11.15

antithesis, opposition, 13,15

apodeixis, proof, 3,13.17; 9,23–4; 12,12;
    23,33; 28,27

apopempein, send off, 21,13

aporein, raise a puzzle, 4,27; 8,20.27; 10,26;
    11,24.27; *passim*

aporia, puzzle (n.), 11,3

arête, virtue, 19,25; 23,28; 24,16.31;
    25,2

arithmêtikê, arithmetic, 29,7.11; 30,1.30

arithmos, number (n.), 24,30–1;
    25,1.3.15–20; 29,9–30,21; 33,9

arkhangêlikos, archangelic, 20,34

arkhê, starting-point, 23,26

arkhein, rule (v.), 9,31–2; 13,31; 18,34–6

arthron, article, 10,29

artios, even, 29,13

aspis, shield (n.), 22,21

astronomia, astronomy, 29,8.32;
    30,10.34–5

asunkhutôs, without confusion, 30,16

attikizein, speak Attic Greek, 3,32

autoagathotês, goodness itself, 17,2

73

David

Introduction to Philosophy

Translation

Textual Emendations

Below I list departures from Busse's main text (Busse 1904), often to signal agreement with proposals made by other scholars or the editor himself in his apparatus criticus.

1,19	Read *hê anastros sphaira* with V.
2,1	Insert *<anuparktôn kai tôn>* after *tôn*, with Calzolari.
2,2	Read *<ou> zêtoumen <to ei esti, alla> to ti esti*, with Calzolari.
2,10–12	Maintain the text from *isteon de* to *ti estin*.
3,23	Accept V's addition *peri poiou sêmainomenou êgoun*.
3,30	Insert *ê hupographêi* after *horismôi*.
3,34	Read *ara* for *gar*.
7,27	Accept V's addition of *dunatai gar to auto morion kai leukon einai kai melan kata allon khronon ginesthai apo hêliokaias*.
8,2	Read *leukou* in place of *melanos*.
9,34	Insert *hoi* before *mutheuontes*.
14,23–4	Read *authoristos <ho> horos*.
16,8	Punctuate: *tais lexesin, ho horos ouk elleipei ktl.*
18,10	Insert *kai* before *homoiôsis*.
18,31	Read *tou antilupêsai ton lupêsanta* in place of *tou lupêsai ton antilupêsanta*.
20,8–10	Excise the words from *ouk eisin* to *monou*.
20,26	Insert *isteon hoti hex eisin tês philosophias horismoi* before *eisi de houtoi*, with Calzolari.
26,1	Excise *aei*.
26,2	Read *ta auta* for *kai alla*, and *phthengomena* (with KV) in place of *phthengomenon*.
27,26–7	Excise the words *anô men* down to *to hulikon*.
31,15	Read *legetai* in place of *esti*.
34,11	Maintain *brexon* with the MSS, in place of Busse's *orexon*.
39,16	Read *to men . . . to de* in place of *ton men . . . ton de*.

39,20	Insert *ti* after *mega*.
42,19	Include *oude gar tiktei ôon, alla zôon* after *zôotokei*, with K V.
45,30	Read *houtos* in place of *autos*, as Busse suggests.
46,6	Add the following supplement after *Puthagoras*: *<tên philosophian horizetai, all'eita atopôs* (or *alogôs*)>.
46,9	Punctuate *kata tou tektonos theis.* Add the following supplement thereafter: *<Kai ho Puthagoras ton sophon horizomenos>.*
47,7	Excise the words *hôsper angelos*, as Busse recommends.
51,26	Read *houtos* in place of *autos*, with Busse.
53,33	Add the following supplement after the second *deka*: *<autos de ou tiktetai kata pollaplasiasmon ex allou arithmou entos tês dekados>.*
54,31–55,1	Excise the words *kai dia diaireseôs manthanomen ta merê autês.*
56,28	Read *<katholikôteron kai em>periektikôteron <autou on>*, with V.
64,13	Read *tina* in place of *ti.*
70,31	Insert *mias* before *philosophias* with T V.

Introduction to Philosophy, Taken from the Lectures of David, the Most God-loving and Godly Philosopher[1]

Lecture 1

Those who love philosophical discourses, if they have touched the pleasure that derives from them with the tip of their finger, and who have bid farewell to all earthly cares, are clearly driven towards them by some kind of sober madness. They immediately evoke in their souls love for these arguments, through knowledge of what exists. As we will learn with god's help, philosophy is knowledge of what exists. So because a wise love and great eagerness have driven us too into this arena, let us plunge ourselves into the divine strife of philosophy, without considering the present task a burden. Rather, since we are looking towards the goal of god's promise of philosophy, let us consider every toil as slight and secondary compared to it.

But I have decided to put off the general explanation for a little while, in obedience to Aristotle's rule[2] that these four points must be examined in the case of just about everything:

1. Does it exist?
2. What is it?
3. What sort of thing is it?
4. Why is it?

And it is reasonable that we should examine these four points. For some things do not have existence, as for example the goat-stag, 'the so-and-so', 'Boo',[3] and all the rest that has been fashioned by our understanding, while other things do have existence. Again, among those things that have existence, some have a doubtful one, for example <the>[4] sphere that carries no stars[5] or the antipodes (there is doubt whether these exist or not), but others have an existence that is

not in doubt but agreed upon, for example man or ox. In the case of things

2,1   <that do not exist or>[6] that have a doubtful existence, we examine <not what they are, but> whether they exist, but in the case of those things that have an agreed upon existence, we examine <not whether they exist, but>[7] what they are. What something is can be known either by its name or by its definition: by its name, as when we look at something and ask what it is, and say 'It is a man';

5   by its definition, as when we say 'A rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge'.

Next, since things do not only share something in common but also differ from one another (for example, animals do not only share a common genus insofar as they are animals, but also differ insofar as some are rational and others irrational), we examine for this reason what sort of thing each is, in

10   order to recognize their differences. For the differences appear together plainly in the definition.

We should know that whenever [the answer to the question] 'What is it?' is indicated by the name [of that thing], one should examine what sort of thing it is. But whenever [the answer to the question] 'What is it?' is known by definition, one should not examine what sort of thing it is, but rather why it is.[8]

Since all things look towards some goal and neither the Demiurge nor nature nor craft has contrived anything in vain, let us examine the question

15   'Why is it?', e.g. 'Why is there a bed?' – So that men may rest. And again, 'Why does man exist? – To adorn this universe, since it would be imperfect if humankind did not exist, as Plato shows in the *Timaeus*. Plato has the Demiurge say after the creation of heaven and earth: 'Three mortal kinds remain still

20   ungenerated. Heaven will be imperfect if these do not come to be.'[9] He calls the cosmos 'heaven', referring to the contained by the container.[10]

Philosophy is our subject, then, the finest and most honourable among human activities, whose existence we ourselves do not call into question. But

25   some people, who are like the blind debating about colours whom the Stagirite mentions[11] (those who are blind by birth cannot debate about colours, since they do not know what colour is), call the existence of philosophy into question. Let us put the arguments of these people in the open and attempt their refutation as best we can, so as to expose their folly plainly. We will learn in the next lecture what the arguments of these people are.

Lecture 2

As we have promised in the previous lecture, let us now come to set out the arguments of those who want to deny the existence of philosophy, and attempt their refutation as best we can. The first argument of those who wish to do away with philosophy is this: 'Being is a homonym, homonyms cannot be brought under a definition, things that cannot be brought under a definition are not objects of knowledge; therefore being is unknowable.[12] So if philosophy is knowledge of beings, it is unknowable, since being is really unknowable.'

    We shall reply to this argument in two ways, making use of an objection (*enstasis*) and a counter-argument (*antiparastasis*).[13] We should know that the function of an objection is to overturn the opposing arguments from the starting-point and right from the beginning. The function of a counter-argument, on the other hand, is to accept the argument as true while showing that it has no bearing at all on the issue in question, but is rather said in vain.

    Now in order to overturn the argument of those who want to overturn philosophy we raise the objection that being is not a homonym, but rather one of the things deriving from one thing[14] (we will learn as we make progress what homonyms are and what things are that derive from one thing). Further, we raise this counter-argument: even if we concede that being is a homonym, it is not thereby unknowable. For homonyms can be brought under a definition.

    It is a rule of dialectic that in the case of homonyms, three points must be examined: (i) how many senses a homonym has, (ii) what sense is relevant to the argument, and (iii) how to describe or define the single sense relevant to the argument. Let us make clear what has been said with an example: when the argument is about a dog, we must first say how many senses 'dog' has, since it is a homonymous word; for example, that it means the dog-star or the sea dog or the land dog.[15] Second, we must say <what sense, i.e.>[16] what kind of dog is relevant to the argument. Third, we must either describe it or bring it under a definition. For example, if the argument is about the land dog, we say that it is a four-footed animal that barks.

    And so we can examine these three points in the case of being too. We examine first how many senses it has, and say that it is spoken of in ten senses, i.e. the ten categories. Second, we examine which sense is relevant to the argument, whether substance or quantity or quality or the subsequent

30   categories. Then we examine whether to bring it under a definition or a
      description. So if being can be brought under a definition <or a description>,[17]
      it is clear that it is not unknowable.

          The second argument of those who want to overturn philosophy proceeds
      in this way: existing things are in flux and flow, and do not obtain any sort of
      rest. <So>[18] things have changed before they can be defined, since they change
4,1   almost before one can make any utterance about them. They give the example
      of a river, where someone cannot step into the same water twice.[19] Others, who
5   press the difficulty further, say that one cannot step even once into the same
      water, since that water is rapidly going past and other water immediately comes
      upon it.[20] They say that in this way things are in flux and flow without obtaining
      any sort of rest, and clearly do not fall within the domain of knowledge. For as
      soon as we want to know them they change and become different at different
      times, and one cannot attain knowledge of them. How then can philosophy
10   be knowledge of beings, when they are unknowable because they are in flux
      and flow?

          They also put it another way: for acts of comprehension (*katalêpsis*) to
      occur, the knower must conform to what is knowable. They say that the knower
      is the soul, while what is knowable is the object, i.e. what comes to be known.
      For conformity between knower and the knowable, i.e., an appropriate act of
      comprehension, to occur, what is knowable must either not move but always
15   remain the same, or, if what is knowable moves and changes, the knower, i.e.
      the soul, must move and change along with it. If, for example, what is knowable
      happens to be white, then the soul must be white also, and if it becomes water,
      the soul must also become water. In fact, however, the soul does not change
      along with what is knowable. So it is clear that the soul cannot know it.
20   Therefore philosophy cannot be knowledge of what exists, since what exists is
      not subject to knowledge. This is what these people say.

          We can reply to them, first, that philosophy is not concerned with
      particular things, which are in flux and flow, but rather with universals, which
      do not change, but always remain the same. Second, even if we grant that
25   philosophy is concerned with particulars, someone will not be incapable of
      comprehending just because the knower, i.e. the soul, does not change along
      with what is knowledge, i.e. the object. For according to this argument neither
      would the divine know any of the things that come to be, since it does not

change along with things, but always remains the same. And again, according to this argument a doctor in a natural state would be unable to know what is contrary to nature, i.e. when he is healthy, he would be unable to distinguish diseases, but he would have to become sick in order to distinguish them.

Again, often the soul knows things before they change, as Plato shows when he says that 'the souls of the wise do not only arrive at reality after the fact (*katopin*), but they anticipate it and have foreknowledge that precedes change'.[21] So much about these matters.

The third argument that those who seek to overturn philosophy bring forward is this: what is known is subject to perception, as Plato shows when he says: 'The Demiurge gave us sight and hearing, so that we may succeed in philosophy through them.'[22] Taking this much to be agreed, they say: 'If we can show from your division that the parts of philosophy cannot exist, it is clear that philosophy does not exist.' So they say: 'According to you, philosophy is divided into a theoretical and a practical part, and the theoretical part once again into mathematics, natural science, and theology.[23] If, therefore, we are able to overturn these parts, it is clear that philosophy does not exist.' They say that mathematics is not a part of philosophy, as Plato also thinks. For he thinks that mathematics is not a part of philosophy but a sort of preparatory exercise, like grammar and rhetoric. For this reason he wrote above the entrance of his school 'let no one enter who is untutored in geometry'.[24] They say that natural science is overturned by the second argument which says that existing things are in flux and flow, while theology is overturned in this way: the divine, they say, is not subject to perception, but what is not subject to perception is not subject to knowledge; therefore the divine is unknowable. So much on these matters.

We can reply that these people have not said anything about the practical part of philosophy so far, which is opposed to the theoretical part, and so it is clear that they have not done away with the whole of philosophy. For the practical part is also a part of philosophy. Plato shows this when he says: 'I call a philosopher not only someone who knows and remembers a lot, but also someone who has attained a spotless and pure way of life',[25] which is the task of the practical philosopher. So much about these matters.

Let us proceed to speak in defence of mathematics, natural science, and theology. With regard to mathematics, we can say that Plato does *not* think that

it is not a part of philosophy, unless [one means] of the peak of philosophy, i.e. of theology; for he thinks that mathematics is not a part of *this*. It is clear that he knows that mathematics is a part of philosophy, given that he says that it is

30   a science; and if it is a science, it is clear that it is a part of philosophy. Aristotle in fact explicitly calls mathematics a part of philosophy.[26]

6,1   We have defended natural science and overturned the second argument of the Sceptics, which says that existing things are in flux and flow. With regard to theology, we can say that even if the divine is unknowable, we attain a conception of the Demiurge by contemplating his creations and the well-ordered movement of the universe. What is not apparent can be discerned

5   most readily from what is apparent. Since everything in motion is moved by something else, and we see that the heavens are a body and that they are in motion, they are moved by something else. Therefore there is someone who moves the heavens. And since the same movement moves it continuously, it is clear that a single mover moves the heavens, as Aristotle says.[27] If there were many movers that move the heavens, one would move it in one way, another in

10   another, and its movement would not be one and the same. And since the heavens are always moving without stop, it is clear that some incorporeal mover always moves them. If the mover of heaven had a body, he would be limited. But a limited body also has a limited power and would not be able to move the heavens continuously and without stop.[28] From this it is clear that what moves the heavens does not have a body. Nor indeed will it perish, since

15   if what moves the heavens perished, the heavens would perish with it. But in fact the heavens do not perish; therefore it is clear that what moves the heavens does not perish either. So what has the argument proved? That what moves the heavens is single, incorporeal, unlimited, and imperishable. And this is precisely the divine. In this way then we have attained a conception of what is not

20   apparent from what is apparent. So let us finish this lecture here, now that we have overturned the third argument of these people too.

Lecture 3

The fourth argument of those who seek to overturn philosophy is this: either

25   philosophy is knowledge or it is not. If it is not knowledge, it is clear that it is

neither a craft nor a science, since every craft and science is knowledge, because each knows its own subject matter. But if philosophy is knowledge, it is either particular or universal. If it is particular, it is worse than the other crafts (these are universal forms of knowledge that have universal standards; in fact grammar, rhetoric, and the craft of medicine have universal standards). But if philosophy is worse than the other crafts, how can you say that it is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences? But if it is universal knowledge, it cannot exist, and this is clear from the following argument: universal knowledge is a universal accident (knowledge is a kind of accident, since it is a quality, and quality, as we will learn, is an accident). But universal accidents cannot be found in particular substrates (for example, universal whiteness cannot be found in swans alone, since then it could not be found in any other particular thing, e.g. in snow, white lead, or milk). If therefore philosophy is universal knowledge, it is clear that it cannot be found in particular substrates, e.g. in Socrates, Plato, or Alcibiades. But if it is not found in a substrate, it is clear that it does not exist, since accidents that are not found in substrates do not exist. That is what they say.

It is possible to refute them thus: philosophy is a universal form of knowledge and yet it is not impossible to find it in a particular substrate; for even if universal accidents cannot be found in particular substrates, the knowledge of them can be found in particular substrates: for example, even if universal whiteness does not exist in Socrates alone, the knowledge of it can exist in him alone, since Socrates can know that white is a colour that pierces sight.[29]

Further, contraries can never be found unmixed and pure in the same part at the same time; for example, white and black cannot be found unmixed and pure in the same substrate at the same time, since it is not possible that the same part should be both white and black at the same time. The qualification 'in the same part' is added, because it is possible to find white and black in different parts; as in the case of an Ethiopian, who is white as far as his teeth are concerned, while the rest of his body is black. The qualification 'at the same time' is added, because it is possible to find white and black in the same part at different times; <for example, the same part can come to be white and black at different times because of exposure to the sun>.[30] 'Being unmixed and pure' is added, because of greyness, i.e. being mouse-coloured, since both black and white can be found in greyness, but they are not unmixed and pure there. The

nature of whiteness is not perfectly preserved [in greyness] nor that of blackness, since greyness is a mixture of white and black. However, even though contraries that are unmixed and pure cannot be found in the same part at the same time, knowledge of them can be found in a single substrate.

35   For the same person can know that white is a colour that pierces, i.e. diffuses,
8,1   sight (because the colour white diffuses sight), and that black is a colour that compacts, i.e. compresses, sight (we recall that sight becomes diffuse through <whiteness>,[31] which is also why people suffering from ophthalmia put black fabric on their eyes in order to compress their sight when it
5   has become diffuse). So in this way, even if universals cannot be found in particular substrates, knowledge of them can be found in particular substrates, since Socrates can know universals, e.g. what a man is, what a horse is, what a stone is.

Having thus refuted the fourth argument of these people too, let us go on to demonstrate that philosophy exists, because we should not only refute
10   opposing views but also establish our own. We demonstrate that philosophy exists in this way: if god exists, providence also exists, because god does not merely exist, but he also exercises providential care. But in fact god exists, for it is the mark of madmen to deny his existence.[32] Therefore it is clear that providence also exists. But if providence exists, it is clear that wisdom also exists, by means of which god exercises his providential care. For god does not
15   exercise his providential care without reason nor without wisdom. But if wisdom exists, it is clear that there is also a striving and desire for it. For everything strives for the good, which is also why it is called the good (*agathos*), on account of the fact that we are rushing towards it very eagerly (*to agan theein*). But if there is a striving and desire for wisdom, it is clear that philosophy exists, since philosophy is nothing other than love of wisdom, as Pythagoras
20   defines it. With these remarks, we conclude the present lecture.

Lecture 4

Even if our enquiry into the existence of philosophy was a digression, we have demonstrated that the arguments of those people who try to deny its existence
25   are weak, using the truth as our ally. For these people who lead lives of

contention (they are the Pyrrhonists, who try to overturn everything), wanted to overturn the mother of proofs, I mean philosophy, using proofs, and, so to speak, overturn philosophy using philosophy. This is what Plato replies to these people, who say that there is no knowledge: 'Do you say that knowledge does not exist inasmuch as you know [that it does not exist], or inasmuch as you don't know? If you know, it is clear that knowledge exists, since you know 30 [that it does not exist]. But if you don't know, who will believe you when you 9,1 are making statements that you neither know nor understand?'[33] Aristotle, in one of his exhortations, in which he encourages young men to pursue philosophy, says that if we ought not to philosophize, we ought to philosophize, and if we ought to philosophize, we ought to philosophize; so we absolutely ought to philosophize.[34] That is to say, if someone says that 5 philosophy does not exist, he uses proofs to deny [the existence of] philosophy. But if he uses proofs, it is clear that he is doing philosophy, since philosophy is the mother of proofs. If he says that philosophy exists, he is again doing philosophy, since he uses proofs to show that philosophy exists. Therefore anyone who denies the existence of philosophy and anyone who does not is in either case doing philosophy, because each of them uses proofs to give 10 credibility to what he says. But if each of them uses proofs, it is clear that he is doing philosophy, since philosophy is the mother of proofs.

Leaving behind us the question 'does philosophy exist?', let us move on to considering the question 'what is it?' and say what philosophy is. We should know that philosophy is both some one thing since it is examined as a whole 15 and also a multiplicity since it has different parts. We define it, insofar as it is some one thing, and we divide it, insofar as it is a multiplicity. For it is absurd to present definitions and divisions in the case of the other crafts, but to present neither a definition nor a division of philosophy, from which all the crafts originate. We should know that Plato mentions both the definition and the 20 division [of philosophy]. He mentions the definition, when he says in the dialogue *Phaedrus*: 'My boy, there is one starting-point for correct deliberation: to know what one is inquiring into; otherwise, one must go wrong in everything',[35] i.e., someone wanting to deliberate well about something ought to know the nature of the thing [he is deliberating about] itself, or rather its definition. Someone who does not know the definition completely misses the 25 thing. For example, when someone wants to state something about medicine

and does not know the nature of medicine, i.e. that it deals with the human
body, but thinks that it deals with wood, all the remarks he throws out about it
are pointless. Plato mentions division in the dialogue *Sophist* when he says:
30   'nothing can boast of escaping the method of division',[36] and in fact nothing
escapes division. For if I say that some animals are rational and some irrational,
there is nothing besides this, since there is no animal that is neither rational
nor irrational. Again, in the same dialogue[37] Plato says of division that
Prometheus has given us the method of division together with the brightest
10,1   fire. For we should know that <the>[38] tellers of myths say that Prometheus
stole fire from the gods and gave it to humans. This story has an allegorical
meaning: since Prometheus was the first to discover the method of division,
5   and it is analogous to fire, they say that he gave fire to humans. It is clear that
the method of division is analogous to fire, because fire separates both like and
unlike things from one another. It separates like things, for example metals
(these are separated from one another by fire; for example silver is separated
10   from gold by fire and lead from copper, and these are alike insofar as they are
all metals); and unlike things, as when dirt is separated from the metals by fire
(dirt and metal are unlike). In the same way, division too separates both unlike
and like things from one another. It separates like things, as when we divide
animals into rational and irrational, mortal and immortal (i.e. we separate the
15   irrational from the rational, and the immortal from the mortal; these are alike,
insofar as they are all animals); and it separates unlike things, as when we
separate the number ten from grammar by dividing, and say that grammar
belongs to the qualified (because it is a quality), but the number ten belongs to
the quantified (because it is a quantity). These are unlike, since they do not
20   belong to the same genus: the number ten belongs to number, and number to
quantity; but grammar does not belong to quantity, but rather to universal
craft, and craft belongs to science, science to disposition, and disposition to
quality.
25   This being so, let us state the definition of philosophy and its division. But
let us examine what we should do first: should we present the definition of
philosophy first or divide it? We can say that one ought to define philosophy
first and only then divide it, for the following reason: definition is analogous to
the monad, division to multiplicity. Just as the monad is prior to multiplicity, so
30   definition, which is analogous to the monad, is prior to division, which is

analogous to multiplicity. That definition is analogous to the monad and division to multiplicity is clear from the following: just as the monad is some one thing and a single nature, so definition too brings multiplicity into some one thing and produces a single nature (for example, the definition 'a rational, mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge' produces a unity and a single nature, man). Division, on the contrary, brings some one thing into multiplicity. For example, it takes substance and divides it into body and the incorporeal, and body into what is animate and inanimate, and likewise for the rest.

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Now let us go on to define philosophy. But since it is impossible that someone should construct syllogisms unless he first learns what a syllogism is and what its origin is, so it is impossible that someone should define something unless he first learns what a definition is and where it derives from. Because we know this we present nine main points. First, we state what definition is; second, how a definition differs from a term, from a description, and from a descriptive definition; third, what the origin of the word 'definition' is; fourth, where definitions derive from; fifth, what definitions are perfect, and what imperfect, and what the deficiency and the soundness of definitions consist in; sixth, how many definitions of philosophy there are; seventh, why there are that number of definitions of philosophy and neither more nor fewer; eighth, what their order is; ninth, who discovered them. With these remarks we also conclude the present lecture.

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Lecture 5

Let us begin with the first main point and say what a definition is. We should know that a definition is a concise statement (*logos*) that indicates the nature of the subject matter. But since, as we will learn, definitions are usually constructed from the genus and the constitutive differentiae, let us state which word in the present definition [of definition] is analogous to the genus and which one to the constitutive differentiae. Let us use the definition of man as an example to make the exposition clear to us. We should know that man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge. Notice here how 'animal' stands for the genus (it is the more common term and applies to many

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25   things, since it applies to man and dog and horse and suchlike), while the other
     words stand for constitutive differentiae. So, then, in this definition of definition
     'statement', (*logos*) stands for the genus (it is more common and applies to
     many things, since it applies both to a statement in thought and one expressed
30   [verbally]), while the other words stand for constitutive differentiae. Let us go
     on to explain this. We should know that 'statement' (*logos*) has been added to
     contrast [a definition] with a name, since indeed a name shows the nature of
     the underlying substrate, e.g. man, and what the definition accomplishes with
12,1 many words, the name does with a single one. For this reason, they are defined
     in opposition to each other: a name, they say, is a compact definition, i.e.
     [compact] by giving a general view, or [rather], through conciseness, while a
     definition is a name that has been unfolded. So we add 'statement' (*logos*) in
     order to exclude names. But if definitions also accomplish what names do
5   (since in fact both names and definitions indicate the nature of the subject
     matter), why have definitions been thought up? We say it is because [definitions
     allow us] to know the constitutive differentiae, i.e. the features constituting the
     subject matter. For if we say 'man', we do not know the constitutive differentiae,
     but if we say 'rational animal' and the rest, we do. 'Concise' is added because of
10   extended discourses (*logoi*), e.g. *On the Crown*,[39] and narrative accounts (*logoi*),
     (although these are statements (*logoi*), they are not concise). 'Indicating the
     nature of the subject matter' is added either because of proverbs such as
     'nothing in excess'[40] and 'know yourself' (these are also concise statements, but
     they do not indicate the nature of the subject matter), or because of descriptions.
15   For descriptions do not indicate the nature of the subject matter, but what is
     incidental to its nature, and its attributes, e.g. as when I say 'man is capable of
     walking upright and of laughter, having flat nails'. These indicate the attributes
     of man. So much about the first main point.
          Let us go on to the second main point and say how a definition differs from
20   a description, a term, and a descriptive definition. We should know that a
     definition differs from a description, because definitions are derived from
     essential words and indicate the essence and nature itself of the subject matter;
     for example, 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge'.
     Descriptions on the other hand derive from accidents and indicate the attributes
25   of the subject matter and what is incidental to its nature, as, for instance, when I
     say 'man is capable of walking upright and of laughter, having flat nails'. Since we

have said that definitions are derived from essential terms, but descriptions from accidental ones, let us learn what is essential and what accidental. We should know that what preserves a man by its presence, and destroys him by its absence is essential, such as rationality. For when this is present, it preserves a man, but when it is absent, it destroys him, since it is impossible that a man should exist without being rational. What neither preserves a man by its presence nor destroys him by its absence is accidental; for example, whiteness, since this neither preserves a man by its presence nor destroys him by its absence. For it is possible that a man should be white and that he should not be white, since it is not the case that if he is not white, he is not a man on this account. Again, being able to walk upright and having flat nails [are examples of accidents]: these do not preserve a man by their presence, nor do they destroy him by their absence. For even if a man is not capable of walking upright but moves on all fours, and even if he does not have nails, he is nonetheless a man.

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Having said this, let us go on to state how a term differs from a definition. We should know that just as man and animal differ from each other in universality and particularity (man is more particular, while animal is more universal: for if anything is a man it is also an animal, but it is not the case that if anything is an animal it is also a man; not only man is an animal, but also horse, ox, and dog), so indeed do definition (*horismos*) and term (*horos*) differ in universality and particularity. Definition is more particular, but term more universal: if anything is a definition, it is a term, but it is not the case that if anything is a term, it is a definition, since 'term' indicates not only definitions, i.e. the concise statements that indicate the nature of the subject matter, but also boundary markers (*to horothesion*),[41] and is that into which a proposition is resolved according to Aristotle. For Aristotle says: 'I call "term" that into which a proposition is resolved, [that is,] both what is predicated and what it is predicated of.'[42] For example, 'Socrates is walking' is a proposition; this can be resolved into 'Socrates' and into 'is walking'. Each of these, as Aristotle says, is called a 'term'; therefore, both 'Socrates' and 'is walking' are terms. So definitions and terms differ from one another in universality and particularity. Often we call a definition 'term', using the universal word, as when we refer to a man with the general word 'animal'.

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Now that we have learned how definitions differ from terms, let us go on to state how definitions differ from descriptive definitions. We should know that

a definition differs from a descriptive definition, because definitions are one in
30   form and derived from essential words alone; for example, 'man is a rational
mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge'. Descriptive definitions on
the other hand are mixed, since they are derived from both essential and
accidental terms and, so to speak, composed of definition and description; e.g.
when we say: 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and
knowledge, capable of walking upright and of laughter, having flat nails'. We
35   should know that all the words need to be essential in order to create a
definition, for example 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect
and knowledge', while it is enough to have a single word added [to this
14,1 definition] which indicates some accident in order to create a descriptive
definition; for example, 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect
and knowledge, capable of walking upright'. Just as all the strings [of a musical
instrument] need to be well-tuned to create a harmony, but even a single
5   discordant string is enough to create disharmony; and again, just as there
needs to be a symmetry of mixtures and a natural conjunction of parts to bring
about health, but even a single unbalanced mixture and a single part in an
unnatural state are enough to bring about disease; so indeed all the words need
to be essential to create a definition, but even a single word added [to the
10   definition] that indicates something non-essential is enough to create a
descriptive definition. So much about these matters.

      Some people raise a puzzle about the first main point and say: 'you have
erred in giving the definition of definition. For we demand from you another
definition of that definition, and another of that one, and so it goes on to
infinity, and we will never know what a definition is.' Some people reply in
15   defence that we are not defining definition *qua* definition itself, but *qua*
definable, or rather, as a subject matter. We can reply to them that the puzzle
remains all the same: we shall say that a definition must be given of *that*
definition *qua* definable, and again of that definition *qua* definable, which
likewise goes on to infinity. We can say that just as there are some things that
20   are their own measure and some that are measured by others (for example, the
number ten measures itself and other numbers; it measures itself when
counting out the units it contains, but measures another number, insofar as it
measures a different number: it measures twenty by the number two, since two
times ten is twenty), so indeed <the>[43] definition [of definition] defines itself

and others. It defines others because it defines all other definitions, while it also 25
defines itself along with them. Just as a man who defines another man by
saying that 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge'
has [thereby] not only defined all men but also himself insofar as he [himself]
is indeed a man, so the definition of definition defines not only the other
definitions, but also itself insofar as it is indeed a definition. So much about 30
these matters.

Some people raise a puzzle about the second main point and say: 'If essence
is superior to accidents, but a definition derives from essential terms, while a
description derives from accidental ones, why do we say "descriptive definition",
putting the worse element first, and not "defining description"?' Some people
reply in defence that we say 'descriptive definition' and put the worse term first 35
since, according to the poet, 'the worse things carry victory'[44] and especially
when it comes to naming (we say 'half-donkey' [for a mule], deriving the name
from the worse element, and not 'half-horse'). This is what they say. 15,1

We can reply that the resolution is plausible, except that those raising the
puzzle do so mistakenly. First, none of the ancients claimed that we should say
'descriptive definition' and not 'defining description'; second, whether we say 5
one or the other, the meaning is not impaired. Aristotle says that nouns and
verbs mean the same things when they are changed around: 'Socrates is
walking' means the same thing as 'walking is Socrates', and 'Plato's *Alcibiades*'
the same as 'the *Alcibiades* of Plato'.[45] This, with the help of god, concludes the
lecture.

Lecture 6 10

Let us begin [with] the third main point: from where does the word 'definition'
derive? We should know that the word 'definition' (*horismos*) is said
metaphorically and derives from the boundary stones (*horothesia*) of little
farms. The ancients, because they avoided every sort of disproportion, both
greed and self-denial, discovered boundary markers, so that through them
they could enjoy what is theirs and keep away from what is foreign. Now in the 15
same way too definitions circumscribe their subject matter and separate it
from what is extraneous. Let us familiarize ourselves with this theory using the

definition of man as an example: 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge'. Notice how by saying 'animal', I have separated man

20   from non-animals, e.g. inanimate things; how by saying 'rational', [I have separated] man from the non-rational, such as irrational [animals]; how by saying 'mortal', from immortals; and how by saying 'receptive of intellect and knowledge', from long-living nymphs, i.e. mortal daemons. Long-living nymphs are mortal daemons that live for many years. They are animals, mortal, and rational, but they are not receptive of intellect and knowledge, since they

25   do not learn anything but possess understanding and all knowledge by nature. Only man is receptive of intellect and knowledge, since he comes to have understanding in actuality.

We should know that in definitions the words are reciprocally related to the things, for whenever a definition includes too many words, it includes too few

30   things. For example, when I say: 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge and able to use grammar', I have included too many words but too few things (I have not defined every man but only the grammarian). But whenever it includes too few words, the definition includes

16,1   too many things. For example, if I say 'man is a rational mortal animal' I have included too few words, but too many things, for I have defined not only man, but also the long-living nymphs. These are animals that are rational and mortal. As Olympiodorus the philosopher used to say, 'Nature has invented a rather

5   amazing contrivance, making poverty rich and having richness feign poverty.'[46]

But someone might raise the following puzzle: 'if, as we have said, whenever you include too many words, you include too few things, how can it be that if I say "man is a rational mortal animal that dies and so on" and include too many words, the definition does not[47] include too few things because it encompasses every man?' We reply that the additional word does not signify

10   anything more than the subject, since the meaning of 'mortal' and 'dies' is the same. So because the additional word does not signify anything more, it does not lead to the exclusion of things.[48] This also concludes the third main point.

Let us go on to the fourth main point and say from where definitions derive.

