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The African National Congress of South Africa: Organization, Communist Ties, and Short-Term Prospects

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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*SNIE 73-86
July 1986*

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Also Participating:

- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
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SNIE 73-86

THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
SOUTH AFRICA: ORGANIZATION, COMMUNIST
TIES, AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

Information available as of 31 July 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 31 July 1986.

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SCOPE NOTE

In the past two years, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa has emerged both within South Africa and on the international scene as a major actor on the South African scene. Its growing international acceptance seems predicated on the belief that the ANC is a dominant shaper of events inside South Africa. This Estimate seeks to examine the ANC, assess its policies and role in contemporary South Africa, and estimate its growth and influence over the next two years. It will also examine the nature of the ANC's "revolutionary alliance" with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and measure SACP influence and control over the ANC and its policies and activities.



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KEY JUDGMENTS ¹

The international recognition accorded to the African National Congress (ANC) as a spokesman for South African black political aspirations is likely to grow during the next two years, as is its popularity with South African blacks. The ANC's ability to garner widespread support, however, is unlikely to be matched by a commensurate increase in its ability to direct and control events inside South Africa. We believe that the ANC recognizes that its chances for overthrowing the South African Government in the near term are poor and that its greatest short-run strengths lie in its ability to broaden its base of international support and to gain domestic support as South African blacks become more politicized and radicalized. [redacted]

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In our judgment, the ANC's advocacy of the revolutionary and violent overthrow of the South African Government will continue and likely intensify. The ANC will maintain a pro-Soviet posture and the longstanding alliance between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) will continue, as will the SACP's considerable influence over and extensive and widespread presence in the ANC's organizational and decisionmaking structures. This influence, however, will remain constrained by non-Communist ANC leaders and fall short of complete domination or control. [redacted]

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The Soviets calculate that the ANC will be the principal vehicle for change in South Africa and they view the SACP, as well as ANC dependence on Soviet military assistance, as their means of influence within the ANC. The SACP is a protege of the Soviet Communist Party, which funds and guides it. Moscow has treated the ANC as its "natural ally" in the region deserving of financial, political, and military support. The Soviets, however, are somewhat suspicious of the ANC's ideological reliability and are concerned that nationalist elements could be co-opted by Pretoria into some kind of reform program. [redacted]

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The Soviets are opposed to current Western efforts to promote negotiations because they believe the South African Government is still too strong, Western countries remain influential, and the ANC is not yet

¹ The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, concurs in this Estimate, but notes that it has not examined how potential changes in US policy or a significant expansion of US relations with black South African organizations might alter the conduct or policies of the ANC. [redacted]

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recognized as the only spokesman for South African blacks. Moscow appears convinced that the best way to advance Soviet interests in South Africa is to support the ANC and its campaign of armed struggle. Carefully directed violence, as Moscow sees it, will provoke counteraction and repression by the South African Government, which in turn will contribute to the polarization and politicization of the masses. Violence will disrupt the economy, lead to disinvestment by Western governments, and ultimately promote the collapse of the South African regime. Moscow, however, appears concerned about growing internally generated violence that is not under the control of the ANC and from which rival groups may benefit. [REDACTED]

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The ANC is a small (about 10,000), externally based and bureaucratically complex organization. Transformed by banning and suppression in the 1960s from a legal, internal mass party to an externally based, "vanguard" style liberation movement, the ANC's main components are:

- A military wing (about 5,000 strong), mostly based in Angola.
- A collection of governing bodies located, along with most of the ANC leaders, in London and Lusaka.
- An extensive external network (in about 40 countries, including most major capitals) of ANC offices, which raises funds and garners support, disseminates propaganda, and provides general foreign representation.
- A rather disorganized and small clandestine political and military support infrastructure within South Africa and in neighboring states. [REDACTED]

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We see little near-term prospect that the ANC and the South African Government will find common ground to negotiate. Both sides appear ill-disposed to compromise and determined to gird themselves for the long struggle. There remains, however, an outside chance that both sides could agree to talks. Should such talks occur, we believe both sides would enter into them largely for tactical reasons, such as sowing division in the other's camp or fostering the appearance of reasonableness in Western eyes, rather than with the intention of negotiating seriously. [REDACTED]

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The ANC is unlikely to fundamentally alter its articulated goals and objectives. The ANC's short-term military goals will continue to be designed to rally black resistance to the government, to intimidate whites and erode their resolve, and to undermine government control of nonwhite areas, while seeking over the longer term to develop an insurgency capable of overthrowing the white government. On the

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political front, the ANC is likely to continue to encourage intensified antigovernment activities by black South Africans and try to increase Pretoria's international isolation by supporting demands for harsh economic sanctions. In an effort to appeal to as broad an audience as possible, the ANC also is likely to maintain its allegiance to its official political manifesto—the 1955 Freedom Charter—that lists moderate socialist and democratic aims. ANC leaders are unlikely to see any political advantage to formulating a more specific vision of a future black majority government. [REDACTED]

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Notwithstanding the fact that the ANC is now the most popular black organization inside South Africa, there is little prospect that the ANC will be able to mount a regime-threatening military campaign during the period of this Estimate. In particular, Pretoria's willingness to strike whenever and wherever it believes necessary against the ANC will hamper its efforts to build the infrastructure needed inside South Africa to sustain an insurgency. [REDACTED]

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ANC military activities during the next two years will probably result in more civilian—especially white—casualties than in the past. Although the older generation leaders may question the political wisdom of risking Western support by such a campaign, we believe pressure from young militants for such actions—including possible attacks on Western business interests—will grow. [REDACTED]

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ANC internal political operations will have very mixed results. Efforts to create a coherent underground political organization have been beset with difficulties and will face continuing constraints. We expect the ANC to participate in and even take control of some of the shadow government organizations springing up in townships where government control has collapsed. Although in competition with other groups, ANC popularity and access to weapons will give it a decided edge. [REDACTED]

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The ANC will continue to try to broaden its appeal to supporters of groups such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). While these groups are not now under—or likely to come under—ANC control or direction, a growing number of internal groups are likely to at least publicly pay homage to the figurehead role of the ANC. In most cases, however, ties between the exiled ANC and internal opposition groups are unlikely to go much beyond rhetorical alliances with their leaderships, and we expect that the ANC will be forced to be content with trying to bypass leaders and appeal to the rank and file. Internal leaders, in our judgment, recognize that closer ties probably are a short-term liability rather than an asset as long as the ANC remains a banned organization.

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Resistance to the ANC from "black consciousness" groups, regionally/tribally based groups like Chief Buthelezi's Zulu organization Inkatha, and rural-based groups such as the Pretoria-created homeland "governments," will continue but slowly erode as the ANC makes inroads into their memberships and areas of influence. [REDACTED]

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The ANC is likely to have considerably more success mobilizing international opinion in its favor and gaining increased financial, and perhaps military, support. Although we expect that many supporters, and potential supporters, in the West will be troubled by the ANC's close ties to the Soviet Bloc and the group's increasing use of indiscriminate attacks, current political trends in South Africa as well as the worldwide focus on Pretoria's intransigence will work to the ANC's advantage. [REDACTED]

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Increases in support from the wider international community, however, are likely to be offset somewhat by ANC reverses in the region. South Africa almost certainly will increase the cost of supporting the ANC to neighboring countries by repeatedly demonstrating its military and economic dominance. The black ruled nations have few resources for fending off Pretoria, and when pressed will have no choice but to attempt to please Pretoria, if only by temporarily limiting or restricting ANC activities within their borders. [REDACTED]

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The SACP, by dint of its long history of support for the ANC and presence therein and its dedicated and ideologically committed leadership, has exercised, and is likely to continue to exercise, considerable influence in the ANC. We see little likelihood that ANC officials—Communist and non-Communist alike—will see any political advantage to fundamentally altering their longstanding and extensive relationship. These ties date to the 1920s, extend through the period of civil disobedience in the 1950s, and were formalized in an alliance in 1969 of the three revolutionary "pillars of the liberation struggle": the ANC, the SACP, and the SACP-controlled South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). We estimate that perhaps as much as 25 percent of the ANC's total membership now belongs to the SACP. [REDACTED]

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SACP representation on the ANC's ruling National Executive Committee (NEC) and other ANC bodies, as well as the ANC's dependence on the Soviet Bloc, will continue to give SACP members considerable influence over ANC policies. In our judgment, probably more than half the seats on the NEC—11 known and 8 probable SACP members—currently are held by Communists. Known or suspected SACP members, for example, hold such important ANC positions as secretary general, deputy secretary general, intelligence and security director, director of information and publicity, and top slots in the military wing. [REDACTED]

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The SACP and the Soviet Bloc also are likely to continue to have leverage because:

- Thousands of ANC political and military cadres have been trained in the Soviet Bloc or exposed to Marxist-Leninist political education by Communist instructors in ANC camps.
- The SACP has gained entry into black labor through the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), which is a member of the major international Soviet labor front. This influence is marginal, however, given that SACTU has little influence—and only marginal prospects for gaining influence—in South Africa's burgeoning black labor movement.
- Most ANC literature is printed in East Germany and the two mainline ANC publications as well as the ANC radio program have Soviet Bloc advisers and receive Bloc assistance.
- The Soviet Bloc continues to provide virtually all military assistance received by the ANC. Hundreds of Cuban and East German instructors train ANC military wing recruits in Angola.
- The Soviets also provide limited nonmilitary assistance—such as scholarships to study in Bloc countries—and provide or encourage a wide spectrum of material support through non-Bloc surrogates or fronts. [REDACTED]

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Non-Communist leaders of the ANC—most notably ANC President Oliver Tambo—are well aware that SACP members have the potential to gain control of the ANC, and are likely to continue to work successfully to thwart Communist attempts to completely control the ANC. Past reporting indicates that Tambo and other non-Communists, although recognizing the need to maintain good relations with their major benefactor, sometimes resent heavyhanded Soviet and SACP attempts to dictate to the group. [REDACTED]

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Among the factors that we believe will continue to limit SACP leverage are:

- A decisionmaking process that operates by way of consensus rather than voting. This has a tendency, in our judgment, to discount the SACP's numerical strength and enhance "old guard" influence.
- The presence of two identifiable black nationalist factions in the ANC—the "old guard" non-Communists and the young militants. The interests of these groups will continue at times to run counter to those of the SACP.

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- Tactical and organizational moves by non-Communist leaders to limit SACP influence. In the past, these have included rules that prohibit all nonofficial contacts between ANC and Soviet officials, and the reported creation of a core Working Committee—composed of non-Communists—to run the ANC on a day-to-day basis. Tambo's position as ANC president also gives him significant input in the SACP appointments of some SACP officials.
- The presence of young black militants—many of whom are in the military wing, and appear increasingly contemptuous of nonblacks, Communists, and the cautious military tactics of the "old guard" leadership.
- The ANC will continue to receive the bulk of its nonmilitary aid from non-Bloc donors.
- Recognition by all parties that the SACP lacks popular support inside South Africa, and that a split would leave the SACP isolated and with little influence inside South Africa.

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There are two sets of key variables that could alter our estimation of ANC prospects. The first would see the release of Nelson Mandela. The South African Government would like to release Nelson Mandela primarily to avoid the repercussions of his dying in jail. However, given the immense domestic and international popularity of Mandela, he poses a real threat to the government and it is unlikely, in our judgment, that he will be released over the next two years. [REDACTED]

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A second key variable, somewhat outside the scope of this Estimate, is the pace and scope of South African Government reform. Should political reform be accelerated by the government, ANC relationships with internal organizations would be jeopardized. There are few indications that Pretoria has such an acceleration in mind, however, and recent government crackdowns suggest that the pace of reforms will, if anything, slow. [REDACTED]

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During the period of this Estimate, Moscow is likely to continue its present mix of low-cost and low-risk support for the ANC and SACP by supplying arms, advisers, and limited funds, and lending propaganda and diplomatic support. The Soviets probably are confident that in the long run this effort will pay off with a pro-Soviet regime in South Africa. To this end, they likely are encouraged by Pretoria's shift toward greater repression of black dissidents, believing that it further isolates Pretoria, increases the chances of a violent overthrow of the government, and lessens the chances that the ANC will be tempted to backslide and negotiate with the South African Government. [REDACTED]

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The ANC will continue to present a dilemma for the United States. The ANC's tactics of revolutionary violence are not consonant with US policies designed to promote nonviolent change. Most troubling is the SACP's strong position in the ANC leadership and the ANC's pro-Soviet, anti-US posture. These negative factors are not likely to change in the next two years.

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On the other hand, in the likely context of developments in South Africa over the next two years and beyond—inadequate reforms, increasing black resistance, government suppression—the ANC will strengthen its monopoly on the symbols of liberation and hold a virtual veto over blacks who may claim to speak for the majority. In the absence of significant political reform and negotiations with credible black leaders, and given the likelihood of increasing violence and polarization, it is difficult to see: how the ANC can be divorced from a growing number of internal black opposition groups; the ANC-SACP alliance sundered; its support of revolutionary violence diminished; or Soviet influence reduced.