15   We should know that definitions derive either from the subject matter or from the end or from both, i.e. the subject matter together with the end. But let us first say what the subject matter is and what the end. We should know that the subject matter is what the craft deals with and acts on, while the end is that at

which it aims, by which it is characterized, and for the sake of which it does everything. For example, pieces of timber are the subject matter of carpentry (because it deals with them and acts on them), but its end is to make beds or chairs or something like this. Again, the heavenly bodies are the subject matter of astronomy, and its end is not to make things similar to them, but to know their movement. In this way philosophy too has both a subject matter and an end. Its subject matter is all existing things, while its end is knowledge of them, i.e. to know them and through this knowledge to become like god. For the philosopher is like god, as the Pythia indicates when she says the following about Lycurgus who was both a lawgiver and a philosopher (the ancient philosophers were also lawgivers):

> You have come to my rich temple, Lycurgus,
> And I am in doubt whether I shall declare you a god or a man,
> But all the same I shall declare you a god, Lycurgus.[49]

The Pythia is in doubt not because she does not know what to call him and needs another Pythia for this, but in order to show that his human and divine nature are evenly matched, which is why she adds:

> But all the same I shall declare you a god, Lycurgus.

It is clear that the perfect philosopher is like god, since he is distinguished by the same characteristics as god: for just as god is distinguished by goodness, knowledge, and power (as the verses show which say about goodness 'the gods are the givers of noble things'[50] and about knowledge 'the gods know everything'[51] and about power 'the gods can do everything'[52]), in the same way the perfect philosopher is also distinguished by these three characteristics, I mean by goodness, knowledge, and power. He is distinguished by goodness, because just as god takes providential care for everything, so the philosopher also takes care of imperfect souls and leads them to perfection by changing them from being ignorant to having knowledge; by knowledge, because just as the divine knows everything, so the perfect philosopher too professes to know everything; by power, because just as the divine desires what it is within its power, so does the perfect philosopher. But in god's case this statement converts (god wants what is in his power, and has the power to do what he wants), while in the philosopher's it does not, since he wants what is in his power but does

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not have the power to do whatever he wants. If he wants something impossible, he cannot do this; for example, if he wants to touch the heavens with his finger, he cannot do this.

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'How can you say that the philosopher is distinguished by power in the same way as god, even though in god's case the statement converts, as has been said, but in the philosopher's, it does not?' We can reply that we say this because the perfect philosopher wants and desires what he is also able to accomplish; he does not desire impossibilities. In fact, according to the Stoics the greatest poverty consists in insatiable desires.[53] But we should know that, as we proceed, we are able to show how god's knowledge, goodness, and power are somewhat different from the philosopher's.

Well then, we should know that definitions derive from the subject matter or the end or both, i.e. the subject matter and the end together. They derive from the subject matter, as when we say 'medicine is a craft that deals with the human body' (this is what medicine deals with); from the end, as when we say 'medicine is a craft productive of health' (the end of medicine is to preserve health when it is present or to restore it when absent); and from both, as when we say 'medicine is a craft that deals with the human body and is productive of health', joining together the two previous definitions. In this way then we also define philosophy by its subject matter, as when we say 'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things'; by its end, [as when we say] 'philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man'; by both, as when we say 'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things <and>[54] becoming like god as far as is possible for man'. So much about these matters.

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'how can you say that definitions either derive from the subject matter or the end or both, even though we usually say that all definitions derive from a genus and constitutive differentiae?' Some people give the following explanation: definitions of things in nature derive from a genus and constitutive differentiae, as with man; but definitions of crafts derive from the subject matter or the end or both, as with the example mentioned before. That is what they say.

But they are wrong, first because they have not resolved the puzzle: the puzzle is that *all* definitions derive from a genus and constitutive differentiae, while they said that some definitions derive from a genus and constitutive

differentiae, and others from the subject matter or the end or both, the subject matter and the end. Second, [they are wrong] because their [own] resolution [of the puzzle] is wrong, since we also find definitions of things in nature that derive from the subject matter and the end, as with anger. For anger is natural and yet we define it by its subject matter and end, since we say 'anger is a boiling of the blood around the heart directed towards revenge'. Notice that 'anger is a boiling of the blood around the heart' [is a definition] that derives from the subject matter (*to hupokeimenon*), because the blood around the heart is what underlies (*hupokeitai*) anger, while 'directed towards revenge' [is a definition] derived from the end. For the end of anger is the desire <to inflict pain in revenge>.[55] So much about these matters.

We can reply that we are right to state that all definitions derive from a genus and constitutive differentiae. Definitions that derive from the end or from the subject matter or from both have both a genus and constitutive differentiae; for example 'medicine is a craft that deals with the human body'. Notice how here 'craft' stands for the genus, and the other words for the constitutive differentiae. Another example: 'medicine is a craft productive of health'. Notice how here 'craft' stands for the genus, and the other words for the constitutive differentiae. Another example: 'medicine is a craft that deals with the human body and is productive of health'. Notice how 'craft' stands for the genus, and the other words for the constitutive differentiae. Another example: 'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things'. Notice how here 'knowledge' stands for the genus, and the other words for the constitutive differentiae. This also concludes the fourth main point.

There is a fifth main point, where we examine what a perfect definition is and what an imperfect one. We should know that a perfect definition is one that converts with the definiendum; for example, when we say that if anything is a man, it is also a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge, and if anything is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge, it is a man. An imperfect definition is one that does not convert, since not converting is a deficiency in a definition. This deficiency has its origin in the definition's including too much or too little: a definition that includes too much does not convert, for example 'man is a rational mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge capable of using grammar'. This definition does not convert since it includes too much: if anything is a rational mortal animal

20   receptive of intellect and knowledge capable of using grammar, it is a man, but
      it is not the case that if anything is a man, it is a rational mortal animal receptive
      of intellect and knowledge capable of using grammar, since not every man is a
      grammarian. But nor in fact does a definition that includes too little convert:
      for example, 'man is a rational animal'. Notice how this definition does not
      convert, because it includes too little. For if anything is a man, it is a rational
      animal, but it is not the case that if anything is a rational animal, it is a man,
25   since not only man is a rational animal, but also angels and daemons. So much
      about these matters.

      Let us finally examine which of the previous definitions are perfect. We
      should know that definitions derived from both, i.e. from the subject matter
      and the end together, tend to be perfect (for example, 'carpentry is a craft
      dealing with wood that is productive of chairs'), while those derived from
30   only the subject matter or from only the end are for the most part not
      perfect. For example, if we say 'medicine is a craft dealing with the human
      body', the definition does not convert, since if anything is medicine, it is
      a craft dealing with the human body, but it is not the case that if anything
      is a craft dealing with the human body, it is medicine. For not only medicine
35   deals with the human body, but also gymnastics and cosmetics and
20,1 hairdressing. Again, if I say 'anger is the boiling of the blood around the heart',
      the definition does not convert. If anything is anger, it is a boiling of the blood
      around the heart, but it is not the case that if anything is a boiling of the blood
      around the heart, it is anger, since there can also be boiling of the blood around
5   the heart because of fever. Again, if I say 'rhetoric is the artisan of persuasion',
      the definition does not convert. For if anything is rhetoric, it is an artisan of
      persuasion, but it is not the case that if anything is an artisan of persuasion, it
      is rhetoric, since not only rhetoric is an artisan of persuasion but also dialectical
      philosophy.

      Above 'for the most part' {definitions that derive from only the subject
10   matter or only the end are not perfect}[56] is added, since sometimes one can
      also find a perfect definition that derives from the subject matter alone, for
      example with glass-making. For if we say 'glass-making is a craft that deals with
      glass', the definition is perfect, since if anything is glass-making, it is a craft that
      deals with glass, and if anything is a craft that deals with glass, it is glass-
15   making; for glass is the subject matter of glass-making alone. With philosophy

both the definition from the end alone and from the subject matter alone are perfect.

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'why, in the case of philosophy, are the definitions that are derived from the subject matter alone and from the end alone perfect?' We can say that it is because the subject matter of philosophy belongs to it alone and not to anything else (since philosophy alone has 20 everything that exists as subject matter); and again, because the end of philosophy belongs to it alone, since only philosophy has the knowledge of all that exists and through this knowledge becomes like god. So much about the fifth main point and the present lecture.

Lecture 7

Since we have come to understand the fifth main point, let us also examine the 25 sixth, where we state how many and what definitions of philosophy there are. <We should know that there are six definitions of philosophy>;[57] and they are the following:

1. Philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* beings.
2. Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things.
3. Philosophy is a preparation for death.
4. Philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man.
5. Philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences.   30
6. Philosophy is love of wisdom.

So much about the sixth main point.

The seventh main point is why there are this many definitions of philosophy, 21,1 and no more and no fewer. We can say that there are two answers, one derived from division, the other arithmetical. This is the one derived from definition: some things are real but have no name, for example things in the 5 depth of the sea and on inaccessible mountains. For there are things in the depths of the sea that exist, even though they have no name because we do not know them. Again, some things have names but are not real, for example the horse-centaur, since it has a name, but is not real; there is no horse-centaur. Again, some things have names and are real, for example man and the crafts. 10

These have names and exist. Philosophy has a name and is real, as we have learned in the discussion of whether philosophy exists. Philosophy exists among the primary subjects, since it is the mother of the crafts and sciences, because the crafts and the sciences derive their first principles from philosophy;

15   for example, the geometer accepts as given that a point is what has no parts, but the natural philosopher knows the explanation for this. Again, the physician accepts as given that the human body is composed of the four elements, but the natural philosopher knows the explanation for this. Again, the grammarian accepts as given that *êta* and *ômega* are long vowels, but the philosopher of the liberal arts (*ho mousikos philosophos*) knows the explanation for this.

20   So philosophy, as we have said, has a name and is real and exists among the primary subjects. Since it has a name, it has a definition that derives from its name, i.e. 'philosophy is love of wisdom'; but since it exists among the primary subjects, it has a definition that derives from its superiority, i.e. 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences'. And since it is real, it has a subject

25   matter and an end, and each of these in two ways. For every craft and science has a subject matter and an end, and each in two ways: a proximate subject matter and a remote subject matter, and again, a proximate end and a remote end. To make clear to ourselves what has been said, let us apply this argument to ship-building. We should know that ship-building has a subject matter and

30   an end, and each of these in two ways, a proximate subject matter and a remote subject matter, and again a proximate end and a remote end. The proximate subject matter is simple wood, while the remote subject matter is wood in a certain form, for example wood that has been shaped for a keel or a steering

35   oar. First the ship-builder takes simple wood, and then he seeks to bring it into

22,1   the appropriate shape for a keel or a steering oar. Again, the proximate end is to simply make a ship, while the remote end is to make a ship of a certain sort, for example a 'gazelle' (*dorkôn*) or a 'lamp' (*lukhnos*).

        So in the same way philosophy has a subject matter and an end, and each of these in two ways: it has a proximate subject matter and a remote subject

5   matter, and similarly a proximate end and a remote end. Its proximate subject matter is beings as such, while its remote subject matter is particular beings, e.g. divine and human things. Again, its proximate end is to pursue death, i.e. to bring about the mortification of the affections, while its remote end is what results from this, i.e. from bringing about the mortification of the affections,

namely becoming like god as far as is possible for man. Since philosophy, then, has a subject matter and an end, and each of these in two ways, as has been 10 said, it also has four other definitions. Two derive from the subject matter: one from the proximate subject matter, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* beings', the other from the remote subject matter, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things'. Two derive from the end: one from the proximate end, i.e. the one that says 15 'philosophy is a preparation for death', the other from the remote end, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man'. So this is the solution from division that shows why there are six definitions of philosophy.

The arithmetical solution is this: some numbers are perfect, and some are 20 superabundant or deficient, and these latter are also called 'imperfect'. A number is perfect when its constitutive parts are equal to the whole, e.g. the number six. The constitutive parts of six add up to the number six. Half of six is three, a third of six two, and a sixth of six one – and there you have six. It is not possible to multiply six by a quarter, since when we multiply it by a quarter, we are forced to 25 divide the monad; but arithmeticians do not divide the monad.[58] Superabundant numbers are those whose constitutive parts add up to more than the whole, e.g. the number twelve: its constitutive parts add up to sixteen, since half of twelve is six, a third four, a fourth three, a sixth two, and a twelfth one – and there you have sixteen. Deficient or imperfect numbers are those whose constitutive 30 parts add up to less than the whole, e.g. the number eight, since its constitutive parts add up to the number seven. Half of eight is four, a quarter two, and an eighth one – and there you have seven. So there are six definitions of philosophy, since six is the first perfect number (before it there is no other perfect number). For the mother of the crafts and sciences needed to be adorned 35, 23,1 with the first perfect number.[59] With these remarks, we conclude the present lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 8

Let us go on to the eighth main point and say what the order of the definitions 5 of philosophy is. We should know that the last of the six definitions of

philosophy is the one from etymology, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is love of wisdom'. The last of the other five is the one from superiority, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences'. Of the four remaining definitions, the first ones are those derived from the

10   subject matter, while the ones derived from the end are last. And in each of the two groups, the definition derived from what is proximate is prior to the one derived from what is remote. The definition from the proximate subject matter, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings', is prior to the one from the remote subject matter, i.e. the one that says

15   'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things'. Again, the definition derived from the proximate end, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is a preparation for death', is prior to the one from the remote end, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man'. So this is the order of definitions:

1. Philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings.
2. Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things.
3. Philosophy is a preparation for death.
4. Philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man.
20   5. Philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences.
6. Philosophy is love of wisdom.

Having said this, let us go on to give an explanation of the order of the definitions. We should know that the definition from etymology, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is love of wisdom', takes the last place. This is reasonable:

25   the thing should come first, and the name be given to it last, for which reason 'name' (*onoma*) sounds like 'similar to being' (*tôi onti homoion*). The ancients did not assign names at random but in conformity with the subject matter: for example, the word 'man' (*anthrôpos*) is used because of 'looking up' (*anathrein*) and by comparison[60] with what he has seen (*ha opôpe*); and again, the word 'horse' (*hippos*) is used because of the 'flying' (*hiptasthai*) of the hooves. In this

30   way philosophy must exist before it can receive a name and be called 'philosophy'. Since the name takes the last place, then, the definition derived from naming, i.e. from etymology, also takes the last place.

24,1   The definition from superiority, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences', is the last of the remaining ones

for the following reason: the more common features are prior to those that are particular to a given thing and that apply to it alone, just as in the case of definitions. In definitions, after all, the most common terms are first, but the ones that are particular to a given thing and that apply only to the definiendum take the last place, as for example with the definition 'man is a rational mortal animal and so on'. Notice how the most common terms come first here, i.e. 'animal' (since not only man is an animal, but also a horse and a dog), and again 'rational' (since not only man is rational, but also angels and daemons), and in the same way 'mortal' (since not only man is mortal but also the long-living nymphs). But the terms that are particular to a given thing and that only apply to the definiendum take the last place, since 'receptive of intellect and knowledge' applies only to man, since only man comes to have knowledge in actuality. The long-living nymphs on the other hand are not receptive of intellect and knowledge, since they do not come to have knowledge in actuality, but possess it within themselves; for they know everything naturally.[61]

Since then the most common terms are prior to those that are particular to a given thing, the definitions derived from the subject matter and from the end are also prior to the definition derived from superiority. This is because the subject matter and the end are more common (not only philosophy has a subject matter and an end, but also every craft and every science), while superiority is particular to philosophy. The definitions derived from the subject matter are prior to those derived from the end, since the subject matter is also prior to the end. Unless there is a subject matter, no end can be found; unless the carpenter, for example, has wood, he is not able to make chairs or beds or anything like this. The definitions derived from the proximate are prior to those derived from the remote: for example, the one derived from the proximate subject matter, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings', is prior to the one derived from the remote subject matter, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is the knowledge of divine and human things'. Again, the definition derived from the proximate end, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is a preparation for death' is prior to the one derived from the remote end, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man', since the proximate is prior to the remote. The proximate is closer and we approach the remote through it: unless the carpenter, for example, has simple

wood, he cannot separate wood of a certain form, i.e. wood that has certain
25,1   qualities and wood that does not. The philosopher in turn cannot become like
god unless he pursues death, i.e. brings about the mortification of the affections.
So much about the order of the six definitions.

5   We should know that some people wish to apply two other definitions to
philosophy; the doctors one definition, and other people the other. The doctors
wish to exalt their own craft, 'exchanging gold for bronze', in the words of the
poet,[62] and define philosophy as follows: 'philosophy is the medicine of the
soul, and medicine is the philosophy of the body'. But this definition is not
right: its manner of demonstration, which is discredited among philosophers,
10   is circular, since it defines[63] the subject of inquiry in terms of itself, as when we
say: 'Where is Plato staying?' – 'Where Dio is staying.' – 'And where is Dio
staying?' – 'Where Plato is staying.' So the manner of demonstration in these
definitions is circular in the same way: 'What is philosophy?' – 'The medicine
of the soul.' 'And what is medicine?' – 'The philosophy of the body.' Notice how
when they ask 'what is medicine?' they respond 'philosophy' and when they ask
15   'what is philosophy?', they respond 'medicine': they define the subject of
enquiry in terms of itself.

       Besides, even if we grant that the definition 'philosophy is the medicine of
the soul' is right, it is implicit in the definition that says 'philosophy is a
preparation for death', since a preparation for death, i.e. bringing about the
mortification of the affections, is nothing other than healing the soul.

20   Other people apply another definition to philosophy, i.e. the one that says
'philosophy is the greatest kind of music'. This is how Plato defines philosophy
in the *Phaedo*.[64] But the definition 'philosophy is the greatest kind of music',
since it also derives from superiority, is implicit in the definition derived from
superiority, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science
of sciences'. So much about the eighth main point.

25   Let us go on to the ninth main point and say who discovered these
definitions. We should know that two definitions are attributed to Pythagoras,
the one derived from the subject matter and the one derived from etymology.
We cannot demonstrate this from Pythagoras' writings, since Pythagoras did
not compose any. He said that 'I do not want to bequeath my teachings to
30   lifeless things (he used to call books 'lifeless'), but to ones that have life, i.e.
students, and that are able to reply to questions.' A man can reply to questions,

but not a book, and as one of the Pythagoreans used to say: 'books cannot {always}[65] teach me, but they always <say> <the same>[66] about the same things'.[67] For books always say the same about the same things and cannot reply to questions, but men can. As we have said, we cannot demonstrate that these definitions can be attributed to Pythagoras from his writings, since he did not leave any behind. Do not let anyone think that the *Golden Verses* are by Pythagoras; rather, some Pythagorean wrote them and ascribed them to the name of his own teacher [*sc.* Pythagoras] as homage. But we can demonstrate that the definitions are Pythagoras' on the basis of the Pythagoreans' [own testimony]. Nicomachus[68] (he is one of the Pythagoreans) says: 'Pythagoras defined philosophy as follows: 'philosophy is the knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings', and again, 'philosophy is the knowledge of divine and human things', and again, 'philosophy is love of wisdom'.

The two definitions derived from the goal can be attributed to Plato, i.e. 'philosophy is a preparation for death', and 'philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man'. He clearly thinks that philosophy is a preparation for death in the *Phaedo*, which is why he says: 'Other people are likely unaware that those who rightly practise philosophy do none other than to pursue dying and being dead.'[69] In the *Theaetetus*, he clearly thinks that philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man, which is why he says: 'But, Theodorus (he was a geometer),[70] since evil cannot be destroyed (there must be something opposed to the good) nor find a place among the gods, it must go around this mortal nature and this place. Therefore we should try to flee from this earth to the gods as soon as possible. What is this flight? Becoming like god as far as is possible for man. One becomes like god by being pious and just with wisdom.'[71] The definition from superiority which states 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences' can be attributed to Aristotle, since he defined philosophy in this way in the *Metaphysics*.[72] With these remarks we also conclude the present lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 9

Now that we have learned how many and what definitions of philosophy there are, the reason why they are this many, their order, and who discovered them,

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27,1   let us go on to set them out clearly by bringing them into the open. We should know that the first definition is the one that says 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings'. One should know that 'knowledge' stands for the genus, since knowledge is something more universal. There is universal

5   knowledge and particular knowledge, and again knowledge with explanation and knowledge without, for instance knowledge based on experience. The other words [in the definition] stand for the constitutive differentiae that separate philosophy from the other crafts and sciences. Philosophy is the knowledge of all real beings, but the other crafts and sciences do not have

10   knowledge of all real beings, but [only] of some. For instance, astronomy deals only with the stars, medicine only with the human body, and carpentry only with wood. So much about this topic.

   Some people raise the following puzzle: 'Why did [Pythagoras] say "knowledge"? Why should only philosophy be knowledge and not every craft?'

15   In order to resolve this puzzle, some people say that the crafts are forms of ignorance more than knowledge, since they know some things but are ignorant of many others, while philosophy, because it knows everything, is knowledge strictly speaking. This is what these people say to resolve the puzzle. But we can reply that the puzzle is overly subtle: according to the argument of the objectors, we ought not to say 'animal' when defining 'man', since not only man is an

20   animal but also horses and oxen.

   Further, they raise the following puzzle: 'Why did [Pythagoras] say "knowledge of [the] real beings", with the article, and not "knowledge of real beings", without it?' In order to resolve the puzzle, they say that he included the article in order to show that real beings share a kinship with the higher realm, through the efficient, i.e. the demiurgic, cause; and with the lower,

25   through the material cause, as Plato also says: 'god bound together the summits of things with the higher and lower realm' {with the higher realm, through the efficient, i.e. the demiurgic, cause; with the lower, through the material cause}.[73] This is what these people say. We can reply to them that they are wrong, since the article does not indicate kinship; rather, it generally

30   refers back to and repeats something mentioned previously. When I say 'a man has come', for example, I indicate that it is someone unknown, but when I say 'the man has come', I introduce someone mentioned before. For this reason we can say that Pythagoras included the article in the definition,

i.e. [he said] 'knowledge of [the] real beings', in order to show that philosophy is knowledge of all real beings and not [only] some. If he had left out the article, i.e. [if he had said] 'knowledge of real beings', he would have said the same as 'knowledge of some real beings', just as Aristotle too says in *On Interpretation* that unqualified premises are equivalent to particular qualified premises.[74] For example, someone who says 'a man is walking' says the same as to say 'some man is walking'. But premises with the article are equivalent to universal qualified premises: when someone says 'the man is walking', he says the same as to say 'every man is walking'. Therefore Pythagoras included the article in order to show that philosophy is knowledge of all real beings and not [only] some.

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Further, these people raise the following puzzle: why did Pythagoras say 'knowledge of real beings' and not 'and of beings that are not real'? We can reply, first, that there is no knowledge of beings that are not real (nobody can know unreal beings, since knowledge is of real beings); second, that even if we grant that there is knowledge of beings that are not real, by saying 'knowledge of real beings' he has also encompassed their opposites, I mean beings that are not real. For someone who knows one of the opposites also knows the other one; for example, someone who knows that white is a colour that pierces sight knows that black is a colour that compresses it.[75] So much about these matters.

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But we should know that he has added '*qua* real beings' in order to show how philosophy knows real beings; in other words, that she does not know them by quantity. For philosophy does not know how many men or horses or stars there are, but their nature. This is what the definition 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings' purposes to show: [philosophy knows real beings] insofar as they exist and how they are naturally – for this is how we know them, as they are naturally. This clarifies the first definition, i.e. 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings'.

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Let us go on to specify the second definition too. We should know that the second definition of philosophy is the following: 'philosophy is knowledge of both divine and human things'. And one should know that 'knowledge' stands for the genus, but the other words stand for the constitutive differentiae. For philosophy deals with divine and human things; it neither despises the gods because of its concern with human things nor neglects human things because

30   of its concern with the divine. Instead it desires the divine because it wants to learn, but orders human affairs by leading them to perfection.

But some people raise the following puzzle: 'why do you say that philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things, since it does not deal with human and divine things alone, but also with other things?' For philosophy deals with

29,1   the heavens, which are not god; and moreover, Aristotle wrote a treatise *On Animals*, in which he wrote not only about human beings but also about other animals; and moreover, [philosophy] also [deals] with plants, which are neither god nor human.

Now we can reply that some real beings are eternal and some perishable,

5   and among eternal beings the divine is superior, but among perishable beings, humans. For this reason he mentions only 'divine and human things', because they are superior.

But we should know that each of the [two] definitions we mentioned surpasses the other and is surpassed by it. The first definition surpasses the second in accuracy, since it indicates how philosophy knows real beings through the addition '*qua* real beings'. But the second surpasses the first in

10   clarity, because by saying 'knowledge of divine and human things' it indicates what sort of things philosophy deals with. With these remarks we finish the present lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 10

The third definition, which derives from the proximate goal, is the following: 'philosophy is a preparation for death'. This is how Plato defines it in the

15   *Phaedo*, by saying: 'Other people are likely unaware that those who rightly engage in philosophy do none other than to pursue dying and being dead.'[76] The two terms 'dying' and 'being dead' have been added correctly. 'Dying' indicates the practical part of philosophy, since the philosopher has a practical

20   concern when he brings about the mortification of the affections by "dying".[77] 'Being dead' indicates the theoretical part, since 'being dead' has a past sense. The philosopher is contemplative (*theôrêtikos*) after "being dead": after he has mortified the affections and purified his soul he reaches towards contemplation and begins to do theology. Unless he brings about the

mortification of the affections and purifies his soul, he cannot do theology, since according to Plato 'it is not right for the impure to touch the pure'.[78] So much about these matters.   25

Some people present the following puzzle to Plato when he says that philosophy is a preparation for death: 'Plato, what do you mean by saying that the philosopher can take himself out, i.e. kill himself, and infringe the sovereignty of the Demiurge when he seeks to undo the bond which the latter   30 has tied (I mean the bond between body and soul)?' Many arguments demonstrate that one should not take oneself out, i.e. kill oneself. The first one comes from Plato himself, since Plato himself says in the same dialogue [*sc.* the *Phaedo*]: 'we are as in a sort of prison and must not take ourselves out of it and   30,1 run away'.[79] Second, if the philosopher is like god, as we have shown above[80] when we were showing that he is distinguished by the same characteristics as the divine, and he who is like god does not take himself out, i.e. kill himself, it is clear that the philosopher does not kill himself, even though he prepares for death. It is clear that a godlike man does not kill himself, given, at any rate, that   5 the suicide is not only unlike god but even opposed to him, because he wants to loosen the bond which god has tied, i.e. he wants to separate the soul from the body. Third, the divine never withdraws its influence from its subordinates, I mean men, but [only] appears to do so because of their incapacity   10 (*anepitêdeiotês*). What does this mean? Just as the sunlight shines on everyone in equal measure, but seems to bring more light to some than to others because of the unfitness of the sense organs (some people can be found to have good eyes, and others bad ones, and for this reason some think that the sun is brighter, and others that it is dimmer), so the divine too never withdraws its   15 influence from men and takes providential care for all in equal measure. But because of the weakness of the recipient it seems to withdraw its influence from him, since wicked men separate themselves from god. In the same way the philosopher ought not to pursue death and separate his soul from its subordinate (I mean from the body, since the body, being mortal, is worse than   20 the soul, which is immortal). Fourth, if virtue is the greatest happiness, but philosophy is the place (*khôros*) of virtues (we gain the virtues through philosophy), the happy person and the person living virtuously are not troubled either by defects of the body or by external, i.e. pecuniary, misfortunes. But the   25 person untroubled by defects of the body and external misfortunes does not

kill himself, and it is clear that the philosopher too does not kill himself because he is not troubled by defects of the body or external misfortunes, since he lives virtuously. Those who are troubled by defects of the body and external

30   misfortunes should listen to the words of Hippocrates: 'because of external misfortunes they reap private pains'.[81] Besides, Plotinus also shows this, i.e. that a person living virtuously is not troubled either by defects of the body or by external misfortunes. When someone asked him: 'when someone has suffered the calamities of a Priam in his life; experienced an Iliad worth of evils;

31,1 and been cast away without burial after death, is he happy or not?', Plotinus replied: 'Away with your petty speech (*mikrologia*)! One is not deprived of the virtue of soul.'[82]

       This being so, what can we say about Plato, given that in some places he says that one should pursue death, but in others that one should not

5   kill oneself? Is he contradicting himself or not? We can say that he is not contradicting himself. But in order to show this, let us make a few points. We should know that life is opposed to death, since life is a disposition and the cause of our being, but death privation. Each of these is twofold: life is twofold,

10   since there is natural life and also voluntary life. Natural life is the conjunction of soul and body by which the soul bestows perception and movement onto the body; by which we are all alive; and by which the body binds the soul. For this reason natural life is called 'living body' (*demas*), as though it were 'the bond (*desmos*) of the soul', and 'body' (*sôma*), as though it were the tomb (*sêma*) and grave of the soul.[83] But life is voluntary when the worse overcomes

15   the better, i.e. when the soul is overcome by pleasurable indulgences of the body. This life <is> also <called>[84] 'dissolute' (*akolastos*), i.e. not moderate. Natural death is the separation of the soul from the body, by which we all die. Voluntary death is the virtuous life, i.e. a preparation for death through

20   mortifying the affections while still alive. So four states correspond to these distinctions: being, non-being, being in a good state, being vicious. Being is natural life, non-being natural death, being in a good state voluntary death, and being vicious voluntary life. So when Plato says that we should pursue death, we should understand voluntary death, i.e. death by virtue, i.e. the

25   mortification of the affections. But when he says that one should not kill oneself, we should understand natural death, by which we all die. So much about these matters.

We should know that a certain Cleombrotus hurled himself from a rooftop and died, in the belief that Plato means philosophers pursue natural death. Callimachus says this about him:

> Saying 'Goodbye, Sun', Cleombrotus from Ambracia   30
> Leapt from a high rooftop into Hades.
> He suffered no evil that would invite death, but had read
> A single book of Plato's, *On the Soul*.[85]

Olympiodorus the Philosopher replied to this:

> If Plato's book had not kept my passion in check   32,1
> I would already have loosened the grievous and woeful shackle of life.[86]

In other words, unless he had been given the benefit of knowing how to live well by Plato, he would have preferred non-being to being vicious. For Plato says that one should not kill oneself, as we have learned. To prevent more   5 people like Cleombrotus coming into existence, let us add something to the definition while preserving its meaning, and say that it is the following: 'philosophy is a preparation for death while preserving the living being', that is to say, it is the pursuit not of natural but of voluntary death.[87] With these remarks we finish the present lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 11   10

Since Plato has defined philosophy as a preparation for death, the Stoics thought that he means natural death and taught that it is justified to kill oneself under certain circumstances.[88] They say that since life is like a great feast, it is clear that there are as many ways for someone to kill himself with justification as there are ways in which the feast may be broken up. They say there are six ways in which   15 a feast may be broken up: (1) the guests may rise to break up the feast with justification when there is a lack of food. In the same way someone may also kill himself with justification when there is a lack of material goods and he does not want to be consumed by famine, as Theognis too says to a certain Kyrnos: 20

> To escape poverty, a man should throw himself
> Into the cavernous sea, Kyrnos, or from sheer cliffs.[89]

We should know that he does not mean that a destitute man should kill himself; rather, he means that the destitute man should sow [seeds] everywhere
25   (*pantakhou speirein*), in inaccessible mountains as well as the sea, as it were, in order to escape starvation.

Further, (2) a symposium may be broken up because the food has gone bad and is harmful, since the guests may rise to break up the feast with justification when the food is in such a condition. In the same way someone may kill himself with justification when his body is in a bad state (*kakokhumos*) and unfit to receive the virtues of the soul, because he wants to be freed from
30   disease. For this reason a certain Cynic philosopher who was half-paralyzed came before the Emperor Julian and said to him:

33,1   Half of me is dead, but the other half sees the light of day.
         Have pity, Emperor, on a Cynic cut into two.

That is to say, he requested that he be either cured or killed. But the Emperor replied to him:

         You are doing injustice to both Pluto and Phaethon,
5   Still gazing at the one, but deserting the other.[90]

Further, (3) a feast may be broken up because of some special circumstance. For when the host suddenly falls ill or hears of the loss of those dear to him, the guests rise and the feast is broken up. In the same way someone may also kill himself with justification when some special circumstance has arisen. For this
10   reason a certain Pythagorean woman named Theano, when she was in the power of the tyrant of Sicily and asked why the Pythagoreans do not eat beans, said 'I would rather eat them than tell you'. When the tyrant in turn told her 'Very well, eat them', she said 'I would rather tell you than eat them'. And in this way she died, having bitten off her tongue.[91]

Further, (4) a feast may be broken off because of drunkenness, because
15   when the guests are drunk the feast may be broken up with justification. In the same way someone may kill himself with justification when he reaches very old age and begins to drivel and lose his mind.

Further, (5) a feast may be broken up when the guests begin to fight and to commit some unlawful acts against one another. In the same way, someone may kill himself with justification when he is in the power of enemies and

forced to commit some unlawful acts, e.g. to commit incest with his mother or   20
to eat something unlawful.

Further, (6) a feast may be broken up because of some general calamity. When a general calamity has arisen, e.g. a fire or a barbarian incursion, the guests also break up the feast with justification. In the same way someone may kill himself with justification because of a general calamity, as when a citizen who is vanquished by fear kills himself when enemies approach his city and   25
are about to sack it. This is what the Stoics say.

We should know that some other people taught that there are only three other ways in which one can kill oneself with justification. They say that natural life is threefold: the best, the intermediate, or the worst. When someone lives the best life or the intermediate one and sees that he is leaning towards the   30
worse, he may kill himself with justification. Further, when someone lives the worst life and sees that he is going to be in the same condition forever without approaching the best life, he may kill himself with justification. So much about these matters.

But we can reply that one ought not to kill oneself with or without   34,1
justification (someone who does this opposes the Demiurge and tries to seize power over Him by wanting to loosen the bond that He has tied, I mean by wanting to separate the soul from the body), and that one ought to listen to Plato when he says: 'we are as in a sort of prison (*phroura*)   5
and must not take ourselves out of it and run away, but should await the one who bound us, until he himself loosens the bond'.[92] Calamities do not happen so that one can kill oneself, but so as to put the soul to the test. For just as the best captain is put to the test, not in calm weather, but in storms, so too the best soul is put to the test in misfortunes. For this reason, because they   10
wanted to demonstrate the fortitude of their souls, the Peripatetics used to say: 'Zeus, shower[93] us with tribulations'. With these remarks we finish the lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 12

From here, Plato moves up to the remote goal, and not simply to the remote   15
one, but to the remotest one, beyond which it is impossible to go. He defines

philosophy as 'becoming like god as far as is possible for man'. What goal in life is as blessed and as fitting for man as becoming like god? But we should know that some people say that the philosopher cannot become like god insofar as

20   he is a man, and they argue as follows: the substance of god is different from that of man, as the poet shows when he says:

> Since the race of the immortal gods
> Is unlike that of men who walk upon the earth.[94]

And different substances also have different perfections; for example, the

25   substance of man and horse are different, and the perfection of a horse is different from that of a man. If therefore the substance of god and man are different, and different substances have different perfections, it is clear that the perfection of god is different from that of man. Therefore philosophy is not becoming like god.

30   In order to resolve this puzzle, let us say in what sense we use the word 'like' (*homoios*) here. But first let us say in how many senses 'like' is used. We should know that 'like' is used in four senses: 'like' is used when we observe the same quality in the whole species, as when we say that all Ethiopians are alike in being black and all swans are alike in being white. Next, 'like' is

35   used when we observe greater and lesser degrees of the same quality in different

35,1 species, as when we say that white pepper is like black pepper in terms of hotness, since both are hot, but to differing degrees: black pepper is hotter, while white pepper is less hot. Next, 'like' is used when we find the same

5   various qualities in different species, as when we say that the ringdove and the pigeon are alike, since the pigeon has the same various qualities as the ringdove (black, white, and brown). Next, 'like' is used in the case of image and

10   original, as when we say that an image of Socrates is similar to Socrates. We should know that the archetype is called 'original' (*paradeigma*) and, as it were, the reference-point for the image. For example, we say that Socrates is the original of Socrates' image, since he is the reference-point for the image. We say

15   that the philosopher is like god in this sense: just as we say that the image of Socrates is like Socrates, even though the image of Socrates and Socrates are different (for one is lifeless, but the other alive), in this sense we also say that the philosopher is like god, even though the substance of god and man are

20   different. That the philosopher is like god is clear from the following: the

perfect philosopher is distinguished by the same characteristics as the divine. The divine is distinguished by three characteristics, by goodness, knowledge, and power,[95] and the perfect philosopher by the same characteristics, I mean by goodness, knowledge, and power. By goodness, because just as the divine takes providential care for everything, so the perfect philosopher too takes care of imperfect souls through his knowledge (he brings imperfect, i.e. 25 ignorant, souls to perfection through his knowledge); by knowledge, because just as the divine knows everything, so too the perfect philosopher professes to know everything; by power, because just as the divine wants what is in its power, so too the perfect philosopher wants what is in his power. So much about these matters. 30

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'why do you say that the philosopher becomes like god by goodness, knowledge and power?', if at least according to the poet:

> The race of the immortal gods 36,1
> Is unlike that of men who walk upon the earth.[96]

We can respond to these people that the definition adds 'as far as is possible for man' for this reason. The philosopher seems to become like god as far as is possible and attainable for man, since goodness and knowledge 5 and power do not exist in man in the same way as in god. Goodness is different in god and man, since goodness is consubstantial with god and his substance. This is why god is incapable of evil, because he has an abundance of goodness, just as the sun too is said to be unreceptive of darkness 10 because of its abundance of light. But man has goodness by participation, which is why he is also receptive of wickedness, just as air is said to possess light by participation (because it is illuminated when the sun is rising), which is why it is also receptive of darkness, since it becomes dark when the sun is setting.

Further, knowledge is different in god and man. God always knows 15 everything at the same time, and there is no time when he does not know, but man does not know all things always or at the same time – consider for example a child that has just been born and knows nothing in actuality but is said to know potentially; and further, that it is possible that a person knows something today but happens to forget it the next morning and does not know it. 20

Nor does man know everything at the same time; rather, his knowledge is particular, since he knows one thing at this moment and another at another, as Plato indicates when he says: 'Blessed is he in whom wisdom and prudence are present, even if only in old age.'[97] Further, power is different in god

25 and man, since in god's case it converts. God can do whatever he wants, and he wants what is in his power; nothing is impossible for him. But it does not convert in the philosopher's case, since he wants what is in his power, but he cannot do what he wants, because when he wants to do something impossible, e.g. to touch the heavens with his finger or to create

30 the heavens, he is unable. If someone should say: 'But the perfect philosopher does not want anything impossible; rather, he desires only what he is able to achieve, because the greatest poverty (according to the Stoics) consists in insatiable desires', we say that the perfect philosopher does not want anything impossible, since he knows the weakness of his own nature. Rather, he desires what he is able to achieve. For god, however, nothing is impossible. So much about these matters.

37,1   Some people raise the following puzzle: 'where has Plato defined philosophy as "becoming like god as far as possible for man"?' We may reply that he does so in the *Theaetetus*. There he addresses a certain geometer named 'Theodorus'

5 and says: 'But since evil cannot be destroyed, Theodorus, (there must be something opposed to the good) nor find a place among the gods, it must go around this mortal nature and this place. Therefore we should try to flee from this earth to the gods as far as is possible. What is this flight? Becoming like god as far as is possible for man. One becomes like god by being pious and just with wisdom.'[98]

10   Further, these people raise the puzzle that Plato did not define philosophy but the 'flight from evils'. We can reply to them that the 'flight from evils' is precisely philosophy. If philosophy brings about the mortification of the affections, as we have said above when defining it as a preparation for death,[99] and the mortification of the affections is nothing other than the 'flight from

15 evils', then it is clear that Plato has defined philosophy. Besides, if both justice and wisdom are virtues, and philosophy is the location (*khôrion*) of the virtues (because it is by philosophy that we gain virtue), it is clear that Plato has defined philosophy, because he says 'being pious and just together with wisdom'. Moreover, by saying 'with wisdom' he has defined the theoretical part of

philosophy; for if wisdom is the perfection of reason, and the perfection of reason is the goal of the theoretical part of philosophy, i.e. the knowledge of reason, it is clear that by saying 'with wisdom' he has defined the theoretical part. But by saying 'piety and justice' he has defined the practical part; for if piety and justice are virtues of character, and virtue of character, i.e. the adornment (*kallôpismos*) of character, is the goal of the practical part of philosophy, it is clear that by saying 'pious and just' he has defined the practical part. So much about these matters. 20 25

Some people raise the following puzzle: 'why does he specify two terms, i.e. "pious" and "just"?' Some people try to resolve this puzzle by saying that piety is the high point of justice, which is also why we say that those who are very unjust are impious. But it is better to say that piety differs from justice, since a person who preserves equality in things of the same kind is called 'just', while someone who pays serious attention to the divine is called 'pious'. Plato shows that piety differs from justice, since he wrote two dialogues, one of them entitled '*On Justice* or *On the Republic*', and the other '*Euthyphro* or *On Piety*', in which he discusses the divine. So much about these matters. 30 35

Some people raise the following puzzle: if there are four virtues of the soul, courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom, why does Plato mention only one here, I mean justice? We can reply to these people, first, that he is also mentioning wisdom, since he says 'being pious and just together with wisdom'. Second, even if he were to mention justice alone, this is nothing unusual, as we will demonstrate. We should know that there are four virtues of the soul, courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom, since the soul has three parts (reason, spirit, desire). This is reasonable, since each part of the soul should be ordered by its own virtue, which is why reason is ordered by wisdom, spirit by courage, and desire by temperance. Not only should each part be ordered by its own virtue, but the harmony and order among the parts should also be preserved. For this reason, justice pervades everything to preserve harmony and order by being seen, not in a single part, but in all the parts. We see in the universe that some parts only rule, i.e. the divine, some parts both rule and are ruled, i.e. human beings (these are ruled by the divine and rule irrational animals), and some are only ruled, such as the irrational animals. In the same way, these parts can be seen in man, who is a microcosm according to 38,1 5 10 15

Democritus:[100] some parts only rule, e.g. reason, some both rule and are ruled,
20   e.g. spirit (it is ruled by reason, but rules desire), and some are only ruled, e.g.
desire. So since justice exists over and above the other virtues, as pervading
them all and preserving their order, Plato has mentioned it as the virtue that is
25   most necessary. Third, he also has encompassed the other virtues by mentioning
justice, since the virtues of knowledge, i.e. those with reason, imply one another.
Someone who is moderate with reason, that is, someone who knows why he is
moderate (i.e. someone who knows that one ought to be moderate, since
injustices and greed result from dissoluteness), such a person is necessarily
30   also brave, because he subdues his affections. He is also wise, since he knows
the reason why he ought to be brave; and also just, since injustices result from
pleasurable indulgences of the body.

We have specified 'the virtues of *knowledge*' because of the natural virtues,
which derive from temperament. These do not imply one another, since
39,1   someone who is moderate by temperament is not always also brave or wise or
just. They are also called 'slavish' and 'irrational': 'slavish', because the natural
virtues are necessarily implied by temperament, since someone with a cooler
temperament is necessarily moderate; and 'irrational', either because someone
5   who is moderate by temperament is not always moderate with reason (for he
does not always know the reason why he ought to be moderate), or because the
natural virtues are also seen in irrational animals (the ring-dove, for example,
is naturally moderate, the fox wise, the lion brave, and the stork just, because he
feeds his father when the latter has grown old).

Again, we have added '[virtues] of knowledge' because of the virtues of
10   character. These virtues derive from a certain upbringing (*paradosis*) or set of
precepts (*parangelia*), e.g. when someone is moderate from a certain upbringing
or set of precepts. They do not imply one another, since someone can be
moderate by upbringing without being wise. Here finishes the lecture.

Lecture 13

15   After Plato and Pythagoras, who have defined philosophy in two ways, from
the subject matter <on the one hand>, from the goal <on the other>,[101] comes
the Stagirite, I mean Aristotle (Stageira is a city in Macedonia, where Aristotle

was from). He defines philosophy in the belief that it is a thing of great importance; accordingly, he has defined it in a single way, whereas each of the others [*sc.* Plato and Pythagoras] has defined it in two ways. Instead, Aristotle thinks that philosophy is <something>[102] great and exalted, for which reason   20
he has defined it by its superiority when he says: 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences'.[103] But we should enquire what each redoubling means, i.e. 'craft of crafts' and 'science of sciences', since it would have been enough to say 'philosophy is a craft and a science'. We could say that he likens philosophy to a king with the first redoubling, i.e. 'craft of crafts', and   25
to god with the second, i.e. 'science of sciences'. For just as we signify a king when we say 'ruler of rulers', so we liken philosophy to a king when calling it 'craft of crafts'. Again, just as we signify god when we say 'king of kings', so we liken philosophy to god when we call it 'science of sciences', since science is   30
superior to craft insofar as science provides the first principles to craft. The grammarian knows that *êta* and *ômega* are long, but music provides the reason   40,1
why. Just as a king does not sully himself by talking directly to the common crowd, but appoints officials through whom he takes care of even the lowliest subjects, so philosophy produces the crafts through which she knows what is subordinate to her. Again, just as the divine has certain powers by which it   5
cares for things in this world, so philosophy too produces the sciences through which she knows what is subordinate to her.

Besides, Aristotle said that philosophy is both the craft of crafts and the science of sciences because the subject matter of the crafts and sciences is related to them just as the crafts and sciences are related to philosophy. For in   10
fact the human body is the subject matter of medicine, but medicine itself is the subject matter of philosophy; and again, the heavenly bodies are the subject matter of astronomy, but astronomy itself is the subject matter of philosophy.

Further, Aristotle has defined philosophy as craft of crafts and science of sciences because philosophy knows the nature of things, while she leaves knowledge of their concomitants to the crafts and sciences. Philosophy grasps   15
form and matter by knowledge and infers the four elements, and on their basis compounds, and on their basis parts of the body, and on their basis the human body. For the rest, philosophy leaves knowledge of other matters, I mean of disease and health, to medicine, not because she is ignorant of them (she knows   20
these too) but because she does not want to sully herself or descend to the last

dregs [of particularity]. Again, philosophy knows the nature of the [human] voice, but leaves it to the study of language to know its concomitants, i.e. accents and breathings. And again, philosophy knows the shapes and the nature of geometry, but leaves geometry to know the rest, for example that a point is indivisible.

Further, Aristotle said that philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences, because she bestows the first principles to the crafts and the sciences. Grammar, as we have said, knows that *êta* and *ômega* are long, but does not know the explanation (*aitia*), and delegates it to music. Again, the doctor knows that the human body is composed of the four elements, but delegates the explanation to natural philosophy. Again, the geometer knows that the point is indivisible, but natural philosophy provides the explanation, since he does not know the reason why the point is indivisible. Again, rhetoric has come to deal with particular justice, i.e. political justice, but does not even know the nature of justice; the philosopher however does. For this reason rhetoricians, because they are ignorant of the nature of justice, choose doing injustice over suffering it, but the philosopher, since he knows the nature of justice, does not choose either of these, and if in fact it falls to him to choose one of them, he would rather choose to suffer injustice than to do it. People say that one cannot do injustice against a person's soul, unless of course one does injustice against one's own soul by doing unjust and wicked deeds. The person who does injustice against another either does so against the latter person's body, when he assaults it with blows, or against his external goods, i.e. his money, by stealing his property. But the person himself has his existence in his soul, since the body is the instrument of the soul. For this reason we say that there are 'I' and 'mine' and 'what belongs to mine': [the ancients][104] used to say 'I' to mean the soul, insofar as each person really exists in the soul; 'mine' to mean the body (since the body is the instrument of the soul), and 'what belongs to mine' to mean external goods, since possessions belong to the body. Therefore someone doing injustice does not do injustice, except against his own soul.

We should know that philosophy not only bestows first principles to the sciences and the crafts that use reason, but also to the manual crafts. But we should know that all the unreasoning crafts are called 'manual crafts' (*banausoi*) by a misuse of language; strictly speaking, the manual crafts are

those that work with fire; the word derives from 'going' (*bainein*) by the 'furnace' (*ausos*). An oven is a 'furnace', because it lets out some steam (*atmos*). The carpenter knows how to distinguish straight and crooked timbers with a rule or a measuring-line, which is what the poet is demonstrating when he says 'he made [them] straight to the line',[105] but he does not know the reason why he distinguishes them with a line. Rather, he delegates the explanation to the philosopher, since the geometer know the explanation for this. So much about these matters.

But we should know that the crafts are called 'unreasoning' not because they do not have an account or explanation, even though the craftsman does not in fact know the explanation, but because someone can pursue them without uttering a word. The carpenter for example can produce a chair without speaking.[106] But we should know that philosophy bestows not only their first principles to the crafts and sciences, but also corrects their mistakes. Grammarians, for example, define sound as 'impacting of the air', but the philosopher corrects this and says that the definition is not right. The two terms do not convert: if something is sound, it is impacting of air, but it is not the case that if something is impacting of air, it is sound; for example, when I strike the air with wool, no sound is produced.[107] But correct definitions do not usually convert, as we have learned.[108]

People define sound as follows: 'sound is the product of the breath stored within us when it travels through the rough windpipe and is articulated by the tongue and the epiglottis'.

Further, Aristotle said 'philosophy is the crafts of crafts and the science of sciences', because the crafts and sciences use definitions, divisions, and proofs; but the mother of these is philosophy. Here finishes the lecture.

Lecture 14

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Now that we have learned the complete [fifth] definition [of philosophy] as a whole above, let us go on to inquire into its parts. We should know that some people say: 'You were wrong to say that philosophy is the craft of crafts. For if it is the craft of crafts, it is clear that it is indeed a craft. But if it is a craft, it is clear that it is fallible, which is absurd.'

We can reply to these people that words said together are not always used in their usual sense. Consider, for example, that 'a dead man' cannot simply be called 'a man': a dead man does not have the characteristics of a man, because he is neither alive nor capable of perception. Again, 'a stone
10   vessel' cannot simply be called 'a vessel', because it does not float like a ship. Again, it is as with the dark saying, i.e. the riddle, that says: 'a man who was not a man – but still a man – killed a bird that was not a bird – but still a bird – sitting on a tree that was not a tree by throwing a stone that was not a stone'. The riddle means that a eunuch killed a bat sitting on a fennel-bush
15   by casting a pumice stone. It calls the eunuch 'a man who is not a man': 'a man' because the definition of man applies to the eunuch (the definition is 'rational mortal animal capable of receiving knowledge and intellect'), but 'not a man', because he does not engender what is like himself like the complete man. It calls the bat 'a bird that is not a bird'; 'a bird', because it flies, and 'not a bird', because it does not lay eggs like other birds but is viviparous;
20   <for it does not lay eggs but engenders an animal>.[109] Further, the bat has fleshy wings, which is not an attribute of other birds. It calls the fennel-bush 'a tree and not a tree'; 'a tree', because it is like a tree, but 'not a tree', because it is not solid like other trees. It says that the pumice stone is 'a stone and not a stone': 'a stone', because it is like a stone, but 'not a stone', because it is
25   not solid like other stones. Rather, it is porous, i.e. like a sponge. As we have said, words said together are not always used in their usual sense, just as, conversely, words used in their usual sense are not always said together. Suppose a certain Simon is a cobbler by trade, with a good character but bad at his trade. In this case the words, which are used in their usual sense, cannot be said together: for instance, if I say 'Simon is a cobbler', and further,
30   'Simon is good', I cannot put both these statements together, i.e. 'Simon is a good cobbler', since it implies that he is good as a cobbler, which is inappropriate because we assumed that he is bad at his trade.[110] It follows that someone saying that philosophy is the craft of crafts is not saying that philosophy is a craft, since, as we have claimed, words said together are not always used in their usual sense.

43,1   Besides, even if Aristotle had said that philosophy is a craft, it would not be absurd, because often the name of the craft is applied to the science. For instance, Plato in the dialogue *Gorgias* calls science a 'craft'. He says:

'shall we say that you know some craft?',[111] in place of 'science'. For someone who knows, knows a science. In the dialogue *Sophist* he calls the Demiurge a 'craftsman', and what is more, one who knows everything infallibly.[112]

Further, if the definition 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences' derives from superiority, and what is superior is not the same as what it is superior to, but better, it is clear that philosophy too, since it is superior to craft, is not the same as craft. So much about these matters.

But some people ask: 'why does Aristotle call philosophy "the science of sciences"?' Why indeed? Is science different from philosophy? We can reply that science is twofold, hypothetical and unhypothetical. Science is hypothetical when it assumes principles that require proofs and does not know their explanation, as when the geometer takes it as given that the point is indivisible, and does not know the explanation for it but delegates it to the natural philosopher. Science is unhypothetical when it assumes common notions that do not require proof, e.g. when we say 'god is good'. This is a common notion because everyone agrees that god is good and it does not require proof. So much about these matters.

Since we have mentioned craft and science, let us go on to differentiate them. But before this, let us make a few remarks about knowledge. We should know that knowledge is either particular or universal, and either with or without reason, which results in these four forms: trial-and-error (*peira*), experience (*empeiria*), craft (*tekhnê*), and science (*epistêmê*). Trial-and-error is unreasoning knowledge of one thing, for example when someone knows only one remedy and uses it without knowing the reason why or how he ought to use it. Experience is unreasoning knowledge of universals, as the Empirical doctors[113] illustrate: they know many remedies, but do not know the reason [for their efficacy]. So experience is unreasoning human memory and attention to recurring similar observations; the Empirical doctor, for example, uses remedies based on his memory and attention to recurring similar observations. But craft is rational knowledge of universals or a disposition that proceeds methodically with imagination. For craft is a kind of disposition and knowledge, but also proceeds methodically, because it always acts in accordance with order. We have added 'with imagination' because of nature, since nature is a disposition (because it exists in beings that have a nature, e.g. in a man, a stone,

44,1 or wood) and proceeds methodically (because it proceeds in order), but not with imagination, like craft. The craftsman who uses reason when he wants to make something first forms a mental picture of what he wants to make and then produces it accordingly. But nature does not create anything in this way,

5 since she does not first form a mental picture of what she wants to make. Or, again, craft is a system derived from cognitive acts, organized by experience towards some goal that is useful in life. The definition can be given clarity as follows: a craft is 'a system derived from cognitive acts', i.e. an assemblage of discoveries (craft is perfected by particular discoveries about particular things);

10 it is 'organized by experience', i.e. it has been tested by much experience (men put practical rules (*theôrêmata*) to the test in the light of much previous experience, and in this way establish them for the craft); 'for some goal that is useful in life' has been added because of futile and wicked craftsmanship, which is not beneficial for life. Futile craftsmanship, like tight-rope walking or

15 performing balancing acts, is neither useful nor harmful for life. Wicked craftsmanship, on the other hand, like that of sorcerers, aims at what is not beneficial for life and is harmful, because sorcerers aim at what in addition to not benefitting also harms human life. So much then about crafts.

Science on the other hand is infallible and unchanging knowledge of universals (because it knows what it knows infallibly); or it is infallible knowledge according to the nature of its subject matter, since science knows its

20 subject matter as it is naturally and insofar as it belongs to nature. This is what we have to say about knowledge.

But some people raise the following puzzle: 'if both crafts and sciences produce everything with reason, how are they different from each other?'

25 Some people say that science is different from craft, insofar as science is infallible but craft fallible. We can reply to them that they are wrong. For craft is infallible with respect to its own rational principles, but seems fallible about the explanation of its subject matter, as we are going to show shortly. So we can

30 say that science differs from craft in subject matter, since a craft deals with things in flux and not with what always remains the same. For example, medicine deals with the human body, which is in flux and does not always remain the same. Again, grammar deals with words, which do not always remain the same, since words are different over time, because they are used in

35 different ways at different times. For this reason the crafts are thought to be

fallible. This happens because of their subject matter: because the subject 45,1
matter is in flux and different at different times, failure occurs and a craft is
thought to be fallible. For example, when a doctor wants to give someone a
purge, at the appointed time the state of the wind suddenly changes and the
patient's body, being in flux, is in a different condition. When the doctor 5
administers the purge it does no good to the patient, because his pores are
blocked on the surface and there is no purging through the sweat. The patient
always benefits insofar as medical principles are concerned, but since his body
is in flux and in a varying condition, failure occurs. But science deals with what 10
always remains the same, because it involves itself with universal man and
universal horse, which always remain the same. In this respect, then, science
and craft are different: science always applies reason (*logos*) (astronomy for
example makes correct predications by reason alone), but craft either engages
only in physical activity, like painting for example (because the painter engages 15
only in physical activity, since he can paint even if he's not talking), or it engages
in physical activity and reason equally, as for example singing accompanied by
a kithara (this – I am talking about singing accompanied by a kithara, not harp
playing, since the latter only strikes chords, and does not sing – engages in
physical activity and speech (*logos*) equally,[114] because it strikes chords and
sings with the voice); or it engages more in reason than physical activity, like 20
grammar for example (grammar engages more in reason, e.g. when it offers
explanations, but less in physical activity, e.g. when writing accents and
punctuation marks); or it engages more in physical activity than reason, as
medicine, which engages more in physical activity, e.g. when taking a pulse or
applying remedies, but less in reason, e.g. when making a preliminary
examination of the circumstances and giving its cause. With this we finish the 25
present lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 15

Let Pythagoras be the beginning and end for us, since he used to turn towards
himself and to connect the beginning with the end like the circle, where the
beginning is also connected to the end. So <Pythagoras>[115] is the beginning 30
and the end for us; the beginning, because his definitions came in the beginning,

i.e. 'philosophy is the knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings', and further, '[philosophy is the] knowledge of divine and human things'; the end, because

46,1 his definition comes again at the end, i.e. 'philosophy is love of wisdom'. We should know that some people have criticized the present definition on the grounds that correct definitions usually convert but the present one does not. For if something is philosophy, it is love of wisdom, but it is not the case that if

5 something is love of wisdom, it is philosophy, since every craft desires its own subject matter.

Now we can reply that the present definition is correct, since it is by Pythagoras. For he was the first person <to define philosophy, but then>[116] the word 'wisdom' was <incorrectly> applied to the manual crafts too, as the poet shows when he says 'a wise carpenter fitted them together',[117] applying the word 'wise' to the carpenter. <And Pythagoras when defining the wise man>[118]

10 applied 'wisdom' to knowledge of real being, and was the first to call only knowledge of real being, i.e. god, 'wisdom'. The divine is called 'real being' in the strict sense since it always exists, because being is what always remains the same and never changes. So Pythagoras called the desire for being, i.e. the divine, 'philosophy'. We should know that strictly speaking, we ought to apply

15 the word 'wisdom' all the more to the divine, since wisdom (*sophia*) is said to be a kind of 'preserver' (*saophia*), i.e. the preserver of light (*hê to phôs sôzousa*). Since the divine is immaterial and not receptive of opposites, it preserves the light of its own nature. What is material, i.e. what is in the sensible world, on the other hand, does not preserve the light of its own nature, because it can receive opposites and is obscured by them.

20 Some people raise the following puzzle: 'if the divine is manifest by nature, why is it not so for us?' We can reply that just as the sun, which is naturally bright, seems rather dim to bats because of the unfitness of their sense-organs, i.e. because they do not see in daytime, so too the divine, which is manifest and pure by nature, is not manifest to us because the eye of our soul is obscured by

25 the mist of the body, i.e. by pleasurable indulgences.[119] So much about these matters.

But we should know that philosophy has many degrees, since one employs many degrees [of knowledge] in order to know philosophy. One needs to know the five powers of knowledge, which are perception, imagination, opinion,

30 discursive thinking (*dianoia*), and intellect. Perception is particular knowledge

of something present, since it perceives something present: sight cannot perceive something, unless it has it in view, and hearing in turn cannot perceive a sound, unless it is near. Imagination, on the other hand, is particular knowledge of something absent, for example when today I imagine, i.e. recall, a man I have seen yesterday. Imagination differs from empty thoughts in that imagination recalls existing things (because someone imagines and recalls what he has seen), while empty thoughts are conceptions of non-existing things, as when someone invents the goat-stag or the hippo-centaur, because these things do not exist. But opinion is twofold, either rational or irrational. It is irrational, for example, when someone thinks that the rational soul is immortal without stating his reason; and rational, as when someone thinks that the rational soul is immortal and states the reason why. We should know that rational opinion is a conclusion from premises, for example, 'the soul is self-moving, what is self-moving is always moving, what is always moving is immortal {like an angel},[120] therefore the soul is immortal'. Consider the conclusion of the premises, I mean 'therefore the soul is immortal'. This, which is concluded from the premises, is called rational opinion (*doxa meta logou*). Discursive thinking (*dianoia*), on the other hand, is rational knowledge of universals. Discursive thinking differs from rational opinion in that rational opinion is a conclusion derived from premises, as we have said, while discursive thinking takes commonly accepted premises to prove the point in question: for example, it takes for granted that the soul is self-moving and that the self-moving is always moving, and that, if something is always moving, it is immortal. It proves from this the point in question, I mean that the soul is immortal.[121] But intellect knows everything within its scope, i.e. the intelligibles, by a simple mental application, i.e. immediately and at the same time.

So[122] trial-and-error (*peira*) arises from perception and imagination (for this too is particular knowledge), and experience (*empeiria*) from irrational opinion (since it also has irrational knowledge of what it knows, just as irrational opinion). Indeed, experience also arises from perception and imagination, since it consists of what is particular. Empirical doctors produce their remedies when they have examined every single one of them and used their irrational imagination to recall them to mind. We should know that when experience arises from perception and imagination, it is called 'seeing with one's own eyes' (*autopsia*) (the empirical doctor sees the nature of his remedies

with his own eyes and, when he has examined each of them, knows their nature). But when experience arises from irrational opinion, it is called 'inquiry'

30 (*historia*), as when someone thinks that a certain remedy has a particular nature without having tested it himself, but derives this belief from hearsay. Craft on the other hand arises from rational opinion and discursive thinking;

48,1 for like them, craft also knows universals rationally. Science arises from discursive thinking and intellect. When it assumes principles that require proof, for example that the point is indivisible (because this requires proof), science arises from discursive thinking; but when it assumes definitions or

5 common notions that do not require proof, for example that god loves mankind (because this is agreed by all and does not need proof), science arises from intellect. Thus craft differs from science not only in those respects mentioned in the previous lecture, but also in that craft arises from rational opinion and

10 discursive thinking, but science from discursive thinking and intellect. We have shown with the previous arguments that philosophy has many degrees and that it is the finest thing of all, as Plato shows when addressing a certain geometer called Theodorus: 'There has never been a greater good for men bestowed by god, nor will there ever be one.'[123]

15 So we have learned that there are six definitions of philosophy and what their explanation is. We have not only learned this, but also that there are four different kinds of definition of philosophy: those that derive from the subject matter, i.e. the one that states 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings' and the one that states 'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things'; those that derive from the goal, i.e. the one that states 'philosophy

20 is a preparation for death' and the one that states 'philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man'; the definition derived from superiority, i.e. the one that states 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences'; and the one from etymology, i.e. the one that states 'philosophy is love of wisdom'. There are four kinds of definitions of philosophy, because the number four is held in great esteem by the Pythagoreans, as they themselves show

25 when they swear by Pythagoras: 'By him that gave the tetractys to our souls, the source of ever-flowing nature', i.e. 'By Pythagoras who gave us the number four, the source of ever-flowing nature.'[124] He called the number four 'the source of ever-flowing nature', because our bodies are composed of the four elements

30 (the number four was held in great esteem by the Pythagoreans because of

this); or because the elements are also four in number, i.e. earth, water, air, and fire; or because there are also four virtues of the soul, i.e. courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom; or because four added to the numbers before it equals ten. When three is added to four it equals seven, and when two is added in turn, nine, and when one is added in turn, ten. They tend to say that ten is a venerable number, insofar as the number ten can receive the numbers before it, for which reason it is also called 'decad' (*dekas*), as though it were a kind of receptacle (*dekhas*). With these remarks we finish the present lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 16

Since we have earlier on given an arithmetical explanation which shows why there are six definitions of philosophy, [we should know] that the commentators take their starting point from this and proceed to discuss the numbers up to the decad. They say that the monad (*monas*) is so called after 'remaining' (*to menein*), since the monad, by whatever number it is multiplied, preserves the same form; for example, one times three equals three, one times four equals four, one times five equals five. Notice how the monad, when multiplied by these numbers, preserved the same form and did not equal another number. If someone should say: 'Look, I count one and four, yet the same number is no longer preserved, but becomes five', we reply that this is a case of addition and for this reason the same number is not preserved. So we say that the monad is not a number but the principle of number. If someone should ask: 'if the monad is the principle of number, why do you say that it is not a number?', we reply that the principle of something is not always the same as that of which it is the principle (*arkhê*); for example, the foundation is the starting point (*arkhê*) of a house, yet the foundation is not [itself] a house. This is also how the monad can be the principle of number without being a number. We are going to demonstrate that the monad is not a number once we have made a few points beforehand. We should know that when in the case of numbers we use the preposition 'by' (*epi*), it is multiplication, for example five by (*epi*) five equals twenty-five (instead of 'five times five'), and again, three by three equals nine (instead of 'three times three'). But when

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there is also a union (*sundesmos*), it is addition; for example, three plus three
equals six, four plus four equals eight. So numbers are greater when multiplied

30   by themselves than when they are added to themselves; for example three
times three equals nine, but three plus three equals six. Notice how three when
multiplied [by itself] equals nine, but when it is added [to itself] it equals six,

50,1   and that nine is greater than six. Again, four times four equals sixteen, but four
plus four equals eight. If, therefore, the monad, on the contrary, equals a greater
number when added [to itself] than when multiplied [by itself], it is clear that
it is not a number. For one times one is one, but one plus one two. So much
about the monad.

5   The dyad (*duas*) is named after 'passing through' (*to diienai*) and 'going
through' (*diaporeuesthai*). The dyad is the first to have separated itself out of
the monad, since the dyad, which manifests division, was the first number to
supervene on the monad, which manifests unity. But we should note that not
even the dyad is strictly speaking a number, because, as we have learned,
numbers that are multiplied by themselves produce a greater number than

10   when added to themselves.[125] But the dyad equals the same number when it is
multiplied by itself and added to itself, since two times two equals four and two
plus two equals four. Therefore the dyad is not a number.[126] The dyad is not a
number in another way too, since every even number, when the monad is
taken away, i.e. subtracted, becomes odd, and becomes odd in turn when the
monad is added to it. For example, four, when the monad is subtracted,

15   becomes three, an odd number; and when in turn the monad is added, four
becomes five, which is likewise odd. If, therefore, two, when the monad is
added, becomes three, an odd number, but does not become an odd number
when the monad is subtracted (because when the monad is subtracted, two
becomes one; but the monad is not a number), it is not a number. And in [yet]

20   another way, the dyad is not a number, since every number is composed of
multiple monads, but the dyad is not, because multiplicity (*plêthos*) begins
from three onwards.

       But some people say that the dyad is a number, because every number, when
the two numbers on either side of it are added, becomes half [that number].
For example, five is between four and six, which add up to ten, half of which is

25   five. Again, six is between five and seven, which add up to twelve, half of which
is six. Again, seven is between six and eight, which add up to fourteen, half of

which is seven. If, therefore, two, when the two numbers next to it are added, becomes half [that number] (because two is between the monad and three, which add up to four, half of which is two), it is clear that two is a number. This is what these people say.

But we should know that if someone is going to examine the matter with accuracy, he will find that these people's criterion [for being a number] does not fit the number two. The dyad does not have a number on each side of it, because it is between the monad and three, but the monad is not a number, as we have shown.[127] But we should know that the dyad too is a principle of number. Some people raise the following puzzle: 'how can the dyad be a principle of number, when you said before that the monad is *the* principle of number?' But in order to resolve their puzzle, let us make a few points extraneous to the argument.

We should know that some numbers are even and others odd. Numbers that cannot be divided into equal parts are odd, such as five, which is not divisible into equal parts. Five divides into three and two, and we cannot divide it into two and a half plus two and a half, since the arithmeticians do not divide the monad. Again, seven does not divide into equal parts, since it divides into three and four. Numbers that can be divided into equal parts are even, such as four, which divides into equal parts; because it divides into two and two. Again, six divides into equal parts, because it divides into three and three.