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
While the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC, South African Government-ANC negotiations, or accelerated government political reforms all seem unlikely over this period, progress on any of them could alter the estimated course of developments or change the factors in a more favorable direction for US interests.

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African National Congress (ANC) in Southern Africa—Selected Facilities and Camps



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

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
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DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. The African National Congress (ANC) is at one and the same time a small, largely external, semiclandestine organization of probably not more than 10,000 members and the most popular organization within South Africa. The ANC's position has been bolstered by its ability to gain increasing international recognition as the leading representative of South African blacks, which must be allowed at least a share in any future government. Its resurgence during the past two years of domestic unrest in South Africa has brought to the surface old and new controversies over the depth and significance of the group's ties to the South African Communist Party (SACP), the ANC's political and economic vision of a postapartheid South Africa, and its ability to control and direct antigovernment activities in the black townships. 

2. The seeming paradox between the mass appeal of the ANC and its small size and external base is explained by several factors:

- The ANC was forced by government banning and other suppressive efforts to become a small, semiclandestine, mainly external organization in order to survive.
- None of its rivals for the mantle of the anti-apartheid struggle has developed a broad national appeal.
- The ANC has concentrated its appeal on its broadest, most popular program contained in its 1955 "Freedom Charter," which calls for a "united, democratic, and nonracial state."
- SAG policies of granting only limited reforms and periodically heavily suppressing internal dissent have raised both nonwhite political expectations and the level of frustration and dissent. These policies, combined with economic, demographic, and sociological factors, have served to politicize millions of nonwhite South Africans in the last few years, creating a vast new audience for ANC activity. 

GLOSSARY


ANC	African National Congress
NEC	National Executive Committee of the
ANC	
SACP	South African Communist Party
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organization (Azania is "the black consciousness" term for South Africa)
AZACTU	Azanian Congress of Trade Unions
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
UDF	United Democratic Front
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the ANC military arm
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions

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The Evolution of the ANC

3. Founded in 1912, the ANC has undergone a number of transformations that reflect the changing goals and tactics of South African blacks as well as the differing responses of successive white-dominated governments to black political activity. The small group of largely middle-class, educated, black professionals and tribal chiefs who formed the core of the early ANC made little headway in organizing opposition to the government's racial policies. Dynamic younger activists—including Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and others who now form the "old guard" of today's ANC—gained control of the organization in the 1940s and launched a campaign of more militant disobedience that included protest marches, strikes, and mass demonstrations. By the mid-1950s the ANC claimed a membership of over 100,000 but achieved little more success than its predecessors in forcing changes on the government. 

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4. Banned—along with the rival Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)²—by the government following the Sharpeville incident in 1960, the ANC went underground and pursued a campaign of sabotage directed by the group's newly formed military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation). South African police broke the campaign in 1962-63 with a series of arrests of ANC leaders, including Mandela. With its internal organization decimated, some 600 ANC cadres who had eluded arrest went into exile to begin the long process of reforming and transforming the ANC from an internally based mass political organization to a small, externally based revolutionary movement. [redacted]

5. As the organization atrophied in exile, the ANC in the early 1970s became less and less relevant to events going on inside South Africa. The Soweto riots in 1976-77, however, proved a boon to the ANC; some 4,000 young, black, student refugees fled South Africa and joined the ANC. Strengthened by new recruits, increased military and training assistance from the Soviet Bloc, and the emergence of new staging and training areas in newly independent Mozambique and Angola, the ANC began to conduct a limited number of sabotage bombings and haphazard attacks on police stations in the late 1970s. In 1980, it began a more active and organized paramilitary campaign that has continued to this day. [redacted]

6. Although the ANC had been closely associated with the SACP since the 1920s—the ANC, for example, was closely tied to several SACP-controlled mass organizations during the period of civil disobedience in the 1950s—these bonds were strengthened and expanded when the ANC was forced into exile beginning in the early 1960s. The SACP, far more experienced than the ANC at operating in exile and with wider international contacts, funneled economic aid to the ANC and provided limited military assistance and training. Most black SACP members joined the ANC after the banning of the Communist Party in 1950. Most of the remaining party members followed when the ANC officially opened its membership to non-blacks in 1969. In the wake of the Soweto riots, [redacted] Soviet assistance in the form of increased provision of arms and training, both in the region and in Bloc countries. Not surprisingly,

² The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which continues to this day as a rival of the ANC, split from the ANC in the late 1950s over the issue of white and Communist influence within the organization. The PAC leaders argued that non-African—especially white Communist—participation in the anti-apartheid struggle was reinforcing black servitude [redacted]

throughout this period the ANC's public ideological pronouncements and programs assumed a more revolutionary Marxist tone. [redacted]

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The Current Setting

7. The ANC's growing popularity comes against a backdrop of dramatically escalating black frustration and protest over the scope and pace of the political reforms offered by Pretoria. The 1984 Constitution, granting some political representation to Coloreds and Indians but none to blacks, served as a catalyst for black resistance to apartheid and the government. Many blacks saw the constitutional changes as denying them any hope of increased political rights and gave up on Pretoria's intermittent and slow reform program. Violent resistance to government authority broke out in black townships, at first over economic grievances, but, within a year, largely motivated by a political agenda of total resistance to government authority. Despite massive government efforts to contain it, violence in black townships has resulted in some 2,000 killed in unrest-related incidents since September 1984. This violence increasingly has been directed against symbols of political authority, most notably blacks who either represent the government by serving on local governing bodies or who economically benefit from "the system"; many government-imposed local government authorities have been destroyed. In their place have arisen new community organizations, which range from local groups often under the control of bullyboys to more organized—and probably more representative—shadow community governments. Although many of these organizations have proved, or will prove to be, transitory, there is no question that the multiplication of black political organizations and the expansion of violent black resistance to South African governmental authority signal a new phase of black political protest. [redacted]

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8. Although these trends appear on the surface to track well with longstanding ANC objectives, the ANC has been responsible for only a small percentage of recent violent incidents. In contrast to their public statements, in which they claim that township violence is a response to their call to "make South Africa ungovernable," ANC leaders privately have admitted that they trailed, rather than led, events. In August 1985, ANC President Oliver Tambo, in a rare public admission, noted that the ANC must "catch up" with township militants and "properly take control of them." [redacted]

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9. Despite its lack of control over the internal situation, the ANC has benefited from the unrest.

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Popular support among South African blacks for the ANC as a symbol of black resistance has skyrocketed in this volatile political climate. Polls indicate that roughly half of South Africa's 9 million urban blacks now support the ANC, and that an even greater number favor imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela as their political leader. Nor is there any question that the overwhelming majority of the nonwhite population identifies with the ANC's broad objectives enshrined in the 1955 Freedom Charter (see inset).

10. In our judgment, the ANC's position inside South Africa has been enhanced in part by the group's skillful use of its Freedom Charter, the powerful symbolic appeal of Nelson Mandela and other long-imprisoned ANC leaders, and the attention focused on the ANC by the government. The ANC, for example, has skillfully reechoed and pledged allegiance to the purposely broad and vague goals of the ANC's 1955 Freedom Charter rather than attempting to spell out in detail the specifics of a new government. Consequently the group has been able to draw differing political visions of the future under its umbrella. Liberal white, Colored, and Indian supporters, for example, identify with the Charter's call for a multiracial democratic state, while more militant blacks focus more on demands for social and economic change. The continued imprisonment of Nelson Mandela provides a powerful unifying and rallying symbol for South African blacks while allowing Mandela to remain above the partisan fray. We also believe that the South African Government's stated view that the ANC is directing and controlling much of the unrest has burnished the ANC's credentials as the most influential opposition group.

The ANC

Organization

11. The ANC is a complex organization (see annex A) consisting of numerous committees, 11 of which meet with regularity and varying effectiveness. The ANC has offices in about 40 countries, including most major capitals, but the leadership is concentrated in two countries—the United Kingdom and Zambia.

12. The principal decisionmaking body of the ANC is the 30-member National Executive Committee (NEC), although the NEC meets only a few times a year to formulate broad policies. Its most important organizational entities are the NEC Working Committee, the Politico-Military Council and the External

Coordinating Council. The Working Committee and External Coordinating Council give day-to-day direction to the farflung external elements of the ANC; the Politico-Military Council directs ANC activities targeted against South Africa. Members of all the senior committees are based in Lusaka, London, or, in a few cases, Dar es Salaam, and the senior leaders are inveterate peripatetics; rarely are meetings fully attended and often deputies or ad hoc attendees take part in decisionmaking.

13. Primarily for security reasons, the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) operates largely independently of the rest of the organization. Of the roughly 5,000 ANC guerrillas (virtually all of whom are black) some 4,000 are being trained in camps in Angola by Cuban, East German, Soviet, and Angolan instructors, while several hundred are located in camps in Tanzania. Still others are scattered in small clandestine facilities in Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The number of ANC military personnel inside South Africa is difficult to ascertain, but we believe the figure is less than 200 at any one time. Although military personnel located semipermanently in South Africa were given greater operational freedom last year to select and strike targets, military command, control, and support structures still remain in countries adjoining South Africa.

Objectives

14. The ANC's short-term objectives are fairly clear. The group's military strategy is designed in the near term to rally black resistance against the government, to intimidate whites and wear down their resolve, and to undermine the government's control in nonwhite areas. Short-term political goals center on persuading the international community to isolate the white government completely by imposing the harshest sanctions possible, encouraging intensified antigovernment activities by blacks in South Africa—particularly those who support the ANC—and gaining greater domestic and international recognition as the leading representative of the nonwhite community in South Africa.

15. In the longer term, the ANC seeks to develop an insurgency capable of overthrowing the intransigent white government. Most ANC leaders, recognizing the might of South Africa's vast military resources, privately admit, however, that prospects for such an insurgency are bleak without significant help from the black populace—a "people's war"—and neighboring states. Pinpointing the ANC's long-term political goals

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THE FREEDOM CHARTER

We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:

that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people;

that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality; that our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities; that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief. And therefore, we, the people of South Africa, black and white together — equals, countrymen and brothers — adopt this Freedom Charter. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won.

THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN!

Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws; All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country;

The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex;

All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government.

ALL NATIONAL GROUPS SHALL HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS!

There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races; All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and to develop their own folk culture and customs;

All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to their race and national pride;

The preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime; All apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside.

THE PEOPLE SHALL SHARE IN THE COUNTRY'S WEALTH!

The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people;

The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;

All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people;

All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.

THE LAND SHALL BE SHARED AMONG THOSE WHO WORK IT!

Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it to banish famine and land hunger;

The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers;

Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land;

All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose; People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.

ALL SHALL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW!

No-one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without a fair trial;

No-one shall be condemned by the order of any Government official;

The courts shall be representative of all the people; Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the people, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance;

The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis and shall be the helpers and protectors of the people;

All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or belief shall be repealed.

ALL SHALL ENJOY EQUAL HUMAN RIGHTS!

The law shall guarantee to all their right to speak, to organise, to meet together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their children;

The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law;

All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to province, and from South Africa abroad; Pass Laws, permits and all other laws restricting these freedoms shall be abolished.

THERE SHALL BE WORK AND SECURITY!

All who work shall be free to form trade unions, to elect their officers and to make wage agreements with their employers;

The state shall recognise the right and duty of all to work, and to draw full unemployment benefits;

Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for equal work;

There shall be a forty-hour working week, a national minimum wage, paid annual leave, and sick leave for all workers, and maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers;

Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil servants shall have the same rights as all others who work;

Child labour, compound labour, the tot system and contract labour shall be abolished.

THE DOORS OF LEARNING AND OF CULTURE SHALL BE OPENED!

The government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life;

All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free exchange of books, ideas and contact with other lands;

The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love their people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty and peace;

Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children;

Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit;

Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan; Teachers shall have all the rights of other citizens;

The colour bar in cultural life, in sport and in education shall be abolished.

THERE SHALL BE HOUSES, SECURITY AND COMFORT!

All people shall have the right to live where they choose, be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security;

Unused housing space to be made available to the people;

Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no-one shall go hungry;

A preventive health scheme shall be run by the state;

Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young children;

Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, crèches and social centres;

The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state;

Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of all;

Fenced locations and ghettos shall be abolished, and laws which break up families shall be repealed.

THERE SHALL BE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP!

South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations;

South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation — not war;

Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all;

The people of the protectorates — Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland — shall be free to decide for themselves their own future;

The right of all the peoples of Africa to independence and self-government shall be recognised, and shall be the basis of close co-operation.

Let all who love their people and their country now say, as we say here:

**'THESE FREEDOMS WE WILL FIGHT FOR, SIDE BY SIDE, THROUGHOUT OUR LIVES,
UNTIL WE HAVE WON OUR LIBERTY.'**


Adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, South Africa, on 26th June, 1955.