One should know that odd numbers only divide into unequal parts, e.g. five (because it divides into three and two), while even numbers divide into both equal and unequal parts. I can divide six into equal parts, e.g. three plus three, and into unequal parts, e.g. into four plus two. For this reason, too, the dyad is not strictly a number, insofar as it is an even number that only divides into equal parts (because it divides into the monad and the monad), and not in fact into unequal parts too. So the monad is a principle of all numbers, i.e. of odd and even numbers, but the dyad is the principle of even numbers alone, since it produces even numbers. For example, two doubled equals four, which is even; and two tripled, six, <which>[128] is also even; and similarly with the subsequent numbers [greater than three]. But someone might ask: 'How so? Does the dyad produce only even numbers? In fact it also produces odd numbers: look, when the monad is added to the dyad, it equals three, which is

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30   odd, because three does not divide into equal parts; it divides into the monad
and the dyad. But we cannot divide it into one and a half and one and a half,
since, as we have said, the arithmeticians do not divide the monad.' We reply
that the dyad is not responsible for producing odd numbers, unless we add the

35   monad to it, since it always produces even numbers, as we said above. When it
52,1   is doubled or tripled or, put simply, multiplied many times by itself it always
produces an even number. Besides, the dyad is not a number, since every
number has a beginning, middle, and end <. . .>.[129] So much about the dyad.

The number three (*trias*) is named after being 'indestructible' (*ateirês*)
5   and inexhaustible. It is so called because it cannot be divided into equal parts.
It divides into the monad and the dyad, but we cannot divide it into one and
a half and one and a half, since, as we have said, the arithmeticians do not
divide the monad. But someone might say: 'By this argument, every odd
number ought to be so named from being indestructible and inexhaustible,
10   i.e. from being indivisible into equal parts, for example five and seven. For
these numbers do not divide into equal parts: five divides into three and
two, but seven into three and four.' We reply that three, because it is prior to
the other odd numbers, was the first to take up this designation. But we
should know that three is a number: if we say that three is not a number
15   because two is not a number, not even four is a number by the same argument,
since three is not a number; but not even five would be a number, since four is
not, and so on ad infinitum. But three is in fact a number: when it is multiplied
[by itself], it produces a greater number than when it is added [to itself]: three
by three equals nine, but three plus three equals six. Notice that when three is
20   multiplied [by itself] it equals nine, but when it is added [to itself] it equals six,
and nine is greater than six. This is a property of numbers, as we have said
above:[130] for example, four times four equals sixteen, but four plus four equals
eight. We used this fact to demonstrate that the monad and dyad are not
numbers.
25   In another way too, three is a number, insofar as it is made up of multiple
monads, which is a property of number. Every number is made up of multiple
monads, for example four, five, six, and so on. But three does not seem to be a
number, insofar as it does not have numbers on each side of it, because three is
between four and two, but two, as we have shown,[131] is not a number. All the
same, three is a number for the aforementioned reasons.[132]

Lecture 17

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Now that we have discussed the monad, dyad, and triad, let us go on to discuss the subsequent numbers too. We should know that the tetrad (*tetras*) is named for being, as it were, a kind of base (*hedras*), i.e. steady (*hedraios*) and stable. For we should know that the tetrad produces the square, but the square is hard 53,1 to dislodge because of its many parts that are in contact with the ground. A square stone is hard to lever up, since it has many parts that touch the ground, but when a pillar is tilted, it is easy to move, because it does not touch the 5 ground with many parts. So the number four is so named because of its steadiness and stability.

The pentad (*pentas*) is named for being, as it were, 'one and all' (*hen kai pas*). For the number five is made up of the monad and the number four, but the number four is called 'all', either because there are four elements, from which all bodies are composed, or because the number four when it is added to the numbers before it equals ten (adding three to four equals seven, adding two to 10 seven equals nine, and adding the monad to nine equals ten).

The hexad (*hexas*) is named after 'being equal to' (*hexisas*), one might say, because it is equal to its own parts. Six is a perfect number, as we have learned above,[133] when discussing why there are six definitions of philosophy, since its parts, when added together, are equal to the whole. Why are they equal to the 15 whole? We have explained that above.

The heptad (*heptas*) is named after 'august' (*septas*), because of its august (*to sebasmion*) and venerable nature. The number seven is venerable, which is why there are also seven days in the week, seven planets, and seven vowels. It is called 'right time' (*kairos*) and 'Athena':[134] right time, because the ages of men 20 proceed according to seven (children cut their teeth at seven months and grow new ones to replace them at age seven[135]); and Athena, because (as the story goes) Athena is a virgin and has no mother (she came out of Zeus' head, as the story goes), just as seven is the only number in the decad which is neither produced from another number by multiplication nor produces another 25 number in the decad by multiplication. One should know that some numbers in the decad produce others when they are multiplied, and some are so produced, and others both produce and are produced in this way, for example four, which is produced from two (two times two equals four), but also

30   produces eight, since two times four equals eight. Again, nine is produced in
      this way (three times three equals nine), but does not itself produce a number
      in the decad when it is multiplied, because two times nine equals eighteen, and
      eighteen is not in the decad. Five in turn produces ten, since two times five
      equals ten, <but is not itself produced from another number in the decad by
      multiplication>.[136] So seven does not produce another number within the
54,1 decad by multiplication (because two times seven is fourteen, but fourteen is
      not a number in the decad), nor is it produced from another number by
      multiplication. But if someone should say that seven both produces [another
      number in the decad] and is produced [from one] (adding the monad to seven
5   equals eight, and adding the monad to six equals seven),[137] we say that this is
      addition, not multiplication.

      The ogdoad (*ogdoas*) is called 'producer of the dyad' (*agoduas*), as it were,
      because it produces (*agein*) the number two (*duo*), since it can be divided into
      two down to the monad.[138] Eight divides into four and four, and four in turn
      into two and two, and two in turn into monad and monad. But if someone
      should say that the tetrad should be called 'ogdoad' by this argument, since four
10   can also be divided by two down to the monad (because it divides into two and
      two, and two in turn into monad and monad), we reply that etymologies do
      not convert. Consider that wheat (*sitos*) is named after 'shaking' (*to seiesthai*),
      and not only wheat shakes (*seietai*) but also barley and other crops, yet one
      does not for this reason say that the other crops should be called 'wheat'. So the
      number eight is called 'ogdoad' because it leads to two by way of another
      number; for eight leads to two by way of four. And eight is made up of four
      (two times four equals eight), but four contains two within it. So eight is called
15   'ogdoad' (*ogdoas*) because it leads to two (*agei ton duo*) by way of another
      number, as though it were a kind of 'leader of the dyad' (*agoduas*).

      The ennead (*enneas*) is named after 'one and new' (*hen kai neon*). When
20   nine is multiplied it produces a new number by subtracting one from nine
      down to the monad: for example, two times nine equals eighteen, three times
      nine twenty-seven, four times nine thirty-six, and so on for the other numbers.
      Notice how nine, when multiplied by another number, is progressively
      diminished by one.

      The decad (*dekas*) is named for being some kind of 'receptacle' (*dekhas*),
25   since ten receives (*dekhetai*), i.e. encompasses within itself, all the numbers

before it. For it encompasses the monad, the dyad, and the other numbers. With these remarks the present lecture is also finished, with god's help.

Lecture 18

Now that we have learned through its definitions that philosophy is a single thing, let us go on, and, since it has many branches, subject it to [the process of] division. We learn its parts accurately through division, and we know a whole accurately through its parts. Besides {we learn its parts in the course of division, and}[139] as we come to know its parts we discover what philosophical treatises pertain to what parts of it. In this way we avoid thinking (out of ignorance of the parts of philosophy) that treatises that pertain to its practical part pertain to its theoretical part and vice versa. So let us go on to subject philosophy to [the process of] division.

But now that we have mentioned division, let us go on to state what division (*dihairesis*), further division (*epidihairesis*), and subdivision (*hupodihairesis*) are, so that we do not inquire about something we do not know.[140] We should know that division is the primary section of the subject matter, for example when we say that some animals are rational and some irrational. Further division is the secondary section of the same subject matter conducted in a different manner, for example when we divide animal in a different way, and say in turn that some animals are mortal and some immortal. Subdivision is the section of a member that has already been divided, for example when after dividing animals into rational and irrational, we subdivide the rational animals into mortal and immortal, and subdivide the mortal part in turn into man, horse, dog, and suchlike.

So in this way philosophy divides into a theoretical and a practical part. It knows all real beings through the theoretical part, and reforms character through the practical. It is worth examining why philosophy is divided into two, I mean into a theoretical and a practical part, and not into one or many parts. We can say that it cannot be divided into one, since division never deals with unity but with difference. For division (*diaresis*) is named after 'dividing' (*dihairein*) and separating one thing from another, for example, when I say 'some animals are rational, and others irrational'.

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25   Philosophy is divided into two parts and no more for three reasons. First, philosophy is divided into a theoretical and a practical part because both belong to our essence: the theoretical part, as children show, and, simply put, all people fond of inquiry, i.e. lovers of knowledge (because everyone loves
30   learning something); and the practical part, as the soul shows, which is never at rest; for in sleep the soul does not rest but makes dreams appear. But when we are at rest and have nothing to occupy us, we either pluck our hairs or pick our teeth or something like that.[141] So philosophy divides into two because its theoretical and practical parts belong to our essence.

35   The second reason is this: philosophy, as we have learned, is becoming like
56,1   god. So because philosophy is becoming like god, and the divine has two kinds of powers, theoretical and practical (theoretical powers, insofar as the divine knows everything; practical powers, insofar as it creates everything), philosophy too divides into two parts, i.e. the theoretical and the practical part. With the theoretical part, philosophy imitates god's powers of theoretical reflection and
5   knowledge (through them philosophy knows all beings), but with the practical part, it imitates god's practical powers (through them philosophy cares for souls that are imperfect, by leading them from ignorance towards knowledge).

     The third reason is this: philosophy's goal[142] is to order the soul. But since
10   its goal is to order the soul, and the soul has two kinds of powers, vital powers and cognitive powers (cognitive powers are perception, imagination, opinion, discursive thinking, and intellect, about which we learned above;[143] vital powers are will, choice, spirit, and appetite), philosophy also divides into two, i.e. the theoretical and the practical part. It organizes the soul's cognitive
15   powers with the theoretical part and its vital powers with the practical part. For the practical part teaches us to control anger and not to desire anything unsuitable.

     This is what we have to say about philosophy's division into two, i.e. the theoretical and the practical part. But we should know that each of these surpasses the other and is surpassed by it. The theoretical part surpasses the
20   practical part in terms of subject matter, since the theoretical part has all real beings as its subject matter, with a view to knowing them, but the practical part only human souls. The practical part orders only human souls, and not in fact those of irrational animals; but the theoretical part also knows the irrational natures. The practical part surpasses the theoretical part with respect to its

goal, since the goal of the theoretical part is truth, but that of the practical, the good. A man orders his own character and eradicates his affections (this is good) with the practical part, but contemplates the truth about real beings with the theoretical part.[144] The good is superior to the truth because it is <more universal and>[145] encompassing <than it>,[146] because truth includes goodness, but goodness does not include truth. For sometimes even lies are good, as in the following example: someone, while in his senses, lends another man a sword, but then, in a moment of madness, goes to him wanting to get it back, so that he can do something awful. But the borrower, aware of the situation, denies this and says: 'you did not lend me anything'. He lies, so that the lender will not perpetrate some awful crime when he takes the sword. So here we have a good lie.[147] Another example: robbers chase someone in order to kill him, and when they meet another person and ask him about the person they pursue, he denies that he has seen him, even though he has, and so saves the fugitive. Notice that a lie is good [in these cases].

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Lecture 19

Now that we have divided philosophy into a theoretical and a practical part, let us go on to subdivide these too, since each of these divided members subdivides. But let us first subdivide the theoretical part. This seems to be superior (*timiôteron*) to the practical part, since the theoretical part has all real beings as its subject matter, with a view to knowing them, but the practical part only human souls, because it orders only human souls, and not in fact those of irrational animals. But we should know that Plato divides the theoretical part differently from Aristotle. Plato subdivides the theoretical part into natural science and theology, but did not consider mathematics to be a part of philosophy, but rather a kind of preparatory exercise (*progumnasma ti*) like grammar or rhetoric, which is why, at the entrance to his own school, he had the inscription: 'let no one enter who is untutored in geometry'.[148] Plato used to have this inscription because he discoursed theologically about many subjects and concentrated on theology; and mathematics, of which geometry is a part, is advantageous for gaining knowledge of theology. Aristotle subdivides the theoretical part into natural science, mathematics, and theology. He thought

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25 that mathematics is a part of philosophy, since it is a science. So much about
these matters.

It is worth inquiring why the theoretical part subdivides into three parts, i.e.

58,1 natural science, mathematics, and theology. We can give this explanation: all
real beings are subjects of knowledge for the theoretical part, and there are
three kinds of real beings: those that are material in existence and conception,
such as trees, rocks, and bones (these are material in existence and thought,

5 because one cannot conceive of an immaterial tree, stone, or bone); those that
are immaterial in existence and thought, such as angels, gods, and the soul
which is bodiless[149] (these are immaterial in existence and thought, for one
could not even conceive of god, angel, or bodiless soul as being material); and
those that are material in existence but immaterial in thought, such as
geometric shapes, since these are material in existence (one cannot conceive of

10 a triangle or rectangle or some such shape without matter: they exist either in
wood or in stone or chalk or something of this sort), but immaterial in thought.
For when someone imagines and calls to mind the shape by itself, he imprints
(*anatupoi*) it in his own discursive thinking. Just as wax, when it is imprinted

15 with a signet ring, receives the impression of the seal itself and nothing, of
course, is abstracted from the ring, so discursive thinking (*dianoia*), when it
imagines geometrical shapes, does not take anything away from the matter, but
imagines only the shape itself and imprints (*diatupoi*) it on itself.[150] So because
the theoretical part has all real beings as its subject matter, with a view to
knowing them, and real beings, as we have said, are of three kinds, the

20 theoretical part also divides into three, into natural science, mathematics, and
theology.

We should know that natural science deals with what is material in existence
and thought (for example, it examines how the four elements are combined
with each other). Theology on the other hand deals with what is immaterial in
existence and thought, while mathematics deals with what is material in

25 existence but immaterial in thought.

So let us go on to discuss the order [of natural science, mathematics, and
theology]. We should know that natural science comes first in order, because it
is akin and near to ourselves, inasmuch as it is completely material. Mathematics
is intermediate between natural science and theology, since it participates in

30 the two. It is material like natural science and immaterial like theology, because,

as we have said, mathematics is material in existence but immaterial in thought. Theology is necessarily last: it cannot come after natural science, since one should not proceed immediately to what is completely immaterial from what is completely material. Otherwise we suffer the same as people who have spent a long time in darkness and straightaway look at the sun: they go blind.[151] So we should not proceed immediately from what is completely material to what is completely immaterial. This is what the following verses about Otus and Ephialtes[152] are hinting at:

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> They eagerly mounted Ossa upon Olympus, and upon Ossa in turn
> Pelios with quivering leaves, so that they would scale heaven.[153]

It is in accordance with the phenomena that the poet says Otus and Ephialtes wanted to place one mountain on top of another to prepare their ascent to heaven. The allegorical sense of these verses shows that Otus and Ephialtes wanted to rush from physical and completely material things immediately towards knowledge of the divine. Therefore one should proceed to theology from mathematics. Plato shows that this is true when he discusses mathematics and says: 'This is the way, these the studies, whether easy or difficult, this the path to pursue, which one must not neglect.'[154] In other words, one should ascend to theology through the systematic study of mathematics. Plotinus also shows this when he says: 'To accustom the young to the incorporeal nature, we should teach them mathematics, through which they come to understand it.'[155] We should know that mathematics is like a ladder and a bridge: just as we move up from below on a ladder and cross from one side to the opposite over a bridge, so we proceed from mathematics to theology, because mathematics contributes to knowledge of theology.[156] So much on these matters.

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Some people raise the following puzzle: 'If we study (*manthanetai*) not only mathematics but also natural science and theology, why is only mathematics, and not the other two, called "mathematical" (*mathêmatikon*)?' They resolve this puzzle by saying that natural science cannot be called 'mathematical', because it is not subject to accurate knowledge, seeing that it is completely material, always in flux and flow, and different at different times. Rather, natural science knows something in one way today and in a different way tomorrow, because of its changeable nature. But nor can theology be called 'mathematical', since the divine, inasmuch as it is invisible and incomprehensible, is better

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understood through conjecture (*eikasmos*) than accurate knowledge (*gnôsis*).[157]

60,1 Necessarily, then, only mathematics is called 'mathematical'. Besides, it alone is called 'mathematical', because it teaches us how we should study (*manthanein*) things. For even though Aristotle teaches us this in his logic, he has taken his starting point from mathematics. Further, mathematics alone is called

5 'mathematical', because it exists in discursive thinking (*dianoia*), as the Pythagoreans say; for only discursive thinking studies (*manthanei*), since intellect (*nous*) knows everything by a single mental application (*prosbolê*). With these remarks we finish the present lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 20

10 Now that we have divided the theoretical part into natural science, mathematics, and theology, let us go on to divide each of these. But since the division of natural science and theology has many parts (*poluskhidês esti*)[158] and requires a longer lecture, let's postpone it to the more extensive lectures. For now, let us go on to state the division of mathematics that is more evident. There is also

15 another division into many parts, which will be discussed in the more extensive lectures; notwithstanding, the one we are about to give is accurate. We should know that we need to discuss five main points about mathematics. First, we state how many and what kinds of mathematics there are; second, why there

20 are this many; third, what their order is; fourth, who discovered them; and fifth, what kinds of studies are closely connected to these.

Let us go on to the first point and state how many and what kinds of mathematics there are. We should know that there are four: arithmetic, music,

25 geometry, and astronomy. Let us go on to the second point and state why there are this many kinds of mathematics. We should know that mathematics deals with quantity: because it deals either with numbers like arithmetic (this is quantitative); or with relations between sounds, like music (music is also quantitative, since it examines, for example, what has a double ratio, and what

30 has a ratio of one and a half); or with distances across the earth, like geometry (this is also quantitative); or with the movements of the heavenly bodies, like astronomy, which is also quantitative, because they involve certain distances.

61,1 So now that we have reached this point and know that mathematics deals with

quantity, we should know that quantity is twofold: either continuous or discrete. Something is a continuous quantity when its parts join up along a single edge, e.g. a wall, which is a continuous quantity. When you conceptually (*dunamei*) break it into many pieces,[159] all the broken off pieces join up along a single edge. One piece is joined to another by the line that had been used in breaking the wall apart in thought. In fact, since the line that produced the conceptual division goes through the parts that are broken up conceptually, we find that one part comes to be connected with that line, and so too another part, and all the parts are connected to one another because of that line. As a matter of fact, they had been submitted to division only conceptually, not in actuality, [i.e.] so as to be spatially separated from one another too.

A discrete quantity is what is separated and has nothing that could provide a continuity between one part and the other, as is the case with numbers. The number ten, for example, is separated: whether you assume that it is composed of monads or of five and five, there is no other number that could provide a continuity between this number and the other. When you add another number, you find that a number greater than ten results.

Each of these kinds of quantity is twofold. Discrete quantity is twofold: on the one hand, there is discrete quantity by itself; on the other, discrete quantity in relation to something else. It is by itself, as when we take the numbers by themselves, for instance when we take the number ten itself and do not examine it in relation to another number; and in relation to something else, as when we examine a particular number in relation to another; for example when we examine ten in relation to five and say that ten is twice as much as five. Again, continuous quantity is twofold: unmoving and moving; unmoving, like the earth (it is unmoving, since it does not go from one place to another); and moving, like the heavens, which are always in motion.

That being so, since mathematics deals with quantity, and quantity, as we have said, is twofold (either continuous or discrete), and each of these is twofold (discrete quantity by itself or in relation to something else, and continuous quantity that is unmoving or moving), there are four kinds of mathematics (arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy), in analogy with the four kinds derived from discrete and continuous quantity. Arithmetic deals with discrete quantity by itself; music with discrete quantity in relation to something else; geometry with continuous quantity that is unmoving; and

astronomy with continuous quantity that is moving. So much about the second main point.

Let us go on to the third main point and state the order of the kinds of mathematics.[160] We should know that arithmetic and music are prior to geometry and astronomy, since arithmetic and music deal with discrete quantity, but geometry and astronomy with continuous quantity. Discrete quantity is superior to continuous quantity, because discrete quantity can receive different forms without confusion (*asunkhutôs*). Consider, for example, the number twenty-five, which is a discrete quantity and can receive different forms without confusion: in fact, it is both circular and square. It is circular, because just as in a circle the beginning is joined to the end, so here one begins with five and by multiplying it by itself ends up with the same number, i.e. five times five equals twenty-five. Notice how one starts with five and by multiplication ends up with five again. On the other hand, twenty-five is called 'square', because every number when multiplied by itself equals a square number, for example three times three equals nine, four times four equals sixteen; and so five times five equals twenty-five. Continuous quantity on the other hand cannot receive different forms without confusion. Consider how when someone draws the shape of Hector in wax, which is a continuous quantity, he cannot draw another shape unless the first one disappears; otherwise confusion ensues. Since discrete quantity is superior to continuous quantity, then, arithmetic and music, because they deal with discrete quantity, are prior to geometry and astronomy, because these deal with continuous quantity. But arithmetic is prior to music, since arithmetic, as we have said above,[161] deals with quantity by itself, but music deals with quantity in relation to something else. Being by itself is prior to being in relation to something else, since something must first simply exist before it can enter into relation with something else. Geometry is prior to astronomy, since geometry deals with continuous unmoving quantity, but astronomy with continuous moving quantity. Now, the unmoving is prior to the moving, because the principle of movement is rest; for someone about to move proceeds from rest. This then is the explanation of the order of the kinds of mathematics.

We should also give another explanation: arithmetic is analogous to the monad, music to the dyad, geometry to the triad, and astronomy to the tetrad. Thus they have the following order, in analogy with the order of the numbers:

arithmetic is analogous to the monad (because arithmetic deals with quantity   5
by itself, and something by itself is some particular thing); music to the dyad
(because music deals with quantity in relation to something else, and a relation
applies to at least two things); geometry to the triad (because geometry deals
with plane figures, and the first figure is the triangle, since neither a single line
nor two lines make a figure); and astronomy to the tetrad (because astronomy   10
deals with the heavenly bodies, and every body is extended in three dimensions,
since it has length, width, and height. Each of these is contained by two
boundaries, i.e. it has two limits that encompass it. Length is encompassed on
either side, and likewise width and depth, such that six boundaries or limits   15
can be deduced. These six can be reduced to four, because one limit is common
to two dimensions: the limit of width comes to be the beginning of length or
height). Because astronomy, then, deals with the heavenly bodies, and every
body is extended in three dimensions (it has length, width, and height, and
these have four boundaries, i.e. limits), [the Pythagoreans] say that it is   20
analogous to the tetrad. So we understand why arithmetic is first, music second,
geometry third, and astronomy fourth. So much about the third main point.

    Let us go on to the fourth main point and state who discovered the four
kinds of mathematics. We should know that the Phoenicians discovered   25
arithmetic, because they were merchants and needed numbers for their
accounts. The Thracians discovered music, because Orpheus, who is said to
have discovered music, came from there; he was a Thracian. He invented a
marching tune to raise their spirits, so that they would become especially
warlike. The cold that keeps in the internal heat makes it fiercer; they are   30
spirited and warlike by reason of the heat, but also good at dancing, because
they have to escape arrows quickly. Their dance is the Pyrrhic one, which is
martial, according to the words of the poet:

    Merione, although you are an excellent dancer,[162]   64,1
    [My piercing spear might have made you stop.]

The Egyptians discovered geometry out of need: because the Nile frequently
rises and floods Egypt, there was a confusion of land boundaries. They came to
blows and killed one another before finally devising some measure by which   5
they could from then on partition the land and protect the property of each
individual. This measure they also called 'ten-foot rod' (*akaina*), because of 'not

slaying' (*mê kainein*), i.e. killing, since it removed slaying and killing. So the usefulness of geometry arose from necessity.

The Chaldeans invented astronomy, because in the region where they live
10   the sky is clear and without clouds, and for this reason they readily took up the study of the heavenly bodies, i.e. astronomy.[163] This is what we have to say about the fourth main point.

Let us go on to the fifth main point and state what <kinds of learning>[164] are closely connected to the kinds of mathematics. We should know that the craft of calculation (*hê logistikê*) is closely connected to arithmetic. The two are
15   different from each other, because arithmetic studies the nature of numbers, examines number by itself, and does not divide the monad, while the craft of calculation examines number in empirical things. Instead of the monad,[165] the craft of calculation takes a man or a horse or a cubit-long piece of wood and
20   divides the monad into a half, a third, an eighth, and so on. Closely connected to music is material music. We should know that music uses only ratios, while material music uses instruments such as cymbals and flutes. Land-measurement (*hê geôdaisia*), on the other hand, is closely connected to geometry. Geometry gives an account of magnitudes and shapes, while land-measurement deals
25   with property and divides land, which is why land-measurement is named after 'division' (*dasmon*), i.e. the partition of land. Closely connected to astronomy is the study of spheres. But astronomy deals only with the heavenly bodies, while the study of spheres deals with every sphere. It explains the attributes of each sphere, whether it is made of ceramic, wood, or stone, and
30   examines the essential properties (*ta huparkhonta*) of every sphere, not only the heavenly one, as Theodosius discusses in his work on spheres.[166] The study of spheres is more immaterial than astronomy, since it discusses the sphere considered abstractly.

We should know that Olympiodorus says that a trace of the other mathematical kinds remains down to the present day, i.e. of arithmetic,
65,1   geometry, and astronomy. But he says about music: 'we hear but a rumour but do not know anything'.[167] This, he says, is because there is no trace of music preserved. But we should know that there are books on music even in the present day. Music is not only suitable for the souls of irrational [animals] but
5   also for those of rational beings. Sheep that follow the shepherd's pipe[168] as though they derive pleasure from the sound show that music is suitable for the

souls of irrational animals. That it is also suitable for the souls of rational animals is shown by the battle-trumpet, which rouses the soul, and by the instruments used in the theatre that relax the soul by giving it pleasure. With these remarks we finish the present lecture, with god's help.[169]

Lecture 21

Now that we have learned that philosophy divides into a theoretical and a practical part, and that the theoretical part divides into natural science, mathematics, and theology, let us go on to state in what way the division takes place in these cases. Afterwards we will discuss the division of the practical part. But in order to understand this, let us say how many and what methods of division there are. We should know that some people say that there are eight methods of division. They are: division of genus into species; of species into individuals; of wholes into parts (and this in two ways, either into like parts or into unlike parts); of homonymous words into different senses; of substance into accidents; of accidents into substances; of accident into further accidents; and [division of things] from one thing and in relation to one thing (*aph'henos pros hen*).[170] Division is of genus into species as when we divide animal into rational and irrational (because animal is a genus and divides into species, i.e. into rational and irrational); of species into individuals, as when we divide universal man into Socrates, Plato, Alcibiades, and the other [individual] men; of wholes into like parts, as when we subdivide a whole vein into smaller veins (here the division is of wholes into like parts, because parts that have the same name as one another and the whole are called 'like parts', as when a vein is subdivided into smaller veins; for each of these has the same name as the whole and the others, i.e. 'vein'); of wholes into unlike parts, as when we divide the whole head into ears, nose, and eyes (here the division is of a whole into unlike parts, because parts that do not have the same name as one another and the whole are called 'unlike',[171] and in fact neither the ears nor the nose nor the eyes are called 'head'. Nor do they have the same name as one another, since the ear is not called 'nose' nor the nose 'eye'); of homonymous words into different senses, as when the word 'dog' is divided into sea dog, land dog, and star dog;[172] of substance into accidents, as when we say that some men

are white and others black (here the division is into white and black, which are
10   accidents); of accident into substances, as when we say that some white things
are snow, some white lead, and some swans (the division is of white, which is
an accident, into snow, swans, and white lead, which are substances); of accident
into accidents, as when we say that some white things are warm and others
15   cold; warm, as unslaked lime; cold, as snow (notice that here, the division is of
white, which is an accident, into warm and cold, which are also accidents
themselves); and of things from one thing and in relation to one thing, as when
we derive 'medical book', 'medical remedy', 'medical plaster' from medicine[173]
(notice that these are derived from one thing (*aph'henos*), since they are named
20   after the single craft of medicine), and in relation to one thing (*pros hen*), as
when we derive 'a book good for health', 'a remedy good for health', 'a plaster
good for health' from the goal, I mean health, because we name them with
reference to a single thing, health. This is how division takes place.

We can say that strictly speaking, there are not eight methods of division
25   but three: of a genus into species, of wholes into parts, and of homonymous
words into different senses. The other methods cannot be sustained. Division
cannot be of species into individuals, since there are infinitely many individuals,
and individual men are infinitely many and incalculable. Because they are
infinitely many and incalculable, they cannot be brought under division,
30   insofar as someone wanting to bring the men in a given city, living and dead,
67,1   under division would never reach the end. But nor is division of accident into
substances: to say that some white things are swans, some white lead, and some
snow, is not to divide accident into substances, because white things do not
5   divide whiteness considered by itself, but the white body, which is a substance.
Nor can they divide whiteness into white lead and swans and snow, since
whiteness is an accident, and these are substances, but an accident cannot be
divided into substances. What is divided is normally divided into like parts,
not unlike parts; for example, animal divides into animals, not into non-
10   animals; rational divides into rational beings, not into irrational ones; and
mortal divides into mortal beings, not immortal ones. So how can an accident
be divided into substances? But nor is division of substance into accidents. To
say that some men are white and others black is not a division of substance
into accidents but of substance into substances that have accidents, because the
15   division is into black and white men, who are substances. Nor is division of

accident into accidents: division is either of genus into species, as when we say that colour divides into the species white and black (in fact, colour is a genus and divides into the species white and black, which is why it falls under the method of dividing a genus into species); or of substance into substances, and by no means of accident into accidents, because to say that some white things are hot and others cold is to divide substance into substances. White bodies, which are substances, divide into hot or cold bodies, and these are substances. They cannot divide white considered by itself, i.e. whiteness, into hot or cold bodies, since white considered by itself is neither hot nor cold. But nor does division of things from one thing and in relation to one thing exist; this is rather a case of enumeration. Things [derived] from one thing and in relation to one thing are indefinite and incalculable, since one can say 'a book on medicine', 'a medical diet', 'a medical plaster', 'a medicinal wine', 'a medicinal oil', and infinitely many other things. Again, one can say 'a healthy wine, a healthy diet, a book on health'. Since these are infinite and incalculable, how can they be brought under division? As a result, then, there are strictly speaking only three methods of division: of genus into species, of wholes into parts, and of homonymous words into different senses.

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It is also possible, starting from a given division, to give an account of the methods of division in the strict sense and of those that are insubstantial. In fact, it is possible to say that something divides either by itself or by accident. If by itself, it divides either as a thing or as a word: if as a thing, it is a case of division of wholes into parts, or of species into individuals, or of division of things from one thing and in relation to one thing (because these items divide as things); if as a word, it is a case of division of homonymous words. If it divides by accident, it is a case of the remaining methods, i.e. of division of substance into accidents; or of accident into substances; or of accident into accidents. For these are divisions by accident. People have devised one method of division by accident because some men happen to be white and others black, and they say that this is division of substance into accidents. Again, they have devised another method of division by accident because some white things happen to be warm and others cold, and they say that this is division of accident into accidents. We can say the same thing about the other method, I mean the division of accident into substances. With these remarks we finish the present lecture, with god's help.

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Lecture 22

Now that we have stated what the methods of division are, let us go on to state how philosophy divides into a theoretical and a practical part. We should know that philosophy cannot be divided like a genus into species, since there is no

25   prior and posterior among opposed species. For example, animal divides into rational and irrational, and neither rational nor irrational is prior, but both come to be together. But if there is prior and posterior among the parts of philosophy (the theoretical part is prior and the practical part posterior, since one engages in practical action and shapes one's character through theory and reason; unless this happens, practical action will be irrational), it is clear that

30   the division is not of genus into species. Besides, one of two opposed species does not need the other to exist; for example, rationality does not need

69,1   irrationality to exist, nor does irrationality need rationality. But if the practical part of philosophy needs the theoretical to exist (because the practical part needs theory, through which one shapes one's character), it is clear that the division is not of genus into species. Further, one of two opposed species is not

5   found in the other; for example, irrationality is not found in rationality, nor rationality in irrationality. If, therefore, the theoretical part is seen in the practical one (practical action takes place through theory, because one subordinates one's emotions with reason and not irrationally), it is clear that the division is not of genus into species. Further, the ends of opposed species

10   cannot co-exist; for example, the end of rationality is to use reason, but that of irrationality, not to use reason, and the end of rationality does not exist in that of irrationality nor does the end of irrationality exist in that of rationality. If therefore the end of the practical part encompasses the end of the theoretical, it is clear that the division is not of genus into species. The end of the theoretical

15   part is truth (because the theoretical philosopher wants to know the truth about real beings), while the end of the practical part is goodness (because the practical philosopher wants to rule the affections and order his character, which is precisely goodness). But truth is encompassed by goodness, since truth is good. But nor can [philosophy's division be] of species into individuals,

20   since individuals are infinite in number and incalculable (because universal man divides into many men), and the parts of philosophy are not infinite, because they are only two: the theoretical and the practical. Besides, one can

point with a finger at individuals (someone can point at Socrates with his finger and say: 'This is Socrates'), but the parts of philosophy cannot be pointed at with a finger. For how could one, given that they are incorporeal? Further, individuals cannot be divided (because Socrates is not divided as an individual but as a whole into parts). If therefore the parts of philosophy can be divided (and in fact, the theoretical part can be divided, as we have shown,[174] as well as the practical part, as we will go on to show), it is clear that they are not individuals. Therefore the division [of philosophy] is not of species into individuals. But nor is it of homonymous words into different senses, since there is no prior and posterior among homonyms (because people do not say that the dog-star is prior to the land dog or the land dog prior to the sea dog, but they say that all of them come to be together). But if there is prior and posterior among the parts of philosophy (because the theoretical part is prior and the practical part posterior, because someone engages in practical action through theory), it is clear that the division is not of homonymous words into different senses. But nor is it of substance into accidents, since philosophy is not a substance: it is knowledge, and knowledge is a quality and some kind of accident.[175] But nor is the division of accident into substances, since the theoretical and practical parts of philosophy are not substances. Rather, they are kinds of knowledge; and knowledge, as we have said, is a quality and some kind of accident. But nor is the division of accident into accidents, since, as we have shown in the previous discussion,[176] the so-called method of dividing accident into accidents is either division of genus into species or of substance into substances. But division [of philosophy] into theoretical and practical parts cannot be of genus into species, as we have shown,[177] nor one of substance into substances. This is because we have shown[178] that neither is philosophy a substance insofar as it is knowledge (every kind of knowledge is a quality and some kind of accident), nor are its theoretical and practical parts substances insofar as they too are kinds of knowledge. Nor is the division of wholes into parts: philosophy does not divide into like parts, since like parts have the same name as one another and the whole. When we subdivide a vein into many veins, for example, the small veins are called the same as the whole and as one another; all of the subdivided parts are called 'veins'. For this reason the division of philosophy is not into like parts, since although the parts have the same name as the whole (because the theoretical part has the name 'philosophy', as

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20   does the practical), they do not have the same name as one another. In fact, the
      theoretical part of philosophy is not called 'practical', and the practical part not
      'theoretical'. But nor is the division into unlike parts, since parts that do not
      have the same name as one another and the whole are called 'unlike'. The head,
      for example, divides into ears, nose, and eyes, and these do not have the same
25   name as the whole (the ear is not called 'head' nor the nose 'eyes'), nor as one
      another (the ear is not called 'nose' nor the nose 'eye'). For this reason the
      division of philosophy is not into unlike parts, since although the parts of
      philosophy do not have the same name as one another (because the theoretical
      part is not called 'practical', nor the practical 'theoretical'), they have at least the
30   same name as the whole: the theoretical part is in fact called 'philosophy' in the
      same way as philosophy, and likewise for the practical part.