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is more difficult given the diversity of views represented in the ANC leadership. The group's official political manifesto, the 1955 Freedom Charter (see inset), lists moderate socialist aims but is deliberately vague in order to appeal to and attract as broad a coalition of antiapartheid forces as possible. While President Tambo has privately expressed a preference for a moderate, independent state with a democratic base, the ANC leadership has avoided formulating a platform for a black majority government—in part to avoid internecine conflict. 

South Africa, and handicapped also by the need to have some form of support mechanism in states bordering South Africa, and by difficult to nonexistent communications with operational units, the MK has done well to increase its sabotage activity in the last year (see annex B). 

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ANC External Activities


16. The ANC, through its foreign offices and participation in international organizations, seeks to mobilize opinion in favor of the ANC and obtain material support for the ANC. The ANC also promotes measures and activities that condemn, isolate, and damage the South African Government such as boycotts and sanctions. The ANC also seeks international recognition as the sole and only legitimate representative of the South African peoples. 

20. Recent bombings suggest that the ANC is continuing its shift toward attacks on civilians despite the potential hazards of South African retaliation and Western condemnation. Against a backdrop of the worst domestic unrest in South Africa's modern history and challenges presented by the state of emergency, the ANC leadership apparently has decided that attacks on government targets alone are not sufficient. Given the pattern and scope of recent indiscriminate bombings, we consider it highly likely that virtually all of these bombings were the work of ANC guerrillas. 

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17. The ANC has had growing success in all these external activities, and this success will very likely continue to increase. Aided initially only by the Soviet Bloc, Soviet front organizations (all of which the ANC has joined), and radical African states, the ANC has obtained a worldwide venue for its agitprop activities against South Africa and to promote itself. Although we have only sketchy intelligence on external support to the ANC, non-Communist moral and material support is on the increase. Non-Communist governments and organizations, such as the British Government and the EEC, which have historically avoided contact with the ANC because of its program of seeking the overthrow of the South African Government through revolutionary violence, have publicly opened contact with the ANC leadership in the last year. 


21. Until last year the ANC generally tried to avoid causing civilian casualties during attacks on government targets. Exceptions usually were unintentional or were justified as retaliation for South African raids against ANC targets in neighboring states. ANC spokesmen claimed, for example, that the car bombing of the South African Air Force headquarters in May 1983, in which 19 people died and 219 were injured—many of them civilian passersby—was in response to a South African attack on ANC guerrillas in Lesotho six months earlier. Following a major ANC conference in Zambia in June 1985, President Tambo said the group would continue to strike at government targets but would be less concerned about civilian casualties. This decision reflected the growing influence of militant, rank-and-file black nationalist youths opposed to what they saw as inaction by the ANC's relatively moderate "old guard" leadership. Most ANC bombings since late last year have been directed against civilian rather than government targets. A recent ANC statement specifically noted that white farmers and urban white males were considered by the ANC as part of the government's "security forces" and were valid targets for ANC operations. 

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ANC Internal Activities

18. Internal activities fall into two categories: military/paramilitary and political actions. 

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Military/Paramilitary Activities

19. The capabilities of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (commonly referred to as "MK"), to conduct military operations are modest (see annex B). Handicapped by the need to infiltrate MK cadres over long distances, sometimes remote and difficult terrain, and heavily patrolled borders into and out of

22. The recent heightened frequency of ANC attacks reflects a second important change.  the ANC conducted about 260 attacks from 1976 to 1984; in 1985 alone, it carried out 136 attacks, or roughly three times the number of attacks in 1984. The increase has continued in 1986, with some 116 attacks during the first half of the year. There has been a flurry of bombings following the declaration of a state of emergency in June. We believe this increase primarily

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resulted from a decision made at the ANC conference last year to grant greater operational freedom to military personnel inside the country to plan and execute attacks. In the past, ANC military commanders located in neighboring states would meticulously plot out operations based on detailed information on potential targets inside South Africa provided by reconnaissance teams. Guerrilla teams usually then would infiltrate South Africa, retrieve weapons from caches placed earlier by separate units, conduct the attack against the predetermined target, and flee back across the border. Very often, however, the slightest problem would result in the entire operation being postponed. [REDACTED]

23. Under the new rules of engagement, more guerrillas apparently are being deployed for longer periods inside the urban townships, choosing their own targets within parameters presumably set by the leadership, and striking when ready. This has allowed them to conduct relatively simple hit-and-run attacks on black local authorities (widely despised as government collaborators) as well as the increased numbers of security personnel in the black townships, who have proved often to be vulnerable to surprise attacks. The recent increase in indiscriminate urban bombings and the use of landmines—operations which also require less planning and preparation than in the past—is likely to help make 1986 another record year of activity for the group, especially as the ANC appears determined to take advantage of the international focus on South Africa. [REDACTED]

24. In a third important development, the ANC military wing decided last year to begin limited recruitment and training of black youths inside the townships to try to offset increasing restrictions on ANC activities in neighboring states by nervous host governments. Although further details are sketchy, ANC officials clearly want the new recruits to be disciplined and under the strict control of regular military cadres. One event last year tends to confirm that the ANC has at least experimented with passing out weapons to young township militants and perhaps has provided elementary on-the-spot training as well. On 26 June 1985 seven young local blacks died and seven were injured in a series of related incidents in three townships near Johannesburg. Six of the dead and several of the injured were missing their right hands because of grenades that had been rigged to explode prematurely. The grenades came from an ANC arms cache that South African security personnel had discovered and tampered with earlier. A hiatus in grenade attacks of several months followed the widely publicized deaths of the youths and subsequent ANC

claims that police posing as guerrillas had given the booby-trapped grenades to inexperienced activists. [REDACTED]

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Political Activities

25. The longstanding ANC attempts to build a widespread coherent underground political organization in South Africa have had limited success. While numerous ANC cells are believed to exist in South Africa, these cells are not in direct communication with ANC headquarters in Lusaka. ANC command structure runs from Zambia to offices and bureaus in countries bordering South Africa. Within the republic, intermediate command and control echelons do not appear to exist. Furthermore, the ANC facilities in neighboring states have been subject to periodic South African countermeasures, including military attack, making it more difficult to maintain links between Lusaka and the internal cells. [REDACTED]

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26. Although some of these echelons in neighboring states have been abandoned under pressure from Pretoria and host governments, most will likely be reconstituted in the next two years. The prospects for effective underground organization in South Africa, with coherent guidance and direction through a chain of command, seem modest. South African raids on ANC offices have compromised much of the group's organization through captured documents and the interrogation of captives. Any further underground organization will remain vulnerable to such countermeasures. In addition, the ANC's process of vetting new members will continue to inhibit the growth of the organization in South Africa. If the ban on the ANC were lifted, however, it would likely grow rapidly using the existing cell network as an organizational frame. [REDACTED]

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
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27. We do anticipate that ANC cadres will participate in, and in some cases, control the "shadow governments," (for example "street committees," "action councils," and "peoples' courts") that are springing up in some populous African townships, such as Mamelodi, Guguletu, and Alexandra. The government is unlikely to succeed in suppressing all of these groups and their self-appointed leaderships. The ANC agents will be in competition with other groups such as "black consciousness" militants and local criminal warlords, but we anticipate that the ANC influence within these "liberated areas" will gradually increase and represent a significant ANC gain. [REDACTED]

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28. The second line of ANC internal political strategy, which has been more successful than the development of an underground, focuses on legal internal

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opposition groups. The ANC seeks to win support from, and in turn supports, existing major associations of groups opposed to the government's policies. In addition, the ANC calls for the creation of new united fronts of other groups, such as women and youth. This strategy enhances ANC claims to represent the majority and advances the work of building unity. Two key federations, with extensively overlapping memberships, have developed this line of strategy. The principal group is the UDF, which brings together over 600 organizations; second is the COSATU labor federation, some of whose components are also linked to the UDF. Leaders of both have traveled to Lusaka for meetings with ANC leaders and issued statements of support. Some ANC leaders intend to build these and other federations into the broad popular fronts similar to those called for in classic Marxist-Leninist strategy. We anticipate that ANC connections with and influence over these groups will become stronger, although dependent to a degree on Pretoria's actions. The ANC will fall short of converting them to obedient surrogates in most cases, however. [redacted]

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Relations With Internal Organizations

29. The ANC has a wide range of supporters and opponents within South Africa. While few groups are under ANC control or direction, a growing number support it. Some support derives simply from its symbolic importance as the oldest black nationalist movement. Numerous groups also share the fundamental ANC objectives of eliminating apartheid and restructuring South African politics and society on lines similar to, if not explicitly following, the ANC Freedom Charter. This support, however, does not equate with complete agreement with every aspect of ANC programs and tactics. In particular many groups do not endorse the "armed struggle." Some disagreements lead to moderate or strong—even bitter—opposition among sectors of society that otherwise share the desire to protest and change apartheid. [redacted]

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Labor

30. The black labor movement in South Africa is divided on support for the ANC. The leadership of the largest black labor federation, the 660,000 member Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), has made statements openly supportive of the ANC. COSATU leaders have conducted talks with ANC officials in Lusaka. Officials of the ANC's SACP-controlled labor affiliate, SACTU, were present at these talks but played only a minor role. Nonetheless, we expect the COSATU leadership to retain formal

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independence from all political groups. While COSATU may support the ANC in opposition to the white government, it is unlikely to welcome any effort by the ANC or SACTU to assert itself as the senior spokesman for or representative of black labor. [redacted]

31. One small black federation, AZACTU, which claims 60,000 members, rejects the ANC's multiracial character and Communist ties. Many other labor leaders, such as the CUSA and TUCSA federation leaders, prefer to remain neutral even if they have personal inclinations toward the ANC in order not to divide their memberships on a political issue. [redacted]

32. COSATU's expression of support for the ANC was the key factor in the creation in May 1986 of a new labor grouping based on Chief Buthelezi's Zulu-based Inkatha movement. This grouping, called the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), is explicitly anti-ANC and opposed also to COSATU, which it accuses—incorrectly in our view—of being an ANC front. Although UWUSA is being built from the top down as the labor arm of Inkatha, it is likely to organize substantial portions of the work force in Natal and KwaZulu and thus dilute both ANC and COSATU influence in these areas. [redacted]

The United Democratic Front (UDF)

33. The UDF is a loose federation of over 600 separate and widely disparate organizations with both national and regional leaderships and a claimed membership of some 2 million. The UDF's political agenda closely resembles the democratic and multiracial aspects of the ANC's Freedom Charter and many UDF leaders have had strong ANC connections. The ANC probably has substantial influence in the national UDF leadership, in some of the regional leaderships such as the Natal and West Cape UDF organizations, and reportedly directs a small number of the component organizations. Nonetheless, we do not credit either South African Government or ANC claims that the UDF is an ANC surrogate. The UDF is a loose organization and the large majority of its component organizations are autonomous actors and not controlled by the ANC. Many of these groups are issue oriented and are willing to act contrary to ANC wishes in negotiating with the South African Government or "establishment" entities to obtain real reforms or benefits for their members. [redacted]

34. The UDF's future is cloudy. Newly formed community and youth groups, some dominated by violence-oriented radicals that claim allegiance to the

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UDF, have overshadowed more conservative, reform-oriented groups and leaders, including religious groups. The UDF has been a specific target of government suppression and, given the disparate nature of its constituency, it is questionable whether the UDF can survive as a national organization given concerted government suppression. [redacted]

Black Consciousness Groups

35. Black consciousness groups reflect a longstanding minority black opposition to the ANC's multiracialism and its alleged SACP domination. They believe blacks should win their own liberation and reject white domination or participation in the struggle. The first group formed to promote these views was the 1958 Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), still feebly opposing the ANC from exile. A second group, the now-banned Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), provided the dynamics for the 1976 Soweto riots. Successor Black Consciousness (BC) groups set up the National Forum in 1983 as a much smaller rival to the UDF. Most National Forum groups are dominated by intellectuals, internally divided, and are increasingly in violent conflict with the UDF and ANC supporters. The leading component, the 20,000 member Azanian Peoples' Organization (AZAPO), is hostile to the ANC and UDF on a number of counts. It accuses the ANC of being controlled by white and Indian Communists, and criticizes ANC/UDF support of consumer and school boycotts. In turn, the ANC has publicly disparaged AZAPO as immature. Although the views of many young radicals are closer to the views of the BC National Forum, we expect continuing defections from this group to the ANC and UDF. [redacted]

The Township Militants

36. The most visibly active group within South Africa is the mostly unemployed and young township militants who are responsible for much of the violence. The township militants appear to lack coherent organization or serious affiliation with other groups. In general, they favor violence against "collaborators," and the "establishment," and feel that only by open violence can they bring down the system of white rule. Various groups claim allegiance to the ANC, UDF, or AZAPO, but evidence of serious organization or incorporation is lacking. Violence often seems random and nihilistic. The ANC, UDF, and AZAPO are making efforts to recruit and control these groups, but with only limited success to date. The very amorphousness of these groups prevents comprehensive government suppression of them. [redacted]