         So the remaining option is to say that [the parts of philosophy] derive
      from one thing, since both the theoretical and practical parts take their
      name from a <single>[179] philosophy. For in fact both the theoretical and the
      practical part are named 'philosophy' after philosophy. Aristotle however says
      that the division of philosophy is of a whole into parts. He is right, because he
35   says that the theoretical and practical parts are parts of philosophy. In fact, just
71,1 as the whole is incomplete when one of the parts is missing (because, for
      example, the whole [human] body is incomplete if one hand is amputated), in
      the same way philosophy is incomplete if the theoretical or the practical part
      are eliminated. The perfect philosopher has to not only be ordered by theory
      but also to take pride in practical action.

5   If someone should say: 'What is philosophy divided into? Like or unlike
      parts?', we say that it is into like parts, because the parts of philosophy have the
      same name as the whole and as one another, which is characteristic, as we have
      said,[180] of like parts. They have the same name as the whole, because just as
      philosophy is called 'philosophy', so the theoretical part is called 'philosophy', as
10   is the practical part. They have the same name as one another, because the
      practical part can also be called 'theoretical', at least given that practical action
      takes place through theory (because someone uses reason to shape his
      character), and the theoretical part can be called 'practical', because knowledge
      is the activity (*energeia*) of the soul, and someone acts (*energei*) with
      knowledge.[181] For someone who makes use of the good does so in the
15   knowledge that it is noble to do so. And in fact someone who uses temperance

does so in the knowledge of its nature, which is why people who desire unnecessary things even if they know their useless nature seem like people without knowledge.

So we have learned how philosophy divides into a theoretical and a practical part; that the division is of a whole into like parts; and that the division of things deriving from one thing is not strictly speaking a division, as we have said in the previous discussion.[182] So much about these matters. 20

Let us go on to state how the theoretical part divides into natural science, mathematics, and theology. We should know that the division is not of genus into species, since there is no prior and posterior among opposed species, as we have said above.[183] Now the theoretical part has prior and posterior: first 25 comes natural science, second mathematics, and third theology. Besides, genera never divide into three; for example, animal divides into rational and irrational, and again, colour into white and black. So how can we say that the division is of genus into species in a case where there are three species, i.e. natural science, mathematics, and theology? Further, one of two opposed 30 species never participates in the other; for example rationality does not participate in irrationality, nor irrationality in rationality. But given that mathematics participates in natural science and theology (in natural science, when it considers material things, in theology, when it considers immaterial things), it is clear that the division is not of genus into species. 35

Some people reply to this as follows: 'Look, the genus living divides into three species, i.e. animal, zoophyte and plant, and not only does it divide into three species, but one of the species also participates in the others. Zoophyte 72,1 participates in animal and plant, as even the name shows.' We can reply to these people that we will demonstrate the error of their division in the following.

Further, they make the following objection: 'Look, the genus of rhetoric divides into three species, because it divides into judicial, hortatory, and 5 panegyric.' We can reply to these people that their division is wrong, because opposed species never involve different times. For example, rationality and irrationality, which are opposed species, do not involve different times: we do not say that rationality is about the present while irrationality is about the future. So given that the parts of rhetoric involve different times (for instance, 10 hortatory rhetoric is about the future, because an adviser deliberates about the

future; judicial rhetoric is about the past, because a judge judges past deeds; and panegyric is about the present, because it augments present and existing

15   benefits), it is clear that they are not strictly speaking species divided from a genus. Besides, the ends of opposed species do not co-exist: the end of rationality is to use reason, but that of irrationality is to not use reason, but neither does the end of rationality exist in that of irrationality nor the end of irrationality in that of rationality. So given that the ends of the parts

20   of rhetoric co-exist (for instance, the end of judicial rhetoric is justice, that of hortatory rhetoric the advantageous, that of panegyric the good; and the good is advantageous and just, and the just advantageous and good, and the advantageous just and good), it is clear that the division is not of genus into species. So the division of rhetoric [suggested by the opponents] is wrong. So

25   much about these matters.

But nor does the theoretical part divide as a whole into parts, because the division can be neither into like nor into unlike parts. It cannot be into like parts, since even though its subparts have the same name as the whole (the

30   theoretical subparts have the same name as the theoretical part), they do not have the same name as one another: natural science is not called 'mathematics', nor is mathematics called 'theology'. But like parts have the same name as the whole and as one another, as we have said above.[184] But nor can the division be into unlike parts, since even though the subparts do not have the same name

35   as one another (natural science is not called 'mathematics', nor is mathematics called 'theology') they have at least the same name as the whole. This is because the theoretical subparts are called by the same name as the whole, but unlike

73,1   parts do not have the same name as the whole and as one another, as we have said above.[185] But nor is the division of species into individuals, nor of substance into accidents nor of accident into substances nor of accident into accidents

5   nor of homonymous words into different senses, by reason of what we said about the theoretical and the practical part.[186] Rather, they belong to things derived from one thing, because natural science, mathematics, and theology are called 'theoretical' by derivation from the single theoretical part of philosophy. So much about the division of the theoretical part.

10   Let us go on and examine the division of the mathematical part, how it divides into arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. We can say that the division is not of genus into species, since, as we said above,[187] there is no prior

and posterior among opposed species. If, therefore, there is prior and posterior among the parts of mathematics (because arithmetic comes first, music second, geometry third, and astronomy fourth), it is clear that the division is not of genus into species. But nor is the division of a whole into parts, since it can be neither into like nor into unlike parts, by reason of what we have said about natural science, mathematics, and theology.[188] These, I mean arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy do not have the same name as one another (arithmetic is not called 'music' nor geometry 'astronomy'), but they have the same name as the whole. For all the parts of mathematics are called 'mathematics', and for this reason they are prevented from being unlike and like parts: from being like parts, since, as we have said,[189] like parts have the same name as one another and the whole, while the parts of mathematics only have the same name as the whole; and from being unlike parts, since, as we have said, unlike parts neither have the same name as one another nor as the whole.[190] But nor can the division be of species into individuals, nor of substance into accidents nor of accident into substances nor of accident into accidents nor of homonymous words into different senses, by reason of what we have said about the theoretical and practical parts.[191] Rather, the division is of things derived from one thing: all parts of mathematics are derived from the single science of mathematics. With these remarks we finish the present lecture, with god's help.

Lecture 23

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Now that we have discussed the division of the theoretical part of philosophy let us go on to the division of the practical part. If this part comes after the theoretical (because one proceeds from the theoretical to the practical part and because it is through reason that one orders one's character and subdues one's affections), it should not be underestimated, since, as Plato says: 'I call a philosopher not someone who knows and remembers a lot, but someone who has attained a spotless and pure way of life.'[192] The philosopher must be, not someone who knows a lot, but rather someone who rules his affections, and who rules them through reason, since he is rational. So let us go on to state the division of the practical part.

But we should know that the Aristotelians and the Platonists divide the practical part differently. The Aristotelians divide it into three: ethics, household-management, and politics. They do so reasonably, since someone who orders characters either orders a particular character, which is the domain of ethics, or
15   a household, which is the domain of household-management, or a city, which is the domain of politics. They say that it can be shown through Aristotle's writings that the practical part divides into these three. This is because Aristotle wrote ethical treatises, in which he discusses character; but he also wrote treatises on household-management, in which he discusses the administering of a household (here he says that four elements jointly contribute to the existence of
20   a household: the relation of a man towards his wife; a father's love for his children; the slaves' need for their master; and a balance between spending and income, because an imbalance of either is shameful. When there is a lot of income and little spending, it is shameful because someone in this position is viewed as miserly. When in turn there is little income but a lot of spending, it is
25   shameful because someone in this position is viewed as spendthrift); and also treatises on politics, in which he states how the city should be governed. Plato likewise wrote political treatises; he has the same goal as Aristotle. But we should know that Plato and Aristotle have the same goal in their treatises on the
30   statesman[193] (both say how the city should be governed), but the goals and titles of their works on the constitution (*politeia*) are different. The title is different, because Plato wrote *Republic* (*Politeia*), in the singular, but Aristotle, *Constitutions* (*Politeiai*), in the plural; and the goal is different, because Aristotle
75,1   states how the ancients governed their cities, for example the Argives and Boeotians, while Plato states how many kinds of constitutions there are and how they should be governed. So much about these matters.

The Platonists criticize the present division [of practical philosophy] by
5   saying that it is wrong: a genus never divides into three species, but always into two; animal, for example, divides into rational and irrational, and colour into black and white. Besides, opposed species never have the same end; for example, rationality and irrationality do not have the same end (rationality has as its end to use reason, but irrationality not to use reason). Now, the parts of
10   practical philosophy have the same end, because in fact ethics and household-management and politics have the same end, I mean the ordering of one's character.

Further, quantity never changes the same species; for example, a small and a large triangle belong to the same species while differing in quantity. In addition, the same species is not found in opposed species, because, for instance, the species of rationality is different from that of irrationality. But ethics, household-management, and politics belong to the same species; for it is not true that, since ethics orders a particular character, household-management many characters, and politics the whole character of a city, they are therefore also different species. And in fact, justice in a single soul and in many souls is the same by nature.

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Further, one of two opposed species is never found in the other (rationality is never found in irrationality nor irrationality in rationality). But if ethics and household-management are found in politics (someone who can order a city can also order a household and an individual), it is clear that they are not different.

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Further, one single species is never equivalent to a genus (because rationality alone is not equivalent to animal, nor is irrationality alone, but both together are), but politics alone is equivalent to practical philosophy. According to the Aristotelians, if the Platonists say that practical philosophy divides into ethics, household-management, and politics, but politics encompasses within itself ethics and household-management (because someone who can order a city can also order an individual and a household), it is clear that politics is equivalent to practical philosophy. But if it is equivalent to it, it is clear that the division is wrong. With these remarks we finish the present lecture, with god's help.

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Lecture 24

Having [thus] criticized Aristotle's division of practical philosophy, the Platonists go on to divide practical philosophy into two, legislation and jurisdiction. This is reasonable, because the philosopher either gives laws with which he helps to order characters forever, and this results in legislation, or he judges according to established laws, and this results in jurisdiction. Just as legislation relates to cities by preserving justice in them, so jurisdiction relates to legislation by preserving its laws. Ethics, household-management, and

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politics hold the rank of subject-matter for legislation and jurisdiction: the law-giver either orders an individual character or a household or a city by giving laws which govern each person. The judge likewise either judges an individual or a household or a city. The poet too hints at the same thing, I mean legislation and jurisdiction, when he says that Minos and Rhadamanthys were brothers (because both had Zeus as their father), and that Minos was a lawgiver and Rhadamanthys a judge.[194] He was hinting at the fact that legislation and jurisdiction derive from the single practical philosophy. Further, he says that Minos was older and Rhadamanthys younger. He thereby hints at the fact that legislation precedes jurisdiction, because unless one first gives laws, one cannot judge by them.

But we should know that the division of practical philosophy into legislation and jurisdiction is not of genus into species, since the species that are separated from the genus do not admit of prior and posterior. For example, animal divides into rational and irrational, and rationality is not prior nor is irrationality, but both come to be together. But if legislation is prior to jurisdiction (because unless one first gives laws, one cannot judge by them), it is clear that the division is not of genus into species. By employing the same arguments that we have applied to natural science, mathematics, and theology, you will find that the division does not take place in one of the other methods, but is of things deriving from one thing, because legislation and jurisdiction are called 'practical' by derivation from the single practical philosophy.

So now that we have learned through the previous discussion what philosophy is, let us go on to say what sort of thing it is. But we have already learned this through the preceding discussion, I mean through the definitions and division of philosophy. We learned through its division that philosophy is theoretical and practical, because we have divided it into these two parts, i.e. the theoretical and the practical. But if someone should say that not only philosophy is theoretical and practical, but also the crafts (consider that medicine is theoretical, as when it diagnoses disease and states the causes at its origin, and practical, as when it administers a purge or opens a vein), we reply that only philosophy is strictly speaking theoretical and practical. It alone is strictly speaking theoretical, because the crafts do not know all real beings, but deal with material things alone, since they do not deal with the divine. But philosophy deals with all real beings, because it also deals with the divine. It

alone is strictly speaking called 'theoretical' for this reason especially: the word 'theory' (*theôria*) derives from 'seeing the divine' (*ta theia horan*). But philosophy alone is strictly practical, since the crafts are concerned with bodies, as medicine is concerned with the human body, or with external things,[195] as carpentry, metal-working, and architecture are: these crafts are not concerned with the human body, but with external goods and possessions; carpentry, for example, makes chairs, couches, and so on; metal-working cups and so on; and architecture houses, all of which are external goods and possessions. But philosophy is concerned with the soul, because the eye of the soul, when it has become short-sighted and obscured by pleasurable indulgences of the body, is roused and illuminated by philosophy. This concern with the soul is more indispensable than those with the body or external goods, insofar as the soul is more indispensable than the body and external goods. So philosophy alone is strictly speaking called practical.

Through division, then, as has been said,[196] we have determined what sort of thing philosophy is, because we learned that it is theoretical and practical. But we have also determined through the definitions what sort of thing it is: through the definitions derived from its subject matter, i.e. the one that says 'philosophy is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings', and the one that says 'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things', we learned that it is theoretical; through the definition derived from superiority that says 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the science of sciences', we learned that it is sovereign; through the definition derived from the proximate end that says 'philosophy is a preparation for death', we learned that it is purificatory (a preparation for death is nothing but the mortification of the affections, i.e. the purification of the soul from affections); and through the definition derived from the remote end that says 'philosophy is becoming like god as far as is possible for man', we have learned that it is political, since the political philosopher wants to imitate the divine as far as possible for man both in knowledge and practical action: in knowledge, so as to know all real beings; in practical action, so as to order men's characters and to preserve a certain order among mankind through virtue. In short, we can say that because philosophy has two parts, i.e. the theoretical and the practical part, and six divisions, some of the six divisions encompass the theoretical part of philosophy, others the practical, and others both the theoretical and the practical.

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In fact, the two definitions derived from its subject matter, i.e. 'philosophy

10   is knowledge of real beings *qua* real beings' and the one that says
'philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things', and the definition
derived from superiority that says 'philosophy is the craft of crafts and the
science of sciences' encompass the theoretical part. The definition from
superiority encompasses the theoretical part, because this is what the definition
derived from superiority shows, namely that philosophy bestows the first

15   principles of which it has knowledge to the crafts and the other sciences.
On the other hand, the definition derived from the proximate end that says
'philosophy is a preparation for death' and the one from etymology that
says 'philosophy is love of wisdom' encompass the practical part of philosophy.
The practical part brings about a preparation for death, i.e. the mortification

20   of the affections, just as the desire for wisdom belongs to the practical
part.[197] The definition derived from the remote end that says 'philosophy is
becoming like god as far as is possible for man' encompasses the theoretical
and the practical part of philosophy. In fact, someone wanting to become
like god as far as is possible for man wants to become like god in knowledge

25   and practical action: in knowledge, so as to know everything, in practical
action, so as to order men's characters and to preserve order among mankind
through virtue.

Now that we have learned what sort of thing philosophy is, let us go to learn
why it exists. Philosophy is not useless, if, at any rate, 'there has never been,

79,1   Theodorus, a greater good for men bestowed by god, nor will there ever be one',
as Plato says when addressing a certain Theodorus.[198] We should know that
philosophy exists for ordering men's souls and for lifting the soul from this
murky and muddy life to the divine and immaterial, like Homer's Athena:

5   So that you may well understand both god and man.[199]

One should understand that the soul has two kinds of powers: cognitive and
vital powers. These are the cognitive powers: intellect, discursive thinking,
belief, perception, and imagination. These are the vital powers: will and choice,
spirit and desire. There are rational and irrational powers among each of these:

10   among the cognitive powers, some are rational, others irrational: intellect,
discursive thinking, and rational opinion are rational, but perception,
imagination, and irrational opinion are irrational. For in fact irrational

perception is also found in the irrational animals, and likewise imagination, because an irrational animal when it passes by a place often pictures and recognizes it. This is why many irrational animals return to their own home ground by themselves. Irrational opinion is called 'irrational' not because it is also found in irrational animals, but it is called 'irrational' because it lacks reason: for example, when someone thinks that the soul is immortal, but does not state the reason why, and instead says: 'I heard it said so'.

15

Some of the vital powers are rational, some irrational. Will and choice are rational powers (they are found only among rational animals, but not in fact among the irrational ones, because irrational animals do not have will and choice); and anger and desire are irrational powers, because irrational animals also feel anger and desire.

20

That being so, philosophy was invented for ordering human souls, and for organizing the cognitive powers through the theoretical part, and the vital powers through the practical part, i.e. for making us rule anger and desire, and for not allowing us to feel anger or desire inappropriately. With these remarks, we conclude the present lecture and the introduction to philosophy, with god's help.

25

Notes

1 The title of the Armenian version of David's *Prolegomena* reads: 'Definitions and divisions of philosophy by the Thrice-Great and Invincible Philosopher David, in Opposition to the Four Propositions of the Sophist Pyrrho' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 3). The Greek text does not mention the Sceptic philosopher Pyrrho (*c*. 360–270 BCE) by name.

2 A reference to Aristotle's *An. Post.* 2.1, which sets out these four questions.

3 David's examples of non-existent entities pose a challenge to translators. His first example, that of the fictitious goat-stag, is a commonplace in ancient commentaries. His second example, here translated as 'the so-and-so' (*skindapsos*), originally referred to a stringed musical instrument, but was later used in the sense of 'word without meaning' (see the entry for *skindapsos* in LSJ). 'Boo', the third item in David's list, translates the Greek *to blituri*, which was already used as an example of a meaningless sound by the Stoics (see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.57) but could in other contexts refer to the sound that the string of an instrument makes when it is plucked. Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 59,1; *in An. Pr.* 3,21; Syrianus, *in Metaph.* 84,15–16.

4 Reading *hê anastros sphaira* with V.

5 The controversy alluded to here concerns the question whether there exists a sphere beyond the fixed stars (hence '<the> sphere that carries no stars', *<hê> anastros sphaira*).

6 I am here following a suggestion by Calzolari 2009a, 61, who argues from a comparison of the Greek text with the Armenian version that the words *<anuparktôn kai tôn>* have dropped out at 2,1 after *tôn*, and reads *<ou> zêtoumen <to ei esti, alla> to ti esti* at 2,2.

7 See n. 6 above.

8 Busse proposes deleting lines 10–12 ('We should know . . . why it is'). Note however that the Armenian translation of David's text has a comparable and more fully argued passage, which I quote here for comparison: 'For when we ask "What sort of thing is it?" we answer either "It is rational" or "irrational"; either "mortal" or "immortal". It is important to realize, however, that "What sort of thing is it?" frequently become [*sic*] apparent in "What is it?" Because when "What is it?" is answered through a definition, then the answer to "What sort of thing is it?" will also be revealed in the answer to "What is it?" For "What sort of thing is it?"

becomes apparent through definition. But when "What is it?" is answered through a name, then "What sort of thing is it?" will not be revealed in the answer to "What is it?", and then one must investigate "What sort of thing it is"' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 5).

9 Plato, *Tim*. 41B. In the Armenian version, the *Timaeus* quotation is explained in considerably more detail: 'The meaning of this is as follows: there were three more mortal genera lacking for us and uncreated – that is, they had not yet been created. Now there are three mortal genera: creatures of the air, creatures of the water, and creatures of the earth, which also include man; and until these were created, as he says, heaven would not reach completion' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 7). Calzolari 2009a, 64 suggests that the original Greek text may have contained a passage corresponding to the Armenian, which could have been omitted from the MSS by a copyist's error.

10 David claims that Plato in the *Timaeus* passage uses the more comprehensive term 'heaven', which contains the universe, to refer to the universe, which is contained in heaven.

11 See Aristotle, *Phys*. 2.1, 193a7–8.

12 Some MSS (K and T) add the following question at this point: 'How then can you say that philosophy is knowledge of real being, when being is unknowable?'

13 Aristotle defines the term *enstasis*, here translated as 'objection', as 'a premise contrary to a premise' (see *An. Pr*. 2.26). See also Ammonius, *in Cat*. 52,22–53,6. A 'counter-argument' (*antiparastasis*) accepts the opponent's premise as a hypothesis, but denies that it implies the desired conclusion. Cf. Hermogenes, *De inv*. 3.6 for a brief discussion of the two terms.

14 The mode of predication envisaged here, '[deriving] from one thing' or *aph'henos* in the Greek, is the one Aristotle discusses at e.g. *Metaph*. 4.2, 1003a33–1003b6. *Aph'henos* predication is different from homonymous predication, in that the former allows for a 'focal meaning', i.e. the primary sense of an expression on which other uses of that expression depend, whereas homonymy in the strict sense does not.

15 The example of 'dog' to illustrate the concept of homonyms goes back to Aristotle himself (cf. *SE* 166a16). The dog-star here refers to Sirius, while the sea dog refers to a kind of shark that Aristotle discusses elsewhere (see e.g. *HA* 6.10).

16 Accepting V's addition *peri poiou sêmainomenou êgoun*, which clarifies the argument and may have dropped out because of a scribal mistake (*saut du même au même* because of the second *peri*).

17 I insert *ê hupographêi* after *horismôi*. Nothing David has said so far would suggest that being is defined rather than described, and for the purposes of his argument, he can leave both options open. The Armenian version at this point reads: 'Thirdly,

we give a definition or description of this meaning; and if we can define and describe it, then it is clear that the thing [*sc.* being] is not unknowable' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 11).

18 Reading *ara* for *gar*.

19 Compare Ammonius, *in Cat.* 2,25 for this example, which goes back to Heraclitus (DK B12). For a thorough examination of the relationship between a leading Pyrrhonist in antiquity, Aenesidemus of Knossus (active in the first century BCE) and the philosophy of Heraclitus, see Polito 2004.

20 Cf. Plato, *Crat.* 402A.

21 Cf. *Meno* 81C.

22 A loose paraphrase of *Tim.* 47A–E.

23 For this division of philosophy, see already Aristotle, *Metaph.* 6.1, 1026a19.

24 For a discussion of this inscription, see Saffrey 1968. Cf. also Philoponus, *in DA* 117,27; Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 9,1; Elias, *in Cat.* 118,18.

25 The passage in quotation marks seems intended as a quotation from Plato, but cannot be found in any surviving work of Plato.

26 See n. 23 above.

27 Cf. *Phys.* 8.6, 259a19; *Metaph.* 12.8, 1073a28.

28 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 8.10, 266b5–6.

29 Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 67D–E and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 10.7, 1057b for the theory that black and white are either 'compacting' or 'piercing' sight. I note here my misgivings about *monôi* in line 15, a qualification that muddles the argument and could be excised without undermining David's main point (knowledge of universals can be present in individuals, even if universals themselves cannot).

30 Accepting V's addition of an explanatory example here, which illustrates the thought. The Greek is: <*dunatai gar to auto morion kai leukon einai kai melan kata allon khronon ginesthai apo hêliokaias*>.

31 Reading *leukou* in place of *melanos* at 8,2. The thought is that black 'compresses' sight and so counteracts the effect of whiteness, which has earlier been said to 'diffuse' sight (7,35–6). The MS reading *melanos* is therefore an error.

32 At this point, the Armenian version of the text reads: 'Now it is clear that God exists, for [only] the Epicureans maintain that there is no God' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 19).

33 Cf. Elias, *in Cat.* 109,31–110,3.

34 Cf. Aristotle, *Exhortation* fr. 51 Rose, and Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 144,15–17.

35 Plato, *Phaedrus* 237B.

36 Plato, *Sophist* 253C.

37 In fact the reference is to Plato, *Philebus* 16C, not the *Sophist*.

38 Inserting *hoi* before *mutheuontes*.

39 David is referring to the speech *On the Crown* by the celebrated Athenian orator and statesman Demosthenes (fourth century BCE).

40 On the maxim 'nothing in excess', cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1389b3–4.

41 The Greek text leaves the relation between the words *horos* (here 'term', but also used in the sense of 'limit') and *horothesion* ('boundary marker') unclear, unlike the Armenian version, which explains that a *horos* (i.e. a spatial 'limit') can determine 'the boundaries of districts, villages and farms' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 33). It is possible that the Greek text would have included a similar explanation here that has dropped out of the text for whatever reason. Cf. 15,12–15 below.

42 Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 24b16–17.

43 Reading *authoristos <ho> horos*.

44 Homer, *Iliad* 1.576.

45 Cf. Aristotle, *Int.* 10, 20b1–2.

46 This quotation from Olympiodorus does not appear in his extant writings.

47 Punctuate: *tais lexesin, ho horos ouk elleipei ktl.*

48 David's point is that definitions that include synonymous terms differ from definitions that are too narrow. The latter do not fully account for the definiendum (and so 'leave out things'), while the former do not necessarily suffer this defect.

49 Cf. Herodotus, *Histories* 1.65.

50 Homer, *Odyssey* 8.325.

51 Homer, *Odyssey* 4.379.

52 Homer, *Odyssey* 10.306.

53 Cf. Plato, *Laws* 5, 736E. The quotation is not preserved in any extant Stoic author; David may be relying on a doxographical handbook. See also below, 36,31.

54 Inserting *kai* before *homoiôsis*.

55 Reading *tou antilupêsai ton lupêsanta* in place of *tou lupêsai ton antilupêsanta*.

56 The words in curly brackets, from *ouk eisin . . . monou*, may be a gloss on *anôterô*, and are perhaps better ignored. David is here explaining only the use of the limited phrase 'for the most part'. I am grateful to the anonymous vetter of this translation for alerting me to this possibility.

57 Following a suggestion by Calzolari 2009a, 62, I am here inserting *<isteon hoti hex eisin tês philosophias horismoi>*, a phrase that is also contained in the Armenian version of the text, and in any case required, given that David promises to say *how many* definitions of philosophy there are. The omission can be explained by a copyist's error: reaching the first *horismoi* in line 26, the scribe may have mistaken

the second (now omitted) *horismoi* as the place he had reached, leaving out the intervening words (a kind of error known as *saut du même au même*).

58 In other words, six times a quarter equals one and a half, which is not a whole number but requires one to 'divide the monad', i.e. to allow fractions of one.

59 Some MSS (T and V) include the words 'The perfect numbers are 6, 28, 496, and 8128' (*eisi de teleioi arithmoi ho hektos ho eikostos ogdoos ho tetrakososiostos enenêkostos kai ho oktakiskhiliostos hekatostos eikostos ogdoos*) at this point.

60 Reading *analogizesthai* in place of *analogizestha*, a misprint.

61 See 15,26; 16,1–3 above.

62 Homer, *Iliad* 6.236.

63 The Greek word *kataskeuazein* literally means 'to set up', 'to establish', or 'to construct', but it is clear from the context that the idea of *defining* something in terms of itself is most relevant here.

64 Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 61A.

65 *Aei* in line 1 seems to rather weaken the point here; it may be a copying error, and I suggest excising it.

66 Reading *ta auta* for *kai alla* (cf. *ta auta* at the end of line 2), and *phthengomena* (with KV) in place of *phthengomenon*.

67 This quotation attributed to Pythagoras does not appear to be attested elsewhere. It reminds one of Plato's own critique of writing in the *Phaedrus* (274B–278E). Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 13,36–14,1. On Pythagoras' misgivings about writing, cf. also Iamblichus, *De vit. Pyth.* 34.246, 5–10.

68 Nicomachus of Gerasa, active in the first century CE, was an influential Pythagorean philosopher. The quotation David offers here does not appear in Nicomachus' extant works.

69 See Plato, *Phaedo* 64A.

70 The parenthesis is David's, and not a part of the *Theaetetus* quotation.

71 Plato, *Theaetetus* 176A.

72 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.2, 982a.

73 Lines 26–7 are probably a marginal gloss that has become integrated into the main text, and are omitted by K and the Armenian version of the text. They repeat almost exactly lines 23–4, which makes it unlikely that they were originally part of the text. For the quotation from Plato, see *Phaedo* 60C.

74 Cf. Ammonius, *in Int.* 111,12–13, commenting on Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 17b26–37.

75 See n. 29 above.

76 Plato, *Phaedo* 64A.

77 I am here placing double quotation marks around "dying", and "being dead" below, to signal that the two terms are used in the special sense of extirpating the

affections in this life, rather than meaning 'ceasing' or 'having ceased to exist'. Single quotation marks around 'dying' and 'being dead' are quotation marks properly speaking, referring to the words as they are contained in the quotation from Plato, *Phaedo* 64A.

78 Plato, *Phaedo* 67B.

79 Plato, *Phaedo* 62B.

80 Cf. 17,1–17 above.

81 Hippocrates, *De Flat*. 1,5–6 Littré.

82 Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.4.7, 29–31. David is not so much quoting the passage as giving an imaginative paraphrase.

83 Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 493A.

84 I suspect that *legetai* should be read in place of *esti*: David's purpose here is to explain the use of the term 'indulgent' (*akolastos*), rather than to make the obvious point that a life overcome by pleasure is as a matter of fact also indulgent. The Armenian version of the text has: 'such a life is called dissolute etc.' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 73).

85 Callimachus, *Epigrams* 25.

86 Cf. Elias, *Prol*. 14,9–10, who quotes the same verses.

87 For an important discussion of how David's revised definition of philosophy as the preparation for death 'while the living being is preserved' relates to the strikingly similar phrasing of Pseudo-Elias and a fragment by Stephanus, see Roueché 1990, 121–3, who quotes and translates the relevant texts.

88 Cf. *SVF* 3.768 and Olympiodorus, *in Phd*. 1.8, 19–39.

89 Theognis, *Elegies* 175–6.

90 Julian's cryptic reply seems to criticize the Cynic for still being alive ('gazing at Phaethon'), while recoiling from death ('deserting Pluto'). Alternatively, Julian might be criticizing the Cynic's indecision, as Papazian 2015, 108 points out. Cf. *Anthologia Graeca* 9.137, where the exchange is presented as taking place between the Emperor Hadrian and a grammarian.

91 Cf. Olympiodorus, *in Phd*. 1.8, 29–32 and Elias, *Prol*. 14,30–15,8 for this story.

92 Plato, *Phaedo* 62B. It is worth noting that David, like Elias, rejects the Stoic arguments that justify suicide in particular circumstances without qualification. He is thereby departing from the position of Olympiodorus, who carefully explains that suicide is a real evil as far as the body is concerned, but can possess a beneficial aspect when it procures a greater good for the soul. See Gertz 2011, 27–50 for Olympiodorus' discussion of suicide in his commentary on Plato's *Phaedo*.

93 Maintaining *brexon* with the MSS and the Armenian version of the *Prolegomena*, in place of Busse's *orexon*.

94 Homer, *Iliad* 5.441–2.

95 Cf. 17,3–10 above. MSS K and V include the following remark at this point: 'As the poem testifies, when it says, referring to goodness, that the gods are givers of good things; with reference to knowledge that they know everything; and with reference to power, that they can do everything'.

96 Homer, *Iliad* 5.441–2.

97 Plato, *Laws* 2, 653A.

98 Plato, *Theaetetus* 176A.

99 See 29,18–20 above.

100 Democritus fr. 34 DK.

101 Reading *to men . . . to de* in place of *ton men . . . ton de*. As 39,19 suggests, Plato and Pythagoras are each supposed to have stated a definition derived from the subject matter *and* from the goal; therefore the masculine article *ton* seems to be a mistake. I am grateful to the anonymous vetter for his or her comments on this passage.

102 Insert *ti* after *mega*.

103 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.2, 982a.

104 The subject of *elegon* is not specified; grammatically, it could also mean 'I used to say', instead of 'they'. In the Armenian version of the text, the distinction between 'I', 'me', and 'mine' is attributed to the Pythagoreans.

105 Homer, *Odyssey* 5.245.

106 Busse recommends excising lines 21–4, presumably because they are something of a digression, but it is worth noting that they are also contained in the Armenian version of David's *Prolegomena*.

107 This definition of the sound of the human voice goes back at least to the Stoics (cf. *SVF* 2.138–40). David's critique of it is reminiscent of Iamblichus' strictures, which are reported by Simplicius, *in Cat.* 131,10–15. For the example of wool, cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* 419b14–15.