37. As economic conditions in the townships worsen and recruitment efforts on the part of the ANC, UDF, and AZAPO intensify, we envision some more structured organization of these elements developing, particularly in townships where the government administration has collapsed. The ANC has a marked advantage in recruiting these groups by means of its supply of arms and will likely make the most headway, but we envision much of the township violence continuing to come from ill-organized and largely transitory groups. We also see interfactional violence among these township militants on the rise, at times encouraged by the South African Government. [redacted]

Rural and Homeland Blacks

38. The often-made charge that the ANC is dominated by Xhosa-speaking leaders such as Mandela and Tambo has had some impact on ANC appeal among other ethnic groups, particularly among the Zulu, traditionally hostile to the Xhosa. ANC rivalry with the KwaZulu leader, Chief Buthelezi, and his Zulu-based political movement (which claims a membership of over 1 million) has been quite bitter and shows no signs of diminishing. While Buthelezi embraces the political aims of the ANC and has acknowledged the leadership of Nelson Mandela, he rejects the armed struggle and ANC demands for disinvestment and other sanctions. Buthelezi has probably significantly undermined ANC efforts to expand among the 7 million Zulus, who represent about one-quarter of South Africa's black population. Many young urban Zulus, however, have rebuffed Buthelezi's leadership, and his continued failure to win any significant concessions from Pretoria has diminished his general prestige. Meanwhile the ANC has moved to increase its support in rural areas and the homelands. ANC and UDF activities have expanded to several "homeland" areas and are likely to increase. The tribally oriented homeland "governments" created by Pretoria are not uniformly hostile to the ANC. For example, the Kangwane leader Enos Mabuza in early 1986 met with ANC leaders in Lusaka and has made statements generally supportive of the ANC. [redacted]

White Groups

39. Numerous white groups—businessmen, students, religious leaders, opposition political figures—have opened contact with the ANC in the last year. The ANC has made expansion of contacts with white groups such as the End Conscription Campaign and the National Union of South African Students a top

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priority for 1986. The garnering of white support for the ANC will be handicapped by the increasing ANC support for sabotage and terrorist actions that kill white civilians. [Redacted]

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Communist Influence in the ANC

40. The nature of the relationship between the ANC and the South African Communist Party has provoked sharp debate within the ANC and drawn close scrutiny of outside observers. Historically, the SACP has preferred to conceal the Communist allegiance of some senior ANC officials for fear of alienating moderate sympathizers. Nevertheless, in public the two groups define their relationship as an "alliance" that, along with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), forms the three "pillars of the liberation struggle." [Redacted]

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41. The ANC, however, is not a monolith nor do we believe it is under the firm control of any one cohesive group. In our judgment, the SACP (in part because of its long history of support for the ANC and its dedicated and ideologically committed leadership) has a considerable degree of influence in the ANC—particularly in the ANC's military wing. At the same time, however, we believe that generational, racial, and ideological differences within the ANC act as a brake against any SACP attempt to gain domination over or total control of the ANC. [Redacted]

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42. The ties between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (known as the Communist Party of South Africa before it was outlawed and reformed in the early 1950s) date from the founding of the party in 1921. Although relations between the two groups have ebbed and flowed, the SACP historically has been well represented in ANC councils (see annex C). Given that almost all SACP members seek to conceal their party affiliation, it is not possible to identify with full confidence all Communist members of the ANC or assert with certainty the percentage of ANC members who also belong to the SACP. We estimate, however, that perhaps as much as 25 percent of the ANC's total membership may belong to the SACP, although we cannot provide firm or incontrovertible intelligence to support this judgment. We are confident, however, in judging that the SACP exerts *considerable influence* on ANC policies through its disproportionately heavy representation on the National Executive Committee (NEC) and other decision-making bodies. In our judgment, probably somewhat more than half of the 30 seats on the NEC—11 known and 8 probable SACP members—are currently held by

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Communists (see chart). Known or probable SACP members currently fill the key ANC positions such as secretary general, deputy secretary general, deputy treasurer general, intelligence and security director, director of information and publicity, secretary of the political committee, editor of the party magazine *Sechaba*, and the top positions in MK, just to name the most prominent. [Redacted]

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43. SACP influence also extends throughout other ANC organizations. SACP members, for example, play a leading role in the ANC's military wing created in 1961. Since then, SACP cadres have held top command positions in both the military and intelligence sections of the ANC. In addition, thousands of ANC political and military cadres have been trained in the Soviet Bloc or exposed to Marxist-Leninist political education given the Communist instructors in ANC camps. [Redacted]

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44. The SACP also has gained limited entry into the black labor movement through the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), founded in 1954 and currently operating in self-imposed exile in Lusaka, Zambia. SACTU is a member of the Soviet-front World Federation of Trade Unions and has served as a conduit for Soviet funding to the ANC. Almost all the top executives of the SACTU are SACP members while SACTU's head sits on the NEC. [Redacted]

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45. SACP influence is particularly strong in the ANC's information and propaganda spheres. Most ANC literature is printed in East Germany and the two mainline ANC publications as well as the ANC radio program, Radio Truth, have Soviet Bloc advisers and receive Bloc assistance. [Redacted]

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SACP Organization and Objectives

46. *SACP Organization.* Details on the inner workings of the SACP or the means by which Moscow directs the SACP are scarce. We do know, however, that the SACP is a pro-Soviet, semisecret party headquartered in London. To help "monitor" the ANC, the SACP has established a watchdog District Committee based in Lusaka. The SACP appears to see itself as a vanguard and the key force directing the ANC, the broader "national democratic" liberation movement. As such, limited intelligence indicates that the SACP is not interested in mass recruitment in its ranks, and follows a careful and lengthy screening process—often as long as three years—of potential SACP members. [Redacted]

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**Membership of the African National Congress's
National Executive Committee**


Name	Race/ Ethnic Group ^b	Position	Age
Communists			
Joe Slovo	W	Chief of staff, military wing	60
Alfred Nzo	B/Xhosa	Secretary general	61
S. R. "Mac" Maharaj	I	Member, with military and intelligence responsibilities	51
Mzwai Piliso	B/Xhosa	Head, intelligence and security department	62
Dan Tloome	B/unknown	Deputy secretary general	65
John Nkadameng	B/unknown	General secretary, SACTU	60 ^a
Reginald September	C	Member	62
James Stuart	C	Member	49
Aziz Pahad	I	Member	44
Francis Meli	B/unknown	Editor, Sechaba, ANC Magazine	49
Stephen Dlamini	B/Swazi	President, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU)	73
Probable Communists			
Thabo Mbeki	B/Xhosa	Director Department of Information and Publicity	44
Joe Modise	B/Sotho	Commander, military wing	53 ^c
Martin "Chris" Hani	B/unknown	Deputy Commander and political commissar, military wing	42 ^c
Pallo Jordan	B/unknown	Director of research, Department of Information and Publicity	44
Anthony Mongalo	B/Sotho	Representative to East Germany	49
Josiah Jele	B/Zulu	SACTU staff	54
Gertrude Shope	B/unknown	Head, women's section	60
John Gaetswe ^a	B/unknown	Member	65 ^c
Probable Non-Communists			
Cassius Make	B/Sotho	Political commissar, military wing	45 ^c
Henry Makgothi	B/Tswana	Secretary of education	57
Joe Nhlanhla	B/unknown	Member	53 ^c
Sizakele Sigxashe	B/Xhosa	Member	48
Non-Communists			
Oliver Tambo	B/Xhosa	President	68
Thomas Nkobi	B/unknown	Treasurer General	63
Johnny Makatini	B/Zulu	Director, Department of International Affairs	56
Simon Makana	B/Xhosa	Head of security in Lusaka	51
Jacob Zuma	B/Zulu	Representative in Mozambique	44
Robert (Manci) Conco	B/Zulu	Representative in Mozambique	43 ^c
Ruth Mompati	B/unknown	Member	60

^a May no longer be NEC member.^b Key: (B) - Black (I) - Indian
(C) - Colored (W) - White^c Approximately.

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47. The SACP is not without some internal division and has suffered in the past from racial tensions. Although blacks reportedly make up 90 percent of the SACP members, the Party continues to be dominated by English-speaking whites and Asians.³ Racial antagonism has on at least a few occasions resulted in black SACP members' intriguing against white members within the leadership. Nonetheless, the SACP leadership has shown the capability to tolerate and overcome personality clashes, as well as racial hostilities, within its ranks. Individual members who stray too far are purged, and SACP members of all races have a record of pulling together to protect SACP equities within the ANC. Despite an expected increase in black-white tensions within the SACP, we do not envision them splitting or seriously shaking SACP cohesiveness over the next two years.

number of South African black organizations such as the "black consciousness" groups, probably has a broad antipathy for US policy toward South Africa. A majority of ANC members are suspicious of capitalism, from which they have derived little benefit, and fond of Marxist terminology. ANC publications on foreign policy, for example, closely follow Soviet themes and ANC President Tambo and other senior ANC officials regularly issue statements that parallel Soviet positions.



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Soviet Objectives

48. **SACP Objectives.** SACP literature makes clear that it envisions and is planning for a scenario in which there is a broad national democratic revolution after which the "working class" under SACP control will "take over the state apparatus" to engineer an economic and social revolution. In 1983, the late Chairman of the SACP, an Indian, listed the Party's more immediate tactical goals as:

50. The Soviet Union seeks important long-term strategic objectives through the overthrow of the South African Government and its replacement by a regime "well-disposed" toward Moscow. Moscow believes the economic weight of South Africa, its educated and well-trained work force, and its developed economy and infrastructure will enable a black South African government to assume a leading role on the continent, even overshadowing Nigeria and Ethiopia. Moreover, the Soviets are aware of the value of South African resources, especially of minerals strategic to the West. In the short- to medium-term, Moscow seeks to undermine the influence of the West in South Africa while extracting maximum propaganda benefit for Soviet international diplomacy and to remove South Africa from being what it terms a "strategic pillar" of the Western alliance.

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- Guiding and directing the revolutionary struggle.
- Educating the masses to the "universal truths" of Marxism-Leninism.
- Strengthening the ANC-SACP alliance.
- Resisting backsliding to a "bourgeois-reformist" way of development.
- Concentrating on organizing, uniting, and giving clear guidance to the black working class.
- Defeating South African Government attempts to create a black middle class.

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49. Taking its cues from Moscow, the SACP's agenda not surprisingly takes on a manifestly anti-US tone claiming that US efforts to foster political change without destroying South Africa's economic system are unwelcome "reformism." Although the ANC has followed a less consistent track in public and private, it is equally not surprising that factions of the ANC often strongly echo positions taken by the SACP. We estimate that the majority of the ANC, like a growing

51. Soviet strategy toward South Africa closely meshes with Soviet policy toward other southern African states whose governments are generally sympathetic to the ANC. For example, a portion of the Soviet military assistance to several of those states is channeled toward the arming and training of the ANC. Southern African states often suffer South African retaliation for support to the ANC, creating a perceived need for improved self defense and military assistance, openings the Soviets can exploit.

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
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52. The Soviets calculate that the ANC will be the principal vehicle for change in South Africa and view the SACP, as well as ANC dependence on Soviet military assistance, as their means of influence within the ANC. The SACP is a protege of the Soviet Communist Party, which funds and guides it. Moscow has treated the ANC as its "natural ally" in the region deserving of financial, political, and military support. The Soviets, however, are somewhat suspicious of the ANC's ideological reliability and are concerned that nationalist elements could be co-opted by Pretoria into some kind of reform program.

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³ A recent SACP publication gave the following ethnic breakdown for the attendees at the late 1984 Sixth Congress of the SACP: 64 percent African, 18 percent Indian, 6 percent Colored, and 12 percent white.

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53. The Soviets are opposed to current Western efforts to promote negotiations because they believe the South African Government is still too strong, Western countries remain influential, and the ANC is not yet recognized as the only spokesman for South African blacks. Moscow appears convinced that the best way to advance Soviet interests in South Africa is to support the ANC and its campaign of armed struggle. Carefully directed violence, as Moscow sees it, will provoke counteraction and repression by the South African Government, which in turn will contribute to the polarization and politicization of the masses. Violence will disrupt the economy, lead to disinvestment by Western governments, and ultimately promote the collapse of the South African regime. Moscow, however, appears concerned about growing internally generated violence that is not under the control of the ANC and from which rival groups may benefit.

in the United Kingdom. Funds have been provided by the Soviets to individual ANC members, both SACP and non-SACP, within the ANC hierarchy.

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indicates that Soviet embassies have supplied coded communications channels between some ANC offices.