108 See 19,10–13 above.

109 I include the addition *<oude gar tiktei ôon, alla zôon>* contained in MSS K and V.

110 On our knowledge of the historical Simon the Cobbler, a contemporary of Socrates, see Sellars 2003.

111 Plato, *Gorgias* 449A.

112 Cf. Plato, *Sophist* 219A, which makes reference to the angler (an example case for the method of division), not the Demiurge.

113 The Empirical doctors were a school of ancient physicians who emphasized the role of 'experience' (*empereia*) and what is apparent in the study of diseases, in opposition to the so-called Dogmatists.

114 David's argument, that the crafts employ reason to varying degrees, relies on the sense of *logos* as meaning both rational thought and reasoned speech, which is why he can give the example of accompanied singing to support his case.

115 Reading *houtos* in place of *autos*, as Busse suggests.

116 As it stands, Busse's text yields a confused sentence, and one should probably assume that there is a lacuna after the word *Puthagoras* in line 6. The omitted text may have read something like <*tên philosophian horizetai, all'eita atopôs* (or *alogôs*)>, as a comparison with the Armenian version shows. There, we read: 'Pythagoras was the first to define philosophy, which then without any foundation was also extended to the applied arts' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 107).

117 Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 9,13 for this quotation. It may be an imprecise recollection of Homer, *Iliad* 23.712, as Busse suggests, where the carpenter is described as *klutos* ('famous') rather than *sophos* ('wise').

118 Again, a lacuna should be suspected here. In the Armenian version, we read: 'And Pythagoras in defining a wise man predicated it [*sc.* wisdom] of true knowledge of existence' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 109). A conjectural rendering of the missing Greek that follows *theis* (punctuate: *theis.*) would be: *Kai ho Puthagoras ton sophon horizomenos ktl.*

119 For the analogy with bats, cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 2.1, 993b9–11; Elias, *Prol.* 15,28–30.

120 The addition *hôsper angelos* is likely to be a marginal note that has been mistakenly integrated into the main text. It is not included in the Armenian text.

121 David's presentation of the difference between rational opinion and discursive thinking may at first sight seem somewhat puzzling. Both rational opinion and discursive thinking are described as a conclusion that is derived from a set of premises, and in the example that he gives, both rational opinion and discursive thinking in fact reach the same conclusion from the same premises. The difference seems to lie in the fact that discursive thinking proceeds from 'commonly accepted' (*homologoumenon*) premises, which presumably means that the conclusion of the argument can be asserted with greater confidence than the conclusion of a valid argument whose premises are doubtful or contentious.

122 MS T adds a marginal note at this point, which reads as follows: 'We should know that Olympiodorus says the following about the ascent to knowledge of philosophy: first comes perception, second imagination, third opinion, fourth trial-and-error (*peira*), fifth experience, sixth knowledge, seventh science, eighth memory, and ninth wisdom, the desire for which is philosophy.'

123 Plato, *Timaeus* 47B. In its context, the quotation is not in fact addressed to Theodorus, who is a character in Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus*.

124 David is here rephrasing the Pythagorean oath in terms that will be more
    accessible to his students, replacing words in the Doric dialect with Attic Greek
    (i.e. writing *pêgên* in place of *pagan*, and *hêmin* in place of *hameterais psukhais*),
    and explaining that 'tetractys' refers to the number four. Cf. e.g. 'Iamblichus',
    Theolog. Arithm. 22,21–2 de Falco; Iamblichus, *De Vit. Pyth*. 29.162, 17–18 Klein;
    Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math*. 7.94, 5–6 Mutschmann.

125 Some MSS (K and V) add: '<for example>, three times three equals nine, but
    three plus three six' (*<hoion>* [suppl.] *tris treis ennea, treis de kai treis hex*).

126 One MS (V) includes the following remark at this point: 'since every number is
    composed of multiple monads, but the dyad is not (multiplicity begins with
    three). Further, that two is not a number . . .'. The addition is likely to result from
    a copying error, however; cf. 50,19–21.

127 See 49,18 and 50,1–3 above.

128 Reading *houtos* in place of *autos*, as Busse suggests.

129 The Armenian version of the text does not discuss Pythagorean number theory
    in nearly as much detail as David; consequently, it does not help with filling in
    the lacuna that is clearly present in the Greek text.

130 See above, 49,28–30.

131 See above, 50,7–8.

132 See above, especially 52,17–23.

133 See above, 22,33–23,2.

134 Cf. 'Iamblichus', *Theolog. Arithm*. 70,22–71,21.

135 The Armenian version adds: 'children born at the sixth or eighth month
    do not survive' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 115). Cf. Olympiodorus, *in Alc.*
    158,2–159,2. For the idea of dividing human growth into stages of seven
    (whether months or years) and multiples thereof, common in antiquity, see
    Tanner 1981, 1–13 *passim*, and the valuable note in Mueller-Jourdan
    2007, 13 n. 76.

136 The place of the number five in David's schema (numbers that both produce
    other numbers and are produced by them, like four; numbers that are only
    produced, like nine; and numbers that only produce, like five) is left rather
    unclear in the text, and I suspect that it would originally have contained a
    clarification after the second *deka* such as the one suggested in angle brackets,
    which translates the Greek: *<autos de ou tiktetai kata pollaplasiasmon ex allou
    arithmou entos tês dekados>*.

137 In other words, seven 'produces' (*tiktei*) another number, e.g. eight, when one is
    added to seven, but is also 'produced' (*tiktetai*) from another number, e.g. from
    six through the addition of one.

138 Cf. 'Iamblichus', *Theolog. Arithm*. 75,2–3.

139 The words *kai dia diaireseôs manthanomen ta merê autês* create an awkward sentence, and seem little more than a repetition, perhaps through a copying mistake, of the same phrase in line 30. I suggest excising them.

140 Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 9,26–10,8; Olympiodorus, *in Cat.* 84,33–84,6; Elias, *Prol.* 25,26–26,5.

141 Cf. Elias, *Prol.* 27,23–4.

142 *skokon* is evidently a misprint for *skopon*.

143 See 46,28–48,9 above.

144 MS V offers a slightly more expansive description of the theoretical part of philosophy: someone adorns (*kosmei*) 'the truth [sic] with the theoretical part, which teaches us the truth about real beings' (*dia de tou theôrêtikou tên alêtheian· to theôrêtikon de didaskei hêmas tên en tois ontois alêtheian*).

145 I read <*katholikôteron kai em*>*periektikôteron* <*autou on*>, with V.

146 One MS (V) contains the following remark at this point: 'The good is more universal than truth as in the following example: if anything is a man, it is an animal, since every man is an animal, but it is not the case that anything that is an animal is a man, since not only man is an animal, but also horses and dogs and so on.'

147 The example goes back to Plato, *Republic* 331C–D.

148 Cf. 5,12 above, and n. 24 above.

149 David may have the rational soul in mind here (which, in Neoplatonic psychology, is not inseparably bound to the body), or perhaps the world soul in its highest aspect.

150 Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* 424a17–21.

151 David may here be alluding to the allegory of the cave in Plato's *Republic*; cf. 515C–E.

152 Otus and Ephialtes are mythical giants who attempted to storm heaven by heaping mountain upon mountain, an act of daring for which they eventually paid with their lives.

153 Homer, *Odyssey* 11.315–16.

154 Plato, *Epinomis* 992A.

155 A loose quotation of Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.3.3, 5–7. In the passage, Plotinus does not make particular reference to the role of mathematics in educating the young, contrary to the way he is being quoted by David. Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 12,26–7; Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 10,1–2.

156 Cf. Nicomachus of Gerasa, *Intr. arith.* 1.3.6 Hoche; Ammonius, *in Isag.* 10,22.

157 David's relegation of theology to a mode of knowledge characterized by 'conjecture' (*eikasmos*) is remarkable, all the more so if one recalls Plato's analogy of the Line, where 'imagination' (*eikasia*) occupies the lowest rank (cf. *Republic*, 509D).

158 As Mueller-Jourdan 2007, 69 n. 180 points out, the claim that theology 'has many parts' could at first seem surprising, given that theology has no obvious sub-disciplines, unlike natural science, where one can list biology, meteorology, etc. It cannot be ruled out, however, that David conceives of theology in much the same way as Proclus, i.e. as being concerned with the orders of the gods and our common notions concerning them, which would account for its complexity as a science.

159 The Armenian version embellishes the thought experiment slightly and offers: 'if one potentially breaks it up *and distributes all its pieces in many different places*, etc.' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 129, my italics). Note, however, that this embellishment runs counter to the Greek text as it is translated here: if we separate a wall into horizontal slices along its length, there is one continuous edge along which all the slices join up, namely its length. Once we scatter the various pieces, as the Armenian version would have it, this is of course no longer true. I am grateful to the anonymous reader for useful comments on this passage.

160 Cf. Nicomachus of Gerasa, *Intr. arith.* 1.4–5 Hoche.

161 See 61,36–7 above.

162 Homer, *Iliad* 16.617.

163 Cf. Plato, *Epinomis* 987A.

164 Reading *tina* in place of *ti*.

165 The meaning of the two occurrences of 'monad' in this sentence cannot be the same; otherwise, David would be contradicting himself in the same sentence (i.e. 'instead of taking the monad, the art of calculation takes a man [...] and divides the monad'). Presumably, the second occurrence of 'monad' refers to something like an instantiated unity, rather than to the arithmetical unity that mathematicians deal with. I am grateful to the anonymous vetter for comments on this passage.

166 A reference to the *Sphaerics* by Theodosius of Bithynia, a work written towards the end of the second century BCE.

167 Olympiodorus quotes Homer, *Iliad* 2.486.

168 Cf. Ammonius, *in Isag.* 13,21–4; Elias, *in Isag.* 31,13–18 for similar discussions of music.

169 The Armenian version includes the following illustration of the power of music at this point: 'It should be known that music possesses great power, for it can plunge the soul into various states and restore it to good humour, to which laments and elegies bear witness, for these can dispose the soul accordingly. Thus some tell the tale of how [once] when at a feast Alexander heard a musician play a war song, at which he instantly took up arms and departed. But when the musician began to play a festive tune he returned to join his fellow guests' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 135).

170 For the meaning of the phrase *aph'henos pros hen*, used by Aristotle to refer to terms that are related insofar as they make common reference to a single thing (*pros hen*) and in some sense derive their meaning from it (*aph'henos*), see n. 14 above.

171 One MS, V, includes the following remark at this point, possibly a marginal note that has been included into the main text by a copyist: <For example, when we divide the head into ears, nose, and eyes, they do not have the same name as the whole> (*hôs hotan tên kephalên temômen eis ôta rhin* (*kai* superscr.) *ophthalmous· tauta gar oute tôi holôi homônumôs legontai*). I am grateful to the anonymous reader for helpful comments on this addition.

172 On the different meanings of 'dog', see n. 15 above.

173 For the same example, see e.g. Ammonius, *in Cat.* 21,20–4; Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 386,7–8; Olympiodorus, *Prol.* 34,22–4.

174 See Lecture 19 above.

175 Cf. 7,2–3 above.

176 See above, 67,16–26.

177 See above, 68,23–69,3.

178 See 69,36–70,4.

179 Inserting *mias* with TV, and the Armenian version of the text ('from a single philosophy' (Kendall and Thomson 1983, 143)).

180 See 67,16 above.

181 David here refines his previous denial that either of the parts of philosophy can be called by the name of the other; cf. 70,27–8 above.

182 See above, 67,27–32.

183 See above, 68,22–6.

184 See above, 65,27–9.

185 See 66,2–3 above.

186 See 68,22–71,4 above.

187 See above, 68,22–6.

188 See 72,26–73,2 above.

189 See above, 65,27–9.

190 See 66,2–3 above.

191 See 68,22–71,4 above.

192 Compare 5,21–3 above, and n. 25. Note that the earlier quotation says 'I call a philosopher not *only* someone . . .', a claim not equivalent to the one made here.

193 It seems that David is talking about two works titled *Statesman* (as Busse suggests with his capitalization), one by Plato, one by Aristotle. Aristotle's work is lost to us, but listed in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 5.22.

194 Cf. Homer, *Iliad* 14.322.

195 MS V adds the words <i.e. possessions> (*êgoun tas periousias*).

196 See 76,29–33 above.

197 Some MSS (K and V) include the following remark: 'It is clear that (*hoti gar hê* K) desire is for the good, if at any rate this desire is also seen in irrational (*alogois* KV²) animals that are deprived of reason. They too have some desire and longing [for the good]. Besides, just as actions are distinguished by good and bad, so is desire. <But> (read <*de*> in place of *gar*?) reason is distinguished by truth and falsehood.'

198 Plato, *Timaeus* 47B. See n. 123 above.

199 Homer, *Iliad* 5.128.

English–Greek Glossary

abundance: *huperbolê*

accident: *sumbebêkos*

accuracy: *akribeia*

activity: *energeia*

act of comprehension: *katalêpsis*

actuality: *energeia*

add: *suntithenai*

addition: *sunthesis*

adorn: *kosmein*

adornment: *kallôpismos*

affection: *pathos*

after the fact: *katopin*

angel: *angelos*

anger (n.): *thumos*

anticipate: *prophthanein*

arena: *agôn*

argument: *epikheirêma*, *logos*

article: *arthron*

artisan: *dêmiourgos*

ascent: *anodos*

assemblage: *athroisma*

attribute (n.): *parhepomenon, to*; *sumbainon, to*

attribute (v.): *anapherein*

august: *septas*

base: *hedras*

be analogous to: *analogein*

becoming like: *homoiôisis*

be consubstantial with: *sunousioun*

be defined in opposition to: *anthorizesthai*

be fond of enquiry: *philopeustês*

belong to one's essence: *sunousiousthai*

be prior to: *protereuein*

be subject to: *kathupoballein*

boiling: *zesis*

Boo (meaningless sound): *blituri, to*

book: *biblion*

boundary: *horos*

boundary-marker: *horothesion*

bridge: *gephura*

bring under: *kathupoballein*

calamity: *peristasis*

calculation: *logistikê*

change (v.): *ameibein*

change along with: *summetaballesthai*

character: *êthos*

choice: *prohairesis*

circular: *diallêlos*

clarity: *saphêneia*

cognitive: *gnôstikos*

cognitive act: *katalêpsis*

common notion: *koinê ennoia*

compacting: *sunkritikos*

compress: *sunagein*

conceive: *epinoein*

conception: *diatupôsis*; *ennoia*

conceptually: *dunamei*

concise: *suntomos*

conclusion: *sumperasma*

concomitant: *parhepomenon, to*

conform (v.): *epharmozein*

confusion: *sunkhusis*

   without confusion: *asunkhutôs*

conjecture: *eikasmos*

conjunction: *sunapheia*

consider: *epilogizein*

constitution: *politeia*

constitutive: *sustatikos*

contention: *eris*

continuity: *sunapheia*

continuous: *sunekhes*

contrary (n.): *enantion, to*

contrast (n.): *antidiastolê*

contrivance: *mêkhanêma*

convert: *antistrephein*

counter-argument: *antiparastasis*

courage: *andria*

craft: *tekhnê*

    futile craftsmanship: *mataiotekhnia*

      manual crafts: *banausoi tekhnai*

      wicked craftsmanship: *kakotekhnia*

creation: *dêmiourgêma, poiêsis*

criterion: *kanôn*

daemon: *daimôn*

death: *thanatos*

debate: *sullogizein*

deficiency: *kakia*

deficient: *ellipês*

definable: *horistos*

define: *horizein*

definiendum: *horistos*

definition: *horismos*

degree: *anabathmos*

deliberate (v.): *bouleuesthai*

demonstration: *deixis*

deny: *anhairein*

deriving from one thing: *aph'henos*

describe: *hupographein*

description: *hupographê*

descriptive: *hupographikos*

desire (n.): *epithumia*

despise: *kataphronein*

differ: *diapherein*

difference: *diaphora*

differentiae: *diaphorai*

differentiate: *dialambanein*

diffuse (v.): *diakhoun*

discourse theologically: *theologein*

discrete: *dihôrismenos*

discursive thinking: *dianoia*

disposition: *hexis*

dissolute: *akolastos*

dissoluteness: *akolasia*

divine (adj.): *theios*

divine (n.): *theion, to*

division: *dihairesis*; *diakhôrismos*

doubtful: *amphiballomenos*

drivel: *lêrein*

elements: *stoikheia*

enumeration: *aparithmêsis*

equality: *isotês*

eradicate: *ekkoptein*

essence: *ousia*

essential: *ousiôdês*

essential properties: *ta huparkhonta*

ethics: *êthikon, to*

etymology: *etumologia*

even: *artios*

evenly matched: *amphêristos*

exalt: *semnunein*

existence: *huparxis*; *hupostasis*

experience: *empereia*

explanation: *aitia*

extended: *diastatos*; *ektetamenos*

failure: *apotukhia*

fallible: *ptaistos*

fashion (v.): *diaplattein*

feast (n.): *sumposion*

first principle: *arkhê*

flight: *phugê*

flow: *aporhoê*

flux: *rhoê*

fly (v.): *hiptasthai*

folly: *anoia*

form (n.): *eidos*

fortitude: *karterikon, to*

furnace: *ausos*

further division: *epidihairesis*

gazelle (type of ship): *dorkôn*

genus: *genos*

give pleasure: *hêdesthai*

goal: *peras*; *skopos*; *telos*

goat-stag: *tragelaphos*

goodness: *agathotês*

grain: *sitos*

wheat: *sitos*

greed: *pleonexia*

happiness: *eudaimonia*

hard to dislodge: *dusmokhleutos*

have foreknowledge: *progignôskein*

high point: *epitasis*

homage: *timê*

homonym: *homônumon, to*

horse-centaur: *hippokentauros*

household-management: *oikonomikon, to*

human: *anthrôpinos*

hypothetical: *enhupothetos*

ignorance: *agnoia*

image: *eikôn*

imagination: *phantasia*

imitate: *mimeisthai*

immaterial: *ahulos*

immortal: *athanatos*

impacting: *plêgê*

imperfect: *atelês*

imperishable: *aphthartos*

imprint (v.): *anatupoun*

incalculable: *aperilêptos*

incapacity: *anepitêdeiotês*

include too little: *elleipein*

include too much: *pleonazein*

incomprehensible: *akatalêptos*

incorporeal: *asômatos*

indestructible: *ateirês*

individual (n.): *atomon*

inexhaustible: *akataponêtos*

infallible: *aptaistos*

infinite: *apeiros*

injustice: *adikia*

    do injustice: *adikein*

inquiry: *historia*

instrument: *organon*

insubstantial: *asustatos*

intellect: *nous*

invisible: *ahoratos*

irrational: *alogos*; *aneu logou*

irrationality: *alogon, to*

jointly contribute: *sundramein*

jurisdiction: *dikastikon, to*

justice: *dikaiosunê*

kill oneself: *anhairein heauton*

kind (n.): *genos*

kinship: *koinônia*

know: *eidenai*; *epistanai*; *gignôskein*

knowledge: *gnôsis*; *gnôstikon, to*

ladder: *klimax*

lamp (type of ship): *lukhnos*

land-measurement: *geôdaisia*

law-giver: *nomothetês*

lean towards: *ekklinein*

lecture: *praxis*; *theôria*

legislation: *nomothetikon, to*

like: *homoiomerês*

limit: *peras*

limited: *peperasmenos*

living: *empsukhos*

long-living: *makraiôn*

look up: *anathrein*

lose one's mind: *paraphronein*

love (n.): *erôs*

love (v.): *eran*

madness: *mania*

material (adj.): *enhulos*

matter: *hulê*

meaning: *sêmainomenon*

memory: *mnêmê*

mental application: *prosbolê*

mixture: *krasis*; *migma*

monad: *monas*

mortification: *nekrôsis*

move along with: *sunkineisthai*

movement: *kinêsis*

muddy: *hulôdês*

multiplication: *poluplasiasmos*

multiplicity: *plêthos*

multiply: *poluplasiazein*

murky: *akhluôdês*

music: *mousikê*

naming: *onomasia*

narrative (adj.): *diêgêmatikos*

nature: *phusis*

number: *arithmos*

nymph: *numphê*

objection: *enstasis*

odd: *perittos*

opposed: *antidihairoumenos*

original: *paradeigma*

overly subtle: *perittos*

overturn: *anatrepein*

participate: *metekhein*

participation: *methexis*

peak (n.): *akra*

perception: *aisthêsis*

perfect (adj.): *teleios*

perfection: *teleiotês*

petty speech: *mikrologia*

piercing: *diakritikos*

piety: *hosion, to*

pious: *hosios*

plausible: *pithanos*

pleasurable indulgence: *hêdupatheia*

plunge oneself: *hupoduesthai*

politics: *politikon, to*

posterior: *husteros*

potentially: *dunamei*

power: *dunamis*; *dunaton, to*

practical action: *praxis*

practical rule: *theôrêma*

premise: *protasis*

preparation: *meletê*

preparatory exercise: *progumnasma*

prepare for: *meletan*

principle: *arkhê*

prison: *phroura*

privation: *sterêsis*

product: *apotelesma*

promise (n.): *epangelia*

proof: *apodeixis*

proposition: *protasis*

proximate: *prosekhes*

proverb: *apophthegma*

providence: *pronoia*

prudence: *phronêsis*

pure: *akratos*; *arrupos*; *katharos*

purificatory: *kathartikos*
put to the test: *dokimazein*
puzzle: *aporia*

qualified: *prosdihôrismenos*
quality: *poion, to*; *poiotês*
quantity: *poson, to*; *posotês*

raise a puzzle: *aporein*
rational: *logikos*; *meta logou*
rationality: *logikon, to*
reason: *logos*
receptacle: *dekhas*
receptive: *dektikos*
redoubling: *anadiplasiasmos*
reference-point: *arkhetupon, to*
refutation: *anatropê*
refute: *anaskeuazein*
relation: *skhesis*
    in relation: *en skhesei*
remote: *porrô*
rest: *stasis*
rhetoric: *rhetorikê*
riddle: *ainigma*
right time: *kairos*
rule (n.): *kanôn*
run away: *diadidraskein*
rush: *epipêdan*

school: *akroatêrion*
science: *epistêmê*
seal: *sphragis*
section: *tomê*
seeing with one's own eyes: *autopsia*
self-denial: *meionexia*
separate (v.): *diakrinein*
separation: *diakhôrismos*
set of precepts: *parangelia*
shake (v.): *seiesthai*

shape (n.): *eidos*; *skhêma*
sight: *horasis*; *opsis*
slavish: *andrapodôdês*
slay: *kainein*
so-and-so: *skindapsos*
soul: *psukhê*
sovereign: *arkhikos*
species: *eidos*
spotless: *akêlidôtos*
stable: *monimos*
starting-point: *arkhê*
statement: *logos*
steady: *hedraios*
steam: *atmos*
step (v.): *brekhein*
strife: *agôn*
striving: *ephesis*
subdivide: *hupodihairein*
subdivision: *hupodihairesis*
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        pragma, to
subordinate: *hupotattein*
substrate: *hupokeimenon, to*
substance: *ousia*
superabundant: *hupertelês*
superior: *timioteron*
superiority: *huperokhê*
surpass: *nikan*
syllogism: *sullogismos*

take oneself out: *exagein heauton*
take providential care for: *pronoein*
temperament: *krasis*
temperance: *sôphrosunê*
ten-foot rod: *akaina*
term: *horos*
theology: *theologikon, to*
theory: *theôria*
title: *epigraphê*

tomb: *sêma*

trial-and-error: *peira*

tribulation: *peristasis*

truth: *alêtheia*

unchanging: *ametakinêtos*

understanding: *dianoia*

unfitness: *anepitêdeion, to*

unequal: *anisos*

unhypothetical: *anhupothetos*

union: *sundesmos*

unity: *henôsis*

universal (adj.): *katholikos*; *katholou*

unknowable: *agnôstos*

unlike: *anhomoiomerês*

unlimited: *apeiros*

unmixed: *amigês*

unmoving: *akinêtos*

unqualified: *aprosdihoristos*

unreceptive: *anepidektos*

upbringing: *paradosis*

vein: *phleps*

virgin: *parthenos*

virtue: *aretê*

   natural virtue: *phusikê aretê*

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vital: *zôtikos*

voluntary: *prohairetikos*

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wickedness: *kakia*

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wise: *sophos*

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theologikon, to, theology, 5,8.15.25.27; 6,2; 57,17.23.27; 58,20.22.29–30.32; 59,22–3.25.30; 60,10.12; 65,12; 71,22.26.30.33–4; 72,31.35; 73,7.18; 76,25

theôrêma, practical rule, 44,10

theôria, contemplation, 29,23; lecture, 2,29.31; 6.21; 29.31; *passim*; theory, 68,27; 69,1.6.34; 71,4.10; 77,7

thumos, anger, 18,26–7.29.31; 20,1–3; 56,16; 79,22.27; spirit, 38,6.9.20; 56,12; 63,28; 79,8

timê, homage, 26,8

timiôteron, superior (adj.), 14,32; 29,4–5; 56,28; 57,12; 62,8.22

tomê, section, 55,9–13; 61,8.11

tragelaphos, goat-stag, 1,17; 46,37

zesis, boiling, 18,27–8; 20,1–4

zôtikos, vital, 56,10–11.15; 79,7–8.19.26

Olympiodorus

Introduction to Logic

Translation

Textual Emendations

Below I list departures from Busse's main text (Busse 1902, often to signal agreement with textual changes already suggested by the editor himself in his apparatus criticus.

1,1	Excise *eis ta* in the title (Busse).
3,23–4	Read *aprophulaktôs* in place of *aprophulakton*.
4,35	Read *eipein* in place of the *eipen* that Busse proposes to delete.
5,10	Read *oude* in place of *oute* (Busse).
5,20	Read *boulomenos* in place of *oiomenos* (Busse).
6,24	Accept Busse's *kata monas* for *kai mona*.
7,5	Read *proênekhthê* in place of *proênengkên*.
7,22	Read *philosophias* in place of *philosophois* (Busse).
7,28	Excise *ta sungrammata*. In the next sentence, read *apo te* in place of *epi men* (Busse).
8,26	Read *prothesthai* in place of *perithesthai* (Busse).
9,4	Read *ekeinais* in place of *ekeinois* (Busse).
9,10–12	Excise *kai tês theologikês* in lines 10–11, insert *<tên êthikên tês phusikês>* in lines 11–12, and excise *kai tên mathêmatikên tês theologikês* in line 12.
9,36	Read *pantôs* for *pantôn*.
9,38	Read *pantôs* for *pantôn*.
10,29	Read *noein* for *poiein* (Busse).
10,35	Excise *dei* before *arkteon* (Busse).
12,4	Insert *ou* before *deos*.
12,26	Read *tina sungrammata* for *to sungramma*, and *kakon* in place of *kakou* (Busse).
15,8–9	At line 8, read *<to mathêmatikon>* in place of *to theôrêtikon*, and at line 9 *<to mathêmatikon hupo to theôrêtikon>* in place of *to theôrêtikon hupo to mathêmatikon*.

16,3   Read *philosophias* in place of *logikês* (Busse).

16,6   Accept Busse's conjecture *<kheirôn ousa. nun de hai allai tekhnai*
            ouk eisi>.

16,15   Read *toutôn* in place of *houtô* (Busse).

16,27–8   Transpose the rhetorical question at 16,27–8 (*ei toinun . . . ouk an*
            eiê alethes) to come after *organon* in line 14.

20,7   Read *te* in place of *ti* (Busse).

20,29   Accept Busse's supplement *<kai allôs· ho peri pragmatôn*
            dialegomenos dêlon hoti khrômenos phônais ta pragmata
            sêmainousas>.

22,14   Read *dêlontos* in place of *dêlontes*, and *sêmainontos* in place of
            sêmainontes (Busse).

24,1   Read *protera* in place of *prôta* (Busse).

Introduction[1] to Logic by Olympiodorus the Philosopher

Lecture 1

Because we wish to benefit from the fount of goodness there is an eagerness among us to cleave to Aristotle's philosophy, which endows life with the source of goodness, but above all leads us to accuracy in our enquiries when our understanding has become illuminated by it.[2] Come, then, let us begin at once with these three topics, so that we may attain what we desire: (i) the *Categories*, (ii) logic, and (iii) Aristotle's philosophy. We will examine the preliminaries for each of these, that is to say, for the *Categories* and their method, by which I mean logic, and for knowledge, that is, Aristotle's philosophy.

    Regarding the *Categories*, i.e. the book, we will examine six points that tend to be always discussed in the introduction to any book, I mean (i) the goal (*ho skopos*) of the book, (ii) its usefulness and (iii) place, (iv) its title, (v) its author, and (vi) its composition.[3] Regarding its method, i.e. logic, we will examine whether it is a part of philosophy or a tool. Regarding the whole of Aristotle's philosophy, we will consider ten points:[4] (1) Where do the names of the [philosophical] schools come from? (2) What is the division of Aristotle's books? (3) Where should one begin with Aristotle's books? (4) What are their degrees (*bathmos*), and which carry us to the summit of Aristotle's philosophy?[5] (5) What obvious usefulness derives from the attainment of his philosophy? (6) What kind of person should a student of Aristotle's books be? (7) What kind of person should a commentator be? (8) Why did the Philosopher make a point of being unclear? (9) What is the style of his writing? (10) How many and what kind of preliminaries should there be for each book?

    Since, then, we have as our goal to examine the preliminaries to the three topics set out above, we must above all investigate where in these matters we should begin our instruction, whether with the first categories, or the method, or with neither, but rather with the preliminaries to Aristotle's philosophy.

So I say that we should begin with the preliminary questions that lead us towards Aristotle's philosophy, rather than with those concerning the *Categories*
5   or its method, for two kinds of reason: because of the sciences and because of the crafts. We are enthusiasts for the sciences, because they tend to begin from more universal principles, which we also find to be the case with philosophy. Indeed philosophy is more universal than logic, and logic more universal than the *Categories*. But because we begin from the preliminaries to Aristotle's
10   philosophy, we are enthusiasts for the crafts, since in like manner the crafts make the end of contemplation the beginning of action, as is the case, for example, with a house-builder constructing a house.[6] In the same way we too have ascended to logic by beginning from the *Categories*, and from logic to Aristotle's philosophy, such that what has been the end of contemplation will
15   become the beginning of action.

Therefore, since we intend, and rightly intend, to begin from the preliminaries to Aristotle's philosophy, those ten points that we already mentioned must first become clear: (1) From where do the philosophical schools derive their names? (2) What is the division of Aristotle's books? (3) What is the starting-point [for
20   their study]? (4) What is their method? (5) What is their goal? (6) What kind of person should a student of Aristotle's books be? (7) What kind of person should a commentator be? (8) What is the style of Aristotle's writings? (9) Why did the Philosopher make a point of being unclear? (10) How many and what kind of preliminaries should there be for each book?

Now we may reasonably inquire why we ought to examine neither more nor
25   fewer than these ten points. And since this is our goal, let us attempt the argument by using some method of division and demonstrate that these ten points alone are necessary for our inquiry – bearing in mind the saying of the divine Plato, that 'nothing will be able to boast that it has escaped the method of division'.[7]

Now philosophy has both a name and existence. Because it has a name, it
30   invites discussion of the first main point: (1) From where do the philosophical schools derive their names? But insofar as it exists, philosophy can be considered either by itself or in relation to something else. If it is considered in some relation to something else, it is either in relation to itself or to us. And if it is considered in relation to itself, it is either as divided or as continuous. And because it is divided, we examine the second main point: (2) What is the

division of Aristotle's writings? But because it is continuous, it invites discussion 35
of these three main points: (3) What is the starting-point, (4) what is the
method, and (5) what is the goal? It is reasonable that these are three, since
everything continuous has a starting-point, a middle, and an end.

Insofar as philosophy is relative to us, it is always relative to a learner or a
teacher and invites discussion of two main points, (6) one that sets out what
kind of person a student should be, the second (7) what kind a commentator
should be. But if philosophy is by itself, it has both a written form (*lexis*) and a 40
purpose (*dianoia*). Insofar as it has a written form, then, it invites discussion of
two different main points, (8) what the style of the instruction is and (9) why 3,1
the Philosopher makes a point of being unclear. Insofar as it has a purpose, it
invites discussion of this final main point, which examines (10) how many and
what sort of preliminaries to Aristotle's philosophy belong to each of his
writings.

Therefore, since we have shown through the method of division that only 5
these ten points need to be examined, let us explain each one in turn, occupying
ourselves with investigating the nature of each. For now, let us proceed to the
first main point that we said must be examined, i.e. from where the names of
the philosophical schools are derived.

The philosophical schools take their names from seven sources:
either (1) from their founders; or (2) from the birthplace of their founders;
or (3) from the place of teaching; or (4) from the school's form and way of 10
life; or (5) from the method of attaining knowledge, i.e. from the manner
of argument in philosophizing; or (6) from some accidental feature; or
(7) from the goal.[8]

Some schools are named after their founders, for example when we talk
about 'Pythagoreans', 'Democriteans', 'Epicureans', after Pythagoras, Democritus,
and Epicurus, those who first founded these schools.[9] Some schools take their 15
names from the country of their first founders, for example the Cyrenaic
philosophy, which is named after Aristippus of Cyrene;[10] the Eretrian
philosophy, after Menedemus the Eretrian;[11] and the Megarian philosophy,
after the Megarics Eucleides and Terpsion.[12]

Some schools take their name from the place of teaching; the Stoics, for
example, are so called because Zeno spent time teaching in the Stoa Poikile,[13]
and his school then took its name from that place. 20

Some schools are named after their form of life, such as the Cynic philosophers. They were called 'Cynic' philosophers for one of two reasons: either because they were living a simple life in a haphazard sort of way, eating and drinking like dogs in the marketplace and sleeping in large casks, and, to put it simply, doing other things <without precaution>,[14] and denying that
25   what is conventionally noble is better than what is noble by nature; or because they would bark like dogs at strangers and fawn at those familiar to them, such that they would immediately receive those worthy of philosophy with affectionate greetings, but repel those unworthy of it, i.e. unable to master philosophical arguments, and chase them away.[15] For this reason, because of their frank speech and their contentiousness, they were called Cynics. Plato in
30   fact says this about them: 'even a dog has something of a philosopher in him'.[16]

Some philosophical schools are named after their method of attaining knowledge, i.e. after their manner of disputation in philosophizing. We call those philosophers 'Sceptics' (*ephektikoi*), for example, who were concerned with the nature of reality and examined it and, unable to succeed in their inquiries, thought that there is complete ignorance (*akatalêpsia*).[17] In support
35   of this claim they also used to say that what appears to each person is true. Their [school] was like that of the so-called tripod of Apollo.[18] It was called Apollo's tripod, because when asked about any subject they would give a threefold answer: either both things are true, or neither, or one of the two. In
4,1   the case of the soul, for example, when asked 'what is the soul, mortal or immortal?', they would reply that it is either both (i.e. mortal and immortal), or neither (neither mortal nor immortal), or one of the two, and this could be in two ways, the soul being either mortal or immortal.

Now as the Sceptics are saying these things, the divine Plato and Aristotle
5   put their school to shame by refuting them. Plato argues in this way: 'You who maintain that there is complete ignorance either know that there is complete ignorance or you do not know it at all. If you do not know it, how can we believe you, since your claim is just talk?[19] But if you know that there is complete ignorance, then look! – there is knowledge (*katalêpsia*) after all, since you know that there is complete ignorance.'[20]
10   Aristotle says the following against Protagoras, who, as I have said,[21] thinks that what appears to each person is true: 'If Protagoras is wrong, he is wrong, and if he is right, he is also wrong. For he is wrong both when he is wrong in

saying that there is complete ignorance and when he is right in saying that anyone at all has the last word about what he thinks is true: we think that there is knowledge, and therefore it is clear that there really is knowledge. But if there is knowledge, Protagoras is wrong.'[22]

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Galen refutes the Sceptics by drawing on the obvious (*apo tês enargeias*), when he says: 'Unless there is knowledge and the nature of reality is defined, why on earth are we not going to step into a furnace when looking for water, or, in the same way, step into the sea when looking for food?'[23]

But since the Sceptics have been refuted sufficiently, let us now examine by what conceptions they were led to maintain that there is complete ignorance. Well then, we say that they used to make arguments such as the following when they maintained that there is complete ignorance: they would say that the knower must conform to the object known. But, they say, if the knower is going to conform to the object known, the object known must remain stable and firm and always the same. If it should move, then the knower must move and change together with it. Yet if the objects of knowledge, i.e. reality, are indeed in flux and changeable and do not remain stable, the soul that comes to know them does not change or follow them along. Therefore it is clear that there is no knowledge. Those who cling to this conception use an argument of this sort to make their own sorry school seem persuasive.

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We can reply to them: 'You are mistaken in maintaining that the soul does not change along with reality.' It is clear that what has come to be and is perishable is not at rest: the very nature of reality itself bears witness to this, and so, moreover, does the saying of one of the ancients,[24] that in the same way it is impossible to step into the same river twice at the same time and in the same place ('And am I not right', says another one of the ancients, '<to say>[25] that it is not possible to step into the same water twice, indeed even once? For the water that runs over the fingers is different from the water that runs over the foot, as it were').[26] In this way nothing can remain at rest, but is always changing. But we have discovered that the soul does not only attain reality after the fact (*katopin*), but sometimes even anticipates it with the swiftness of its motion, as prophecies and the predictions of solar eclipses, for example, show.[27] These are signs that indicate the soul's foreknowledge of things. In this way, then, are the philosophical schools named after their method of attaining knowledge.

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Schools are also named after the goal of their philosophy, as for example the so-called Hedonists. Because they maintain that the pleasure of philosophy
10   and of all reality is the goal, but not the base pleasure known to the masses,[28] they are called by the name 'Hedonists'.

But we should know that it is not right to maintain that pleasure is the goal, since the goal is happiness. Happiness can be considered in three ways: with respect to the soul, since truth and justice flourish there; with respect to
15   the body, since it shares in good health so as to assist the virtues of the soul; and with respect to external goods, since someone <...>[29] be happy. We say that pleasure is not the goal, but that it follows the goal, just as we say that shadow follows bodies on which light is shone, whenever the sun is not directly above.

We say that some schools are named after some accidental feature, as when we say 'Peripatetics'. The reason they are called Peripatetics can be accounted
20   for in the following manner: the divine Plato, <wanting>[30] to keep his body healthy and unimpeded for the activities of his soul, walked about in his gatherings with students. When he had died, Xenocrates and Aristotle, his students, took over this pastime of his. Xenocrates taught in the Academy and
25   along with his followers was called 'the Academic Peripatetic', while Aristotle taught in the Lyceum and along with his followers was called 'the Lycean Peripatetic'. Later, Xenocrates' activity was omitted, and his followers were simply called 'Academics', while Aristotle's followers were simply called 'Peripatetics' and the place [where Aristotle taught] omitted. In their case the activity was not omitted with good reason: for it was fitting that Aristotle
30   should be quite influenced by the opinions of his teacher and his familiarity with him.

With these remarks we finish our discussion of the seven ways in which the philosophical schools derive their names. In order to show that the schools cannot derive their names in more or fewer ways, let us proceed from the following division: either the schools take their names from some accidental
35   feature or from a concept (*dianoia*): from some accidental feature, as the Peripatetics, but if from a concept, either from a person, or from things. If from a person, then either from names, just as the Pythagoreans are called [after the name 'Pythagoras']; or from the place of teaching, as the Stoics; or from where they have come, as the Cyrenaics and the Eretriacs. Those schools that take their

names from things do so either from their manner of life, such as the Cynics; or from their method of attaining knowledge, as the Sceptics; or from their goal, as the Hedonists. This division shows that it is reasonable that philosophical schools should derive their names in seven ways. Thus let us finish the present lecture, now that we have examined the division in appropriate detail.

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Lecture 2

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With our enumeration of the ten points mentioned above we have finished the first main subject, which taught us where the schools derive their names from, i.e. in seven ways. Let us move on to the second main subject, I mean the division of Aristotle's writings. Now some of Aristotle's writings are particular, others universal, and others intermediate between universal and particular. His particular writings are those written by him for specific individuals, i.e. his letters, which were collected by Andronicus[31] and Artemon.[32] His universal writings, on the other hand, are those in which he investigates the nature of reality. The *Histories* are his intermediate writings, for example the *History of Animals* and the *Constitutions*, 250 in number, in which the way of life of the Athenians and other nations is set out in detail. And let no one say to us that he is at a loss as to why on earth the Philosopher composed such writings. Because I reply to such an objector that this [interest in politics] is another sign of Aristotle's love of humanity. He set out the constitutions of the ancestors, so that those born later would be able to choose some and to avoid others, by judging in which ones they could live well as citizens, and in which ones not. But let us move on from the intermediate and particular writings and turn towards the universal ones in order to study their division. Now some universal writings are in the form of notebooks, while others are treatises. Those in the form of notes were written as summaries and <for Aristotle's own use>,[33] and have an unadorned diction. For one should know that the ancients, when they wanted to compose a treatise and were collecting anything they could find to prove its argument, wrote their findings down in summary fashion for their own use. But all the same, when they came across the books of yet more ancient writers, they certainly took many ideas from there, in order to confirm what is true and refute what is false. And this is what the nature of notebooks is like.

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We call those writings 'treatises' that have an embellished style and diction in addition to the ideas and that are adorned with a diction that is fitting to systematic works. In this way notebooks differ from treatises in that the former

35   have an unadorned style while the latter have an embellished style in addition to compelling arguments.

7,1   Now some notebooks are single in form, while others take many forms. The ones that are single in form were made for a single person, while the ones that take many forms are aimed at multiple people. Some treatises are *in propria persona*, others in dialogue form. Those *in propria persona* <were published>[34]

5   as coming from Aristotle's own person, but those in dialogue form were written dramatically, with many people asking questions and responding. But since the dialogues are also called 'exoteric works', but the writings *in propria persona* 'school works', we shall be right to examine from where these take their names. Some say that the dialogues are called 'exoteric' because

10   Aristotle sets forth things in them that are not conducive for his own purpose.[35] This is also what Alexander used to say, because he did not want to admit that the soul is immortal, notwithstanding the fact Aristotle loudly proclaimed the immortality of the soul in these writings. So as we have said, Alexander, who maintained that the soul is mortal, claimed that those writings in which Aristotle does not give his own opinion are called 'exoteric', in order to avoid

15   being forced to admit that the soul is immortal. This is what these people say. But we usually say that writings for people with a superficial grasp of philosophy, and not true philosophers, were called 'exoteric'. These writings have a clearer style and have not been subjected to demonstrative science. Rather, they are embellished with probable arguments, and besides these, they

20   are directed at personal opinions. This is enough about the name of the dialogues, i.e. why they are called 'exoteric'. The writings *in propria persona* are also called 'school works'. People call them by this name, because they were composed to instruct only lovers <of philosophy>[36] and those accomplished in argument.

25   Some writings *in propria persona* deal with choice and avoidance, i.e. choice of the good and avoidance of the bad, and treat practical matters, while others deal with knowing the truth and theoretical subjects. Yet other writings deal with both, i.e. they deal with discriminating between truth and falsehood *and* good and bad, and deal with all the logical subjects.[37]

We employ a division of philosophy <into>[38] both theoretical and practical
sciences and maintain that natural science, theology, and mathematics belong   30
to the theoretical sciences. The lecture courses called *Physics*, *On Generation
and Corruption*, *On the Heavens*, *Meteorology*, and *On the Soul* treat natural
science. The *Mechanical* and *Optical Problems* are examples of mathematical
writings. The *Metaphysics* is an example of theological writings. Ethics,   35
household management, and politics belong to the practical sciences. The
ethical works include e.g. the so-called *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*; the
ones concerning household management, e.g. Aristotle's *Household Manager*
(he himself gave it that title); the political, e.g. his *Statesman*, which is a different   8,1
work from the 250 constitutions we mentioned before[39] – for these are not
universal. In this way one can make a division between theoretical and practical
sciences. Some logical treatises teach the method itself, while others contribute   5
to the method, and others again purify it. This method is the so-called 'method
of proof', the so-called *Posterior Analytics*, but the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*,
and *Prior Analytics* contribute to it. The *Sophistical Refutations*, *Topics*, and the
arts of *Rhetoric* and the book called *On Poetry* purify the method.   10

But if you wish, we can also understand the order of the contributory
treatises by starting from the method. We should know, then, that in logic, we
have as our goal to understand demonstrative proofs. We understand these
through syllogisms. The syllogism (*sullogismos*) itself, as the name also
indicates, is a kind of collection (*sullogê*) of statements. Now we must learn the   15
simple elements, i.e. the premises, before the syllogism, and before the premises
nouns and verbs, from which the premises are built. So we gain an understanding
of nouns and verbs from the *Categories*; of premises, from *On Interpretation*;
and in the *Analytics*, we will learn the perfect syllogism.

Some people inquire for what purpose the *Sophistical Refutations*, the   20
Topics, and the arts of *Rhetoric* and the book *On Poetry* were composed, and
why the Philosopher set forth his views on these subjects. We reply to these
people that just as the followers of Asclepiades[40] are taught not only knowledge
of what is healthy, but also of what is unhealthy, for the purpose of choosing
the one and avoiding the other, so too the Philosopher, knowing that some   25
sophistical syllogisms try to undermine the truth and to obscure it, thought
that we must <set them out first>,[41] not in order to use them, but so that when
we have knowledge of them, they may not ensnare us. And with these remarks,

we conclude the second main topic, which has taught us the division of
Aristotle's writings.

30   Third among the topics under investigation is where one should begin with
Aristotle's writings. There have been four opinions on the subject: (1) that one
ought to start with ethics; (2) with natural science; (3) with mathematics;
(4) with logic.

(1) Those who say that one should start with ethics claim that we must first
bring our own characters in order and only then begin further studies. For just
35   as eyes in the dark cannot see the sun, so someone oppressed with affections in
his soul cannot take hold of further studies. This is what those who maintain
that the ethical part of philosophy should come before the other parts say.
(2) Those who claim that natural science should come first say that one should
begin from natural principles, since these are natural and familiar to us.
40   (3) Those who claim that mathematics [should come first] tend to say that this
9,1   should be because the following is written above Plato's school: 'Let no-one
untutored in geometry enter.'[42] (4) Others claim that logic should come first
because all the sciences mentioned before need it, at least insofar as <their>[43]
claims are demonstrated syllogistically and in the manner of proofs, and this,
as we have said,[44] is the subject matter of logic.

5   We on our part maintain the following: insofar as the order of reality is
concerned, one should begin with ethics before the rest, because through
ethics we are brought into order and our characters become harmonious. But
since we do not order and beautify our characters in the manner of irrational
animals and in a vulgar way, but through syllogistic argumentation and
10   demonstrative proof, it is right that logic should come before ethics, <natural
science>[45] and mathematics {and theology}.[46] In the case of these three
sciences, <ethics should come before natural science> and natural science
before mathematics {, and mathematics before theology}. And with these
remarks, we have also brought the third main topic to a conclusion.

For our fourth main subject, we examine what the goal of Aristotle's
15   philosophy is and what obvious usefulness can be derived from it. Now it is
plainly apparent that the useful knowledge that can be derived from it is that
there is a single first principle of everything, infinite in power, unlimited,
incorporeal, uncircumscribed, naturally desired by everything, the good itself.
For being good is one thing, and goodness another, just as being white is one

thing, and whiteness another. Being white is what has received the quality itself, and whiteness is that same quality.[47] Thus being good is what has received   20
the quality, but goodness is the reality, existence, and substance of the good itself. Aristotle also says that 'the rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler, one king'[48] in the *Metaphysics*, when he discusses theology: 'It can be   25
established in this way that there is one principle of all things in this way: all reality is well ordered, and this is rightly so, since it is not possible that reality could be badly ordered while god is supreme. What is well ordered has been arranged, what has been arranged has been arranged by something, therefore all reality has been arranged by something.'[49] Therefore we call him who arranges reality 'principle of all things', the knowledge of which is the goal of Aristotle's philosophy.   30

   Our fifth main subject: What are the degrees of philosophy, and what carries us to its summit? Now we say that there are five disciplines that lead us towards the summit of philosophy, namely logic, physics, ethics, mathematics, and theology. Logic is the starting-point, and after it comes ethics, after ethics   35
physics, after physics mathematics, and after mathematics theology. And this is reasonable, since what is <completely>[50] material must come before what is material in some respects and immaterial in others. After this we must proceed to what is <completely>[51] immaterial, following the ordinance of the blessed Plotinus, which states the young should be instructed in mathematics so as to   10,1
become accustomed to incorporeal nature.[52] And this also completes the fifth main subject.

   For our sixth main subject, we examine what kind of person a student of Aristotle's books should be. Now I say that he should be prudent, sharp, refined   5
in his habits, and purified in his soul ('it is not right for the impure to touch the pure', as the divine Plato says,[53] and [as] Hippocrates [says]:[54] 'the more you feed impure bodies, the more you harm them'), and constantly recount to himself the words of Plato, that 'if you do not hear yourself speaking, put no trust in anyone else speaking',[55] and again 'give little thought to Socrates, but a   10
great deal to the truth'.[56] With all this, Plato indicates that we should honour the truth above all and put everything else in second place to it. But in fact the ideal student should also assimilate the parts of his soul to those of the universe at large. For just as in the universe at large there is a king, and subordinate to him soldiers and labourers, so in the case of the student of Aristotle's philosophy   15

too there must be reason occupying the rank of king; spirit that of the soldiers; and desire that of the wage-earners. For reason must rule, spirit be ruled by it, and both must rule desire. Some people ask why the soul has three parts when
20   there are four virtues, practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. We can reply to them that they make a fair point: practical wisdom is the hallmark of the virtue of reason, courage of spirit, temperance of desire, and justice pervades all the parts and can be seen in each. And with this we have completed the sixth main subject.

The seventh main subject is what sort of commentator of Aristotle's books
25   one should be. We say that such a person must be both a skilful interpreter and possess understanding. One must be a skilful interpreter in order to explain the truth clearly, and possess understanding so as to distinguish the truth from falsehood. One must not be enslaved to a particular philosophical school, as though one had hired out one's ears and tongue to it, so as to make everything
30   conform to its tenets, <in thought>[57] as well as speaking and listening. One should not mix together different schools like actors who take on different characters on the stage, lest one should experience the same. Rather, one should have patterns and standards of truth by means of which one is able to distinguish what is right and what is not so. With this, let us finish the present lecture. End of the second lecture.

35   Beginning of the third lecture

We have learned where the philosophical schools take their names from; what the division of Aristotle's writings is; where we should begin[58] [our study of
11,1   them]; through what intermediate stages we should progress; and what we can expect at its summit. In addition, we have learned what sort of student of Aristotle's writings one should be, and then what sort of commentator. Leaving aside these points we have mentioned, let us now examine what the style of the Philosopher's writing is. Now he did not adopt a single style, because he did
5   not concern himself with writing on just a single subject matter. Rather, as he touched upon different subjects, so he adopted a complex harmonious style, desiring that each discourse should suit its subject matter. So in his letters, his style is dense and concise, both colloquial and personal at the same time,

because this is how one should write letters. One should be colloquial, because a letter is a conversation with people who are absent, and just as we talk colloquially when conversing with people who are present, so we should also converse colloquially with people who are absent, that is, in letters. On the other hand, one should be personal when writing letters, so that we do not ourselves forget to fall into private reflection. In the *Histories*, his style is clear, expository, and descriptive, while in the dialogues it is beautiful and full of grace, not lacking anything, with various imitations. In his writings *in propria persona*, his style is compressed, vigorous, dense in ideas, pure in diction, nowhere subservient to poetic metaphors, and arranged with an unadorned rhythm (this is why he himself has not been imitated by later writers, since what is better than skilful composition cannot be imitated by art). But in the exoteric writings his style is adorned by diction. And with this we have also completed the eighth main subject.

As our ninth main subject, we examine why the Philosopher made a point of being obscure. He shows that he is not obscure by disposition (*oikothen*), but deliberately so, in many places where he expounds his ideas with clarity (in the so-called *Topics* among his logical writings, and the *Meteorology* among his writings on natural science). Now he makes a point of being obscure because he wants to make eager and careless youths undergo a trial by examination. When a serious person (*ho spoudaios*) encounters an obscure work, he applies himself and becomes all the more eager to understand the work. But when a careless man encounters an obscure work, he shies away from its study and is driven away by obscurity. Not only Aristotle did this, but also Plato before him, since he [*sc.* Plato] recommended that young people should undergo examination and trial before the study of mathematics. He used to say that they should be carried off to symposia and made drunk, so that what is hidden in their souls may become public. Pythagoras used to do the same: during day-time he would ask his followers about their dreams at night, wanting to divine the movement of their souls through dreams. But we should know that Plato did better than Pythagoras, because in dreams, many things are falsely added or removed, but when drunk, in as much as we are not fully in control of ourselves, what is hidden in our souls comes into the open without fear.[59] But the poets, not wanting to make divine matters perspicuous for everyone, hid their views on divine doctrine in myths. For it is senseless to say, as the poets do,[60] that Kronus

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devoured his children and regurgitated them, while Zeus became a swan. If we
punish men who do such things, how much more absurd is it to attribute such
behaviour to the gods? This is why there is <no>[61] reason to fear that the delicate
souls of the young will accept them as true, since the young are difficult to sway
towards such behaviour. For this reason, let us, for the sake of the poets, admit
the more monstrous tales, because no one could come to believe these stories
due to their implausibility. But in the case of priests, screens fulfill the same
purpose, since their purpose is to prevent the mysteries from becoming
manifest and familiar to the many. For this reason, someone once said:

> I shall sing to the wise, but you shut the doors to the vulgar.[62]

But in fact before all these people, Apollo also prophesied in an ambiguous
manner, not wanting to make his prophecies apparent to everyone. For this
reason he is also called the Ambiguous One (*Loxias*). So what ambiguity is for
Apollo, and screens are for priests, and myths for poets, and dreams for
Pythagoras, and drunken revelries for Plato, is what obscurity is for Aristotle.
And with this we finish the ninth main subject.

For our tenth and last main subject, we examine how many and what sort of
preliminaries there should be for each of Aristotle's writings. Now I say that we
ought to take six points as our preliminaries, I mean (i) the goal, (ii) the
usefulness, (iii) the order, (iv) the title, (v) the author, and (vi) the composition
[of each work]. There is much disagreement about the goals of Plato's writings,
but none about those of Aristotle's. <. . ..>[63] if at least the Philosopher, being an
imitator of nature, says everything for a purpose, so that it is clear from this
that his writings have a goal, just as nature too makes nothing for the sake of it
(*haplôs*) but everything for a purpose. We examine the usefulness of his
writings, seeing that <certain works>[64] seem to be contrived <with bad
intent>,[65] as in the case of the *Sophistical Refutations*. For it is thought that this
book is able to cause harm, because within it Aristotle teaches certain rules of
inference that allow us to deceive. But we say that he did not teach them so that
we may be able to deceive, but to prevent us from being deceived, and not for
our use, but to prevent us from suffering [deception], just as doctors teach
knowledge of poisons not for use, but for avoidance. Further, we do not
examine the universal order (we have learned this already,[66] when we were

saying that logic comes first, ethics follows, and after that physics, and after physics mathematics, and after this theology), but the particular order, such as   35
it exists in things of the same rank (*en tois homostoikhois*): if the treatise deals with logic, it is obvious that we are enquiring into the order that obtains in matters of logic, and likewise in the case of matters of natural science.

Further, we inquire into the explanation for the title when it does not seem to agree with the goal, as in the case of the *Topics*, because the title of the   13,1
treatise is different from what is being taught in it. Often these three things, the goal, the usefulness, and the title [of a treatise] will appear together plainly, as in the treatise *On the Soul*.

Concerning the genuineness [of particular writings attributed to Aristotle], let us examine these two questions: (i) in how many ways are books falsely   5
attributed to authors, and (ii) what are the criteria for distinguishing genuine writings from those that are falsely attributed?[67]

Now in ancient times books were falsely attributed in three ways: (i) because of the ambition of kings; (ii) because of the good will of students; or (iii) because of homonymy, and that in three ways: by homonymy of (a) the author, (b) the writings, or (c) the commentaries. But let us take note, if we may, how   10
the ambitiousness of kings is responsible for the misattribution of books. Now we should know that the ancient kings, who were lovers of discourses, sought out of ambition to gather together the writings of the ancients. Thus Iobates the king of Libya was a lover of Pythagorean writings;[68] Ptolemy, who has the surname Philadelphus, of Aristotelian writings;[69] and Peisistratus, the tyrant of   15
the Athenians, of Homeric writings.[70] And they sought to collect these in exchange for money. Many people desirous for money sought to either compose writings or at any rate to gather whatever writings they found and to include the names of more ancient authors in their titles. They would then offer these for sale and derive financial profit from this deceit. And so it happened, as we said before, that books were falsely attributed to authors   20
because of the ambition of kings.

But sometimes books were falsely attributed by homonymy of their writers, because there was not one single Aristotle the Stagirite, but also the one surnamed Muthos,[71] as well as the one called Paidotribes.[72] Books were falsely attributed by homonymy of the [titles of the] treatises, because not only Aristotle wrote a work titled *Categories*, but also Theophrastus and Eudemus,   25

his students. So often someone coming across the *Categories* by Theophrastus, as it might happen, would have thought that they were by Aristotle. But sometimes books were falsely attributed neither because of homonymy of their authors nor because of the treatises' titles, but because of the homonymy of the commentaries, since often someone would write a commentary on one homonymous treatise which was [then] considered to be about another. Just so

30   Theophrastus wrote a commentary on his own *Categories*, and often someone would mistakenly believe that it was about Aristotle's *Categories*. Or often someone coming across a commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the *Categories* would think that it was in every case about Aristotle's, forgetting that Alexander not only wrote a commentary on Aristotle's but also on

35   Theophrastus' *Categories*.

Sometimes books are falsely attributed because of the loyalty of students towards their teacher, as with all the writings that are ascribed to Pythagoras. For Pythagoras did not leave behind any writings of his own: he would say that one should not leave behind soulless writings, since they cannot stand up for

14,1 themselves, but ensouled writings instead (i.e. students), which are able to fight for themselves and their teachers. So his students composed writings and ascribed them to the name of Pythagoras out of loyalty. And for this reason all the writings that circulate under the name of Pythagoras are misattributions.

5   In the case of Aristotle, his use of division into parts is clear and perspicuous in the manner of geometers: for just as geometers lay down assumptions and postulates in advance and then deduce theorems from them, so Aristotle first teaches what pertains to the usefulness of the treatise, and thus the subject

10   matter itself, in order to clarify the main points of the treatise at hand. Let us bring the present lecture to an end with these remarks, since our teaching on the preliminaries to Aristotle's philosophy is finished.

Lecture 4

Since we have promised to provide instruction on three particular points when we began this introduction,[73] namely on the whole of philosophy (I mean

15   knowledge), on the method (i.e. logic), and on the treatise (i.e. the *Categories*), let us conclude our discussion of the first of the preceding points and proceed

immediately to examine the second (I mean the method), by examining whether logic is a part or a tool of philosophy. Now we must know that there have been different opinions on this question: the Stoics think that logic is a part, the Peripatetics that it is a tool, and the divine Plato that it is both a part and a tool. Plato says in the *Phaedrus* that logic is a part, where he says that it plays the role of coping stone for philosophy.[74] But in the *Phaedo*, he says that it is a tool, where he says: 'Boy, train yourself in this so-called prating, as long as you are still young; otherwise the truth will escape you.'[75] With these words Plato indicates precisely that logic is a tool for philosophy, since he would not have dared to call a part of philosophy 'prating' and 'exercise'. So much about Plato.

The Stoics on the other hand sought to give credence to their own doctrine with two arguments, the first one of which proceeds along the following lines: everything that is used by some craft or science, unless it is either a part or a subpart of another craft or science, <is either a part or a subpart of the craft or science that uses it>.[76] Compare the following examples: dietetics is a part of the craft of medicine, and in no way either a part or a subpart of another craft or science. Dietetics, therefore, is a part of the craft of medicine, and the craft of medicine alone uses it. If, therefore, philosophy too uses logic, but logic does not use another craft or science, logic is either a part or a subpart of philosophy. But it is not in fact a subpart; therefore it is a part. The words 'unless it is [a part or a subpart] of another craft or science' were correctly added to the argument, with a view to astronomy. For [without this addition] astronomy would run the risk of being part of the craft of navigation, since the latter uses the former, as Aratus says about Ursa Major: 'through her [sc. astronomy's] guidance, the men of Sidon steer the straightest course'.[77] In actual fact astronomy is primarily a part of philosophy, since it is included in <mathematics>, and <mathematics in the theoretical part of philosophy>.[78] This is the way in which [the first] line of argument proceeds.

This argument can be refuted briefly and easily by way of the 'lancet-proof', since someone might say to the Stoics: 'does the lancet belong to something else or to the craft of medicine alone? And do some other people use it or only doctors?' Yet all the same no sensible person would say that the lancet is a part of the craft of medicine, since at any rate it is a body – a lancet – while the craft of medicine is incorporeal, and no body can ever be a part of what is incorporeal.

Now what is the origin of this false reasoning? I say it is because the point at issue has been left out of the argument, since the Stoics ought to have said the following: 'everything that is used by some craft or science, unless it is a part or a subpart or a tool of another craft or science, is either a part

20   or a subpart or a tool of the craft or science that is using it.' But in fact no other science uses logic except philosophy alone; therefore logic is either a part or a subpart or a tool of the science that is using it [i.e. philosophy]. But in fact logic is not a part or a subpart, as has been shown; therefore it is a tool for philosophy. And with these remarks [we have finished discussing] the first argument.

The second argument reasons as follows: logic is produced by philosophy;

25   everything that is produced by something else is a part of what produces it; therefore logic, since it is produced by philosophy, is a part of it. This argument is also false; the coppersmith, for example, surely produces his own anvil and the builder his own hammer, say, and yet neither is a part of the other. The Stoic

30   arguments, which seek to show that logic is a part of philosophy, follow this argument.

The arguments of the Peripatetics, on the other hand, which maintain that logic is a tool for philosophy, are three in number and employ the following line of reasoning. The first argument of theirs takes this form: whenever, they say, there are two crafts and one uses the product of the other, the one that uses

35   [the product of the other] is better than the productive one, as is the case, for example, with the crafts of bridle-making and of horsemanship. For the craft of bridle-making makes the bridle, but the craft of horsemanship uses it; therefore the craft of horsemanship, since it uses the product of the bridle-making craft, is better than the latter. In the same way the craft of navigation is

16,1   superior to the craft of ship-building, since the craft of navigation uses the ship which is the product of the ship-building craft. But if this is true, then philosophy will be found <to be worse than> the other crafts that use its product, I mean logic, since philosophy produces logic, but all the other crafts use the product of <philosophy>,[79] for example the crafts of healing, grammar,

5   rhetoric, and, in a word, any number of crafts. <But in fact the other crafts are not>[80] better than philosophy, since this exceeds all absurdity. For who would reach such a height of shamelessness as to call the mother of all the crafts worse than the particular crafts? So if logic is not a part of philosophy because

of this absurdity, it is a tool for philosophy. And with these remarks [we have   10
finished discussing] the first line of argument.

The second argument reasons as follows: a part is going to have the same
subject matter as the whole [of which it is a part], and the same goal [as the
whole]. But logic does not have the same subject matter as the whole, nor the
same goal; therefore logic is not a part of philosophy, but a tool. <If therefore
we have reasoned at all correctly from each of the premises, how could the
conclusion itself not also be true?>.[81] Let us establish each of the premises, and
say the following about the major premise <among them>,[82] which states that   15
the part has the same subject matter and the same goal as the whole: what is
said is true, since for example dietetics is a part of the craft of medicine, and
has the same subject matter, I mean the human body, and the same goal, i.e.
health (for each of them are concerned with health). So for now, the major
premise is robust. But the minor premise in turn, which says that logic does   20
not have the same subject matter and the same goal as the whole [i.e.
philosophy], is not at all robust. For in fact logic and philosophy do not have
the same subject matter: that of logic is words, whereas that of philosophy is
things, as the definition 'philosophy is knowledge of both divine and human
things' shows. But nor do they both have the same goal; rather, the goal of   25
philosophy is 'assimilation to god as far as human beings can', as has been
said,[83] and that of logic is the construction of proofs. And with these remarks
[we have finished discussing] the second line of reasoning.

The third argument also reasons in that same manner: it is said that it is the   30
property of a part that it is used for its own sake, but of a tool that it is used for
the sake of something else. If logic is not used for its own sake, but for the sake
of something else, [i.e.] for demonstration; and what is used for the sake of
something else is a tool for that for whose sake it is used; then logic is not a part
of philosophy but its tool. That logic is not used for its own sake but for the   35
sake of something else, I mean demonstration, is clear from the following:
nature has not hidden everything from us, since it would be impossible for us
to discover anything when we enquire, nor indeed has she revealed everything
to us, since then inquiry would be absurd and pointless. Instead she has made
us both enquirers and discoverers, by showing us some things and hiding
others. So logic has been conceived in order to provide us with a method by
which we are going to be able to discover things hidden by nature, since we   17,1

discover what has not been shown by what logic shows to us. Therefore we have correctly inferred through syllogisms that logic is used for something else and can be called a tool because of this.

Let us also demonstrate through other arguments that the Peripatetics are
5   correct to say that logic is a tool, in order to confirm that what has already been said has a share in the truth. A part completes the essence of a thing; for instance, when it is present it preserves the whole, and when absent, destroys it. It is possible to consider philosophy without logic, since it is by nature both
10   theoretical and practical. Therefore logic will not be a part of philosophy but a tool. But, as has been said,[84] we as humans need logic for demonstration, but we need demonstration for apprehending what is hidden. We can give another constructive argument to make the same point, namely the following: when a tool is removed, it does not thereby undo the whole, as is the case with the axe and carpentry (for when the axe is removed, the carpenter is not killed). When
15   logic is removed it does not undo philosophy; therefore logic is a tool for philosophy. And this argument has the same force as the one before, although it differs by using a different approach.

The arguments of the Peripatetics and the Stoics, then, take this form, but
20   the divine Plato thinks that logic is a part and a tool, a position for which he does not lack argument. 'For', he says,[85] 'I deem you both victorious; you have each provided arguments why logic is a part of philosophy and a tool, and are right, my dear fellows. You fight each other without [really] fighting, since a part is also a tool.' And don't think that I say this in the same respect: logic is a
25   part in one respect and a tool in another, as the argument about the hand and the pitcher is able to prove. For the hand is both a part and a tool: a part of the whole body, and a tool for giving and taking. In the same way a pint is also both a part and a tool, since has two aspects, i.e. the measure and the quantity that is measured out. As the quantity that is measured out, it can be called a part,
30   and as measure, a tool. So just as we have shown in these cases that it is not inappropriate for the same thing to be a part in some respect and a tool in another, so in the case of logic too nothing absurd will follow when we say that logic is both a part and a tool. Logic is a tool when considered as empty schemata,[86] as when I say: 'from two universal affirmations a universal
35   affirmative conclusion follows'. But it is a part when used together with the things themselves, as when I say: 'the soul is self-moving, what is self-moving

is immortal, therefore the soul is immortal', and again, 'everything just is good, everything good is noble, therefore everything just is noble'. Both Plato and Aristotle are worthy of admiration; Aristotle who separated and discovered the schemata without reference to things, and Plato who provided proof without schemata. The ancients knew how to demonstrate, but they did not know how to construct proofs and were in the same position as those who use sandals but do not know how to cut leather.[87] We must not think that Plato is worse than Aristotle on this account, but rather the opposite, i.e. that he is better. For Plato, when he demonstrates, does not lack Aristotle's demonstrative method, but, on the contrary, Aristotle lacks Plato's proofs. Homer and Demosthenes at any rate did not need Aristotle's *On Poetry* or the craft of Hermogenes, but on the contrary the latter needed the former in order to establish their methods while drawing on Homer's and Demosthenes' writings. This is the end of the present lecture, since it is also the end of our inquiry into logic, i.e. whether it is a part or a tool of philosophy.