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Constraints on Communist Influence in the ANC

The Black Nationalist Faction

57. The history of the ANC since the 1940s has included periodic unsuccessful attempts by "black nationalists" to protest SACP and nonblack influence within the ANC. In each case, SACP leaders and veteran non-Communist leaders were able to control the organization and oust the protesters. There have been several grassroots mutinies within MK also protesting SACP and nonblack control, and all these were ruthlessly suppressed (see annex C). (S NF)

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Soviet Bloc Support

54. Soviet support to the ANC is across the board and through multiple channels and seems designed to both enhance the influence of the SACP within the ANC as well as maintain Soviet influence over the broader ANC leadership. We believe the Soviet Bloc provides virtually all the military assistance received by the ANC but is much less generous regarding nonmilitary aid. In both cases, we cannot estimate specific dollar amounts of this assistance.

58. At least two identifiable black nationalist factions within the ANC have interests that at times run counter to those of the group's SACP clique. The first includes "old guard" nationalists who long ago opted to work alongside the Communists against a common enemy rather than break away in opposition to the ANC-SACP alliance. Although members of this group such as ANC President Tambo and Treasurer General Nkobi on occasion have expressed resentment at Communist attempts to undercut their authority, they see themselves as political realists who must recognize that the ANC presently has no choice but to continue to depend on Communist assistance. The second faction is comprised mainly of young rank-and-file militants who joined the ANC during the Soweto riots and who exhibit anti-Communist and antiwhite views. The "Class of 76" already has begun to challenge SACP and ANC officials and is likely to make its presence in the ANC even more strongly felt during the period of this Estimate.

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55. The ANC's heavy dependence on the Soviet Bloc for military aid is an important source of leverage for the SACP and the Soviet Union. In 1983, Oliver Tambo stated that the ANC obtained 90 percent of its military support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Bloc supplies virtually all the military equipment to the MK, and the 500 Cuban and East German instructors present in Angolan training camps provide training to MK recruits, among others. The Soviet Bloc donates all advanced military and sabotage training by means of "scholarships" to the USSR and East Germany; attendance at such courses seems to be a sine qua non for advancement in the MK hierarchy.

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56. Soviet Bloc nonmilitary assistance takes many forms. According to a 1982 report, 180 ANC nonmilitary cadres are given scholarships to study in the Soviet Bloc each year. The Soviets also give or encourage a wide spectrum of material support through non-Bloc surrogates and fronts. The British Communist Party provides a wide variety of support to the ANC

59. *The Non-Communist "Old Guard."* As "practical politicians" and "pragmatists," non-Communist ANC veterans such as ANC President Oliver Tambo and ANC Treasurer Thomas Nkobi have sought to maintain close relations with the Soviet Union and Communist members of the ANC leadership. In the past, for example, Tambo has not always sided with the "old guard" in disputes with the Communists over contentious issues. In one incident Tambo allowed Joe

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[REDACTED]

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Slovo, SACP Chairman and NEC member, to go to Moscow in July 1985 even though several non-Communist NEC members objected because they believe he would brief Moscow on the recently completed ANC conference that Soviet observers were not allowed to attend. [REDACTED]

60. Nevertheless, the ANC non-Communist leaders are well aware that SACP members have the potential to gain control of the ANC, and have worked hard—and with success in our estimation—to prevent the Communists from completely controlling the ANC. Non-Communists in the ANC on occasion have expressed anger at the lack of tact displayed by Soviet officials who have a tendency at times to act as though they have a right to dictate to the group. The ANC's non-Communist leaders also resent the constant and often heavyhanded efforts by Soviet intelligence officers to recruit junior and mid-level ANC members. Tambo and most NEC members also appear resigned to the fact that SACP members on the NEC pass information to Moscow. [REDACTED]

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61. Acting on this distrust of Moscow, Tambo and other non-Communists have taken a number of steps designed to curb Soviet and SACP influence. The group, for example, now has established rules that prohibit all nonofficial contacts between ANC and Soviet officials, and that require all official contacts to be reported. ANC efforts to halt Soviet recruitment activity, however, have had little success. Tambo also occasionally has assigned special projects to non-Communists and had them report back only to him.

[REDACTED] Soviet penetration of the ANC also has been hampered somewhat by the creation of a core Working Committee of the NEC, comprised of non-Communist NEC members and charged with handling the day-to-day activities of the group. There is almost no evidence as to the success of these two measures. Despite the ANC military wing's longstanding need for a secure communications system [REDACTED] refused a Soviet offer last year to provide such a system because the ANC was convinced the Soviets would monitor its communications. ANC efforts over the years to gain greater support from China and the West offers further evidence that the SACP faction in the ANC does not have absolute control over ANC policy. [REDACTED]

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62. There is little evidence available on specifics of the policy debate within the top ANC structures such as the NEC. Despite having an apparent majority in the NEC, the SACP is not able to prevent occasional

initiatives and policies which displease the Soviet Union—such as overtures to China and the West. We attribute this in large part to the “old guard,” which wields influence beyond its mere numbers, and to decisionmaking by consensus, which allows for the play of personal influence of “old guard” leaders like Oliver Tambo. The SACP played an important part in the formation of the most fundamental ANC policies, such as the Freedom Charter and the inception of paramilitary activity. We believe this reflects a broad consensus between the SACP and “old guard” leaders on fundamental strategy, and considerably reduces the areas of potential friction between them. [REDACTED]

63. We also believe that the SACP's lack of popular support inside South Africa gives non-Communist leaders considerable counterleverage against SACP efforts to dominate the group. While we view a collapse of the ANC-SACP alliance as unlikely, such a split would leave the SACP isolated and with little influence in South Africa. We believe both the SACP and Moscow realize this and would be reluctant to pursue opposition to an ANC policy line to the point of risking an irreparable split in the ANC-SACP alliance. [REDACTED]

64. Under the present ANC-SACP relationship, Tambo's position as ANC president also gives him significant input into the SACP's selection of its chairman and secretary-general. The SACP, for example, reportedly must negotiate with Tambo over the role proposed SACP candidates would play in the ANC if they were selected. Tambo also apparently has a voice in the affairs of the Communist-dominated and self-exiled SACTU, a labor federation and the ANC's third “ally.” He and most NEC members reportedly are thoroughly dissatisfied with SACTU and see it as being completely out of touch with the rapidly developing black labor situation in South Africa. Tambo appears to believe that SACTU will never be able to gain direct influence with COSATU's leadership and that the most SACTU is likely to be able to do is serve as a labor propaganda arm for the ANC. Last November he instructed SACTU leaders to comprehensively reexamine their labor strategy and urged them to give up their “impossible” efforts to actively control labor activity in South Africa. [REDACTED]

65. *The Young Militants.* Younger black militants—many of whom are in the military wing—appear increasingly contemptuous of the “cautious” “old guard” as well as nonblacks and Communists, and favor expanding military activities against white civilians. We cannot identify a leadership element of this

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inchoate group. Several recent grassroots mutinies have protested the role of Communists in the ANC's leadership and the sluggish pace of the guerrilla campaign. We believe these restless "young lions" were a major factor in the decision made at the ANC's 1985 conference to revise military tactics. [Redacted] noting the influence of many young delegates, went so far as to speculate that it would be the last conference dominated by the older generation leadership of the NEC. [Redacted]

66. We believe that some black SACP members, particularly in Umkhonto we Sizwe, have opportunistically moved to support the military policies advocated by these militants, probably sensing that this group, which almost certainly represents a majority of the rank and file in Umkhonto we Sizwe and the ANC, poses the most significant potential challenge to the established leadership of the ANC. We see continuing tension between the leadership and this broad group; and the views of this group will increasingly impact on and circumscribe ANC tactical flexibility. For example, we believe that the ANC leadership is cautious and divided over the questions of negotiation with the South African Government or compromise over the armed struggle, in part because of leadership perception that such a move would not be tolerated by the young, militant rank and file. Nonetheless, we see both ANC and SACP leaders retaining overall control of the organization and capable of resisting any challenge to their leadership positions from this group. Over a longer time frame than this Estimate, this group will have the potential for moving into the ANC leadership as some veterans die off and other leaders seek to mollify this faction further by promoting representatives into leadership positions. [Redacted]

Non-Communist Foreign Support

67. Non-Communist support to the ANC is significant, and it exceeds Soviet Bloc assistance in nonmilitary support. One of the two leading non-Communist sources of support are the Nordic countries. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Various UN entities represent the second leading source of nonmilitary support. Lesser but regular contributions are made annually by the World Council of Churches, various Western anti-apartheid movements, and humanitarian aid groups such as Oxfam. The OAU through its Liberation

Committee has been a longstanding, albeit minor, source of military aid, and currently budgets \$300,000 for the ANC. Non-Communist assistance is not designed to enhance the credentials of non-Communist ANC leaders or reduce SACP influence. [Redacted]

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ANC Prospects for the Next Two Years

68. A recent Estimate⁴ described the most likely scenario of developments within South Africa over the next several years as one of continuing white rule, an ongoing government-directed reform program that will receive at best mixed results, at best sluggish economic growth, and continuing outbreaks of black violence. We believe this scenario still is the most likely, and project the following for the ANC for the next two years against this scenario. [Redacted]

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69. The international recognition accorded to the ANC is likely to grow during the next two years. The ANC's ability to garner widespread support as the major—and in some circles the only—recognized spokesman for the broad mass of black South Africans, however, is not likely to be matched by a commensurate increase in the ability of the ANC to direct and control events inside South Africa. The ANC probably recognizes that chances for the overthrow of the South African Government in the near term are poor and that the group's greatest short-run strength lies in its ability to burnish its image and broaden the base of its international support. [Redacted]

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External Activites

70. We anticipate that the ANC's greatest successes will come in mobilizing international opinion in its favor and gaining increased financial, and perhaps military, support. Although we expect that many supporters, and potential supporters, in the West will be troubled by the ANC's close ties to the Soviet Bloc and the group's use at times of indiscriminate attacks, current political trends in South Africa, as well as the worldwide focus on Pretoria's intransigence, will work to the ANC's advantage. The United Kingdom and other EEC members, for example, already have partially reversed past policies and opened contact with the ANC leadership in the past year. [Redacted]

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71. To achieve this broadened external support, the ANC is likely to lobby hard for the imposition of strict sanctions and boycotts against Pretoria while remaining vague about characteristics of a future ANC-oriented government. The ANC can expect continued

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⁴ SNIE 73.2-85, *Prospects for South Africa: Stability, Reform, and Violence*, August 1985. [Redacted]

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and consistent support from the Soviet Bloc, Soviet front organizations, and most African nations. [Redacted]

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72. Increases in support from the wider international community, however, are likely to be offset somewhat by ANC reverses in the region. In particular, South Africa almost certainly will increase the cost of supporting the ANC to the neighboring countries. There is little that militarily weaker and economically dependent black-ruled nations can do to fend off Pretoria. As such, we expect that nations such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique will try to walk a fine line between bowing to South Africa's military and economic might and allowing a limited ANC presence in their countries. When pressed, however, the black-ruled nations will have no choice but to attempt to please Pretoria, if only by temporarily limiting or restricting ANC activities within their borders. [Redacted]

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Internal Activities

73. In part because of its inability to establish secure bases in neighboring countries, the ANC will be incapable of mounting a regime-threatening military campaign during the period of this Estimate. ANC operations, however, are likely to be keyed to ANC perceptions of the state of unrest inside South Africa. Given the South African Government's extensive security network, there is little prospect during the next two years that the ANC will be able in any significant way to move intermediate command and communications echelons now located in neighboring countries into South Africa. Pretoria's willingness to strike whenever necessary at neighboring countries also will hamper ANC efforts to build an infrastructure inside South Africa. [Redacted]

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74. We believe it is difficult to assess at this juncture whether the ANC will expand its recent campaign of attacks against civilian targets, or back away from sustaining such a campaign to avoid alienating the West and potential white supporters in South Africa. On balance, however, the records of other liberation groups around the world strongly suggest to us that the ANC is unlikely to "take a step backward" during its slowly evolving but increasingly harsh military campaign. We expect ANC attacks during the next two years to result in more civilian—especially white civilian—casualties than in the past, although traditional government targets also will be attacked. Young militants in the ANC also are pressing for attacks against Western firms in South Africa to spur even greater disinvestment. The ANC leadership reportedly is waiting to see how the sanctions issue is resolved, but the scope of any new sanctions almost

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certainly will fall short of ANC demands. As a result, although ANC leaders will be reluctant to risk newly improved ANC international legitimacy and increasing Western support, we cannot rule out the possibility of some future ANC attacks on Western business interests inside South Africa. [Redacted]