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Beginning of the fifth lecture

Now that we have reached logic through the *Categories* and the whole of Aristotle's philosophy through logic, let us finish lecturing on these topics and for the rest undertake an inquiry into the subject itself, i.e. the *Categories*, remembering what we said about the tenth main subject.[88] For there we learned that each of Aristotle's writings must be prefaced with these six points, I mean (i) the goal, (ii) the usefulness, and (iii) the order of reading; then (iv) the explanation of the title, (v) the author, and (vi) the so-called composition (*diaskeuê*). Therefore, since we have this desire let us begin with the goal, since everything published for the purpose of the present treatise bears a relation to this. There is not a single opinion on the goal of the *Categories* but there are as many opinions as there are real beings. But these are three in kind, either things (*pragmata*) or thoughts (*noêmata*) or words (*phônai*): things are created by god, thoughts by intellect, and words by the soul. Therefore the goal is also divided into these three kinds. Among the different schools that make this division, there are three schools about the goal: one (to which Porphyry belongs) that maintains that Aristotle is only discussing words; another (to which Herminus belongs), that he

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is discussing only things; and another (to which Alexander belongs), that he is discussing only thoughts. And each of these presents Aristotle as witness to his own doctrine. Porphyry, who argues that Aristotle discusses only words, found confirmation for his own account in the title, since, he says, the treatise bears the

35   title *Categories*, and nothing is a category except what is said about something else; but saying is peculiar to the voice; therefore the treatise deals with words

19,1 alone.[89] And in general the Philosopher [*sc.* Aristotle] from the very beginning announces the purpose [of the treatise], saying that what is not said with respect to things but grasped by words is a homonym. So here too one can understand that Aristotle's goal concerns words, for which reason he also distinguishes them

5   and goes on to say: 'some things (which are usually uttered in speech) are said in combination, and others without combination'.[90]

      Herminus on the other hand thinks that Aristotle deals with things and finds confirmation of his own account in the very fact that Aristotle uses the word 'is' everywhere, since he is used to talking about things.[91] One can confirm

10   the account not only from this fact, says Herminus, but also from the division of real beings taught by Aristotle, when he says: 'some real beings exist in a substrate, others are said with regard to a substrate'.[92] From this it is clear that Aristotle's goal concerns things. And do not let anybody raise difficulties for Herminus by saying that insofar as Aristotle's goal is concerned with words,

15   which themselves exist, it is going to agree with Herminus' account. For someone might perhaps reply to such an objector by arguing in defence of Herminus that words and statements are not said to be in the strict sense, but have being by becoming, as we are going to learn.

      But Alexander took Aristotle to be discussing thoughts, and furnished his own account with starting-points taken from both [schools of thought]. For he

20   says: 'I deem you both victorious, as I am going to show by division. Some things only signify, some things are only signified, and others both signify and are signified. Now words only signify, things are only signified, and thoughts both signify and are signified, since they signify things but are signified by

25   words. Therefore thoughts are intermediate between both words and things. You say that Aristotle is inquiring into words and things, but thoughts are intermediate between the two, and Aristotle, by discussing the extremes, discusses the intermediates. Therefore Aristotle's goal is about thoughts.' Alexander also reasons successfully with another argument: 'Aristotle's goal is

about thoughts', Alexander says, 'because he says at the end of the *Categories* "this, then, is enough about the proposed genera".'[93] If, therefore, Aristotle's goal is about the genera, as has been said; and he further knows that logic does not [study] what comes before the many (this is the task of theology), nor what is among the many (this is the task of natural science), but rather thoughts derived from the many and produced subsequent to them; how can his goal in the *Categories* not be about thoughts, if indeed logic is the subject matter at hand?[94]

In this way the three schools have set out to derive credence for their own positions from the Philosopher himself. The divine Iamblichus, who was born later, says this to them: 'You disagree, good men, while not [really] disagreeing, since you are both right and not right. Each of you is right when he says that this or that is Aristotle's goal, but wrong, because he says that it is his only goal. It is rather as though someone, when defining 'man', were to say that man is either only a living being or [only][95] rational or only mortal. He would be right, since man is all of these things, but wrong in saying that man is each single one alone. In the same way too the person who thinks that Aristotle is talking about either words alone, or about things alone, or about thoughts alone is <both>[96] right and wrong. He is right, since he has grasped the goal in a partial sort of way (*merikôs pôs*), but he is not right, since he has not been able to express the goal of the treatise perfectly. In reality the goal of Aristotle's treatise is neither about words alone nor about thoughts alone nor about things alone, but about all three together, words, thoughts, and things, since it is not possible to discuss any one of them without the rest.'[97]

And because this is the case, let us ask those people who claim that Aristotle examines words alone: 'You who want Aristotle to be discussing words, what sort of words do you mean? Those with meaning or without? Surely not those without meaning, since it is peculiar to grammar to investigate these sorts of words, where 'the goat-stag' and 'Homer' decline in the same way. Therefore if Aristotle's account is not about meaningless words, it must be about those with meaning. But since meaningful words signify things, Aristotle therefore also inquires into things. But words and things are the extremes, as has been shown above;[98] and someone who discusses the extremes also includes the intermediates, which are thoughts. So Aristotle's account is also about thoughts. Therefore, for now the following point has become apparent to us, that someone

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discussing words also discusses thoughts and things. Let those people who say

25   that Aristotle's goal is only concerned with things tell us the answer to this
question: what do you mean by saying that Aristotle discusses things? That he
discusses things *qua* things or insofar as they are signified by words? I take it
that you're not going to say that Aristotle's goal in the *Categories* is concerned
with things *qua* things, since this is the task of first philosophy. Therefore he is
discussing things insofar as they are signified by words. <Besides, it is clear that
someone discussing things also [needs to] investigate words, given that he uses
the latter to signify the former>.[99] For I suppose that he is not pointing at them

30   with his finger when he is philosophizing; therefore his account is also about
words. But since words signify things through the intermediary of thoughts,
Aristotle's concern is therefore also with thoughts. Again, it has been clear to us
from the beginning that someone discussing things also [needs to] discuss the
rest.'

But let those who say that Aristotle's goal is about thoughts come forth into

35   our midst now too. Since they would have Aristotle discuss thoughts, we need
to ask them: 'What are these thoughts? Are they thoughts that exist merely as
empty concepts? – Not at all. – Therefore they are thoughts that signify. Then
what do they signify? – Things.' Therefore it is clear that Aristotle is also
discussing things. And since thoughts do not only signify, but are also signified

21,1 by words, it is clear that Aristotle is also going to discuss words.

And besides: if it has been shown that thoughts are intermediate
between words and things, how could someone who is discussing the
intermediates not also be discussing the extremes? From these arguments we
can grasp that the goal of the *Categories* is about words, thoughts and things.

5   Now it is the task of grammar to examine words *qua* words, that of psychology
to examine thoughts *qua* thoughts, and that of first philosophy to examine
things *qua* things. Since the present book, then, is neither first philosophy
nor psychology nor a treatise on grammar, it is not going to examine things
qua things, nor thoughts *qua* thoughts nor words *qua* words. Rather, it is

10   going to examine words insofar as they signify things through the intermediary
of thoughts. Therefore the goal of the *Categories* has been defined as being
about words that signify things through the intermediary of thoughts, and to
put it simply, it discusses words, things, and thoughts in their mutual
relationships.

But we have not yet attained the complete goal of the *Categories*. For in fact this sort of goal also applies to the *Analytics*, i.e. the treatise on syllogisms, and to *On Interpretation*, which is the treatise on propositions. Therefore, in order to separate the *Categories* from the *Analytics* and *On Interpretation* we must say that the latter discuss complex vocal expressions, while the former discusses simple ones. For this reason we must say that the goal of the *Categories* is about simple words that signify simple things through the intermediary of simple thoughts.

But once again we have not attained the complete goal of the *Categories*. For in fact Aristotle discusses nouns and verbs at the beginning of *On Interpretation*, and these are recognized by all as being simple words of simple things signifying through the intermediary of simple thoughts. Therefore in order to separate Aristotle's categories from nouns and verbs we need to add 'according to their first application', since nouns and verbs do not derive from the first application but rather from the second. But in order to understand what the first and second applications are, let us begin with this point: we should know that nature has intended to make man sociable. Therefore nature, since she has this goal, also endowed him with the ability to discuss, so that he may be able to indicate things to his fellow creatures. He would not have been able to live socially in this way unless there had also been commonality of words, just as those who have different customs cannot be part of the same constitution. The commonality of words arose in the following manner: when the chorus of wise men assembled, they distinguished each thing by its proper name and called one thing substance and another accident. They assigned simple names to simple things and distinguished them for everyone. This is called 'the first application'. Next, the wise men noted that some of the names they had assigned could take an article, while others could not, but rather signified time.[100] They called the former 'nouns' and the latter 'verbs'. And they called this 'the second application'. Now, then, that we have learned what the first and second applications are, let us say this: the goal of the *Categories* is to discuss simple words that signify simple things through the intermediary of simple thoughts in their first application. And with these remarks we have identified the goal.

The *Categories* are useful for the whole of philosophy, since philosophy professes to study real beings. But real beings fall under the ten categories; therefore the book is useful for philosophy.[101] Furthermore, the book is useful

for demonstration. Demonstration is concerned with each part of philosophy,
10   both the theoretical and the practical, so that in the theoretical part we can
establish the truth of appearances through demonstration, and in the practical
do what is good.

  Aristotle titled the book *Categories*, not in order <to indicate>[102] a legal suit
relating to some complaint by the name 'category', but rather <to mean>[103]
15   what is said about something. Some existing things act only as subjects, such as
individuals, and others are only predicated, such as the most generic terms,
and others are intermediate and subordinate terms, which act both as subjects
and are predicated [of other things]. So since Aristotle here discussed the most
general terms, he titled the book *Categories*, referring to the most general terms
in this way. And reasonably so: for if other terms also predicate (*katêgorountai*),
20   I presume that they are not called 'categories' (*katêgoriai*), because they do not
predicate unqualifiedly (*akraiphnôs*), but also act as subjects. The most general
terms, which only predicate and never act as subjects are reasonably called
'categories'. Perhaps someone might raise a difficulty, saying: 'Why did Aristotle
entitle the book *Categories*, and not *On Categories*?' To this objector I reply that
25   Aristotle, wanting, so to speak, to make the description concrete and thereby
indicative of the subject matter, used this sort of title [sc. *Categories*]. In this
way, indeed, Plato before Aristotle used the titles *Phaedrus* and *Alcibiades*, and
Aristides after him did not entitle his eulogies on the generals *On the Generals*,
but rather used the names of those who were receiving praise, *Themistocles*,
30   *Pericles*, *Kimon*, and *Miltiades*, to have their titles signify, as has been said,[104] the
subject matter and imitate it.[105]

  Do not let anyone give the book the title *On Genera*, as Archytas entitled the
Categories. For genera are concepts, as Porphyry says in his *On Genus*: 'therefore
the stated description of the concept of genus contains nothing superfluous,
35   and nothing deficient'.[106] Nor should someone give the title *Before the Topics* to
the *Categories*, as many have done, since not only the present book comes
before the *Topics*, but *On Interpretation* and other writings also do. And with
these remarks we have finished discussing questions concerning the book's
title.

  Is the book genuinely ancient or not? Now some claim that it is spurious for
23,1   four reasons, the first of which is this: the book is spurious because here
Aristotle mentions homonyms and synonyms, but in the *Physics* homonyms,

synonyms *and* heteronyms *and* polynyms.[107] So it is clear that the book is spurious since what it states does not agree with what is said in the *Physics*.

To this argument we reply that the lesson [of the *Categories*] under discussion needed nothing but these two kinds of terms, and Aristotle mentions them because of this. This is the just the way it is with geometers, who from among all the many forms mention only the straight line and circumference. Or we reply that Aristotle has encompassed heteronyms and polynyms with the terms that he mentions, since homonyms are contrary to polynyms, and synonyms to heteronyms. For some homonyms signify many things with a single name, and others in turn one thing with many names. Again, synonyms differ from heteronyms, insofar as synonyms share the same name and the same thing, but heteronyms neither. This is the first explanation.

Those who say that the *Categories* are spurious also put forward this second argument: they say that it is spurious because Aristotle here claims that change and motion are the same, while he claims in the *Physics* that change is more universal than motion.[108] But to this we can in turn reply that Aristotle's task here is not to talk about nature, for which reason he has not been precise in his account of the differences between change and motion (because this is not his goal, but rather to write for those not fully educated).

Their third argument is this: the book is spurious, they say, because here Aristotle says that what is known is prior to knowledge, while in the *Physics* he says that relatives exist together.[109] But to this argument we can once more reply that each statement by the Philosopher is true. For relatives both exist together and do not exist together. They exist together *qua* relatives and *qua* having a mutual relation, but not together *qua* things. In the lectures on *Physics* when examining their relation he says that relatives naturally exist together, but here when he is studying the things themselves he says that they do not exist together.

The fourth argument: the book is likewise spurious, they say, because in many other of his treatises Aristotle assigns greater value to universal than to particular substance, but here, on the contrary, he ranks particular over universal substance. So there are two alternatives: either all his treatises [other than the *Categories*] are rightly considered spurious, or only the one under discussion. But it is in fact impossible that all his treatises [other than the *Categories*] are spurious; therefore the one under discussion [*sc.* the *Categories*] must be spurious. And if this is true, we have established the point in question.

We can once more reply to this argument that Aristotle has reasonably
35   assigned greater value to particular than to universal substance in this treatise,
      but lesser to particular than to universal substance in the others. For in the present
      work he writes for beginners, and reasonably makes use of a hierarchy that is
24,1 suitable for them, starting from what comes first for them (beginners think that
      particulars are <prior>[110] to universals). But in the other treatises when he is
      writing for students with knowledge and more experience, he casts his vote for
      universals, since these are first by nature and first for those who have knowledge.
5   But since we should not only overturn arguments but also construct them,
      let us demonstrate by several arguments that the book is genuinely by the
      author [*sc.* Aristotle]. Now then, it is clear that the book is genuinely by Aristotle
      because of its subject matter, its goal, and the fact that he mentions the book
      under discussion in other genuine treatises, where he says 'as has been said in
10   the *Categories*'.[111] Moreover, if we do not accept the book as genuinely by
      Aristotle, the treatment of logic will not have a starting-point. Where, after all,
      is logic going to discuss simple words in their first application [if not in the
      Categories]? Moreover, if his students wrote [works titled] *Categories* in
      emulation of their teacher, is it not obvious that this treatise is genuinely by
      him?[112] Moreover, they say that after Aristotle's death they found forty copies
15   of the *Analytics* and two of the *Categories* in the libraries. The beginning of the
      one copy of the *Categories* is recorded as 'Homonyms are said . . .', while the
      beginning of the other is 'Among real beings, some are homonyms, some
      synonyms, some polynyms'.[113] The critics have judged that the former is a
20   genuine work by Aristotle, but they concluded that the latter is spurious. And
      with these remarks we conclude our discussion of whether the book is genuine.
          The order of reading is as follows: we must know that things are either
      subject to contemplation or action. But contemplation is reciprocally related to
      action, since the end of contemplation becomes the beginning of action, and
      the end of action becomes the beginning of contemplation; as in the case of
25   the architect, since the architect wants to build a shelter from heat and cold.
      But he cannot build this without a roof, nor can he build the roof without
      walls, or walls without foundations, or foundations without first digging up the
      ground. And where contemplation leaves off, action begins. In the same way
30   the grammarian too says to himself: 'I have accepted a child [as my pupil], so
      that I may teach him language. But the child cannot know language, unless I

first teach him words, from which language is composed; and he cannot know words, unless I teach him syllables. But he will not know syllables without learning the letters.' Where contemplation leaves off, action begins. So if we want to demonstrate something, we cannot do it without particular syllogisms, 35 nor without simple syllogisms, just as one cannot write in a particular way without simply writing. But neither can we have syllogisms without premises, nor premises without simple words. But if at any rate some words belong to the second application and others to the first, and it is impossible to know the second without the first, how could the present treatise not be in the first 40 position, since it discusses simple words in their first application? *On Interpretation* is in the second place, since it discusses simple words in their 25,1 second application; *Prior Analytics* in the third, since it discusses the simple syllogism; and *Posterior Analytics* in the fourth, since it discusses a particular sort of syllogism, i.e. the demonstrative one.

The division of the book falls into three parts. It is divided into what comes 5 before the categories, into the categories themselves, and into what comes after the categories. In the categories, Aristotle sets out the main arguments themselves, dividing the categories into general descriptions and particular characteristics, while in the remaining two divisions he teaches what is useful for the study of the categories.

But we should know that some of the teachings [in the book] are unclear, 10 while others are not as unclear as the previous ones, but lend themselves to our understanding in a faint sort of way. Aristotle first teaches what is utterly unclear, so that, when wrestling with these very questions, i.e. the teaching on the categories, we may not be puzzled by what the Philosopher says while we 15 are ignorant of his meaning. The teachings that are unclear in some respect he has left for later, since we have some feeble conception of them, as has been said.[114] Neither in the beginning nor at the end does he teach everything at the same time, both what is clear and unclear. This is either to prepare the more timid among young men for reading the book; or because of the depth of his arguments; or because of the obscurity of the words; or in fact because of this, 20 to avoid rendering his account unsuitable by making the introduction longer than the main arguments or the concluding portions. Let us finish the present lecture and the preliminaries to the *Categories* and the whole of Aristotle's philosophy with these remarks.

Notes

1   *Eis ta* in the title appears otiose and should be excised, as Busse recommends.
2   The opening sentence of Olympiodorus' *Introduction to Logic*, and particularly its reference to 'leading' (*podêgousês*) the mind to accurate knowledge of the truth, uses language that would be appropriate to mystery religions to describe Aristotle's philosophy.
3   Compare Ammonius, *in Cat.* 7,16–8,10 for this traditional list of preliminaries to the *Categories*. See also the lengthy analysis of this material in Hadot 1990, 19–168.
4   Compare Ammonius, *in Cat.* 1,3–12 for a similar list of ten questions, which may ultimately go back to a work by Proclus that is lost to us (his so-called *Sunanagnôsis* (joint reading) of philosophy, which would have included an introduction to Aristotle in ten chapters, as Elias, *in Cat.* 107,3–26 attests).
5   I am here ignoring Busse's suggestion to reverse the order of points (4), regarding the usefulness of Aristotle's philosophy, and (5), regarding its degrees and how to ascend to its summit, and to read *ho tautês bathmos* in line 18, rather than *ho toutôn bathmos*. The order of the ten preliminary questions is flexible, as a comparison with e.g. 2,17–23 and 2,28–3,3 shows. Aristotle's writings can be said to have 'degrees', in the sense that they can be understood as steps towards the goal of Aristotle's philosophy, which is knowledge of theology. I am grateful to Mossman Roueché for his comments on this passage.
6   Cf. Philoponus, *in Cat.* 11,5–16. For the history of the principle that 'the end of contemplation is the beginning of action' in Arabic and Jewish thought, see Stern 1962.
7   Plato, *Soph.* 235C.
8   Compare Ammonius, *in Cat.* 1,13–3,19 for a parallel discussion of the seven sources for the names of philosophical schools, on which Olympiodorus' list is based.
9   One MS (M) includes the following remark at this point: 'definition of a [philosophical] school: a school is the opinion of wise men who are in agreement with one another and disagree with others.' It is probably a marginal note that was mistakenly integrated into the main text by a copyist.
10 See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 2.65–85 for more information on Aristippus (*c.* 435–356 BCE), who is said to have been born in Cyrene, in modern-day Libya.
11 On Menedemus (*c.* 345–261 BCE), see Diogenes of Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 2.125–44.

12 See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 2.106–12 on Eucleides, and Plato, *Theaetetus* 142B–144A, where he appears as a character in the dialogue's frame narrative, together with the otherwise obscure Terpsion (on the latter, cf. also Plato, *Phaedo* 59B and the entry 'Socrates' in the Suda).

13 The Stoa Poikile (lit. 'Painted Porch') was a colonnade on the north side of the ancient Agora of Athens.

14 Reading *aprophulaktôs* in place of *aprophulakton*. Olympiodorus avoids mentioning the more shocking manifestations that the Cynics' way of living 'according to nature' could take; cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.73.

15 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.60.

16 No such statement is preserved in the Platonic corpus, although it may be inspired by *Republic* 2, 375E. Olympiodorus' source is likely to be Ammonius, *in Cat.* 2,7–8.

17 For a wider discussion of sceptical arguments in the ancient commentators, see Flückiger 2005.

18 Cf. David, *in Isag.* 109,25–6.

19 Lit. 'your claim comes from your jaws (*apo gnathôn*)'. Cf. Ammonius, *in Cat.* 2,14–7.

20 This argument is not in fact to be found in Plato. Nor did either Plato or Aristotle attribute the view that there is a 'complete ignorance' (*katalêpsia*) to Protagoras, who is instead portrayed as believing that all opinions are true (cf. e.g. Plato, *Theaetetus* 170C). Cf. Elias, *in Cat.* 109,31–110,3.

21 This is the first mention of Protagoras in Olympiodorus' *Introduction to Logic*; it is possible that he is referring back to an earlier course of lectures, such as his (lost) *Introduction to Philosophy*.

22 This passage is not in Aristotle, but bears a reminiscence of the self-refutation argument in Plato, *Theaetetus* 171A–B. Cf. Elias, *in Cat.* 110,3–8; Philoponus, *in Cat.* 2,21–4. The argument presented here is an example of *consequentia mirabilis*: if P, then P; if not-P, then P; therefore P (with 'P' standing for 'Protagoras is wrong').

23 Galen's argument is not extant in any of his works that have come down to us; Busse suggests that it may be taken from a lost work *On Demonstration*.

24 'One of the ancients' refers to Heraclitus; cf. fragments B12 and B91 DK.

25 Reading *eipein* in place of the *eipen* that Busse proposes to delete.

26 The view that one cannot step into the same river even once is that of Cratylus; cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 4.5, 1010a10–15. Cf. Philoponus, *in Cat.* 2,8–18.

27 This passage is inspired by Plato's *Meno* (81C). Cf. Ammonius, *in Cat.* 3,5–8; David, *Prol.* 4,31–5.

28 Reading *oude* in place of *oute*, as suggested by Busse.

29 The text at this point is lacunose; Busse conjectures that the words <*toutô mê parontôn ou*> may have dropped out after *hoti*, such that the phrase would read: 'since someone cannot be happy when these [*sc.* external goods] are absent'.

30 Reading *boulomenos* in place of *oiomenos*, as Busse suggests.

31 Andronicus of Rhodes, of uncertain dates, was active in the first century BCE, and is renowned for his edition of the Corpus Aristotelicum.

32 Artemon, whose dates are uncertain, but who was probably active in the late second or the first century BCE, is known to have collected, and published an edition of, Aristotle's letters. See also Goulet 1989.

33 Accepting Busse's *kata monas* for *kai mona*.

34 A passive meaning seems to be required here, which would recommend the reading *proênekhthê* in place of *proênengkên*.

35 Olympiodorus here departs from Ammonius' text, who discusses, and dismisses, the suggestion that Aristotle's 'exoteric' works are so named because they are based on discussions with other people; cf. Ammonius, *in Cat.* 4,20–2.

36 Reading *philosophias* in place of *philosophois*, as Busse suggests.

37 I am here excising *ta sungrammata*. In the present passage, Olympiodorus is discussing writings about various subjects including logic, not writings about other kinds of writing.

38 Reading *apo te* in place of *epi men*, as suggested by Busse.

39 See 6,15 above.

40 Asclepiades of Prusa in Bithynia (d. 40 BCE) was a famous physician in the ancient world, whose works only survive in fragments. For details about his life and work, cf. Pliny, *Natural History* 7.37; 26.37.

41 Reading *prothesthai* in place of *perithesthai*, as suggested by Busse.

42 For a discussion of this inscription, see Saffrey 1968. Cf. also Philoponus, *in DA* 117,27; David, *Prol.* 5,13; Elias, *in Cat.* 118,18.

43 Reading *ekeinais* in place of *ekeinois*, as suggested by Busse.

44 See 8,12–13 above.

45 Busse rightly inserts *kai tês phusikês*.

46 It is doubtful whether Olympiodorus would originally have been talking about theology at all in this context, since it is not one of the disciplines with which one ought to begin one's studies. His overall question is what discipline out of logic, ethics, natural science, and mathematics one should start one's philosophical training with (cf. 8,30–2 above). He himself chooses logic; it remains for him to consider what the relations between the remaining three disciplines are. What has most likely happened is that an editor or copyist has changed the original text in order to reflect an ascending order, with theology at the top, without revising the

text sufficiently to disguise his intervention. I am thus excising *kai tês theologikês* in lines 10–11, inserting *<tên êthikên tês phusikês>* in lines 11–12, and again excising *kai tên mathêmatikên tês theologikês* in line 12.

47 Cf. Ammonius, *in Cat.* 6,13–14.

48 Homer, *Iliad* 2.204–5.

49 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 12.10, 1075a11–25, a passage which Olympiodorus is here summarizing and interpreting in syllogistic form, rather than quoting *ad litteram*.

50 Reading *pantôs* for *pantôn*.

51 Reading *pantôs* for *pantôn*.

52 Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.3.3, 5–7.

53 *Phaedo* 67B1.

54 Hippocrates, *Aphorisms* 2.10 Littré.

55 Plato, *Alcibiades* 114E7–9.

56 Plato, *Phaedo* 91C1–2.

57 Reading *noein* for *poiein*, with Busse.

58 *Dei* before *arkteon* is otiose, and should be excised, as Busse recommends.

59 Cf. Elias, *in Cat.* 126,10–14.

60 Cf. Hesiod, *Theogony* 459–67.

61 From the context of the passage, we should expect Olympiodorus to say that there is no reason to fear that the young shall be corrupted by traditional mythology, precisely because the stories are so incongruous, and because young people do not naturally tend towards immoral conduct. For this reason, I have added a negation (*<ou>*) before *deos* at line 4. The point can be established by contraposition: if the young are liable to believe that myths are true, they will also be inclined to act immorally; but if, as Olympiodorus says, they are not easily moved to immoral conduct, they are also not likely to believe that the myths are true.

62 This verse may have belonged to a poem attributed to Orpheus in antiquity (cf. fr. 7 DK for a similar turn of phrase) and is also quoted by Elias, *in Isag.* 125,3, who refers to it simply as an 'Orphic verse' (*to Orphikon*).

63 The Greek text at this point contains a lacuna.

64 Reading *tina sungrammata* for *to sungramma*. Olympiodorus is not yet talking about a specific work of Aristotle's that may be considered harmful, but rather stating that among Aristotle's writings, there are some that are thought to be harmful.

65 Reading *kakon* in place of *kakou* with Busse.

66 See 9,9–11 above.

67 It is worth pointing out the strong normative connotations that the Greek verb form here translated as 'falsely attributed' (*enotheuonto*) carries. A *nothos* is an

illegitimate son, just as books falsely attributed to a given author might be seen as the illegitimate creations of that author. Olympiodorus' classification includes cases of deliberate misattribution (such as simple forgery) but also cases where the misattribution is a mistake due to homonymy and involves no intention to deceive. For a discussion of the present passage in the context of ancient attitudes towards forgery and pseudo-epigraphy, see Ehrman 2013, 112–13.

68 This 'Iobates' (not to be confused with the mythical Iobates King of Lycia) is probably to be identified with the scholarly Iuba II of Mauritania (*c*. 48 BCE–23/24 CE). Cf. Elias *in Isag* 128,5–9.

69 Ptolemy II Philadelphus was King of Egypt and lived from 309–246 BCE.

70 The story that Peisistratus, the Athenian tyrant (d. 528/7 BCE), sought out all Homeric writings in order to restore the poems to their original form and to gain renown in doing so is also recounted by a second-century BCE grammarian, commenting on Dionysius Thrax, in Hilgard 1901, 29,16–30,10.

71 See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 5.35, who describes Aristotle Muthos as a disciple of Aeschines (of Sphettus), a follower of Socrates active in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE.

72 See again Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 5.35, where Aristotle 'the trainer of boys' (*paidotribês*) is listed; he was apparently mentioned in a *Life of Plato* by Aristoxenus.

73 See 1,6–8 above.

74 Cf. Plato, *Republic* (not the *Phaedrus*) 7, 534E2–3.

75 The quotation does not come from Plato's *Phaedo*, but from his *Parmenides* (135D3–6).

76 The text in angle brackets translates Busse's supplement.

77 Aratus, *Phaenomena* 1.44.

78 At line 8, I read <*to mathêmatikon*> in place of *to theôrêtikon*, and at line 9 <*to mathêmatikon hupo to theôrêtikon*>, rather than *to theôrêtikon hupo to mathêmatikon*. Olympiodorus' point here is that x is a part of y if and only if x is included in y. Without these changes to the text, he would be saying that the theoretical part of philosophy is included in mathematics, which is nonsense, because the whole is not included in the part, but rather the opposite. Likewise, astronomy does not include mathematics, but is included by it.

79 I accept Busse's suggestion of reading *philosophias* in place of *logikês*, which seems necessary to make sense of the argument (A uses B which C produces; therefore A is superior to C; philosophy produces logic, which the other crafts use; therefore the other crafts are superior to philosophy).

80 The text here is clearly lacunose; the words in angle brackets translate Busse's conjecture <*kheirôn ousa. nun de hai allai tekhnai ouk eisi*>.

81 I have transposed the rhetorical question at 16,27–8 to come after line 14, as it appears to belong to the argument of the Peripatetics, rather than to Olympiodorus' own discussion of it. He does not after all think that each of the premises is robust, since he criticizes the minor.

82 Reading *toutôn* in place of *houtô*, as suggested by Busse.

83 The reference to an earlier discussion of the 'becoming like god' motif can only be to a work outside of Olympiodorus' *Introduction to Logic*, and that is lost to us. The most likely candidate is his *Introduction to Philosophy*.

84 See above, 16,35–17,1.

85 Olympiodorus is not quoting Plato's *ipsissima verba*, but rather imagining what Plato would say. Interestingly, 'Plato' here displays the conciliatory attitude attributed to Alexander and Iamblichus; cf. 19,19–27 and 19,36–20,12.

86 Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.3.5,8–11, who maintains that logic is a part of philosophy rather than a tool consisting in empty schemata.

87 Cf. *Life of Aristotle* (vita vulgata) 26,3–5 Düring.

88 See above, 12,19–21.

89 Cf. Porphyry, *in Cat.* 58,5–12.

90 Aristotle, *Categories* 1a16.

91 Cf. Porphyry, *in Cat.* 59,10–27.

92 This sentence in quotation marks is not in fact a quotation, but rather a loose summary of Aristotle, *Categories* 1a20–5.

93 Aristotle, *Categories* 11b15.

94 Cf. Simplicius, *in Cat.* 13,11–18 for Alexander's compromise formulation.

95 *Monon* must be understood to follow *logikon*, and may have been omitted by mistake.

96 Reading *te* in place of *ti*, as suggested by Busse.

97 Cf. Elias, *in Cat.* 130,14–131,14.

98 See 19,26–7 above.

99 The Greek text at this point is lacunose; I am here translating the supplement <*kai allôs· ho peri pragmatôn dialegomenos dêlon hoti khrômenos phônais ta pragmata sêmainousas*> that Busse suggests in his apparatus; a *kai* before *zêtei* in line 29 should perhaps be added.

100 Cf. Ammonius, *in Cat.* 11,7–17.

101 Busse, in my view correctly, omits lines 22,5–8 ('But even if a sign falls under the categories, it does so in a different way: a sign is a starting-point, and a starting-point belongs to relatives, but a relative is one of the categories'), an irrelevant sentence that would at best be a digression from the main subject under discussion, namely the usefulness of the *Categories*.

102 Reading *dêlontos* in place of *dêlontes*, as Busse suggests.

103 Reading *sêmainontos* in place of *sêmainontes*, as Busse suggests.

104 See above, 20,18.

105 Cf. Elias, *Cat.* 132,8–32 for a parallel discussion of the title of the *Categories*.

106 Porphyry, *Isag.* 3,19–20.

107 As noted by Busse, the four terms (homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, and polynyms) are not mentioned together in the *Physics*, or elsewhere in Aristotle's writings.

108 See *Physics* 5.1, 225a34–b3.

109 See *Physics* 3.1, 200b28–32.

110 Reading *protera* in place of *prôta*, as suggested by Busse.

111 Cf. Elias, *in Cat.* 133,12, who makes the same point. The precise phrase 'as has been said in the *Categories*' does not in fact occur in Aristotle's writings, but a list of possible references to the *Categories* within the Aristotelian corpus can be found in Bonitz 1870, 102A.

112 See 13,24–5 above, where Olympiodorus mentions two students of Aristotle who wrote works titled *Categories*, namely Theophrastus and Eudemus.

113 Cf. Ammonius, *in Cat.* 13,20–5.

114 See line 12 above.

English–Greek Glossary

absurdity: *atopon, to*

accident: *sumbebêkos*

accidental feature: *sumbebêkos*

act as a subject: *hupokeisthai*

action: *praxis*

activity: *energeia*

affection: *pathos*

affirmative: *kataphatikos*

after the fact: *katopin*

ambiguity: *loxion, to*

the Ambiguous One: *Loxias*

ambition: *philotimia*

anticipate: *prolambanein*

application: *thesis*

argument: *epikheirêma*; *kataskeuê*; *logos*

article: *arthron*

ascend: *anerkhesthai*

assign greater value to: *protiman*

assimilate: *exhomoioun*

assimilation: *exhomoiôsis*

assumption: *lêmma*

author: *sungrapheus*

be in flux: *rheustos*

be spurious: *notheuein*

beautiful: *hôraios*

beautify: *kallunein*

beginning: *arkhê*

birthplace: *patris*

bring in order: *katakosmein*

category: *katêgoria*

change (n.): *metabolê*

change (v.): *metabainein*

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