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75. On the political front inside South Africa, the ANC is likely to attempt to broaden its appeal to the rank and file of groups such as the UDF and COSATU, but in most cases is unlikely to succeed in establishing much beyond rhetorical alliances with their leaderships. Instead, we expect that the ANC will have to be content with trying to bypass leaders in an attempt to appeal to the rank and file, and place ANC supporters in key positions. In our judgment, although internal leaders will continue to pay some homage (such as by traveling to Lusaka to meet with ANC leaders) to the principles espoused by the ANC, they recognize that closer ties probably are a greater short-term liability rather than an asset. In particular, as long as the ANC remains a banned organization, closer association with the ANC runs the risk of providing Pretoria with "justification" for cracking down harder on groups such as the UDF and COSATU. [Redacted]

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The South African Response

76. All signs point to the government continuing its campaign to discredit the ANC by claiming that it is a Communist-controlled organization dedicated to terrorism, and that it enjoys little support among black South Africans. Although unlikely in our judgment to have much success, we also expect that the government will continue with efforts to build an alternative "moderate" black leadership willing to accept Pretoria's reforms and challenge the ANC on its own ground. [Redacted]


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77. At the same time, we expect that South African security authorities are increasingly likely to move toward a strategy designed to break the back of the organization in exile. Past limited military and paramilitary raids in neighboring countries, which have netted internal ANC documents, compromised ANC networks, and intimidated neighboring states into at least temporarily disrupting activities, are likely to be supplanted by more destructive cross-border attacks. Pretoria also may authorize selective assassinations of ANC officials. Inside South Africa, we expect that security services will continue to have some success rounding up ANC military units that infiltrate the country. At the same time, we expect the security services to become more aggressive in targeting groups such as the UDF. [Redacted]

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78. On balance, we believe South African security forces are capable of keeping ANC-sponsored violence within, from Pretoria's perspective, tolerable limits. We do not believe, however, that Pretoria is capable within the next two years of meeting its stated objective of "restoring order" to black townships, or of creating a black leadership strong enough to overcome opposition from the ANC and other groups opposed to negotiating with the government.

by white establishment entities to community action groups and trade unions, there would likely be a positive response on the part of some opposition groups. Such new conciliatory dialogues would inhibit ANC prospects to influence, penetrate, and control these groups, as well as work against the ANC's broad interests by dampening antigovernment fervor. The current trends of government suppression and consequent radicalization of the legal opposition groups makes such a development unlikely over the next two years.

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Prospects for Negotiation

79. We believe the ANC and the government will not agree to negotiate during the period of this Estimate. Both sides appear determined to gird themselves for the long struggle rather than compromise now. The Eminent Persons Group of the Commonwealth unsuccessfully attempted to promote talks earlier this year. Although the ANC was not put to the test of formally responding to the proposal, there appeared to be some interest in the concept on the part of the ANC "old guard."

Release of Nelson Mandela

83. Pretoria would like to release Nelson Mandela⁵ primarily to avoid the repercussions of his dying in jail. However, given the immense domestic and international popularity of Mandela, he poses a real threat to Pretoria and it is unlikely, in our judgment, that he will be released over the next two years. Should he be released, the most likely scenario would have Mandela moving immediately and smoothly into the top leadership. He would likely accept and support extant ANC policies and the prominent SACP presence as he did in the 1950s, and he would serve as an important new ambassador for the ANC internationally.

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80. There is an outside chance, however, that both sides might agree to talks for tactical reasons, for example, to sow division in the other's camp or to foster an appearance of reasonableness in Western eyes. Delegates at the ANC conference last year agreed that the group should not enter negotiations as long as the apartheid system "remains intact." A consensus also was reached that another conference should be called if the government's position on apartheid changed radically. In addition, the NEC was given authority to begin talks with the government in the meantime but not to make any concessions without specific approval. In the case of the government, we believe it probably will eschew genuine negotiations until after it has exhausted most of its security options and resources, regardless of mounting white casualties and international pressure—a point beyond the time frame of this Estimate.

Implications for the Soviet Union

84. Given the anticipated improvement in ANC fortunes over the next two years, Moscow is likely to continue without major change its present mix of low-cost and low-risk support to the ANC: supplying arms, advisers, and limited funds; lending propaganda and diplomatic support; and other efforts designed to sustain SACP influence within the ANC and advance ANC fortunes.

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Key Variables

81. There are two key variables that would affect and possibly alter these projected outcomes, both related to South African Government actions.

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Conciliation Versus Repression

82. Should the South African Government fundamentally change its policy toward internal nonwhite opposition groups and seek to conciliate these groups by undertaking new reforms and allowing concessions

85. The Soviets are probably confident that this long-term effort of support to the ANC and SACP will ultimately result in an outcome favorable to the USSR—a pro-Soviet regime in South Africa. One of Moscow's major concerns has been that a peaceful reform and gradual elimination of apartheid would reduce the ANC and SACP chances of seizing power. The Soviets likely are encouraged by Pretoria's shift toward greater repression of black dissidents, which isolates it internationally and, in their view, increases the long-term chances of a violent overthrow of the


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⁵ Mandela no longer holds an official ANC position, but he is widely regarded both internationally and in South Africa as the ANC's "leader." His perceived ANC standing is the result of his having become the most visible symbol of black opposition to Pretoria.


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white government. Statements by Soviet officials suggest that they do not expect this to happen soon but are content with the progress their program is showing, although exhibiting a continuing nervousness about social democracy and backsliding tendencies within the ANC. 

Implications for the United States


86. The ANC presents a dilemma for the United States—and ANC is the most popular organization in South Africa, but it is an organization with considerable Communist influence and has extensive and longstanding ties to the Soviet Union, a pro-Soviet posture, and it promotes revolutionary violence. This is not likely to change over the next two years. 

87. The ANC's membership is small, its vision of a future South Africa vague, and its leadership is in exile or imprisoned. But the ANC's broad popularity tends to support its claim to be the leading representative of blacks. The likely future South African developments—inadequate reforms, black resistance, government suppression—will reinforce the ANC's hold on the symbols of "liberation" and its near veto on blacks who may claim to speak for the majority (even if it cannot do so itself). Without significant action on black political rights from the government, it is difficult to see how the ANC can be divorced from the growing number of internal black opposition groups. 


88. The leading role of the ANC makes it essential in any foreseeable peaceful negotiated outcome. Yet the ANC's tactics of revolutionary violence are not consonant with the US preference for evolutionary change. Most troubling are the Communists' strong position in the ANC's exiled leadership and the Congress' pro-Soviet, anti-US posture. 

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
89. Efforts by third parties to deal with the ANC by first seeking to separate it from internal black opposition, under the ANC-SACP alliance, or reduce Soviet influence, would likely fail. ANC resistance to such efforts could jeopardize efforts to improve contacts with the ANC and increase ANC suspicion of Western complicity with the Botha government. 

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90. Over the longer term the ANC character would change were it to expand its role in domestic politics. Even if operating from exile, ANC attempts to spread its influence are likely to include stronger links to internal organizations that are relatively democratic and mostly anti-Communist. If allowed to operate legally inside South Africa, the ANC could become a mass-based party, a transformation that would greatly reduce the role of the SACP. These two factors—the existence of legal internal democratic opposition and the legalization of the ANC—will remain dependent on South African Government policy. 

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
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



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ANNEX A


ANC Organization

The ANC, then a mass organization, was banned in 1960 and its organizational structure virtually eliminated in a series of arrests and detentions in 1962-63. A handful of ANC National Executive Committee leaders who were out of the country, joined by other ANC officials who had fled before arrest, jumped bail, or been released from detention, slowly re-formed the ANC as an exile organization from bases in London and Dar es Salaam. The ANC was organizationally reconstituted as a semiclandestine movement in 1969. All ANC leadership positions were assumed by these exiles, some of whom had held senior ANC positions. Subsequent appointments were made by this self-proclaimed leadership, which ultimately gained acceptance and legitimacy both internationally and within South Africa. The ANC constitution, designed for a legal democratic mass organization, is in fact moribund. 


The highest titular authority of the ANC is its National Consultative Conference, of which there have been two (1969 and 1985). All delegates were handpicked by the leadership. 

The most senior policy organization of the ANC is the National Executive Council (NEC), currently composed of 30 members. The 1969 and 1985 National Consultative Congresses not surprisingly elected the incumbent NECs, but appointments to and dismissals from the NEC regularly occur and appear on the basis of a consensus among the majority of NEC members. The NEC reportedly only meets two or three times a year and rarely with full membership. 


The three top positions in the ANC are, in theory, the president, secretary general, and treasurer general. President Tambo sits ex officio on all substantive committees of the ANC where decisions are made. 

The three substantive committees of the ANC are: the Politico-Military Council (and its subordinate Political and Military Committees), which plans and directs all ANC activity inside South Africa; the External Coordinating Committee, which directs all ANC external activity; and the Working Committee, which provides day-to-day, largely housekeeping, management for external ANC activities. 

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A fourth locus of substantive authority is the Military High Command, which in theory reports to the Military Committee but apparently runs Umkhonto we Sizwe. 

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There is a plethora of ANC departments that manage functional areas of ANC external activity: Information and Propaganda, Education, Health, International Affairs, Youth League, Women's League, Arts and Culture, and Intelligence and Security. Although information is skimpy, it would seem that the department heads have considerable freedom to manage their departments. 

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The most important group not on the formal organizational chart of the ANC is the South African Communist Party. The SACP has a Central Executive Committee based in London, and wields its collective influence on the ANC through its London and Lusaka Committees. Senior SACP members in the ANC presumably report to either the London or Lusaka Committees, and  major ANC policy and decisionmaking take place first in these committees and then are transmitted to the ANC structure through SACP cadres. 

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
The ANC periodically changes the names of its committees. See the organizational chart of the ANC, which is believed to be reasonably accurate 

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Organization of the ANC



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ANNEX B

Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), The ANC Military


The military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation or MK) was formed in 1961 to organize a guerrilla war against the South African Government. Its initial campaign of bombings collapsed when its entire high command was captured in a police raid in 1963 and subsequently convicted at the famous Rivonia trial. 

attacks against South African targets within the past 18 months. It is also attempting to broaden the conflict into a "people's war" by taking advantage of the current unrest in South Africa's black townships. At a conference at Kabwe, Zambia, last year, the ANC decided to broaden the target of its attacks, to carry the fight outside the cities, and to recognize that death of civilians of all races is unavoidable. Ultimately, the "people's war" is meant to establish control over the unrest and to deny the townships to the authorities. The townships could then provide secure bases from which the ANC would be able to fight government forces from inside South Africa and spread the struggle to the country at large. 

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Senior ANC and SACP leaders had gone abroad in 1962 to seek training sites for MK cadres. A handful were subsequently trained in Tanzania and Algeria, but the most significant training was provided by the Soviet Union (arranged by SACP leaders J. B. Marks and Joe Slovo). In 1963-64, over 300 MK trainees received training there. Following an attempt by MK to ally with Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), one of the Rhodesian insurgent groups, which led to the loss of 100 MK fighters in an abortive incursion into Rhodesia in 1967, MK became moribund until 1977. 

Organization


Joe Modise, commander of the ANC's military wing, serves as chairman of the military subcommittee that oversees MK's activities and operations in South Africa. The MK high command oversees infiltration and operations. There are probably several regional commands, most likely located in Lusaka, Maputo, and Luanda. The Luanda command may oversee military training, while Lusaka and Maputo most likely have operational elements assigned, although the Maputo regional command became ineffective for all practical purposes after Pretoria and Maputo signed the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. 

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In 1977, about 4,000 militant, young blacks left South Africa following the Soweto uprising and joined the ANC and MK, reinvigorating the organization. ANC President Tambo reportedly received pledges from Soviet President Podgorniy and Cuban President Castro that year for more support to MK. Later in 1977, MK training camps were established in Angola, and Cuban and East German advisers and Soviet arms were provided. 

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The "Class of 1976" revitalized an ineffective and dormant organization but also sowed the seeds of the current tension in the ANC. The young militants are eager to dismantle apartheid, even if they have to destroy South Africa's economic base and alienate the white population in the process. The "old guard," by contrast, wants to safeguard the economy to ensure a powerful state after they take over. Senior ANC members resist broad antiwhite tactics. 


Although little is known of the MK's subordinate structure beyond the regional commands, we believe it can be broken down into a number of discrete entities:

- Two or three battalion-size units (200 to 400 each) of conventionally trained troops in Angola.
- Transit and support facilities in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania.

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With only approximately 5,000 trained insurgents located mostly outside South Africa, MK does not aspire to a short-term military victory against the South African security establishment. Despite the refusal of South Africa's neighbors to allow the MK to operate from within their borders, the MK has succeeded in markedly increasing the number of its

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Basic Armament

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The MK's arsenal includes: explosives (plastic and other), homemade bombs, limpet mines, antitank and antipersonnel mines, automatic rifles (including AK-47, AKM, and SVD sniper rifles), machineguns (including RP 46, RPK, and PKM), pistols (9 mm and 7.62 mm), and anti-aircraft machineguns, mortars (60 mm and 82 mm), RPG-7 antitank missile launchers, B-11 recoilless rifles, and single tube 122-mm rocket launchers. ANC members are also said to have been trained on the 75-mm recoilless rifle and on the SAM-7 surface-to-air missile. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the ANC is now being supplied with highly technical terrorist equipment. For example, of particular concern to the South African Government is the more frequent MK use of remotely controlled detonators, such as that used for the car bombing of South African Air Force headquarters in 1983. A large number of arms caches have been discovered throughout South Africa, most in northern Natal and the Transvaal. The movement of grenades through Botswana had priority last year over rifles probably because grenades are a useful weapon in the township unrest. [Redacted]

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Logistics

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Large shipments of arms are usually delivered to the MK in Tanzania and in Angola. Its logistic element transports the weapons to infiltration points. The shipment of 200 AK-47 rifles and 57 handgrenades in August and September 1985 serves to illustrate the process and its inherent problems. The arms arrived in northeastern Botswana in late August. After several intermediate stops in Botswana, they were then infiltrated into South Africa by a number of couriers. A delay in the delivery of the grenades caused the ANC leadership in Botswana to question the reliability of the courier. A previous shipment of grenades had been intercepted by the South African authorities and their fuses tampered with, killing most of those who attempted to throw them. [Redacted]

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Capabilities

Basing and Infiltration Routes

The MK's military camps appear to be colocated with, albeit in areas separate from, other ANC facilities in Tanzania, Angola, and Zambia. In Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Mozambique, facilities are limited to safehouses and arms caches. An estimated

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Morale

Faced with an extremely difficult operational environment, a probable high attrition rate on assignments within South Africa, and limited successes over the years, MK morale in locations outside South Africa probably has never been more than mediocre and most often is low. This is reflected by occasional isolated mutinies. The young militants are frustrated with the slow pace of operations and voice dissatisfaction with harsh military camp living conditions. Some MK members recognize and fear South African intelligence and counterterrorist capabilities and avoid assignments within South Africa. From time to time issues such as claims of tribal favoritism, UNITA depredations, and complaints about leadership's luxurious lifestyle have created internal frictions. Morale problems occasionally manifest themselves in desertions, drug abuse, theft, weakened dedication, and general discouragement. Given the small numbers needed for the current and anticipated level of MK operations inside South Africa, the morale problems pose only a partial operational constraint. [Redacted]

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4,000 MK personnel may be present in Angola and several hundred in both Tanzania and Zambia. Others may be abroad for training or in transit to or inside South Africa. We estimate that the number of trained MK guerrillas inside South Africa at any one time is less than 200. [redacted]

The ANC's presence in all the countries adjacent to South Africa has been periodically curtailed in the past four years:

- Swaziland agreed to restrict the movement and activities of South African insurgents within its borders in a secret pact with South Africa in 1982. Clashes between ANC members and the Swazi police in 1984 hampered the use of this route for a time, but [redacted] large, reconstituted ANC presence in Swaziland.
- The insurgent presence in Mozambique was drastically reduced in 1984, following the signing of the Nkomati Accord. Despite South African accusations to the contrary, Mozambique has generally upheld its side of the agreement, removing most ANC members from its territory. The ANC has continued to use Mozambique on a limited basis as a staging area for the infiltration of men and equipment into South Africa without the knowledge or consent of the Government of Mozambique.
- Botswana has been under increasing pressure from the South African Government to expel ANC and other insurgents. Raids against ANC facilities in Gaborone in June 1985 and May 1986 demonstrated Pretoria's determination to take whatever measures it deems necessary to destroy insurgent bases in neighboring countries. Although Botswana has ordered the removal of all ANC personnel from its territory, the small size of the country's security forces and the difficulty they experience in controlling their vast territory make it very likely that Botswana will continue to be used as an infiltration route by the ANC.
- South African security force raids in December 1982 and December 1985, along with various embargoes and other economic impediments, served to remind Lesotho of its vulnerability and dependence on South Africa. Such actions were in part responsible for the 20 January 1986 coup deposing Prime Minister Jonathan, which was followed by the ejection of most ANC members from the country. The small size of the Lesotho security forces and the difficult, mountainous

terrain in most of the country has allowed the ANC and other insurgents to continue some infiltration into South Africa despite the efforts of the Government of Lesotho.

- There are small numbers of MK personnel in Zimbabwe, but Prime Minister Mugabe has not given the ANC the free hand it would like to have in using Zimbabwean territory for bases and staging operations. Mugabe fears South African strikes and is suspicious of the relationship between the ANC and the party of Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe's chief rival. [redacted]

Other potential sources of support for the ANC and its campaign of guerrilla attacks on South Africa are the so-called black homelands. Recent ANC attacks reportedly have increased in the Transkei, and weapons caches have been found in the neighboring Ciskei. The Kangwane homeland leader has encouraged the ANC to believe that the rural population there will support the struggle. Attacks from homeland bases will probably continue, but at a low level. [redacted]

Training


A limited amount of military training has taken place at locations in Tanzania and in Zambia. Almost all of the MK's military training is now conducted at as many as seven camps in Angola, notably Quibaxe, Pango, Malanje, Viana, and Caxito. Most instructors are members of the ANC, although Cuban, Soviet, and East German instructors teach specialized courses. Instruction is broken down into basic and specialized training, and a trainee may have to travel to a number of camps to complete his or her training. Training includes the use of small arms, light mortar, and the RPG-7, sabotage and explosives, and political instruction. Selected students are sent to Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Soviet Bloc countries for advanced training. East Germany, for example, provides training in security, sabotage, countersabotage, counterintelligence, and political agitation. [redacted]


In its latest effort to counter South Africa's policy of denying the ANC bases in neighboring countries and to attempt to take the war to the people, the MK leadership has decided to send weapons instructors into South Africa. Members of ANC cells in the cities are to learn to use pistols and grenades, and in rural areas they are to learn to lay mines. Qualified MK members have been sent to training camps in Angola to complete a three-month instructor course before being sent to South Africa. Conventional military training in Angolan camps for other MK members

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
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continues in anticipation of a conventional level of guerrilla war yet to come and to provide the core of a future black South African army. 

facilities on 1 June 1980, which caused millions of dollars of damage. Recent incidents, such as the use of landmines beginning in November 1985 and attacks on a number of shopping centers and other civilian facilities, demonstrate the changing nature of the MK's strategy and tactics. Earlier attacks were planned against government installations with little risk to the civilian population. A number of recent attacks suggest, however, that civilian casualties have become increasingly acceptable to the ANC. On the other hand, some incidents inside South Africa attributed to ANC/MK may have been perpetrated by independent groups not under the full control of MK in Lusaka but identifying with it. 

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Strategy and Tactics

Despite mounting difficulty in infiltrating from countries adjacent to South Africa, the MK has increased the tempo of its terrorist attacks against South African targets and demonstrated the capability to strike at targets of national significance. Its primary tactic is sabotage. In 1985, the number of these attacks reached 136, compared with 39 in 1982, 56 in 1983, and 44 in 1984. 

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The first MK spectacular consisted of limpet mine explosions at South Africa's synthetic oil production

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ANNEX C

A Chronology of Ties Between the ANC and the South African Communist Party

- | | | | |
|------|--|-------|--|
| 1912 | South African Native National Congress is established and later renamed (in 1923) the African National Congress (ANC). | 1927 | ANC President Josiah Gumede attends the Brussels Conference of the League Against Imperialism and visits the USSR. When he returns, he unsuccessfully lobbies for a new ANC strategy of demonstrations, strikes, tax boycotts, pass burnings, and close ties to the Soviets. |
| 1915 | Leftists split with South African Labor Party and form International Socialist League (ISL). | 1928 | New directive from Comintern states that, in response to the "united white front arrayed against the nonwhites," the CPSA must work toward establishing "an independent native republic—with full guarantees for minority groups—as a stage toward a workers' and peasants' government." Many in the CPSA (especially former ISL members) object to the Soviet line because they prefer to regard blacks as an "exploited class of workers" rather than as a "persecuted race." A pro-Moscow group of ultraleftists, however, eventually gains control and purges the CPSA of black members and whites with ties to trade unions. The purge is sparked by a Comintern directive that accuses all socialists of not being "true revolutionaries." |
| 1921 | ISL members, many of whom had a special interest in the black labor movement, and other leftists, form the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The CPSA joins the Comintern and complies with Soviet orders to concentrate on gaining control of white trade unions. | 1930s | CPSA is virtually moribund despite abandonment of its ultraleft line; ANC continues to follow a slow-moving reformist campaign after Gumede loses reelection bid in 1930. A number of nonwhite Communists, including black trade unionists, receive training in the USSR, including future party leaders Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks, P. J. Mkhize, and David Bopepe. |
| 1922 | Mine owners, trying to offset declining gold prices, precipitate a violent strike by announcing plans to lay off more highly paid white employees and replace them with blacks. The CPSA initially supports the miners' campaign, over which it has little direct control, but becomes disaffected after white miners attack black workers who remain on the job. | 1941 | CPSA membership increases after Hitler invades the Soviet Union. Black Communists gain new foothold in the ANC. |
| 1924 | Pact by the Labor and Nationalist Parties gains them an electoral victory. New government enacts a series of discriminatory laws, some of which entrench white labor privilege, CPSA subsequently shifts its attention to recruiting black members and infiltrating black organizations. Main target is the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU). Begun as a trade union of black dockworkers in 1919, the ICU grows in the 1920s and becomes a mass political movement with well over 100,000 members, eclipsing the ANC during this period. | 1943 | A new ANC constitution is drafted, in part by lawyer Abram Fischer, and promulgated. The new constitution eliminated ex officio representation of native chiefs, contained numerous antidiscrimination and political-social reform objectives. Fischer is later revealed as a longtime CPSA leader. |
| 1926 | CPSA's four members on the ICU's National Executive Committee lead the left wing of the ICU in calls for a more militant program. The remainder of the ICU leadership responds to expelling all CPSA members from the ICU. CPSA focuses on the ANC as a result. | | |

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- 1944 A group of young black nationalists—disgusted with the lack of progress resulting from the ANC's moderate tactics—form the ANC Youth League. Most Youth Leaguers are initially anti-Communist and believe that there is no role for whites in the struggle for black rights. ANC Youth League leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo unsuccessfully attempt to force CPSA members from the ANC in 1945-46.
- 1946 J. B. Marks, a Colored Communist in the ANC, leads a major strike by the African Mineworkers' Union.
- 1946 The Xuma-Dadoo-Naiker agreement formed between the ANC's President Xuma and the Communist-led South African Indian Council (SAIC), and its leaders Dadoo and Naiker, in which the ANC and SAIC agreed to closely cooperate. SAIC leaders gain influence with ANC leaders.
- 1948 Afrikaner-based National Party comes to power.
- 1949 Youth Leaguers dominate ANC National Conference and push through a new "Program of Action" that calls for civil disobedience, strikes, and boycotts.
- 1950 Suppression of Communism Act bans the CPSA and also gives the government wide powers to counter extraparliamentary opposition groups. CPSA announces its dissolution one month before passage of the act. Portions of the organization continue to operate underground; three years later the South African Communist Party (SACP) is formed. Many nonwhite CPSA members quickly join the ANC and assume significant positions in the organization—Moses Kotane, Govan Mbeki, Phillip Vundla, Alfred Nzo, and Alex La Guma being the best known.
- 1950-52 The veteran Communist J. B. Marks assumes the presidency of the Transvaal Province ANC and staffs the province leadership with several Communists.
- 1951 Veteran ANC leader R. V. Selope-Thema resigns from the ANC in protest against Communist influence in the ANC and unsuccessfully attempts to form a rival organization.
- 1952 The ANC and the Communist-led SAIC join in a Defiance Campaign of passive resistance, planned by Communists J. B. Marks, Yusuf Dadoo, and M. P. Naiker, as well as Nelson Mandela, which reflects the growing influence of Communists and Youth Leaguers in the ANC. Defiance Campaign is aimed at changing six "unjust" laws, including the Suppression of Communism Act.
- 1954 Five prominent "Africanist" (antiwhite, anti-Indian, and anti-Communist) officials of the Transvaal ANC are expelled as "divisionists" by the ANC's National Executive Committee.
- 1952-56 Congress Alliance is formed between the ANC and the following Communist-controlled organizations: the South African Colored Peoples Organization, the SAIC, the Congress of Democrats, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. A Congress of the People is held in 1955 and a Freedom Charter, reportedly drafted by SACP leaders Joe Slovo and Moses Kotane, is adopted by the ANC in 1956 that lists the basic aims of the movement. Later that year, the government arrests 156 Congress Alliance leaders on treason charges. The defendants eventually gain acquittals, but the six-year trial consumes the energy of the Congress Alliance, which loses its momentum.
- 1955-62 A 15-man National Consultative Committee (NCC) formed to coordinate policy between the ANC and the five other organizations of the Congress Alliance. Twelve members of the NCC are SACP members. The NCC, led by SACP member Joe Slovo (head of the Congress of Democrats), strongly influences all major ANC policies.
- 1958-59 Black nationalists, angered by the influence of white Communists on the ANC, split with the ANC and form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).
- 1960 The government bans both the ANC and the PAC in a security crackdown following the Sharpeville shooting incident.


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- 1961 Following a recommendation of the Central Executive Committee of the SACP, the ANC forms a military wing—Spear of the Nation—and launches a campaign of sabotage bombings. SACP leaders, led by Joe Slovo, form the majority of the “National High Command” of Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe).
- 1962 The SACP draws up a new Party Program and adopts as short-term objectives the goals listed in the Congress Alliance’s Freedom Charter.
- 1963-65 A series of mass arrests cripples the ANC and weakens the SACP. Among those captured and sentenced to life imprisonment are ANC President Nelson Mandela and SACP Chairman Bram Fischer. ANC and SACP leaders who escape the dragnet go into exile to rebuild their organizations.
- 1967 ANC National Executive member James Hadebe resigns in protest against Communist domination of the ANC, unsuccessfully attempts to form a rival organization.
- 1969 The ANC holds its First Consultative Congress at Morogoro, Tanzania. Nonblacks become authorized to hold positions within the ANC except on the NEC. The revolutionary alliance of the ANC, SACP, and SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions, an SACP front) is proclaimed. The ANC redefines its strategic objective as the military overthrow of the apartheid regime. Several white, Colored, and Indian SACP members, newly accepted within the ANC, form and dominate for 14 years the ANC Revolutionary Council, which controls all ANC activity within South Africa.
- 1969-75 Several senior ANC leaders, known as the “group of eight,” rebel against Communist, white, and Indian domination of the ANC leadership. Despite quiet encouragement from ANC President Tambo, they are purged from the ANC in 1975.
- 1976-77 ANC recruits thousands of young blacks fleeing South Africa in the wake of the Soweto riots and trains them for service in the military wing.
- 1977 Soviet President Podgorniy and Cuban President Castro pledged increased Soviet and Cuban military support to the ANC. Umkhonto we Sizwe’s training camps are quickly established in Angola with Cuban and East German trainers and Soviet arms provided.
- 1980-83 The reinvigorated military wing of the ANC renews its “armed propaganda” campaign by attacking government buildings and security personnel and facilities, and by sabotaging power and transportation equipment and facilities.
- 1985 The ANC’s second Consultative Conference is held in Kabwe, Zambia, in June. Nonblacks are authorized to join the National Executive Committee, and five nonblacks, all SACP members, join the NEC. The congress proclaims a “people’s war” strategy. Subsequently, the ANC leadership apparently broadens the mandate for Umkhonto we Sizwe to allow for attacks on “soft targets.”

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ANNEX D

KEY PERSONALITIES

Nelson Mandela



ANC leader Nelson Mandela, imprisoned since 1962, advocates the violent overthrow of the South African Government and its replacement with a socialist state under majority rule, but he has repeatedly stressed in press interviews his willingness to negotiate with Pretoria. We do not believe that 24 years in prison or advancing age (68) have mellowed Mandela or lessened his commitment to the ANC and to the political goals sketched out in the 1955 Freedom Charter. He has repeatedly spurned government offers to release him if he would renounce violence, declaring that he would accept only an unconditional release. [redacted]

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No one enjoys more popular support among South African blacks than Mandela, whose popularity crosses all ethnic and geographic lines. Over the course of his imprisonment he has become an almost mythical figure to blacks, embodying their aspirations and goals and becoming for them a symbol of black strength and black resistance to the white regime. He has kept in touch with his supporters and other ANC leaders by using family members and press interviews to publicize his views and by having letters smuggled out of prison. Despite his long imprisonment, Mandela, a voracious reader, is well informed about domestic and international events. [redacted]

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We believe Mandela is a socialist rather than a Communist, although he worked closely with many members of the South African Communist Party before his imprisonment. He had ample opportunity to join the SACP before 1962, but we believe that he never made the jump because of his deep attachment to nationalism and to the socialist, quasi-democratic ideals that characterize traditional African culture. Mandela appreciates, rather than supports, Communism. His published writings reveal an admiration for the theoretical nonracialism and social and economic equality of Marxism but say little about its political system. [redacted]

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Mandela joined the ANC in 1944 and soon became a prominent figure in the organization. His political activities led to charges of treason in 1956, but he was acquitted five years later. After a series of incidents in the early 1960s, including the Sharpeville massacre, the banning of the ANC, and the whites-only referendum that created the Republic of South Africa, Mandela concluded that equal rights could be obtained only through violence. He subsequently helped found the ANC's military wing; left South Africa; and made his way to Algeria, where he received military training. He returned to South Africa to lead the guerrilla campaign, but in 1962 he was arrested, tried, and sentenced to five years in prison for inciting a strike and illegally leaving the country. In 1964 he was tried again; after pleading guilty to many of the government's charges, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for sabotage, treason, and other crimes. [redacted]

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Mandela, the son of a prominent Xhosa chief, studied at the University of Fort Hare in the late 1930s but was expelled in 1940 because of his political activities. He subsequently worked as a policeman for a Transvaal mining company and studied law at the University of South Africa and the University of Witwatersrand. During the 1950s, he and Oliver Tambo, the current ANC president, ran a joint law practice in Johannesburg. [redacted]

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Mandela is in generally good health. [redacted] Mandela is married to his second wife, Winnie, who is also a prominent political activist. [redacted]

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
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**Oliver Tambo**


Longtime President Oliver Tambo, in many respects, is the glue that has held the ANC together since it went into exile in 1960. We believe that he exercises profound influence, but not control, over ANC policy. Generally speaking, Tambo acts by consensus and his decisions often merely reflect the majority view of the organization's policymaking body, the National Executive Committee (NEC). Tambo publicly acknowledges the presence of Communists on the NEC, but he asserts that they owe their primary allegiance to his organization. In fact, however, Tambo, the leading member of the NEC's non-Communist faction, is wary of Communist influence in the ANC and has consistently tried to limit it. Regardless of his personal views, we believe Tambo is unlikely to make a major move against the Communists because Soviet aid is vital to the ANC. Tambo regularly briefs Soviet officials on most ANC activities, but he is also anxious to establish or improve relations with Western governments, including the United States. 

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
Tambo helped found the ANC Youth League in 1944. A committed political activist, he quit teaching in 1947 to study law. Five years later he opened a joint law practice in Johannesburg with his close friend, Nelson Mandela. Tambo was politically active throughout the 1950s and gradually assumed greater responsibility in the ANC, serving as its deputy president from 1958 to 1960. He fled to the United Kingdom shortly after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. He spent most of the 1960s as a roving ANC representative. Tambo became "acting president" of the ANC in 1967 and "president" in 1985. Tambo, 68, is in poor health and suffers from heart disease and high blood pressure. 

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**Johnny Makatini**


Johnny Makatini, the socialist director of the department of international affairs, belongs to the non-Communist, "old guard" faction on the NEC. He (like his colleagues) fully supports the ANC's relationship with Moscow because he considers Soviet aid essential for ANC operations. Over and above this, he has a long history of good working relations with Communist or Soviet organizations and was associated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization during the 1960s. In the early 1970s Makatini reportedly had close ties to the KGB, which paid his personal and operational expenses. 

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
Makatini, who studied law at the University of Natal, joined the ANC in the early 1950s. He fled South Africa in 1963 and subsequently served as the ANC representative in Algiers (1964-77) and headed its observer mission at the United Nations (1977-86). Makatini, 56, belongs to the Zulu ethnic group and is one of several members of that group in senior ANC posts. 

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**Alfred Nzo**

Alfred Nzo, a black who joined the Communist Party in 1950, is the ANC's primary contact point with the Soviet Union. Secretary general since 1969 and a longtime member of the NEC, he frequently visits the Soviet Union and strongly supports close relations between the ANC and Moscow. Nzo occupies a key post in the ANC, but we do not believe that he has a large personal following in the organization. In our view, he occupies his current post because of his close ties to other veteran leaders and because he is a competent middleman between the ANC and the Kremlin. 

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
Nzo worked as a health inspector before joining the ANC in 1957. His subsequent political activism led to his banning in 1959 and detention in 1963. After fleeing South Africa in 1964, he served first as the ANC representative in Cairo (1964-67) and, later, in New Delhi (1967-69). He is a vice president of the World Peace Council and last year received a Soviet award, the "Order of Friendship of Peoples." Nzo is 61 years old. 

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Thabo Mbeki

Thabo Mbeki (44), the ANC's publicity and information czar, is one of the most visible and impressive officials in the organization. Mbeki, the son of imprisoned ANC and South African Communist Party leader Govan Mbeki, is probably a Communist, but he often seems to subordinate his suspected ideology to his strong black nationalist sentiments. He is hostile, for example, to SACP nonblack members such as Joe Slovo reportedly because he resents their inordinate influence in the ANC and their slavish ties to the Soviet Union. Mbeki habitually criticizes the United States in public forums, but [redacted] he privately comes across as moderate, favoring dialogue with the West, including the United States. [redacted]

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[redacted] Mbeki has long advocated increasing levels of violence against the South African regime, probably, in our view, because he sees it as an ideal way to solidify support for the ANC among South Africa's restless youth. In a recent speech, for example, he expressed a hope that violence would continue to escalate in South Africa and would expand into white areas. Mbeki is convinced that the ANC is extremely popular in South Africa, but he also believes that blacks are not fully behind the ANC's political goals. He has, in fact, told other ANC officials that the organization must improve its political operations in South Africa. [redacted]

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Mbeki left home in 1962 for the United Kingdom, where he attended Sussex University and later became an officer of the ANC's Youth Section. During the 1960s, he was associated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth (a Communist-front organization) and may have received training in the Soviet Union and East Germany. He held several posts in the ANC during the 1970s, including assignments as a political officer in the military wing and political secretary in the president's office. He holds a seat on the NEC. Mbeki has two brothers who are also prominent ANC members. [redacted]

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Joe Modise

Joe Modise has been nominal commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's military wing, since the late 1960s, but he has actually served throughout the intervening years as a regional military commander. We believe that Modise, a probable Communist, has held on to his post, despite many complaints about his incompetence, because of his ideological orientation and close, longstanding ties to senior ANC leaders. [redacted]

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Modise has belonged to the ANC since at least the late 1950s. Before leaving South Africa in 1964, he was involved in political activities in the Johannesburg area. He may have received military training in the Soviet Union during the mid-1960s. Modise, who is about 53, has a seat on the NEC. [redacted]

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Joe Slovo

Joe Slovo is a longtime member of the South African Communist Party (reportedly its new chairman) and the only white on the NEC. A dedicated Marxist, Slovo advocates the violent overthrow of the South African Government and has publicly acknowledged his involvement in numerous terrorist actions directed against the white regime. Slovo frequently visits the Soviet Union and strongly supports it on all issues. [redacted] Slovo often consults Soviet officials on ANCANC military and political matters. [redacted]

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Slovo, a Lithuanian Jew, immigrated with his parents to South Africa in 1935 when he was nine years old. He was already a Communist when he joined the South African Army in 1944. After serving in Italy and Egypt during the war, he returned home, where he subsequently earned a law degree from the University of Witwatersrand. Slovo, associated with the ANC since the late 1940s, helped draft the ANC's Freedom Charter in 1955 and was defense counsel at numerous treason trials during the 1950s. Slovo himself was tried on treason charges in 1960, but he was acquitted. He fled South Africa in 1963. Slovo's wife, Ruth First, a prominent historian and Communist propagandist, was killed by a parcel bomb in 1982. Slovo was elected to the NEC last year. [redacted]

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S. R. "Mac" Maharaj

"Mac" Maharaj, an Indian and longtime member of the South African Communist Party, plays a major role in ANC military and intelligence activities, particularly covert operations. [Redacted] At least one ANC official believes that he is a KGB agent [Redacted] We believe that Maharaj also has a hand in the formulation of the ANC's current and long-term political strategy; he has been a leading participant in the ANC's recent meetings with delegations of white South African businessmen, students, and opposition parliamentarians. [Redacted]

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Maharaj, who studied law at the University of Natal, has been associated with the ANC and the SACP since at least the mid-1950s. He left South Africa in 1957 for the United Kingdom, where he taught for several years. [Redacted] he joined the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1959 and subsequently became a member of its executive committee [Redacted] was in the Soviet Union from May 1961 until early 1962, when he returned to South Africa and was in charge of receiving and distributing Communist literature for the SACP. In 1964 he was convicted of sabotage and of furthering the aims of Communism and was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Immediately after his release in 1976 he was banned for five years. He fled the country in 1977 and resumed his political activities. He was elected to the NEC in 1985. Maharaj is 51 years old. [Redacted]

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